# Writing Exile: The Discourse of Displacement in Greco-Roman Antiquity and Beyond

EDITED BY

JAN FELIX GAERTNER

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Writing Exile: The Discourse of Displacement in Greco-Roman Antiquity and Beyond

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CONTENTS

*Preface* .......... vii
*Abbreviations* .......... ix
*Notes on the Contributors* .......... xi

Chapter 1. The Discourse of Displacement in Greco-Roman Antiquity .......... 1
Jan Felix Gaertner

Chapter 2. Early Expatriates: Displacement and Exile in Archaic Poetry .......... 21
Ewen L. Bowie

Chapter 3. Exile: the Making of the Greek Historian .......... 51
John Dillery

Chapter 4. Exile on Main Street: Citizen Diogenes .......... 71
Robert Bracht Branham

Chapter 5. Later Greek Voices on the Predicament of Exile: from Teles to Plutarch and Favorinus .......... 87
Heinz-Günther Nesselrath

Chapter 6. Cicero's Roman Exile .......... 109
Sarah T. Cohen

Chapter 7. Exile in Latin Epic .......... 129
Stephen J. Harrison

Chapter 8. Ovid and the 'Poetics of Exile': How Exilic is Ovid's Exile Poetry .......... 155
Jan Felix Gaertner

Chapter 9. Dialogues of Displacement: Seneca's Consolations to Helvia and Polybius .......... 173
Elaine Fantham

Chapter 10. Dio's Exile: Politics, Philosophy, Literature ............ 193
Paolo Desideri

Chapter 11. Ovid and the Medieval Exilic Imaginary .............. 209
Ralph J. Hexter

*Bibliography* ........................................................................ 237
*General Index* ...................................................................... 257
*Index of Greek* ..................................................................... 273
*Index of Latin* ...................................................................... 275
*Index Locorum* .................................................................... 277

# PREFACE

The germ of this book lies in a Corpus Christi Classical Seminar on "Exile and Exiles" at the University of Oxford (Michaelmas term 2001), at which earlier versions of six of the papers of this collection were read. The positive response to the seminar as well as the *status quaestionis* encouraged me to envisage this publication.

The central aim of the seminar was to show that the topic of exile in antiquity is not at all limited to the three most prominent exiles Cicero, Ovid, and Seneca, but that this *trias exulum* has to be placed in a far larger and more complex discourse of exile and displacement, ranging from Cynicism to Late Antiquity. The present volume adopts an even broader perspective, tracing traditions of concepts and motifs from the oral antecedents of the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey* down to the age of Petrarch and demonstrating the immense impact of these traditions on the way in which individuals perceived and described their (real or metaphorical) exile.

I would like to thank the Corpus Christi College Centre for the Study of Greek and Roman Antiquity and the Faculty of Literae Humaniores of the University of Oxford for generously supporting the original seminar. E. L. Bowie first suggested to me the topic and has been extremely helpful ever since. In the editorial work S. J. Harrison has been a *magnaque pars animi consiliique mei* and has read and commented on considerable parts of this book. J. A. Richmond and N. W. Slater kindly checked the English of two of the contributions, acutely alerting me also to several philological problems. S. Jödicke has been a tremendous help by checking references and compiling parts of the indices. Moreover, I am grateful to D. Colomo, M. Deufert, S. Gerke, C. Gronemann, P. Grossardt, J. Hazenbos, and R. Hexter for comments on a draft of the introduction. Finally, I would like to thank I. van Rossum, K. F. Plas, and L. Aalders at Brill, and all of the contributors for their cooperation and patience.

J. F. G.

*Leipzig*
*10 May 2006*

## ABBREVIATIONS

The abbreviations of Latin authors and their works are generally the same as those used in the *Oxford Latin Dictionary* (*OLD*). However, authors and works not cited in *OLD* are abbreviated as in the *Thesaurus Linguae Latinae* (*TLL*), 'Cat.' points to 'Catullus', and, for reasons of clarity, Seneca's consolations *ad Marciam*, *ad Polybium*, and *ad Helviam* (Sen. *Dial.* 6, 11, and 12) are referred to as *Marc.*, *Polyb.*, and *Helv.* Greek authors and works as well as collections of epigraphic, papyrological, and other material are abbreviated as in the *Oxford Classical Dictionary* (*OCD*$^3$). Further abbreviations used in this volume are:

| | |
|---|---|
| *ALL* | Wölfflin, E. et al. (1884–1908): *Archiv für lateinische Lexikographie und Grammatik*, Leipzig. |
| *CE* | Buecheler, F. (1895–7): *Carmina Latina Epigraphica*, Leipzig. |
| Chaniotis | Chaniotis, A. (1996): *Die Verträge zwischen kretischen Poleis in der hellenistischen Zeit*, Stuttgart. |
| Chantraine | Chantraine, P. (1968 ff.): *Dictionnaire étymologique de la langue grecque. Histoire des mots*, Paris. |
| Ernout/Meillet | Ernout, A./Meillet, A. (1985): *Dictionnaire étymologique de la langue latine*, 4. éd., 4. tirage augm. d'additions et de corrections nouv. par Jacques André, Paris. |
| *FGrHist* | Jacoby, F. (1923 ff.): *Die Fragmente der griechischen Historiker*, Berlin/Leiden. |
| *FHG* | Müller, C. (1841–70): *Fragmenta Historicorum Graecorum*, Paris. |
| HS | Hofmann, J. B./Szantyr, A. (1972): *Lateinische Syntax und Stilistik*, München. |
| *IOSPE* | Latyshev, V. (1885–1901): *Inscriptiones antiquae orae septentrionalis Pontis Euxini Graecae et Latinae*, St. Petersburg. |
| KS | Kühner, R./Stegmann, C. (1955): *Ausführliche Grammatik der lateinischen Sprache. Satzlehre*, 3rd edn., Leverkusen. |
| LSJ | Liddell, H. G./Scott, R. (1996): *A Greek-English Lexicon*, 9th edn., rev. and augm. throughout by H. S. Jones et al., Oxford. |

ML Meiggs, R./Lewis, D. (1971): *A Selection of Greek Historical Inscriptions*, Oxford.

*PLAC* Duemmler, E. L. et al. (1881–1978): *Poetae Latini Aevi Carolini*, Berlin.

Roscher Roscher, W. H. (ed.; 1884–1937): *Ausführliches Lexikon der griechischen und römischen Mythologie*, Leipzig.

*SGDI* Collitz, H. (1884–1914): *Sammlung der griechischen Dialekt-Inschriften*, Göttingen.

*SIG*$^{3}$ Dittenberger, W. (1915–24): *Sylloge Inscriptionum Graecarum*, 3rd edn., Leipzig.

*VS* Diels, H./Kranz, W. (1964): *Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker*, 11th edn., Berlin.

# NOTES ON THE CONTRIBUTORS

Ewen L. Bowie is E. P. Warren Praelector in Classics at Corpus Christi College, Oxford, and Professor of Classical Languages and Literature in the University of Oxford. He has published widely on early Greek elegiac and iambic poetry (especially on Archilochus), Attic comedy, Hellenistic poetry, and on the Greek literature and society of the high Roman Empire (Pausanias, Philostratus, and the Greek novelists, especially Longus and Heliodorus). He is currently completing a commentary on Longus, *Daphnis and Chloe*, and editing a volume of papers on Philostratus with Jas Elsner.

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Sarah T. Cohen is an Assistant Professor in the Classics Department at Dalhousie University in Halifax, Nova Scotia. Apart from articles on Ovid's exile poetry and the legal history of exile, she is currently working on a monograph on the effect the legal changes of the early principate have on the rhetoric associated with exile.

Paolo Desideri is Professor of Roman History at the University of Florence. In addition to numerous articles on Greek and Roman historiography and intellectual history, he has published *Dione di Prusa: un intellettuale greco nell'impero romano* (1978) and (with A. M. Jasink) *Cilicia: dall'età di Kizzuwatna alla conquista macedone* (1990).

John Dillery is an Associate Professor of Classics at the University of Virginia. He is the author of *Xenophon and the History of his Times* (1995), and revised and provided a new text, notes and introduction to the Loeb edition of Xenophon's *Anabasis* (2001). Recent publications include two studies of Herodotus as well as a discussion of regional, sacred history

in the Greek world attested mostly in inscriptions. He is currently working on a monograph on non-Greeks writing national histories in the Greek language in the Hellenistic period, as well as a translation of Xenophon's *Hellenica* and *Agesilaus*.

Elaine Fantham, Giger Professor emerita, Princeton University, has written commentaries on Seneca's *Troades* (1982), Lucan, *De Bello Civili* 2 (1992), and Ovid, *Fasti* 4 (1998). In 2004 she published *Ovid's Metamorphoses* in the series *Oxford Approaches to Classical Literature*, and a monograph *The Roman World of Cicero's De Oratore*. A biography of Julia, daughter of Augustus, has come out in 2006.

Jan Felix Gaertner is Post-Doctoral Assistant at the Institut für Klassische Philologie und Komparatistik at the University of Leipzig. He has published a commentary (with text and English translation) of Ovid, *Epistulae ex Ponto* 1 (2005). His research interests include Latin poetry and historiography, Greek lexicography and travel literature. Currently he is preparing a monograph on law in Greek and Latin comedy.

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Ralph J. Hexter is Professor of Classics and Comparative Literature and President of Hampshire College in Amherst Massachusetts. In addition to various articles on classical and medieval literature, he has published *Equivocal Oaths and Ordeals in Medieval Literature* (1975) and *Ovid and Medieval Schooling. Studies in Medieval School Commentaries on Ovid's Ars Amatoria, Epistulae ex Ponto, and Epistulae Heroidum* (1986). Together with Daniel Selden he edited *Innovations of Antiquity* (1992).

Heinz-Günther Nesselrath is Professor of Classics at the University of Göttingen. His publications include *Lukians Parasitendialog. Untersuchungen und Kommentar* (1985), *Die attische Mittlere Komödie* (1990), *Platon und die Erfindung von Atlantis* (2002) and *Platon, Kritias: Übersetzung und Kommentar* (2006). He is editor of an *Einleitung in die griechische Philologie* (1997) and is currently working on an edition of the hymns and satires of the Emperor Julian and on a monograph on Herodotus.

CHAPTER ONE

# THE DISCOURSE OF DISPLACEMENT IN GRECO-ROMAN ANTIQUITY

Jan Felix Gaertner

Exile has been one of the most productive literary topics in twentieth century literature. Together with the related themes of distance, separation, displacement, detachment, and diaspora it features prominently in the oeuvres of writers who fled from the totalitarian regimes of central and eastern Europe such as Thomas Mann, Nabokov, or Brodsky;[1] more recently, exile has become a central theme in postcolonial literature,[2] and, in addition, at least from Nietzsche onwards, exile is a common metaphor for the alienation of modern and postmodern intellectuals.[3]

This increased reflection on exile in the twentieth century has not only influenced research in social sciences and modern languages, but it has also left its mark on the classics, where interest in the exiles of antiquity has grown continuously over the past fifty years. This scholarly interest has, however, been largely confined to the three most prominent ancient writers who went into exile, the 'exulum trias'[4] Cicero, Ovid, and Seneca the Younger; moreover, modern concepts of exile literature have been applied to classical literature without the necessary caution. In what follows I shall first point out some of the problems involved in recent approaches to exile in Greek and Latin literature; then I shall briefly explain the aim, concept, and structure of the present volume; finally, I shall give an outline of the development of ancient discourse on exile.

---

[1] The literature on these and the following authors and groups of authors is vast; cf. e.g. Bevan et al. (1990), Roth-Souton (1994) and the collection of documents written by German exiles in Spalek et al. (1976 ff.). Guida-Laforgia (1995) draws attention to the often forgotten female German writers in exile in the USA.

[2] Cf. Gurr (1981), Ashcroft/Griffiths/Tiffin (2003) 28: "the theme of exile is in some sense present in all such writing", and see e.g. Chancy (1997) on Caribbean literature, Moeller et al. (1983) and Alvarez Borland (1998) on Latin American literature, Jones et al. (2000), Marquard (1978), Ibrahim (1996) and Mudimbe-Boye (1993) on various African authors, and e.g. Horrocks/Kolinsky (1996) and Bader (1984) on the theme of exile in the literature of the migrant communities of the first world.

[3] Cf. Goldhill (2000) 1–7 and Eagleton (1970).

[4] Cf. the title of Leopold (1904).

Apart from the mostly historical study of Grasmück (1978),[5] there have been so far two main attempts to describe and analyse the treatment of exile in classical literature on a broader scale. Influenced by studies on twentieth century exile literature and based on a "phenomenological" (Walde (2000) 299) or, more precisely, a psychological approach, Doblhofer (1987) has tried to demonstrate that the psychological condition of exile is responsible for many similarities between the literary works of ancient and modern exiles; more recently Claassen (1999a) has presented another assessment of ancient discourse on exile, in which she takes up some of the psychological explanations of Doblhofer[6] but organizes the literature according to the narrative perspective, or rather the grammatical person, of the respective works (first-person, second-person, and third-person discourse on exile).[7] Both Doblhofer and Claassen view ancient discourse on exile, or at least parts of it, as part of a wider genre or mode of exile literature. Claassen ((1999a) 241) for example explicitly credits Ovid with the "creation of the literary genre of exilic poetry", and Doblhofer even supplies a list of typical features of exile literature—ancient and modern. However, for several reasons the transfer of the modern concept of exile literature to Greek and Roman antiquity proves to be problematic.[8]

First of all the English word 'exile' is far more precise than the corresponding Greek and Latin terms. Whereas the modern derivatives of the Latin word *exilium* imply an involuntary departure, sanctioned by political or judicial authorities, the ancient usage of the corresponding terms φυγή, *fuga, exilium*, and their derivatives is less strict. φυγή and φεύγειν cover both the expulsion of groups or individuals and their voluntary departure.[9] Possibly influenced by this Greek usage, Latin

[5] On the historical and legal aspects of exile, which are only occasionally touched in the present volume, cf. also the studies by Balogh (1943), Seibert (1979), Cawkwell (1981), Roisman (1982), (1984–6), Brown (1988), McKechnie (1989), Bearzot (2001), Forsdyke (2005) (Greece) and Crifò (1961), (1985) (Rome); cf. also Sordi et al. (1994).

[6] Cf. Claassen's emphasis on experience (1999a) 2: "*Quellenforschung* is not the major object of the work. Of importance is rather the manner in which each exile experiences his condition and the way in which his reaction is put into words". Cf. also Claassen's interpretation of Ovid's persona/personality (p. 31) and of Cicero's use of invective (p. 133).

[7] Cf. Claassen (1999a) 15.

[8] I just mention in passing that in the study of modern literatures, too, the term 'exile literature' has been questioned (cf. e.g. the discussion in Stern (1971)) and is, apart from that, usually not employed for a genre or mode but merely indicates a set of authors who have been in exile.

[9] Cf. LSJ s.vv., Poll. *Onom.* 9.157–8, Grasmück (1978) 15 ff., especially 20–9, and Brown (1988) 17.

authors since Plautus often do not distinguish too rigorously between *fuga* ('flight') and *exilium* ('exile'): thus Plautus clearly employs *exilium* and *fuga* as synonyms in *Mer.* 652: *quis modus tibi exilio tandem eveniet? qui finis fugae?* Cicero calls Aristides' and Metellus' exile *fuga* (cf. Cic. *Sest.* 141, *Rep.* 1.6) and extends the meaning of *exilium* also to a place of refuge, and more generally even, to a mere change of place,[10] and Ovid regularly refers to his banishment as a *fuga* and to himself as a *profugus*.[11] Moreover, ancient authors often do not distinguish between exile and other forms of displacement: ancient consolatory treatises on exile, for example, often mix mythical and historical exiles with characters that today would be called fugitives (such as Patroclus) or voluntary exiles (such as Metellus Numidicus),[12] and Seneca compares the loss of his *patria* in exile to the condition of the many immigrants in the Rome of his day (*Helv.* 6.2–3).[13] Doblhofer and Claassen have seen this problem, and at least Claassen has sought a solution by adopting a very general definition of 'exile literature',[14] but this evidently leads to a category with somewhat undefined boundaries.

A second problem arising from Doblhofer's and Claassen's approach concerns the close interaction between the various kinds of ancient treatments of exile. By linking 'exile literature' to the psychological condition of exile Doblhofer reveals a clear bias towards subjective, autobiographically tinged treatments of exile and against the fictional, historiographical, philosophical, and political dimension of the theme; a similar focus underlies Claassen's distinction between first-person, second-person, and third-person treatments of exile. However, such a distinction is artificial and highly problematic. Two passages from Livy

---

[10] Cf. e.g. Cic. *Caec.* 100: *exsilium . . . non supplicium est sed perfugium portusque supplici. nam quia volunt poenam aliquam subterfugere aut calamitatem, eo solum vertunt.* This usage reflects ancient etymologies of *exilium*, cf. Doblhofer (1987) 55–6 and e.g. Quint. *Decl.* 366.2 p. 400, Paul. *Epit.* p. 479.3–5 (Lindsay).

[11] Cf. e.g. Ov. *Tr.* 3.14.9, *Pont.* 1.8.50. For further parallels see *TLL* s.v. *fuga* 1465.74–1466.28, s.v. *exilium* 1490.72 ff., s.v. *exul* 2100.80 ff., and Doblhofer (1987) 50 ff., Grasmück (1978) 62 ff. (also on the legal aspects).

[12] Cf. also Dio Cass. 38.24.2 (part of 'Philiscus's consolation to Cicero, see nn. 16–17 below): συχνοὶ πλεῖστον ὅσον χρόνον οἱ μὲν ἄκοντες οἱ δὲ καὶ ἑκόντες ἀποδημοῦσι, καί τινες καὶ πάντα τὸν βίον καταναλίσκουσι περινοστοῦντες, ὥσπερ ἀεὶ πανταχόθεν ἐξελαυνόμενοι, καὶ οὐδὲν μέντοι παρὰ τοῦτο βλάπτεσθαι νομίζουσιν.

[13] Interestingly, the same kind of imprecision can be observed in Joseph Brodsky's comparison ((1995) 22) of banished writers with Turkish Gastarbeiters, Vietnamese boat people, and other groups of refugees. Cf. also Said (2000) 181: "it is true that anyone prevented from returning home is an exile", and his subsequent attempt to differentiate between 'exile', 'refugee', 'expatriate', and 'émigré'.

[14] Cf. Claassen (1999a) 14.

and Cassius Dio illustrate this. In the fifth book of his Roman history Livy inserts a speech (5.51–4) in which the early Roman statesman M. Furius Camillus argues against a proposal for settlement in Veii and recalls how he—during his exile—had longed for his *patria* (5.54.3–4). The passage so closely resembles passages in letters written by Cicero during the time of his proconsulship in Cilicia[15] that Ogilvie (ad loc.) has rightly concluded that Livy has taken Cicero as the model for Camillus' speech. Some 200 years after Livy, Cassius Dio treats Cicero's exile in his Roman history and invents a dialogue in which some fictitious Philiscus tries to console the Roman statesman and persuade him that there is no reason for lamenting his banishment in a "womanish fashion".[16] The dialogue "*appears* [my emphasis] to refute *Ad Atticum* 3.15" (Claassen (1999a) 86), although Cassius Dio may not have had *Ad Atticum* 3.15 before him and may have merely drawn from an ancient tradition of philosophical consolations on exile.[17] Both the distinction between different grammatical persons and the category of 'exile literature' in the sense of 'literature written by exiles' would not be very helpful in describing the relation between Cicero and the historians Livy and Cassius Dio, and, what is worse, they would blind us to the fact that the philosophical consolations on exile, which go back to the Cynic philosopher Teles (*fl. c.* 235 BC), already provide all the counter-arguments with which Dio's fictitious Philiscus can 'reply' to a letter written by Cicero in Sept. 58 BC—regardless of whether Dio actually knew Cicero's correspondence from exile or not. The example shows that, obviously, there was a tradition of typical complaints about and consolations for exile which was available to Cicero, Livy, and Cassius Dio and which they could put either into their characters' mouth or into their own.

This last point immediately questions also the psychological framework applied by Doblhofer and, to a lesser extent, by Claassen: if there is a tradition of typical complaints about and consolations for exile one

[15] On this proconsulship being a sort of 'second exile' for Cicero see n. 74 below; Ogilvie compares *Fam.* 2.11.1, 2.12.2, 2.13.3; another parallel is *Att.* 5.15.1 (also written during Cicero's proconsulship in Cilicia (51 BC)): *lucem, forum, urbem, domum, vos desidero.*

[16] Cf. Dio Cass. 38.18–29 (the quote is from 38.18.1); the passage has been treated in greater detail by Claassen (1996a).

[17] Claassen (1999a) 269 n. 74 leaves the question of Dio's sources open; the medical imagery in 38.18.5, 38.19.1–2 (cf. nn. 64–5 below), the use of historical exempla in 38.26.3, 38.27.3, and the suggestion that Cicero should become a historiographer, which has a close parallel in Plutarch's consolation on exile (Plut. *De Exil.* 605C–D, cf. n. 48 below) all show that Dio is heavily influenced by the consolatory tradition.

cannot assume a direct and simple relation between the psychological condition of exile and the literature written by exiles, but one has to take into account that (a) authors may perceive and present their experience of exile according to pre-existing literary and cultural paradigms,[18] that (b) they may merely style themselves or others as (typical) exiles,[19] and that (c) being an exile obviously presupposes that the banished person accepts the role of an exile imposed by circumstances.[20] Moreover, the typical features of exile literature collected by Doblhofer—e.g. the motifs of the exile's closeness to death,[21] his self-heroization,[22] his fear of losing the command of his mother tongue[23]—are either so general that they also apply to numerous other categories of literature[24] or they are not so much characteristics of a genre or mode as a set of motifs or themes that is best called a 'rhetoric' or 'discourse' of exile.[25]

The most problematic point of Doblhofer's and Claassen's approach to the ancient discourse on exile is, however, its circular nature. When Anna Seghers, during her exile from Germany, writes a poem called "Der Baum des Odysseus" and fantasizes about Odysseus' returning to Ithaca and slaying the suitors, she obviously expresses her hope for the fall of the Nazi tyranny through the paradigm of the Odysseus myth, which had already been a *secundum comparationis* for countless exiles before her;[26] when Thomas Mann states "Wo ich bin, ist die Deutsche

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[18] On paradigms shaping perception and manipulating memories see Welzer (2002) 171 and e.g. the studies by Goffman (1981) and Bourke (1999) 16 ff. Of course, the influence of cultural paradigms on the presentation of personal experience has been stressed not only by sociologists but also in narratological studies, cf. e.g. Chamberlain/Thompson (1998) 3, Erll/Roggendorf (2002) 104 (with further literature). Doblhofer (1987) 259 (with examples and literature) observes that modern historical novels written by exiles often feature "das Sich-Wiedererkennen in anderen Zeiten und Personen" and that the same is true of Seneca's catalogue of foundation myths in *Helv.* 7.

[19] Cf. e.g. Whitmarsh (2001a) on Musonius', Dio's, and Favorinus' self-fashioning as exiled philosophers, Hexter pp. 221–2 and 230 below, and the further examples given on pp. 10–11 and 17–18.

[20] Cf. n. 45 for two anecdotes in which the Greek philosophers Anaxagoras and Diogenes ostentatiously reject this role.

[21] Cf. Doblhofer (1987) 69.

[22] Cf. Doblhofer (1987) 67 and 69, Claassen (1999a) 104 ("self-dramatisation"), and Brodsky (1995) 24, Said (2000) 181.

[23] Cf. Doblhofer (1987) 68 and Brodsky (1995) 30.

[24] E.g. some form of self-heroization or self-dramatization can be encountered in any first-person fiction; something similar applies to Doblhofer's emphasis ((1987) 215–21) on hate and invective as typically exilic features.

[25] This terminology obviously also resolves the problems inherent in Claassen's categorization by narrative form.

[26] See Desideri, p. 195 n. 12 below, and cf. Grimm (2003) for this and other examples of Odysseus as a paradigm in the works of twentieth century German exiles.

Kultur",[27] he, too, is the exponent of a tradition that goes back to Cicero and before,[28] and the same applies, of course, also to Brecht when he explains that for his *Gedichte im Exil* of 1943 he has chosen only those poems that were written "in einer Art 'Basic German'" and that other poems which seemed too "reich" were excluded.[29] Doblhofer and others have taken the systematization of the topoi of the modern exile literature as a starting point for understanding the literature written by the exiles of antiquity, without reflecting that the modern authors have inherited these topoi from the ancient discourse on exile. No psychological paradigms are needed to explain that authors like Cicero or Ovid, who have had an immense direct and indirect influence on medieval and modern literature, share many topoi with those that stand at our end of the western tradition. To understand ancient discourse on exile one does not have to resort to psychological concepts and typologies of modern exile literature; rather, one has to go back to the first literary treatments of exile and displacement and even beyond that.

In view of the difficulties inherent in the definition of 'exile' in antiquity and in view of the close interaction between a whole variety of narrative, historiographical, philosophical, political, rhetorical, or just personal treatments of exile and displacement in classical literature, the contributions in the present volume adopt a fairly broad definition of exile and are organized chronologically rather than thematically. Instead of focusing on the 'exulum trias' Cicero, Ovid, and Seneca—though they, too, are treated (cf. Cohen, Gaertner, and Fantham below)—the present volume aims at emphasizing the importance of the so far often neglected discourse on exile in early Greek epic and lyric poetry (Bowie), Greek historiography (Dillery), Cynicism (Branham), philosophical consolations on exile (Nesselrath), Latin epic (Harrison), Greek literature of the empire (Desideri), and in the Middle Ages (Hexter). The difference in approach and scope between the studies by Doblhofer and Claassen and the present volume leads to a rather different picture of ancient discourse on exile (see especially pp. 15–16 below). Although the individual papers mutually interact and refer the reader to the treatment of precedents or reception in other contributions to the volume, readers may find the following sketch of the historical development

[27] Cf. Koopmann (1981), cited by Doblhofer (1987) 241.

[28] Cf. Cic. *Red. Pop.* 14, *Red. Sen.* 34, *Dom.* 137, 141, Pub. *Sent.* u.33: *ubi innocens damnatur, pars patriae exsulat* and Doblhofer (1987) 241, 247, Narducci (1997) 66–7.

[29] Cf. Zimmermann (2003) 32 (with further literature) and see pp. 156 ff. below.

of ancient discourse on exile a helpful orientation. At the same time this sketch may also provide some orientation on authors and subjects that—given the vast topic—could not be treated in detail in the present volume (e.g. the Greek tragedians, Musonius, or Boethius).

Already in early historical accounts of the Near East, exile and displacement play a key role in explaining the foundation of new states: thus the dynasty of Akkade is reported to have been founded by Sargon (2340–2284 BC), who was allegedly exposed in a basket on the Euphrates and travelled downstream until he was found by the water bearer Aqqi.[30] Later the very same motif is central to Greek foundation myths.[31] With the remarkable exception of the Athenians, who claimed autochthony,[32] most ancient Greek city states (not to mention their numerous colonies) explained their coming into being by myths of exile or displacement: Thebes was allegedly founded by Cadmus, who had been told by his father to find his sister or go into exile;[33] the foundation of Sparta was commonly linked with the return of the sons of Heracles;[34] the inhabitants of several Greek cities in Asia minor, namely of Ephesus,[35] claimed descent from Ionian immigrants allegedly led by Androclus, and most famously Rome, in particular the Roman family of the Iulii, claimed descent from Trojan refugees under Aeneas.[36] While accounts such as these are closely connected with the fashioning of local identities and questions of political prestige and propaganda,[37]

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[30] On the story, which, of course, closely resembles that of Moses in the Bible, cf. Cooper/Heimpel (1983), Westenholz (1997). On the influence of Near Eastern narratives on Greek literature see e.g. West (1966) 31, (1997) *passim* (especially pp. 439–40 on the Sargon legend), and Burkert (1992).

[31] See Bowie, pp. 22–3 below and cf. Doblhofer (1987) 199, Harrison pp. 129 ff. below on the closely related Roman tradition.

[32] Cf. Eur. fr. 360.8 (Kannicht): αὐτόχθονες δ' ἔφυμεν and Parker (1987), Rosivach (1987).

[33] Cf. Hellanicus *FGrHist* 4 F 1a, Hdt. 2.49.3, 4.147.4, Eur. *Phoen.* 638–42, Schol. Ap. Rhod. 3.1177–87, Ov. *Met.* 3.1–137, Stat. *Theb.* 1.5–6, Apollod. *Bibl.* 3.1.1, Paus. 9.12.1, and Harrison, p. 150 below.

[34] Cf. Apollod. *Bibl.* 2.8.2, Paus. 8.5.6.

[35] Cf. Pherec. *FGrHist* 3 F 155, Ephorus *FGrHist* 70 F 126, Paus. 7.2.6.

[36] The first attestation of this legend is Hellanicus *FGrHist* 4 F 84; cf. also Hergesianax Alex. *FGrHist* 45 F 7–10, Dion. Hal. *Ant. Rom.* 1.73, Sal. *Cat.* 6. Similarly, the cities Aeneadae (cf. Verg. *A.* 3.12), Aeneia (cf. Dion. Hal. *Ant. Rom.* 1.47,48), Aphrodisias and Etis (cf. Paus. 3.22.11), Capyae (cf. Dion. Hal. *Ant. Rom.* 1.49), Elyma and Aegesta (cf. Dion. Hal. *Ant. Rom.* 1.52) as well as Lavinium (cf. Dion. Hal. *Ant. Rom.* 1.56,57) were allegedly founded by Aeneas; cf. Roscher s.v. 'Aineias' 167–82, Wörner (1882).

[37] A good example is the myth of the foundation of Phaselis by Lacius, who had allegedly been banished by Mopsus and Manto: "Die Gründung der Stadt Phaselis

there is—from fairly early times—also a more literary use of the theme: early, oral narratives of return such as the Usbek epic Alpamysh, the oral antecedents that one may reconstruct for the *Odyssey*, and the epic of Gilgamesh exploit the natural pathos inherent in the separation of a hero from his home and the conflict with new surroundings;[38] the same motif also surfaces in the *Iliad*, where the prowess of valorous men such as Achilles is contrasted with their longing for home.[39]

In these accounts characters long for their native land or city, for members of their family or for their possessions, but exile is not yet presented as an extreme deprivation *sui generis*, nor is there a developed rhetoric of exile.[40] Such a rhetoric only develops with the rise of lyric poetry and its shift of focus from myths of the past towards the persona of the poet and his or her experience.[41] Whereas Archilochus' and Semonides' exile and their literary treatment of it are difficult to reconstruct, Xenophanes (fr. 3 West) may offer a first certain example

sollte in mythische Zeit hochdatiert, also eine echte Kolonie mit einer mythischen Urgeschichte ausgestattet werden" (Prinz (1979) 29 with Philostephanus *FHG* 3.29.1 = Ath. 7.51 p. 297F–298A; cf. Prinz (1979) *passim* for further examples and literature). Of course, also the reverse may have occurred and such foundation myths may have influenced the political agenda: according to Pausanias (1.12.1) Pyrrhus' decision to wage war against Rome was partly prompted by the consideration that Rome was a foundation of Trojan refugees and he himself a descendant of Troy's enemy Achilles; later, according to Just. 28.1.6, one of the justifications put forth by Roman envoys for Rome's support of the Acarnanians against the Aetolians was that they *soli quondam adversus Troianos, auctores originis suae, auxilia Graecis non miserint*.

[38] On the motif of return in the Usbek epic Alpamysh and similar narratives from the Balkans see Zhirmunsky (1966) 281–3, Mirzaev (1983) 81, Reichl (2001) 41–9, Lord (1991) 211–44; on pre-literary precedents for this motif in the *Odyssey* see Radermacher (1915) 51, Hölscher (1989) 32–4 and 51–2, Hansen (2002) 201–11. Whitmarsh (2001a) 280–1 rightly draws attention to the fact that in these stories (cf. imprimis *Od.* 1.1–3) also "the notion that travel generates wisdom is *latent* [my emphasis]" and compares the link of displacement and transition to adulthood in the myths of Jason (cf. Segal (1986) 56–60, Moreau (1994a) 117–42), Orestes (cf. Zeitlin (1978) 160–74), Telemachus (cf. Alden (1987) 134, Moreau (1992)), and Odysseus (cf. Moreau (1994b)). Cf. West (1997) 403–4 on the explicit link of travel and wisdom in the epic of Gilgamesh, and Comito (1975) and Whitmarsh (1999) on the "spacialization of the soul's adventures" (Comito, p. 74) in the ancient novels.

[39] Cf. also the tales of displacement of Phoenix (*Il.* 9.448–80) and Patroclus (*Il.* 23.83 ff.) and see Bowie, pp. 25–6 below; cf. also Schlunk (1976) on suppliant-exiles in the *Iliad* and Montiglio (2000) 87. In a similar fashion exile and displacement are later exploited also in Latin epic (cf. Lieberg (1971), Harrison, pp. 129 ff. below) and in the ancient novel (Comito (1975))—both are clearly influenced by the tradition of Greek epic: cf. imprimis Juhnke (1972), Knauer (1979), and Holzberg (2001) 43–4 (on the *Odyssey* as the "Urform" of the ancient novel).

[40] Cf. Bowie, p. 27 below. On the social history see Roisman (1982), (1984–6).

[41] Cf. Fränkel (1993) 148, Snell (1993) 56 ff. on the history of ideas.

of nostalgia in his poem on his home town Colophon, Solon's ἴαμβος on compatriots sold into slavery abroad (fr. 36 West) draws attention to the condition of linguistic and cultural isolation, and Alcaeus and Theognis not only lament "the toils of vexatious exile" (cf. Alc. fr. 129.11–12 (Campbell): τῶνδε μόχθων ἀργαλέας τε φύγας) and the loss of their property but also establish the imagery of 'exile as shipwreck', the motif of desertion and that of the exile's wish for death.[42]

Thus, by the end of the sixth century BC we not only have an inventory of mythical exiles (e.g. Odysseus, Patroclus) and of exilic plots—suppliant-exiles (e.g. Patroclus), wandering heroes (e.g. Odysseus, Jason), founder-exiles (e.g. Cadmus)—but we also have a clear inventory of themes and motifs of exile (recollection of one's *patria*, 'exile as shipwreck', wish for death, desertion, linguistic and cultural isolation). All of these elements later become central to the ancient perception and description of exile. The typical complaints of exile are not only taken up in Greek tragedy (most prominently in Euripides' *Phoenissae*)[43] and in the Attic orators, particularly Andocides,[44] but they also provide the standard complaints to be refuted in the consolatory treatises on exile, and the ingredients for Cicero's and Ovid's letters from exile. Moreover, both the mythical exiles and their literary counterparts become the benchmark for exile in later authors: thus Odysseus, Jason, Cadmus, Tydeus, and Teucer are

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[42] Cf. Alc. fr. 73.3–6 (Campbell, shipwreck imagery) with Cucchiarelli (1997) (*pace* Bowie p. 42 below), Thgn. 209–10 with Citroni Marchetti (2000) 111–39, 158, 334 (also on Theognis' influence on Cicero and Ovid), Thgn. 819–20 (wish for death), and the detailed discussion by Bowie on pp. 29 ff. below. On Sappho's banishment (which seems not to be reflected in her poetry) see Bauer (1963).

[43] Cf. imprimis Eur. *Phoen.* 357–78 and Aesch. *Ag.* 1269–74, Soph. *OT* 813–20, *OC* 562–6, Eur. *Med.* 643–51 and Schnayder (1957–8), Doblhofer (1987) 28–37, Bordaux (1992), Goldhill (2000) 12–16. Goldhill (2000) 12–16 accentuates that in tragedy (cf. e.g. Eur. *Phoen.* 388–93) the question of the exile's (lack of) freedom of speech comes to the fore; the topic is later taken up in the consolatory tradition: see Doblhofer (1987) 48 and cf. pp. 16–17, 89, 97, 184 n. 36 below. Tzanetou (1997)—known to me only through the abstract in *L'Année philologique*—and Slatkin (1986) 217 analyse how the Greek tragedians exploit the theme of exile to explore and emphasize Athenian civic identity as a state granting refuge (cf. Isoc. *Paneg.* 51, 54 and see Grethlein (2003)). The evident links between tragedy and the later tradition of consolatory treatises on exile (cf. e.g. n. 55 on Eur. fr. 1047 Kannicht) seem not to have been studied systematically yet (but see Nesselrath pp. 90–1, 97 and Fantham pp. 174–5 in this volume).

[44] Cf. imprimis Andoc. 1.5 (it is better to live in a *patria* that is in a bad state, than to live in exile), 2.9 (exile as the most wretched form of life), 2.10 (death is better than exile) and see Doblhofer (1987) 37 and imprimis Zimmermann (2003) 37–9 who emphasizes thematic similarities between Andocides' and Cicero's speeches after their return from exile. Some of the typical complaints of exile also feature in Isocrates (14.46–50, 19.23–7) and Demosthenes (57.70).

later standard exempla in philosophical consolations on exile, Plutarch (*De Exil.* 604C) quotes Archil. fr. 21 (West) in his consolatory treatise on exile as a parallel for his addressee's refusal to see the advantages of his place of exile, and Favorinus (*De Exil.* 10.2) adduces Alcaeus as someone who, despite his great love for his home country (ἀνὴρ περί γε τὴν πατρίδα φιλοστοργότατος), nevertheless coped successfully with the sorrows of exile.

With the rise of Greek historiography, rhetoric, philosophy, and sciences in the fifth and fourth centuries BC exile ceases to be merely the condition of physical and emotional hardship that it had been in epic and lyric poetry. Exile is seen as a relative concept that can be applied not only to states banishing individuals but also to individuals dissociating themselves from states,[45] and two more intellectual concepts of exile come to the fore: exile as a condition that provokes a profound change of perspective and offers knowledge and greater insight, and exile as a political, social, even metaphysical metaphor.[46]

One of the first exponents of the former concept is the Greek historian Thucydides, who famously claimed (5.26.5) that exile allowed him to view the Peloponnesian war with greater objectivity; another is the Cynic Diogenes who allegedly said that it was exile that made him a philosopher.[47] The concept has had a wide following, and exile was soon recognized as an essential component of the experience of the historian[48]

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[45] According to Diogenes Laertius (2.10) the fifth century philosopher Anaxagoras said that he had not been bereft of the Athenians, but they from him; the same idea is later expressed by the Cynic Diogenes, cf. Diog. Laert. 6.49: καὶ πάλιν εἰπόντος τινός "Σινωπεῖς σου φυγὴν κατέγνωσαν", "ἐγὼ δέ γε", εἶπεν, "ἐκείνων μονήν". See Branham, p. 76 below.

[46] This revaluation of exile was, of course, partly prompted by the fact that many of the intellectuals of the time (cf. Brown (1988) on Herodotus, Anaxagoras, Protagoras, Empedocles, and others) were exiles.

[47] Cf. Diog. Laert. 6.49: πρός τε τὸν ὀνειδίσαντα αὐτῷ τὴν φυγήν, "ἀλλὰ τούτου γ' ἕνεκεν", εἶπεν, "ὦ κακόδαιμον, ἐφιλοσόφησα". The concept that travel generates wisdom is, of course, already latent in the *Odyssey* and other narratives (see n. 38 above) and has further precedents in the extensive travelling of Hecataeus (cf. *FGrHist* 1 T 4 and T 12a: ἀνὴρ πολυπλανής with Jacoby ad locc.), Herodotus, and various presocratic philosophers (e.g. Democritus and Pythagoras, cf. Democritus *VS* 68 B 299, Diod. Sic. 1.96.1–3; Diog. Laert. 8.1–2, 9.35–6, Cic. *Tusc.* 4.44 and Montiglio (2000) 88–9, Kotzia-Panteli (2002) 127). Cf. also Hdt. 1.30.2 and 4.76.1 where the wisdom of Solon and Anacharsis is connected with their travelling (see Montiglio (2000) 88–9 and Dillery p. 54 below). The figure of Anacharsis, who was an influential paradigm in Cynicism (Martin (1996), Montiglio (2000) 101–2), links the philosophical with the narrative/historiographical tradition.

[48] Cf. imprimis Plutarch's consolatory treatise on exile, where Thucydides heads a list of historians who wrote in exile (*De Exil.* 605C–D). The concept also features in the

and that of the philosopher.[49] The number of historians writing in exile is considerable and may have been artificially augmented by the fabrication of improbable and confusing tales of some historians' exiles;[50] others, such as the Roman exile Rutilius Rufus, may have been inspired by these precedents to compose their own historiographical works—which, of course, also offered a welcome opportunity of presenting one's life, particularly the circumstances leading to the banishment, in a more favourable light.[51] Cases of ancient exiles styling themselves as philosophers, too, are readily at hand: the most prominent and striking examples are that of the later emperor Tiberius fashioning himself as a philosopher during the time of his self-imposed Rhodian exile,[52] and that of the philosophical conversion of Dio Chrysostom.[53]

For the Cynic Diogenes, however, exile was not only related to a different perspective on the world, but also to a different way of life. Whereas social identity was traditionally connected with man's place in society and exile was seen as proximate to social death,[54] the Cynics begin to employ exile positively. They fuse it with the concept of cosmopolitanism[55] and integrate it into their appeal to the norms of the

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consolatory speech of 'Philiscus' at Dio Cass. 38.28.1–2; it has been taken up by Syme (1962) 40: "exile may be the making of an historian. That is patent for Herodotus and for Polybius" and Hornblower (1987) 27; cf. the detailed discussion of the matter by Dillery, pp. 51 ff. below.

[49] Cf. e.g. Cic. *Tusc.* 5.108, Plut. *De Exil.* 604D–605B, Tert. *Nat.* 2.14.4, André/Baslez (1993) 293–8, Whitmarsh (2001a) 281, and p. 17 below.

[50] Cf. Dillery, pp. 62 ff. below. One may compare the legendary exile of Juvenal, on which see Syme (1979).

[51] Cf. Münzer (1914) 1280, Amiotti (1991) on Rutilius' self-presentation in his exilic works. The apologetic function and the autobiographic aspect have been emphasized by Zimmermann (2002), (2003) 35 who interprets Thucydides' and Xenophon's historiographical works and Andocides' speeches after his return from exile as the origin of autobiography. However, a glance at the proportions of the apologetic/autobiographical passages within Thucydides' historiographical oeuvre (see Dillery, pp. 59, 68 below) or a look into Misch's monumental work on the history of autobiography (cf. imprimis (1949) 22 ff. on the various antecedents (funeral inscriptions, 'Tatenberichte', first-person accounts in poetry and fairy tales)) shows that this is implausible.

[52] Cf. Suet. *Tib.* 13: *equi quoque et armorum solitas exercitationes omisit redegitque se deposito patrio habitu ad pallium et crepidas atque in tali statu biennio fere permansit, contemptior in dies et invisior* and Doblhofer (1987) 186.

[53] See p. 17 below. Cf. also Sen. *Helv.* 9.4 on Marcellus' devotion to the *bonae artes*, Cohen p. 125 with Cic. *Fam.* 9.18.1 on Dionysius II of Syracuse, and Fantham p. 184 on Seneca the Younger.

[54] Cf. Arist. *Pol.* 1253ᵃ1–4, cited by Whitmarsh (2001a) 271; Doblhofer (1987) 21–40 has collected further material. Cf. also Montiglio (2000) 92–8 on Plato's venomous attacks against the elusive and over-ambitious γένος . . . πλανητόν (*Ti.* 19E) of the Sophists and on his view that the true philosopher leads a stable and immobile life.

[55] On the concept of cosmopolitanism cf. Baldry (1965), Stanton (1968), Rutherford

universe and the rejection of the norms and conventions of society.[56] Thus, exile becomes a metaphor for social, political, and even metaphysical dissociation. As such it had already been used negatively in the fifth century by Empedocles, who seems to have been the first to develop the notion of a metaphysical *patria* by calling life on earth exile from heaven.[57] Empedocles' thought has been influential in the realm of metaphysical thinking—partly, but not exclusively, because the same idea later prominently features in one of the most important texts for the Middle Ages, the letters of the apostles Paul and Peter in the New Testament.[58] Whether or not the apostles are indirectly influenced by Empedocles (via currents of popular philosophy) cannot be determined,[59] nor can we be certain of the exact relation between the Empedoclean metaphysical concept and the Cynics' use of exile to describe social and political dissociation.

With Cynicism we have reached the fourth century BC and a decisive moment in the ancient discourse on exile. By this time all major motifs of the later discourse on exile have been introduced, and what follows is primarily a process of recombination and adaptation of these motifs and concepts and of fusing them with other schools of thought and with various literary genres. The first palmary case is the reversal of the Cynic concept of exile by the Stoics, who adopt the concept of cosmopolitanism but completely redefine the relation between state and individual by saying that the wise man does not stand outside society but is a citizen, and that it is the foolish man who is an exile.[60] A second

(1989) 239–40 n. 40, Schofield (1991) 57–92, Moles (1996), Whitmarsh (2001a) 279–80; the concept is prepared in the Euripidean line ἅπασα δὲ χθὼν ἀνδρὶ γενναίῳ πατρίς (Eur. fr. 1047 (Kannicht) ~ Ov. *Fast.* 1.493 (in a consolatory context)); cf. also Doblhofer (1987) 47 (with further literature) on the Cynic transformation of Socrates into an example of cosmopolitanism.

[56] See Branham, pp. 76 ff. below and Moles (1996), Montiglio (2000) 99–100, 103.

[57] Cf. Montiglio (2000) 90–1 and Empedocles fr. 107.13 (Wright (1981) = *VS* 31 B 115.13, quoted at Plut. *De Exil.* 607C): τῶν καὶ ἐγὼ νῦν εἰμι φυγὰς θεόθεν καὶ ἀλήτης with Plutarch's explanation (607D): οὐχ ἑαυτόν, ἀλλ' ἀφ' ἑαυτοῦ πάντας ἀποδείκνυσι μετανάστας ἐνταῦθα καὶ ξένους καὶ φυγάδας ἡμᾶς ὄντας. See Nesselrath, p. 98 below.

[58] Cf. Paul. 2 Cor. 5.6: ἐνδημοῦντες ἐν τῷ σώματι ἐκδημοῦμεν ἀπὸ τοῦ κυρίου (cf. Murphy-O'Connor (1986)), Hebr. 11.13–16, 13.14, Petr. 1 Ep. 1.17, and n. 105 below.

[59] Close parallels in earlier pagan literature such as Cic. *Sen.* 84.4: *ex vita ita discedo tamquam ex hospitio, non tamquam domo* and the reversal of the idea at Hor. *Carm.* 2.3.27–8: *sors . . . nos in aeternum / exsilium impositura* favour this hypothesis; however, exile and diaspora play an important role also in the Jewish tradition, cf. Mosis (1978), van Unnik (1983), Scott et al. (1997), Goldhill (2000) 7–8, Doering (2003) 77 as well as Hexter on pp. 217–18 below.

[60] Cf. imprimis Chrysippus *SVF* vol. 3, pp. 169–70, fr. 677–81 and n. 83 on Cicero's reception of these concepts.

palmary case for the process is the tradition of ancient consolations on exile, in which banishment primarily served as a suitable test case for the application of ethical guidelines and arguments of popular philosophy;[61] originally drawing exclusively from Cynicism and from the lyric, tragic, historiographical, and philosophical inventory of typical exiles (e.g. Cadmus, Themistocles, Diogenes)[62] and typical complaints of exile (see p. 9 above), these treatises later blend the Cynic perspective with concepts of Platonist philosophy (Plutarch) and with the genre of declamation (Favorinus).[63] Moreover, these treatises systematically apply the medical imagery of earlier philosophy[64] to the condition of exile and thereby establish the common comparison of the exile's suffering with a disease.[65]

The process of recombination and adaptation continues in Rome. That typical plots, characters, and motifs of the Greek exilic discourse enter into Latin literature as part of a much more general process of imitation and adaptation of Greek models is unsurprising for the genres of epic, tragedy, and comedy: the foundation myth of Rome by the fugitive Aeneas—first mentioned by Hellanicus (cf. n. 36 above)—is treated already by Naevius and Ennius,[66] and later the theme of exile plays a central role not only in Vergil's *Aeneid* but also in Ovid's *Metamorphoses*, Lucan's *Bellum Civile*, Silius' *Punica*, Valerius Flaccus' *Argonautica*, and Statius' *Thebaid*;[67] the early Roman tragedians—particularly Ennius in his *Medea* and *Telamo* as well as Pacuvius in his *Teucer* and later Seneca in his *Phoenissae*—inherit the theme of exile from their Greek predecessors,[68]

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[61] Cf. Nesselrath's discussion, pp. 87 ff. below and Swain (1989) 156 (on Favorinus).

[62] For the Cynic Diogenes as an exemplary exile cf. e.g. Plut. *De Exil.* 602A, 'Philiscus' at Dio Cass. 38.25.2, Favorinus *De Exil.* 14.51 ff. and see p. 17 below on Musonius' self-fashioning as a Cynic philosopher. Cadmus and Themistocles are cited in the treatise by Teles, probably the first of its kind (third cent. BC), cf. Teles pp. 22.14 and 28.4 (Hense). Particularly the later treatises by Plutarch and Favorinus offer a much larger inventory of exemplary exiles, see Nesselrath, pp. 92 ff. below.

[63] Cf. the detailed discussion by Nesselrath, pp. 87 ff. below.

[64] Cf. e.g. Kudlien (1962) 113 n. 3 and Wehrli (1951) on the earlier tradition of this imagery; Wilhelm (1926) amply illustrates the medical imagery of the consolatory tradition in his discussion of Ov. *Pont.* 1.3. See also Fantham, p. 178 n. 17 below.

[65] The motif is prominent in Cicero, Ovid, and many modern authors, cf. the rich material in Doblhofer (1987) 59 ff. and e.g. Wilhelm (1926) on Ov. *Pont.* 1.3.

[66] Cf. Naev. *poet.* fr. 5–29 (Blänsdorf), Enn. *Ann.* 14–25 (Skutsch). See Harrison, p. 129 below.

[67] See Harrison's discussion on pp. 129 ff. below.

[68] Cf. Enn. *scen.* 208–45 (Jocelyn), imprimis 229–31 (*Medea*), 265–79 (*Telamo*), Pac. *trag.* 313–46 (*Teucer*) with Ribbeck (1875) 133–5, 149–59, 223–31 (on Greek precedents); cf. p. 17 below on Seneca's tragedies.

and Latin comedy does the same with the motif of a lover threatening to go into exile if his love is not requited.[69] Less obvious cases of Latin poets adopting and incorporating exilic paradigms are the stylization of Attis' nostalgic monologue in Cat. 63.50–73,[70] Horace's discussion of travelling in *Ep.* 1.11 (cf. Skalitzky (1973)) and his treatment of Teucer's (*Carm.* 1.7) and Europa's (*Carm.* 3.27) displacement, and Vergil's first *Eclogue*.[71]

More controversial is the place of Cicero and Ovid in the history of ancient discourse on exile. Claassen ((1999a) 27) has interpreted Cicero "as the unconscious creator of the autobiographical genre 'complaints from exile'" and has credited Ovid with the "creation of the literary genre of exilic poetry" ((1999a) 241). However, Cicero and Ovid are not only preceded by the quasi-epistolary[72] poems in which Alcaeus laments his situation in exile (see above), but their treatment of exile is simply unthinkable without the earlier Greek tradition on exile.[73] Cicero's letters written during his exile and his proconsulate in Cilicia[74] as well as Ovid's *Tristia* and *Epistulae ex Ponto* rehearse the rhetoric of exile that had been gradually developing in the Greek lyric poets: the exile's wish for death, the motif of desertion, the nostalgic recollection of the *patria*, the imagery of shipwreck—all this had already featured in the poems of Alcaeus, Theognis, and Solon, in Euripides' *Phoenissae* and in the consolatory tradition (see p. 9 above). Furthermore, Cicero's speeches after his return from exile had a model in Andocides' speeches *De Mysteriis* and *De Reditu*,[75] and the mythologizing self-dramatization of exile in Cicero's *De Temporibus Suis*[76] and Ovid's *Tristia* and *Epistulae*

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[69] Cf. Zagagi (1988) on Menander's *Samia* 616 ff. as well as Plautus' *Cistellaria* 284 ff. and *Mercator* 644 ff., 830 ff. Cf. also Ter. *Hau.* 85–7.

[70] Cf. imprimis the motif of retrospective/mental travel, which has close parallels in Cicero's correspondence, in Liv. 5.54.3–4, and in Ovid, cf. p. 4 above, p. 158 below, and Doblhofer (1987) 146.

[71] Cf. *Ecl.* 1.1–5,59–66; Vergil's lines may be inspired by the loss of his family's possessions near Mantua (cf. Doblhofer (1987) 77–80, 180–1), but Segal (1965) and Somville (1982) have rightly advocated a literary rather than biographical interpretation. Cf. also Doblhofer (1987) 58 and 76 on Verg. *G.* 2.503–12, [Verg.] *Cat.* 3.7–10.

[72] Thus Zimmermann (2003) 42, following Rösler (1980) 273–4.

[73] I am leaving aside here the methodological objections against exile as a literary genre, see pp. 2–6 above. The most recent in depth study of Cicero's letters from exile—Garcea (2005)—completely ignores the Greek tradition.

[74] Herescu (1959) rightly speaks of three exiles, Cicero's real exile in 58/57 BC, his proconsulate in Cilicia in 51/50 BC, and his inner exile under Caesar's dictatorship. On these exiles and their presentation in Cicero's works cf. Claassen (1992), Robinson (1993), Cohen pp. 109 ff. below, and the literature given in the following notes.

[75] Cf. Zimmermann (2003) 37 and n. 44 above.

[76] For the "glorious mythological colour" (Claassen (1999a) 209) of Cicero's treatment

*ex Ponto*[77] reflects literary traditions with which these authors were acquainted from early youth: mythical heroes were commonly used as paradigms in ancient education[78] and rhetoric[79] and thus provided the natural yardstick not only for the perception and evaluation of personal suffering and conduct but also for their literary presentation.[80]

The indebtedness of Cicero and Ovid to their predecessors becomes, however, most noticeable in their reflection of the Greek philosophical discourse on exile. In a letter written during his time of exile (*Att.* 3.15) Cicero reverses the typical arguments of consolatory treatises,[81] and the same is later done by Ovid in *Pont.* 1.3.[82] Moreover, in the speeches, letters, and treatises written after his return to Rome, Cicero takes up the use of exile as a metaphor, which he had found in Greek, particularly Stoic, philosophy: based on an abstract concept of *patria* and *exilium*, Cicero on the one hand argues that he had never been in exile because the legitimate government, the *res publica*, had gone into exile with him or had ceased to exist with his departure;[83] on the other hand he develops a notion of 'innere Emigration' to describe not only his disempowerment

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of his own exile in *De Temporibus Suis* cf. the ironic allusion in [Sal.] *Cic.* 7: *sed quid ego plura de tua insolentia commemorem? quem Minerva omnis artis edocuit, Iuppiter Optimus Maximus in concilio deorum admisit, Italia exulem humeris suis reportavit. oro te, Romule Arpinas, qui egregia tua virtute omnis Paulos, Fabios, Scipiones superasti, quem tandem locum in hac civitate obtines?* and see Büchner (1939) 1251, Harrison (1990), who plausibly conjecture that Cicero's work even included a *consilium deorum*, at which Cicero's return to Rome was discussed.

[77] Cf. e.g. Doblhofer (1987) 273 ff., Chwalek (1996), Claassen (1999a) 71–2 and *passim*, and p. 159 below.

[78] Cf. Marrou (1956) 12–13, 235, Bonner (1977) 283, and e.g. Quint. *Inst.* 12.11.22: *tot exemplis nos instruxit antiquitas, ut possit videri nulla sorte nascendi aetas felicior quam nostra, cui docendae priores elaborarunt.*

[79] Cf. Arist. *Rh.* 2.20, *Rhet. Her.* 3.9, Cic. *De Orat.* 1.18; the use of paradeigmata is already prominent in the *Iliad*, cf. Austin (1966) 300 ff. (with further literature).

[80] Tragedies such as Pacuvius' *Teucer*, which seems to have been a standard element in Roman schooling in Cicero's day (cf. *De Orat.* 1.246 and Ribbeck (1875) 223), too, may have had a strong influence and seem to have been imbued with the Greek rhetoric of exile: cf. the anonymous line *patria est, ubicumque est bene* (Inc. *trag.* 92 = Cic. *Tusc.* 5.108), which Ribbeck (1875) 231 has drawn into his interpretation of Pacuvius' *Teucer* and which has a close Greek precedent at Ar. *Plut.* 1151: πατρὶς γάρ ἐστι πᾶσ' ἵν' ἂν πράττῃ τις εὖ.

[81] Cf. Claassen (1999a) 84. Cicero stresses the availability of consolatory treatises in *Tusc.* 3.81 and later reviews the arguments in *Tusc.* 5.106–9. See also Cohen, p. 120 n. 28 below.

[82] Cf. Wilhelm (1926), Davisson (1983), and p. 157 below.

[83] Cf. Doblhofer (1987) 247–8, Narducci (1997), Cohen pp. 111 ff. below, and n. 60 above (Stoic precedents). Given the currency of the notion one might speak of *Popularstoizismus*, cf. e.g. Pub. *Sent.* u.33: *ubi innocens damnatur, pars patriae exsulat*, Cic. *Mil.* 101: *exsilium ibi esse putat* [sc. *Milo*] *ubi virtuti non sit locus*, Sen. *Ben.* 6.37.

and dissociation from Caesar's dictatorship, but also his attachment to the legitimate government of the *res publica* before Caesar's dictatorship.[84]

Hence, measured against their Greek predecessors, Cicero and Ovid seem far less innovative than Claassen suggests. Their main innovation lies in the adaptation of the earlier tradition to the cultural, political, and literary context of their times. Cicero, Ovid, and later Seneca add typically Roman characters to the inherited inventory of exemplary exiles (e.g. Aeneas, Marius, Rutilius Rufus, Caecilius Metellus Numidicus, Claudius Marcellus),[85] and Ovid blends the rhetoric of exile with the conventions of Roman love elegy.[86] A third modification of the Greek tradition concerns freedom of speech. Whereas most earlier exiles could vent their anger against their political opponents freely because they were out of their reach, exiles under the principate faced the problem that—whether in Tomis or on Corsica—they were still under the rule of the authorities that had banished them.[87] Wishing to return, they had to plead their case without accusing the emperor of having banished them unjustly. This has lead to the highly ambivalent discourse of imperial *ira*

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[84] See Cohen, pp. 121 ff. below and Herescu (1959), Doblhofer (1987) 231–41 (with copious material on the notion of 'innere Emigration' in modern literature). The term 'innere Emigration' seems to have been coined by Frank Thiess, see Cohen, p. 128 below.

[85] Cicero markedly refers to Marius' exile in the speeches he held after his own return from exile (cf. *Red. Pop.* 7, *Red. Sen.* 38); a separate poem on Marius' exile may belong to the same period (see Büchner (1939) 1255). For Rutilius Rufus as an exemplary exile cf. Ov. *Pont.* 1.3.63–6, Sen. *Dial.* 1.3.7, *Ben.* 6.37, *Ep.* 79.14, for Metellus Numidicus cf. Cic. *Red. Sen.* 25, for Claudius Marcellus see Sen. *Helv.* 9.4. On Aeneas as an exemplary exile cf. e.g. Huskey (2002) on Ov. *Tr.* 1.3, Klodt (1996) on Ov. *Tr.* 1.4, and Sen. *Helv.* 7.6–7, where Seneca gives a catalogue of exiles founding Italian cities (cf. also Favorinus *De Exil.* 26.4). The Roman exempla added by Cicero, Ovid, and Seneca testify to the strong influence of Vergil's *Aeneid* (itself obviously influenced by the Homeric epics (cf. n. 39 above) and the tradition of foundation myths that were popular among Hellenistic and Augustan poets (cf. Cairns (1979) 69 ff., Harrison pp. 129–34 below)) and Roman history and historiography (including, of course, the works of the exiled Rutilius Rufus, cf. n. 51 above).

[86] See p. 160 below. Cf. also Fantham pp. 176 ff. on Seneca's fusion of exilic topoi with the tradition of consolations on bereavement.

[87] Worth mentioning in this context is the case of Cassius Severus, who was first exiled to Crete in AD 8, but continued to be a "nuisance" (Syme (1939) 487) and was therefore banished to the barren rock Seriphus in AD 24 (Tac. *Ann.* 4.21). Already the Greek tragedians (cf. n. 43 above) had drawn attention to the exile's (lack of) freedom of speech. Goldhill (2000) 16 ignores the historical circumstances when he says that Cicero and Ovid possessed more *parrhesia* than the earlier Greek exiles. Cicero and the imperial authors Seneca and Dio Chrysostom were fully aware that the condition of exiles was much more difficult in an *oikoumene* that had become one political entity: see Cohen p. 122 on Cic. *Fam.* 4.7.4, Fantham pp. 175–6, 183–4, and Desideri pp. 198–9 on Dio Chrys. *Or.* 1.14.

and *clementia* in Ovid,[88] and plays a key role in the works Seneca wrote during the time of his banishment on Corsica: to avoid accusing the emperor Claudius of injustice or of having been misled in his judgement, Seneca clads his own self-consolation with consolations on bereavement to his mother Helvia and to Polybius (Claudius' secretary *a studiis*) and makes extensive use of the figure of apostrophe, which enables him to put into the mouth of other persons what he himself cannot say.[89]

Both in the works written during his exile on Corsica and in the tragedies, written after his return to Rome, Seneca not only rationalizes or omits the sorrows of exile,[90] but also presents exile as desirable and as a state becoming the *sapiens*.[91] The latter concept—exile, i.e. the removal from the centre of power, making possible the life of a philosopher—also plays a role in Seneca's contemporary Musonius and in Musonius' pupil Dio Chrysostom.[92] Both are deeply influenced by the Cynic tradition[93] and consequently link exile with the typically Cynic concepts of *eleutheria* and *parrhesia*. However, this is not all, for exile also becomes part of their strategy of fashioning themselves as Greek philosophers and establishing themselves as part of a Greek literary tradition,[94] and at least in Dio, exile also raises a central political issue, namely that of the nature and limits of imperial power and of the relation between Greek intellectuals and the Roman emperors.[95]

As in Musonius' and Dio's works, exile also plays a role in Favorinus' self-fashioning. Taking up the tradition of consolatory treatises on exile in his own work *De Exilio* and introducing—like Cicero, Ovid, and Seneca before him (cf. n. 85 above)—new Roman, but also new Greek, exempla to the inherited inventory of Greek exempla,[96] Favorinus fashions a less

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[88] Cf. e.g. Gaertner (2005) 9–12.

[89] See Fantham's analysis on pp. 173 ff. below. On Seneca's indebtedness to the consolatory tradition cf. also Manning (1974).

[90] Cf. Fantham, pp. 174–5 (on Sen. *Phoen.* 502–13 ~ Eur. *Phoen.* 388–405) and 176–84 (on *Helv.*). An exception are Seneca's remarks in *Polyb.* 2.1 and 18.9 (see Fantham pp. 184–5 and 191 below).

[91] Cf. Mader (1993), Lo Piccolo (1998) on the tragedies, and Fantham p. 184 below on *Helv.* 20.

[92] Apart from Musonius and Dio Chrysostom the concept also plays a central role in Plutarch's *De Exilio*, see Nesselrath, pp. 94–5.

[93] Cf. Nesselrath, p. 91 below, and Desideri, p. 199 below.

[94] Cf. Whitmarsh (2001a) 276 ff.; cf. also the earlier treatment of Dio's conversion by Moles (1978).

[95] Cf. Desideri's discussion on pp. 193 ff. below.

[96] Cf. Whitmarsh (2001a) 298 and the more detailed analysis by Nesselrath, pp. 99 ff. below.

comforting and (like Plutarch's *De Exilio*) more spiritual consolation,[97] in which the question of what determines identity is raised and answered in a way that suits both Favorinus' own hybrid identity[98] and the Second Sophistic's focus on Hellenism and *paideia*.[99]

Before ending this rapid survey with a brief glance at the Middle Ages in the West, we have to return for a moment to the early reception of the three major Roman exiles Cicero, Ovid, and Seneca. In *Pont.* 3.1.49–56 Ovid inserts his own case into a catalogue of mythical heroes who have gained lasting fame because of their immense suffering:

*exposuit memet populo Fortuna videndum*
*et plus notitiae quam fuit ante dedit.*
*notior est factus Capaneus a fulminis ictu,*
*notus humo mersis Amphiaraus equis.*
*si minus errasset, notus minus esset Ulixes,*
*magna Philoctetae vulnere fama suo est.*
*si locus est aliquis tanta inter nomina parvis,*
*nos quoque conspicuos nostra ruina facit.*

> Fortune has set me forth to be seen by all the people and she has given me more celebrity than I had before. Capaneus was made more famous by the stroke of lightning; Amphiaraus is known because his horses were swallowed up by the earth. If Ulysses had wandered less, he would be less famous; great is the fame of Philoctetes because of his wound. If there is a place for small names among so great ones, me, too, my downfall has rendered famous.

Whether or not Ovid's exile has indeed made him as famous as Odysseus or Philoctetes in Augustan and Tiberian Rome cannot be determined with certainty. It is rendered probable, however, by the fact that Ovid soon becomes the standard exemplum of an exile in later Latin literature. The first testimonies to this process are Seneca's allusions to Ovid's exile poetry,[100] Statius' *tristis in ipsis / Naso Tomis* (*Silv.* 1.2.254–5), the clustering of Ovidian exilic themes and diction in Statius' treatment of Etruscus'

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[97] Cf. Nesselrath, p. 108 below.

[98] See Nesselrath, p. 100 below on Favorinus' sex; Whitmarsh (2001a) 303 stresses Favorinus' hybridity as a "Roman Gaul writing Greek".

[99] Cf. Whitmarsh (2001a) 303 and Goldhill (2000) 18 with Philostr. *VA* 1.34 (1.35, p. 44): σοφῷ ἀνδρὶ Ἑλλὰς πάντα καὶ οὐδὲν ἔρημον ἢ βάρβαρον χωρίον.

[100] Cf. e.g. *Polyb.* 18.9 ~ Ov. *Tr.* 3.14.33–6 with Fantham pp. 179 n. 19, 191 below and see Innocenti Pierini (1980), Gahan (1985).

exile in *Silv.* 3.3.154–64,[101] and Rutilius Namatianus' evocation of Ovid's poem on the departure from Rome (*Tr.* 1.3) in the description of his own departure from the city.[102] Similarly but less prominently, Seneca becomes the protagonist of a garland of epigrams circulated under his name,[103] and Cicero already features as an exemplum in Plutarch's consolation on exile (*De Exil.* 605E).[104]

Thus, just as Cicero, Ovid, and Seneca presented their experience of exile through the paradigms of the earlier poetic, the philosophical, and the political discourse on exile, their own works and biographies soon become points of reference in treatments of (real or metaphorical) exile for later authors.

This process becomes all the more noticeable during the Middle Ages. With the declining knowledge of Greek in the West and the rise of Christianity philosophical discourse on exile in Greek philosophy becomes less influential and is supplanted by the exilic paradigms of the new canonic texts, i.e. the Old and New Testament,[105] and the mythical paradigms also become less important. The wanderings of Odysseus, Jason, Aeneas, Teucer, or Cadmus stand back and are replaced by the biographies of, or rather biographical speculation about, Latin authors.[106] For Carolingian and later medieval poets Ovid's letters from Tomis become the benchmark for displacement,[107] and this tradition can

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[101] Cf. *Silv.* 3.3.155–64: *summe ducum . . . / tu . . . / . . . / . . . attonitum et venturi fulminis ictus / horrentem tonitru tantum lenique procella / contentus monuisse senem; . . . / . . . / . . . hic molles Campani litoris oras / et Diomedeas concedere iussus in arces, / atque hospes, non exsul, erat* and e.g. *Tr.* 1.5.3: *attonitum* (~ *Pont.* 1.6.12), *Tr.* 4.5.5–6: *veritus non es portus aperire fideles / fulmine percussae confugiumque rati*, *Pont.* 1.2.59–60: *cum subit, Augusti quae sit clementia, credo / mollia naufragiis litora posse dari*, and see Tandoi (1962) 120 on Ovid's use of *fulmen* for the *ira Caesaris*, and p. 158 below on the shipwreck imagery.

[102] See Fo (1989), Tissol (2002), and cf. Doblhofer (1987) 81 on Goethe seeing his departure from Rome through Ov. *Tr.* 1.3. Cf. also Claassen (1999a) 244–51 on Ovid's influence on Boethius.

[103] Cf. Holzberg (2005). See also Dingel (1994) 350.

[104] Cf. also Claassen (1999a) 54 on Plutarch's biography of Cicero and see p. 4 above on Livy's imitation of Cicero's complaints in 5.54.3–4.

[105] Cf. Hexter pp. 217 ff. below and Ladner (1967) on the medieval use of the idea of 'exile from the divine'. The concept is of course prepared in the churchfathers, cf. e.g. Ferguson (1992) on Augustine. Nesselrath (pp. 98, 108 below, with further material) stresses that the presence of the idea in Plutarch's treatise on exile (607C–E; cf. also Plotinus *Enn.* 1.6.8, adduced by Whitmarsh (2001a) 270) is typical of Late Antiquity. Cynic ideas, on the contrary, circulated mostly indirectly: cf. Matton (1996) 240.

[106] Cf. Hexter pp. 212–14 ff. below.

[107] Cf. Smolak (1980) 163 on Hildebert of Lavardin, and Hexter pp. 214 ff. below on Modoin, Ermoldus Nigellus, Walahfrid Strabo, and other medieval authors.

be traced right down to Horia's *Dieu est né en exil*, Malouf's *An Imaginary Life*, Ransmayr's *Die letzte Welt*, Coetzee's *Age of Iron*, and Ted Hughes' *Tales from Ovid.*[108]

These last observations on the influence of Ovid and the New Testament on the exilic discourse of the Middle Ages have shown that the treatment of exile depends not so much on personal experience as on literary, and more generally cultural, canons. The experience of the (real or metaphorical) exile of writers and fictitious or historical characters is interpreted and presented within an inherited, but continuously modified, framework of concepts of displacement and wandering, which depends heavily on educational and intellectual traditions. Thus, ancient discourse on exile (and probably modern discourse, too) is primarily a representation of the history of ideas—not a genre or mode of its own. We are invited to speculate how medieval monks would have treated exile if they had read the *chreiai* about Diogenes and not the letters of Paul and Peter, or what contemporary intellectuals like Said might say about exile and homelessness if they had read less Nietzsche and Adorno and more Ovid.

[108] Cf. the collection of testimonies down to the year 1938 in Stroh (1969) as well as Ziolkowski (2005). See Hexter pp. 231–5 below on Petrarch, Smolak (1980) 172–3, 184 ff. on the humanists Scaliger, Dominique Baudier, and Burman as well as on East German poets, Innocenti Pierini (1990a) on Poliziano, Coppel (2001) on Lotichius, Katz (1992) on Coetzee. Monluçon (2002) discusses the novels of Horia, Malouf, and Ransmayr; she also refers to Mandelstam's *Tristia* and mentions (p. 184) that the Austrian exile Broch hesitated between choosing Ovid or Vergil as the central figure for what later became *Der Tod des Vergil.* For further secondary literature on the modern reception of Ovid's exilic works see Hexter, p. 210 n. 4 below.

CHAPTER TWO

# EARLY EXPATRIATES: DISPLACEMENT AND EXILE IN ARCHAIC POETRY

Ewen L. Bowie

The English term 'exile' and the romance languages' 'exil', 'esilio', 'exilio' etc., all derive from the Latin word *exilium*. This Latin term, however, does not share the assumption of these modern terms that the individual who moves out of a community (the *exul*) does so involuntarily, and that in more cases than not this departure is required or sanctioned by the community's authorities or legal system. Ancient Greek terminology also observes different boundaries. The verb φεύγω, 'I go into exile', also has the meaning 'I flee' and 'I run away from', and in both senses the group or individual who φεύγει may do so voluntarily or unwillingly, and the thing or person which prompts evasive or fugitive action need have no legal or authoritative backing. Hence, the ancient Greek discourse on exile cannot be considered in isolation from the similar discourses on other forms of displacement such as fleeing, migrating and engaging (less than willingly) in travel.[1]

In the following discussion I look at the similarities and differences between exile and other more voluntary forms of displacement in the archaic period; I then discuss responses to exile in a poet whose ejection from his πόλις was unambiguously exilic, Alcaeus; and finally I assess some thoughts on exile that we find in the corpus of early sympotic elegy ascribed to Theognis. Overall the responses to exile are fewer and less developed than one might perhaps have expected. Among the reasons for this is doubtless the sympotic performance-context of almost all this poetry. Some whingeing about one's condition as an exile, or sniping at that of another symposiast, might not risk spoiling a symposion: but pursuing the topic at length could well impair a singer's status as a welcome symposiast. And once poems about exile had been composed and sung, what proportion of them would be lucky enough to be re-performed and to join those poems that achieved written transmission?

[1] On the ancient terminology see also pp. 2–3 above.

The conditions of performance (corresponding to 'publication') and of diffusion and canonisation are utterly different from those in later periods when writing and books had replaced singing and oral transmission. So we should not be so surprised that neither quasi-self-indulgent nor philosophically interesting developments of a rhetoric of exile, each in different ways dependent on the habit of reading written texts, are to be found.

## *Historical context*

The *polis* which constituted the immediate socio-economic context in which archaic Greeks, male and female, free and slave, lived their lives—by modern standards short and uncertain—was one of a huge diaspora that by the end of the seventh century stretched across the Mediterranean from Massilia (Marseille) to Cyprus, from Pontic Sinope and Trapezous to North African Cyrene. Although different *poleis* (and sometimes different groups within a single *polis*) often gave very different sorts of accounts of how they came to be just there, most such accounts involved displacement.

1. One major complex of displacements was associated with what modern archaeologists and historians term the Late Bronze Age. Three major population groups in the Peloponnese (Laconians, Messenians, Argives) constructed themselves as Dorians from northern Greece who had established themselves there in what for us is the twelfth cent. BC, in one version associating this with a 'return' led by the children of Heracles.[2] Archaic Boeotians claimed to have taken over Boeotia about the same time.[3] An explanation that satisfactorily explains both the distribution of Greek dialects (which largely supports this self-perception) and the archaeological evidence (which does not) has yet to be found.[4] But for our purposes the truth is less important than what archaic communities believed.
2. Cities of western Asia Minor and its offshore islands saw themselves as colonists from mainland Greece, in some cases descendants of

[2] Cf. Tyrtaeus fr. 2.12–15 (West), Thuc. 1.12.3. For arguments against accepting the Messenians' claim to have been ethnically different from Laconians in the archaic period see Luraghi (2002).

[3] Cf. Thuc. 1.12.3.

[4] Cf. most recently Schnapp-Gourbeillon (2002).

the 'pre-Dorian' ruling class (e.g. the Neleids of Pylos in Chios) who had crossed the Aegean after the 'Dorian invasion'; one group, the Ionians, claimed close links with Attica,[5] a claim that dialect supports[6] but that was further bolstered by mythology (e.g. the myth of Ion) and establishment of similar festivals.[7] The inhabitants of Attica itself were unusual in claiming autochthony and denying any form of displacement in what we term the Late Bronze Age.[8]

3. Many *poleis* claimed (very often correctly) to have been founded relatively recently by Greeks who for various reasons had left another Greek *polis*. The phenomenon that modern historians misleadingly call 'colonisation' began so soon after the 'Ionian migration' that it may be wrong to see it as wholly different.[9] For fifth century Greeks and for us it begins with settlements in the bay of Naples, Sicily and the Aegean in the mid-eighth cent. BC (Cumae *c.* 740 BC, Naxos traditionally 734 BC, Syracuse *c.* 734 BC), frequently preceded by trading visits and settlements (*emporia*) whose distinction from a 'colony' can be problematic.[10] Within the Aegean itself many 'colonies' were sent, including those by Samos to Amorgos and by Paros to Thasos (early to mid-seventh cent. BC).[11] Although to some extent many participants in such settlements may have gone keenly or willingly, 'colonisation' narratives suggest that in not a few cases they might have preferred to stay in the 'mother' city. Problems resulting from population-growth and land-shortage, from drought or other natural disasters, and competition for pre-eminence within the élite, could operate separately or together to drive individuals or a group to seek a new life elsewhere.[12]

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[5] Cf. Loraux (1993) 184–236, Risch (1981) 269–89.

[6] Cf. Palmer (1980) 53 ff., Chadwick (1985) 3–12.

[7] Cf. Hdt. 1.147.2 on the Apatouria, but note also the Thargelia, cf. Parke (1977), Simon (1983).

[8] Cf. Loraux (1993) 184–236.

[9] The most interesting recent work on 'colonisation' has been done by Malkin (1987), (1994), (1998) and Dougherty (1993).

[10] The case of the settlement on Pithecoussae (modern Ischia) from which Cumae was founded is an obvious example: cf. Ridgway (1992), Buchner/Ridgway (1993), Tsetskhlazde/de Angelis (1994). Note too the initial Theran settlement on the island of Platea before moving to the mainland to the site of Cyrene, cf. Hdt. 4.151.

[11] For the foundation of Thasos cf. Graham (1978).

[12] There has been much discussion of motives for particular acts of colonisation and some attempts to generalise, but "it is not possible to compile a generally applicable assessment of the interlocking claims of over-population and land-hunger at home, opportunities for commercial or social advancement abroad, 'internal' (Greek vs. Greek)

*Literary context*

Our remains of archaic Greek poetry are transmitted to us in texts none of which is likely to have been fixed in written form earlier than the late eighth century (thus Hesiod, and perhaps Homer) and most of which were so fixed in the early seventh century (thus more probably Homer) and later, arguably within the lifetime of the poet in question (thus Archilochus, Callinus, Tyrtaeus, Mimnermus, Semonides in the period 660–40 BC; Alcman, Solon, Sappho, Alcaeus in the period 630–580 BC; Stesichorus *c.* 560 BC, Ibycus and Theognis *c.* 530 BC, Anacreon and Simonides *c.* 530–470 BC).[13] Even at the end of that period movement of populations continued, in some cases precipitated or aggravated by the Persian take-over of the coastal cities of Asia Minor, as in the case of Xenophanes and other Colophonians moving to Eleia, founded by Phocaea *c.* 540 BC for that same reason:[14] both the past and the present of the worlds familiar to the poets and constructed by them for their audiences were ones in which displacement (sometimes in a form that might be called φυγή or 'exile') was an omnipresent phenomenon.

The most important surviving corpus of archaic poetry is hexameter heroic epic. It must be a matter of speculation what sort of stories dominated lost oral antecedents[15] of poems that survive for us either complete (the *Iliad* and *Odyssey*) or only in fragments and in later testimonia.[16] But what survives presents overwhelmingly worlds in which young males are separated from their *polis* and their *oikos*, whether to fight a military campaign overseas (*Iliad*) or at least far from home (*Thebaid*), to execute a quest imposed upon them by an individual or com-

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rivalry and reaction to external pressure" (Ridgway (2003)). For further discussion see Malkin (1987), (1994), (1998), Murray (1993) chapter 7, Tsetskhladze/de Angelis (1994), Osborne (1996).

[13] A convenient summary of biographical evidence for the archaic lyric, elegiac and iambic poets (including evidence for dating) can be found in Knox/Easterling (1985) 211–28; more detail (and extensive testimonia) in Campbell (1982), (1988), (1991) and Gerber (1999a,b).

[14] Cf. Diog. Laert. 9.18.

[15] Since Parry (1928) the view has come to prevail (at different rates in different scholarly climates) that the *Iliad* and *Odyssey* stand in or at the end of a tradition of oral poetry and that they (and the lost poems of the epic cycle) in varying degrees develop myths sung in poems which only had an oral existence. Introductions to these issues can be found in Parry (1971), Lord (1960), Foley (1985); note more recently especially Nagy (1996) and the contributions in Mackie (2004).

[16] The summaries of Proclus, preserved for us by Photius, and the quoted fragments are to be found in Davies (1988), Bernabé (1987) and West (2003).

munity (the labours of Heracles and—later—Theseus, the myth of the Argonauts), or intent on finding their way home from such a quest (the *Odyssey, Nostoi*). Although such scenarios offered many opportunities for exciting narratives, and may to some extent have derived their power from macrocosmic similarities to more localised rituals of ephebic separation from, and then re-integration into, the *polis*, they also at one level reflected the realities of the very mobile world of eighth and seventh century Greeks. On a less dramatic level there were parts of Greece (e.g. Attica) where local expansion into land previously uncultivated must have separated individuals and families from ancestral lands and burial places.

As it happens, in the Homeric poems much stronger expressions of longing are uttered by characters for their native land or city, for members of their family or for their possessions, by individuals who have left home more or less voluntarily, e.g. Achilles recalling his father back in Phthia,[17] than by those who have been forced to leave, whether because family tensions have made staying intolerable, or because they wish to anticipate punishment for a crime, or because they have been sold into slavery (Eumaeus at *Od.* 15.403–84).[18] A review of some of these cases (Phoenix in *Iliad* 9, Patroclus in *Iliad* 23, the false story of Odysseus as a Cretan in *Odyssey* 13) shows how 'exile' might be a misleading concept.

The story of Phoenix stresses his own decision as the proximate cause of his leaving his father's palace in Hellas and taking up residence in that of Achilles' father Peleus. Phoenix had provoked his father's extreme anger by acceding to his mother's pleas that he seduce

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[17] *Il.* 9.393–400, 24.487–92,507–11; cf. Odysseus' expressions of longing for Ithaca and Penelope at *Od.* 9.27–8: οὔ τι ἔγωγε / ἧς γαίης δύναμαι γλυκερώτερον ἄλλο ἰδέσθαι, 9.34: ὡς οὐδὲν γλύκιον ἧς πατρίδος οὐδὲ τοκήων (taken up or quoted at Dio Chrys. *Or.* 44.1, Lucian *Patr. Encom.* 1: ὅτι μὲν οὐδὲν γλύκιον ἧς πατρίδος φθάνει προτεθρυλημένον, Men. Rhet. p. 433 (Spengel)). Note too *Od.* 1.57–9: αὐτὰρ 'Οδυσσεύς, / ἱέμενος καὶ καπνὸν ἀποθρώσκοντα νοῆσαι / ἧς γαίης, alluded to at Dio Chrys. *Or.* 13.4, Lucian *Patr. Encom.* 11, Men. Rhet. p. 433 (Spengel), Apul. *Apol.* 57: *Ulixes fumum terra sua emergentem . . . captavit*, Fro. *ad M. Caes. et invic.* 1.4.3 and 5.20.2 (pp. 7.5–6, 72.4 v. d. Hout), Rut. Nam. *De Red. Suo* 1.195–6. I am grateful to J. F. Gaertner for drawing my attention to these passages.

[18] In addition to the cases I discuss note in the *Iliad* the more briefly told stories of Medon (13.694–7), Lycophron (15.430–2) and Epeigeus (16.571–4) and in the *Odyssey* of an unnamed Aetolian cited by Eumaeus (14.379–81) and of Theoclymenus (15.272–8); at *Od.* 23.118–120 Odysseus takes flight to be the normal consequence of killing another member of one's community. Cf. Hainsworth (1993) on *Il.* 9.479–84 and Schlunk (1976). The contribution of such cases of flight from punishment for homicide to the history of colonisation as a whole is rather exaggerated by Dougherty (1993) 31–44.

his father's concubine; his father had called upon the Erinyes to curse him with childlessness; and although he had mastered his urge to kill his father when (it seems) he perceived himself impotent, he could not bear to stay in the palace of his wrathful father and eluded the attempts of his relatives to dissuade or prevent him from departing. He broke down the doors of his bedroom, leapt over the courtyard wall, and "fled far away through Hellas of the broad choruses"[19] (*Il.* 9.478: φεῦγον ἔπειτ' ἀπάνευθε δι' Ἑλλάδος εὐρυχόροιο). Phoenix does not explicitly dwell on the life he has left, though his catalogue of the eating and drinking to which his cousins resorted to detain him gives us a hint of the prosperity on which he was turning his back, and the epithet εὐρυχόροιο, "of the broad choruses", may be there to remind us of the meaningful rituals of community from which he is 'exiling' himself.[20]

The story of Patroclus, a doublet of that of Phoenix, is much more briefly told: Patroclus, still an infant, killed another boy in anger precipitated by playing—and presumably losing at—dice, and his father brought him from their Opuntian home to the palace of Peleus (cf. *Il.* 24.86–90). The cause is termed homicide, ἀνδροκτασίη, and it is implied that Menoetius and his young son had little choice but to leave. A similar situation is envisaged a little later in the same book in a simile: Priam's entry to Achilles' tent is compared to that of somebody "who has slain a man in his own country and comes to other people's land, to the house of a wealthy man, and amazement grips those who see him" (*Il.* 24.480–2: ὅς τ' ἐνὶ πάτρῃ / φῶτα κατακτείνας ἄλλων ἐξίκετο δῆμον, / ἀνδρὸς ἐς ἀφνειοῦ, θάμβος δ' ἔχει εἰσορόωντας).

The same schema is used to 'explain' the colonisation of Rhodes by Tlepolemus in the *Catalogue of Ships*, *Il.* 2.661–70. Here, of course, although it is only Tlepolemus himself who has slain somebody (indeed a kinsman) he is accompanied on his colonising venture by numerous ἑταῖροι.

A very similar pattern informs the false tale of Odysseus as a Cretan aristocrat who had fought alongside Idomeneus at Troy (*Od.* 13.257–86). Odysseus claims to have been in danger of losing the booty he had won from Troy to Idomeneus' son Orsilochus because in the Trojan War he had refused to be Idomeneus' subordinate and had insisted on leading his own warrior band. So, he asserts, back in Crete he ambushed and killed Orsilochus and persuaded Phoenicians to convey him (and some of his

[19] Unless otherwise noted, all translations are mine.

[20] Cf. Hainsworth (1993) on *Il.* 9.478 noting the importance of the χορός as "public religious ceremony".

booty, less their cut) overseas. The killing of Orsilochus seems superfluous: if 'the Cretan' was to have to leave Crete to secure his booty, why not just leave? We may tell ourselves that 'the Cretan' needed to express his anger against Orsilochus for his treatment, and that Odysseus wants to make it clear to his interlocutor (not yet known to him as Athena) that he can be dangerous and ruthless; or we may imagine that the poet is drawing on the story-type of exile brought about by ἀνδροκτασίη. 'The Cretan' regrets abandoning his place of origin—or at least the half of his booty that he left there with his sons—but he presents himself as positive about his new start in life.

For Homer, then, voluntary and involuntary exile are close if not overlapping, and he does not give his characters a rhetoric which marks either out as a deprivation that is extreme or *sui generis*—that is reserved for women or old men who see their male relatives of fighting age slain and are themselves captured or killed in the sack of a city.[21]

This phenomenon becomes less surprising if we consider some cases of archaic migration known from later texts and a very few sidelights on such migration in poetry that was both contemporary with these migrations and, if we place our *Iliad* and *Odyssey* around 680–70 BC, almost contemporary with Homer. Whereas the movement of Greeks to found a new πόλις on a different site can often be ascribed to a combination of diverse factors—a general shortage of agricultural land on the existing site, trading opportunities imagined or already observed, the new site's superior land and situation—there are several cases where the political situation in the πόλις seems to have been crucial in precipitating the departure of a group.

According to a later tradition, already found in the fifth-century historian Antiochus of Syracuse (*FGrHist* 555 F 13) and preserved for us by Strabo (6.3.2), Tarentum was founded *c.* 706 BC by a group of Laconians, Partheniae, whom he claims to have been threatened with deprivation of their civic rights because they had been born when their Spartiate fathers were away from home fighting the first Messenian war; that their leader's name was Phalanthus has encouraged some to see a pre-Dorian stratum of the population that was being subjected to ethnic cleansing. The whole story has been doubted,[22] but even if fabricated it shows what patterns seemed plausible no later than the fifth century.

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21 E.g. Andromache at *Il.* 24.725–38.
22 E.g. by Osborne (1996) 179–80.

An analogous pattern is offered by Herodotus (4.146–9) for a dark-age Laconian foundation on Thera: Theras, a descendant of Polynices, was regent to his young nephews Eurysthenes and Procles, and when in due course they took power he so resented being ruled by others (cf. Hdt. 4.147.3: δεινὸν ποιεύμενος ἄρχεσθαι ὑπ' ἄλλων) that he went off to join alleged kinsfolk on Thera, taking with him both colonists from the Spartan tribes and a troublesome and recently arrived group claiming to be Minyans. The deal suited both those who left and those who stayed, though the departing Theras was said to have seen his son who stayed behind as a "sheep abandoned among wolves" (cf. Hdt. 4.149.1: τοιγαρῶν ἔφη αὐτὸν καταλείψειν ὄιν ἐν λύκοισι).

A third case may have a stronger claim to historical content. According to Herodotus (6.34–6), Miltiades, son of Cypselus and a descendant through Philaeus of Aeacus, was invited by a Thracian people in the Chersonese to assist their defence of that area, and (once given approval by Delphi) accepted the invitation because he was unhappy at being subjected to Peisistratus' régime in Attica and wanted to get out (cf. Hdt. 6.35.3: οἷα ἀχθόμενόν τε τῇ Πεισιστράτου ἀρχῇ καὶ βουλόμενον ἐκποδὼν εἶναι). So Miltiades sailed off with any Athenians who wanted to join him and was installed as tyrant in the Chersonese. The story makes sense. Although Peisistratus allowed other aristocrats to hold the archonship and presumably to exercise some degree of power, such subordination was not congenial to a man whose descent and wealth (marked out by Herodotus by the fact that he had already won an Olympic victory with a four-horse chariot)[23] seemed to entitle him to be top dog. Top dog he became in the Chersonese, and there is no sign of bad relations between his régime there and that of the Peisistratids in Attica.

This is not in any usual sense 'exile', but its consequences are very similar. We cannot tell how many regrets (if any) Miltiades and his fellow Athenians voiced for the hills and plains of Attica, the protected bays of its south-western coast, or the pomp of the developing Panathenaea. But—as in the tales of 'the Cretan', of the Partheniae, and of Theras—the decision to depart must have been perceived to involve losses as well as gains.

In this context we may contemplate the cases of Archilochus and Semonides. First, the well-known primary texts:

[23] Cf. Hdt. 6.36.1. A closely contemporary indication of the prestige attaching to a chariot victory is given by the dedication by an Alcmeonid, Alcmeonides son of Alcmeon, at the Ptoion in Boeotia, *CEG* 302 (Hansen, *c.* 540 BC?).

ἔα Πάρον, καὶ σῦκα κεῖνα, καὶ θαλάσσιον βίον

Archil. fr. 116 (West)

Away with Paros and those figs and the sea-bound life.

Πανελλήνων ὀϊζὺς ἐς Θάσον συνέδραμεν

Archil. fr. 102 (West)

The misery of Panhellenes has rushed together to Thasos.

ἥδε δ' ὥστ' ὄνου ῥάχις
ἕστηκεν ὕλης ἀγρίης ἐπιστεφής

Archil. fr. 21 (West)

This (island), like the backbone of an ass, stands up, crowned with wild forest.

οὐ γάρ τι καλὸς χῶρος οὐδ' ἐφίμερος
οὐδ' ἐρατός, οἷος ἀμφὶ Σίριος ῥοάς

Archil. fr. 22 (West)

For it is in no way a beautiful or a desirable or a lovely land, like that round about the streams of the Siris.

These lines are compatible with, but can hardly be said to prove, the narrative later told about Archilochus:[24] that he was the son of a Parian, Telesicles, who left Paros to found a colony on Thasos; that Archilochus himself went to Thasos, perhaps not with his father but later, and there was active as a citizen both fighting Thracians and Naxians for control of the Thracian Peraea to which Thasos gave ready access and embroiled in political in-fighting in the new πόλις of Thasos. The inscription of Mnesiepes from the Parian Archilocheion (*SEG* 15.517 E 1 col. II 41–52) has the poet's father Telesicles and the poet's enemy Lycambes co-operating—or at least serving together—on an embassy from Paros to Delphi, and the father returning to Paros to be greeted first by his son destined for immortality as a poet. Two centuries earlier Critias (*VS* 88 B 44 = Ael. *VH* 10.13) had been able to read poems of Archilochus as showing that he had left Paros as a result of poverty (διὰ πενίαν καὶ ἀπορίαν) and that on arrival at Thasos he had acquired enemies there (τοῖς ἐνταῦθα ἐχθρὸς ἐγένετο).

So far our surviving fragments of Archilochus do not allow us to decide whether the poems that stated or implied enmity with Lycambes were composed for first performance in Paros or in Thasos. If the

[24] Much of this is a Parian narrative, found in the inscriptions erected in the Parian Archilocheion by Mnesiepes (third cent. BC, *SEG* 15.517) and Sosthenes (first cent. BC, *SEG* 15.518). We cannot be sure that it was fully supported by the surviving poetry, far less that Thasians accepted the same tradition. For Archilochus' putative biography cf. Burnett (1983), Bowie (1996), Clay (2004).

enmity with Lycambes began or was wholly associated with Paros, then the movement of Archilochus' father and (then?) Archilochus to Thasos may have been partly due to something approaching στάσις between two families who were ἐχθροί—i.e. a variant of the schema we have seen in the stories of 'the Cretan' (*Od.* 13.257–86), of Theras (Hdt. 4.146–9) and of Miltiades (Hdt. 6.34.6). In that context it is not wholly surprising that nothing survives in which Archilochus laments the island he had had to leave. The notion that recollections of an early love-affair included clambering across its craggy glens[25] is less likely than that these curves are human and female.[26] The Parian image that survives is of figs and fish. Parian figs are good, and can command a high price, but their dismissal in fr. 116 (West) suggests that—like his shield, fr. 5 (West)—they seemed to Archilochus something for which he could easily find substitutes. That is not contradicted by his apparent reluctance to see the virtues of his new home: ironically it is precisely in his essay *De Exilio* that Plutarch cites fr. 21 (West) as a parallel for his readers' supposed inclination to ignore the advantages of exile and allow themselves to be obsessed by its demerits.[27] We cannot be sure whether this focus on Thasos' forested mountains and blindness to its arable land and vineyards was combined in the same poem with praise of a fine, desirable and lovely location by the river Siris (fr. 22 (West)), or whether indeed the speaker was not the poet himself but the carpenter Charon (cf. fr. 19 (West)) from whom the poet-narrator might in the end have expressed a different view. But at least we can say that we have nothing that articulates longing for a lost life in Paros.

If the case of Archilochus is hard to reconstruct, that of Semonides is well-nigh impossible. Indeed his movement from Samos to Amorgos may be quite unlike any of the cases I have reviewed. But neither superior agricultural land, nor pursuit of trade or metals, can explain the seventh century movement of Samians, led by Semonides, to one or more of the three cities that had been founded by Naxians *c.* 900 BC on Amorgos, a mere 60 miles west-south-west of Samos in the middle of the Aegean.[28] It is at least a possibility that political dissension (exac-

[25] So Lasserre (1950) 136 ff.

[26] So West (1974) 134.

[27] On this essay by Plutarch, and generally on the tradition of consolatory treatises on exile see Nesselrath, pp. 87 ff. below. Given Plutarch's habits of quotation, however, it would be unwise to infer that anything in the Archilochean poem from which he draws his brief quotation actually represented the poet's (or speaker's) situation as exile.

[28] For a brief account of Amorgos' three cities, Arcesine, Minoa and Aegiale, and references to further discussions see Catling (2003).

erbated by the barbs of Semonides' iambic ψόγος?) contributed to the exodus of Semonides and those who went with him. It may thus have been in the voice of a not wholly voluntary expatriate that the elegy later entitled "An Early History of the Samians" ('Αρχαιολογία τῶν Σαμίων) was first sung.[29] Did Semonides want to ensure continuity of cult and ktistic tradition? Was he keen to establish his own family's importance in Samian affairs before he himself was invited to leave? Was there the least hint of nostalgia?

These questions cannot be answered. But one further migrant poet may offer us nostalgia. Xenophanes grew up in Colophon but left it at the age of 25, presumably as one of its citizens who fled from the advancing Medes in 545 BC; though himself thereafter peripatetic for 67 years (cf. fr. 8 (West)), he seems to have been in some way involved in the Colophonians' establishment of a new πόλις at Elea in south Italy. His elegiac poems included a long account (2000 lines if we credit Diog. Laert. 9.18) of the foundation of Colophon and the colonisation of Elea, itself perhaps some testimony to his attachment to his city's traditions; and in one fragment about Colophonian luxury the philosopher's critical tone seems to be blended with a certain pride in the city's opulence at its acme (fr. 3 (West)):

> ἁβροσύνας δὲ μαθόντες ἀνωφελέας παρὰ Λυδῶν
> ὄφρα τυραννίης ἦσαν ἄνευ στυγερῆς,
> ᾔεσαν εἰς ἀγορὴν παναλουργέα φάρε' ἔχοντες
> οὐ μείους ὥσπερ χείλιοι ὡς ἐπίπαν,
> αὐχαλέοι, χαίτῃσιν †ἀγαλλομεν εὐπρεπέεσσιν,
> ἀσκητοῖς ὀδμὴν χρίμασι δευόμενοι.

> And having learned useless luxury from the Lydians, while they were free of hateful tyranny, they used to go to the agora wearing robes all of purple, no fewer than a thousand as a rule, proud and exulting (?) in the splendour of their hair, drenched with the scent of the most refined unguents.[30]

A near-contemporary who was also highly mobile was Ibycus of Rhegium. Modern accounts highlight his presence at the court of Polycrates of Samos, and Bowra even proposed two periods in his poetic career: composition of Stesichorean narratives in the West, then of shorter erotic songs in the Aegean.[31] The former may never have been in Ibycus'

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[29] For the identity of the 'Αρχαιολογία τῶν Σαμίων in the *Suda* entry on Semonides of Amorgos with his elegiac poem see Bowie (1986) and (2001a).

[30] Translation by Gerber (1999a).

[31] Cf. Bowra (1961) 245.

repertoire at all; as to the latter, the poem to Ganymede addressed to one Gorgias (fr. 289 Page/Davies) seems more likely than not to honour a member of the Leontini family that one or two generations later was to produce the sophist Gorgias.[32] Why did Ibycus leave Rhegium (if indeed he did)? The proverb "More behind the times than Ibycus" (ἀρχαιότερος Ἰβύκου) is explained in Diogenianus' collection of proverbs as follows: "for although he could have been tyrant he left his city" (οὗτος γὰρ τυραννεῖν δυνάμενος ἀπεδήμησεν).[33] The explanation may be unfounded, or may have been developed on the basis of some detail in his transmitted poetry. But that Ibycus was from the élite of Rhegium is probable, and dissent with others of his class may indeed have been a factor. But so far none of his fragments that have come down to us offers support for this idea, far less any indication that he regretted his expatriate lifestyle. Moreover one Hellenistic poet seems to have believed (mistakenly, perhaps) that he was buried in his native Rhegium.[34]

After so many cases where so little is clear even the confused traditions about Alcaeus of Mytilene present some welcome firm ground. A significant number of his poems made reference to his political conflicts (enough to be identified later as στασιωτικά, cf. Strabo 13.2.3). Some elements in his political biography seem clear. When a tyrant Melanchrus was overthrown (around 612–609 BC according to *Suda* π 1659) the coup involved "the brothers of Alcaeus"—an expression that need not exclude Alcaeus himself.[35] In the next few years Alcaeus himself fought at Sigeum for Mytilene against Athens in the campaign that also propelled Pittacus towards power.[36] But during these years too it seems that Alcaeus and Pittacus were initially allied in opposition to a tyrant Myrsilus;[37] and that the discovery of a plot against Myrsilus

[32] Note the Leontini topography of fr. S220 Page/Davies, from *P Oxy.* 2637.

[33] Diogenian. 2.71: one MS (B) adds "to Ionia" (εἰς Ἰωνίαν); 5.12 has the variant proverb ἀνοητότερος Ἰβύκου ("More senseless than Ibycus").

[34] Cf. *Anth. Pal.* 7.714 = Gow-Page, *HE* 3880–5. As Gow-Page note, *Anth. Pal.* 7.745 = *HE* Antipater (of Sidon?) 286–95 takes Corinth to be the place of Ibycus' death.

[35] Cf. Diog. Laert. 1.74: οὗτος [sc. Πιττακός] μετὰ τῶν Ἀλκαίου γενόμενος ἀδελφῶν Μέλαγχρον καθεῖλε τὸν τῆς Λέσβου τύραννον ("Getting together with the brothers of Alcaeus he brought down Melanchrus, the tyrant of Lesbos"). The idea that he was too young to participate (cf. Page (1955) 151–2) receives only fragile support from fr. 75.7 ff. (Campbell) but is endorsed by Campbell (1982) xiv.

[36] So Hdt. 5.95. For scepticism on all this cf. Hutchinson (2001) 187–8.

[37] Myrsilus too had at some point been in exile, from which he had returned in a small boat aided by Mnamon, the addressee of a poem discussed by the commentary in *P Oxy.* 2306 = fr. 305 (Campbell).

caused Alcaeus to go into what an ancient commentator calls his "first exile", at Pyrrha, some 15 miles from Mytilene as the crow flies.[38] The commentator's phraseology shows that Alcaeus' departure followed a pattern we have already seen in Homeric poetry, an intolerable act followed by a decision to leave rather than face the consequences: "in the first exile when Alcaeus' faction organised a plot againt Myrsilus [?and it was betrayed?] and [the plotters?] made a move before facing criminal charges and fled to Pyrrha".[39] The commentator's reading of the texts available to him may of course be unreliable, and my own rendering 'face criminal charges' may be procedurally more scrupulous than what the commentator envisaged.[40] But judicial imposition of a penalty of exile seems not to have been in question.

Pittacus may well have been one of the plotters, and certainly Alcaeus' view was that Pittacus swore oaths with him to defeat their common enemies (cf. fr. 129 Campbell and see below). But at some point Pittacus abandoned Alcaeus' group and joined Myrsilus (cf. fr. 70.7 Campbell). Myrsilus' death gave Alcaeus cause for sympotic rejoicing (cf. fr. 332 Campbell), at least momentarily, but Pittacus then consolidated his own position as τύραννος: indeed, according to Aristotle "the Mytileneans chose Pittacus against the exiles who were headed by Antimenidas and the poet Alcaeus".[41] Thus Alcaeus and his comrades (ἑταῖροι) were edged into the political and (in Alcaeus' eyes)[42] literal wilderness. Another commentary preserved on a papyrus refers to "the second exile", showing that ancient scholars working on Alcaeus could distinguish at least two periods in which he was exiled from Mytilene: like the first, the second may also have taken Alcaeus no further than another part of Lesbos—frustratingly, the word which might have given us its location

[38] The figure of "eight miles" given by Page (1955) 197 is a mistake, whether his or a printer's.

[39] Cf. fr. 114 (Campbell) = *P Berol.* 9569: κατὰ τὴν φυγὴν τὴν πρώτην ὅτ ' ἐπὶ Μυρσίλον κατεσκευασάμ[(εν)]οι ἐπιβουλὴν οἱ π(ερὶ) 'Αλκαῖον κ( ) φαν[ . ] ι̣. [ . ] ς̣ δ(ὲ) π̣ ( ) φθάσα[ν]τες πρὶν ἢ δίκη[ν] ὑπο[σ]χεῖν ἔφ[υ]γον [εἰ]ς Πύρραν. Unfortunately of the poem on which this seems to be a commentary only the first few letters of 13 lines are preserved and the sequence of thought cannot be recovered.

[40] Campbell (1982) 287 renders "before being punished".

[41] Cf. Arist. *Pol.* 1285$^{a}$35 (discussing αἰσυμνῆται): οἷον εἵλοντό ποτε Μυτιληναῖοι Πιττακὸν πρὸς τοὺς φυγάδας, ὧν προειστήκεσαν 'Αντιμενίδας καὶ 'Αλκαῖος ὁ ποιητής. δηλοῖ δὲ 'Αλκαῖος ὅτι τύραννον εἵλοντο τὸν Πιττακὸν ἔν τινι τῶν σκολίων μελῶν: ἐπιτιμᾷ γὰρ ὅτι . . . Aristotle then goes on to cite three lines of Alcaeus which are our fr. 348 (Campbell); these three lines do not in fact show that he was appointed/elected specifically to deal with "the exiles".

[42] Cf. fr. 130B.9 (Campbell): ἐσχατίαις, and see below.

is damaged.[43] There was apparently debate in antiquity as to whether Antimenidas was still with Alcaeus at this point, though his overseas campaigning as a mercenary fighting for the Babylonians[44] is more easily linked with Alcaeus' first period of exile.[45] Alcaeus' second exile seems certainly to have been under the tyranny of Pittacus. A 'third return' (usually assumed to imply a third exile) seems to be associated by the same ancient commentary with the late 580s BC.[46]

Two comparatively long fragments, 129 (Campbell) and 130B (Campbell), preserve responses to some of these situations, voiced in sympotic songs addressed to comrades (ἑταῖροι): the vocative of fr. 130B.4 (Campbell) "O Agesilaidas" marks him as this poem's primary addressee; the opening of fr. 129 (Campbell), which presumably also had a named addressee in the vocative, is lost.[47] I shall argue that 130B (Campbell) ascribes some form of φυγή to Pittacus, and a less colourful φυγή to Alcaeus himself, than is usually thought, and that taken together with fr. 72 (Campbell) it offers evidence that Pittacus too exemplified a mode of displacement.

Our surviving lines of fr. 129 (Campbell) open with a description of the establishment of a common cult of Zeus, Hera and Dionysus, probably at Messon near the gulf of Callone on the island's south-west coast.[48] The shrine at Messon is a little over three miles from Pyrrha, and it is easy to suppose Alcaeus visited it to make offerings and prayers during his 'first exile' at Pyrrha. The cult's divinities are appealed to by the poet to save "us" from "these toils and vexatious exile" (fr. 129.11–2 (Campbell): ἐκ δὲ τῶν̣[δ]ε̣ μ̣ό̣χ̣θων / ἀργαλέας τε φύγας ῥ[ύεσθε) and an Erinys is bidden to requite Pittacus for breaking the oath ritually sworn that either they would die at the hands of those then in power or would kill them and save the "people" from its woes. If Pittacus was initially part of the group that left Mytilene for Alcaeus' 'first exile' then it is very likely that the oaths to which Alcaeus appeals in fr. 129 (Campbell) were solemnly sworn in the shrine whose foundation lines 1–9 describe.

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[43] Cf. *P Oxy.* 2506 fr. 98 = Campbell (1982) testimonium 9 (c) 4–6: τὴ]ν δευτέραν [. . . . . .] . α̣ς̣ φυγὴν καὶ τὴν π̣[ρὸ]ς τ̣ῆι γεφύρη<ι> παράταξιν ἔτι μέμνηται τοῦ ᾿Αν[τι]μεν̣ί̣δα.

[44] Cf. fr. 350 (Campbell), cited both by Hephaestion (*Ench.* 10.3) and by Strabo (13.2.3); for chronology see Page (1955) 223–6, Campbell (1982) xiii–xvi.

[45] Cf. Page (1955) 223–4.

[46] Cf. *P Oxy.* 2506 fr. 98 = Campbell (1982) testimonium 9 (c).

[47] For my purpose it makes little difference to which stage of the conflict either belongs (which is just as well, since in this too certainty is unattainable).

[48] So Robert (1960). Quinn (1961) opted for Cape Phocas.

Alcaeus draws a verbal parallel between his own salvation from exile (fr. 129.11–2 (Campbell): ἐκ δὲ τῶν̣[δ]ε̣ μ̣ό̣χθων / ἀργαλέας τε φύγας ῥ[ύεσθε) and the salvation of the "people" from its woes (fr. 129.20 (Campbell): δᾶμον ὐπὲξ ἀχέων ῥύεσθαι). The latter involve Pittacus "devouring the city" (fr. 129.23–4 (Campbell): δάπτει / τὰν πόλιν): the pains of the former are not elaborated, but perhaps share with the latter the painful thought that the produce of Alcaeus' family properties is ending up in Pittacus' hands and belly.

More detail on the pains of exile emerges from fr. 130B (Campbell):

ἀγνοι̣ς̣ . . . σ̣βιότοις . . . ις ὀ τάλαις ἔγω
ζώω μοῖραν ἔχων ἀγροϊωτίκαν
ἰ̣μέρρων ἀγόρας ἄκουσαι
καρ̣υ̣[ζο]μένας ̓Ωγεσιλαΐδα

καὶ β[ό]λ̣λ̣ας· τὰ πάτηρ καὶ πάτερος πάτηρ
κα<γ>γ[ε]γήρασ' ἔχοντες πεδὰ τωνδέων
τῶν [ἀ]λλαλοκάκων πολί̣ταν
ἔγ[ω . ἀ]πὺ τούτων ἀπελήλαμαι

φεύγων ἐσχατίαις ὡς δ' ̓Ονυμακλέης
ἔ̣νθα[δ'] ο̣ἶος ἐοίκησα λυκαιμίαις
.[ ]ον [π]ό̣λεμον· στάσιν γὰρ·
πρὸς κρ. [. . . .] . οὐκ †ἄμεινον† ὀννέλην.

. ] . [. . .] .[. . .] . μακάρων ἐς τέμ[ε]νος θέων
ἐοι̣[. . . . .] μ̣ε̣[λ]αίνας ἐπίβαις χθόνος
χλι . [.] . [.] . [.]ν̣ συνόδοισί μ' αὔταις
οἴκημι κ[ά]κων ἔκτος ἔχων πόδας,

ὄππαι Λ[εσβί]αδες κριννόμεναι φύαν
πώλεντ' ἐλκεσίπεπλοι, περὶ δὲ βρέμει
ἄχω θεσπεσία γυναίκων
ἴρα[ς ὀ]λολύγας ἐνιαυσίας

] .[. ΄] . [.] . ἀπ̣ὺ̣ πόλλ̣ω̣ν π̣ότα δὴ θέοι
] . [ ΄]σ̣κ̣ . . . ν ̓Ο̣λ̣ύ̣μ̣πιοι
] . . . . . .
. ν̣α̣[ ] . . . μ̣εν.

. . . I poor wretch, live with the lot of a rustic, longing to hear the assembly being summoned, Agesilaidas, and the council: the property in possession of which my father and my father's father have grown old among these mutually destructive citizens, from it I have been driven, an exile at the back of beyond, and like Onomacles I settled here alone in the wolf-thickets (?) (leaving the?) war . . . for to get rid of strife against . . . is not . . . to the precinct of the blessed gods . . . treading on the black earth; . . . meetings themselves I dwell, keeping my feet out of trouble, where Lesbian women

with trailing robes go to and fro being judged for beauty, and around rings the marvellous sound of the sacred yearly shout of women; . . . from many (troubles) when will the Olympian gods (free me)? . . .[49]

Alcaeus' self-pity (130B.1: ὀ τάλαις ἔγω) is explained by his rustic life (130B.2: ζώω μοῖραν ἔχων ἀγροϊωτίκαν) and his longing to hear calls to meetings of the assembly and of the council (130B.3–5: ἰμέρρων ἀγόρας ἄκουσαι / καρ̣υ̣[ζο]μένας ᾽Ωγεσιλαΐδα / καὶ β̣[ό]λ̣λ̣ας). This is further glossed by his reflection that he has been driven away from those things his father and grandfather grew old enjoying along with their mutually destructive fellow-citizens (130B.5–8):

τὰ πάτηρ καὶ πάτερος πάτηρ
κα<γ>γ[ε]γήρασ᾽ ἔχοντες πεδὰ τωνδέων
τὼν [ἀ]λλαλοκάκων πολίτ̣αν
ἔγ[ω . ἀ]πὺ τούτων ἀπελήλαμαι.

The property in possession of which my father and my father's father have grown old among these mutually destructive citizens, from it I have been driven.[50]

By contrast, he says in most interpretations, he is "an exile at the back of beyond, and like Onomacles I settled here alone in the wolf-thickets(?) (leaving the?) war".[51] These lines (9–11) of the poem are now also known from a quotation in a papyrus commentary, which has excluded some earlier readings but still leaves much uncertain:[52] on the basis of Haslam's readings of that papyrus the text now seems to have run

φεύγων ἐσχατίαις ὠς δ᾽ ὀνυμακλέης
ωθ.ν . ος ἐοίκησα λυκαιχμίαις
φεύγων τὸν πόλεμον

Keeping clear in the back-country, but like Onomacles [. . . . .] I have taken up residence in the wolf-thickets (?)/as wolf-fodder (?) keeping clear of the war.

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[49] Translation by Campbell (1982).

[50] Translation by Campbell (1982).

[51] Campbell's translation (1982), based on a text of 130B.10 (Campbell) which ran ἔνθα[δ᾽] οἶος ἐοίκησα λυκαιμίαις. Alcaeus does not develop at all the physical demerits of his back-country location (not surprisingly, perhaps, if he had ready access to the annual beauty competition, mentioned in lines 17–20!). He therefore seems not to offer a cue to later writers who do, e.g. Ovid, *Pont.* 1.3.45–6, 3.1.5 ff., Sen. *Helv.* 9.1, Plut. *De Exil.* 602C.

[52] Cf. *P Oxy.* 3711, ed. M. W. Haslam: lines 9–11 of fr. 130B (Campbell) are lines 31–3 of the commentary. Good discussion in Hutchinson (2001) 208–14.

The repetition of φεύγων in both 9 and 11 is surprising. Surprising too is the fact that the commentary goes on immediately (33–6) to identify Aenos as a city in Thrace (Αἶνος Θρ[ά]κης πόλις) and to discuss its settlement and early history. The word λυκαιχμίας remains mysterious, and the gloss on λυκαιχμίας offered by Hesychius λ 1369: ὁ λυκόβρωτος ("wolf-fodder"), as a description of a person, will work here only if we suppose λυκαιχμίαις to be either a nominative or a dative written by mistake for a nominative. Haslam followed Lobel in taking Onomacles to be a personal name, and thought both that 'Ωθάναος could be read in the papyrus he was editing (*P Oxy*. 3711) and that 'Ωθάναιος could be read in the earlier text edited by Lobel (*P Oxy*. 2165). But he conceded that no story was known, to do with wolf-fodder or otherwise, concerning an Athenian Onomacles, and he could offer no explanation of why the commentator went on to explain what and where the city of Aenos was.

I propose (with some diffidence, but with the sense that desperate situations need desperate remedies):

φεύγων ἐσχατίαις, ὠς δ' ὄνυμ' ἀκλέης
ἐνθ' ᾤναιος ἐοίκησα λυκαιχμίαις
φεύγων τὸν πόλεμον

Keeping clear in the back-country, but like somebody of no renown I have taken up residence where the Aenian wolf-fodder lived keeping clear of the war.

Line 9: the word-division and obliteration of the proper name Onomacles involve no emendation, simply a different interpretation of the letters on the papyrus. The contrast between the behaviour and treatment expected by somebody of Alcaeus' claimed noble ancestry and that of an allegedly less distinguished enemy is a theme familiar from fr. 72.11–13 (Campbell)—where the enemy is Pittacus.

Line 11: this proposal for the first letters relies heavily on Lobel's reading of *P Oxy.* 2165: . . . θα . οιοσ, suggesting σ or ε for the first letter. Haslam thought he could there read ωθα. αιοσ, and in *P Oxy.* 3711 ωθ . ν .οσ. As far as I can see [. . .] θα is indeed preferable as a reading for *P Oxy.* 2165, but not at all easy for *P Oxy.* 3711. ᾤναιος as a crasis for ὁ Αἴναιος is open to the serious objection that in later Greek texts the ethnic for a man from Aenos is Αἴνιος, as indeed would be expected. There are many cases, however, where more than one ethnic for a city is recorded, and a reading of the letters that involves a reference to Aenos is the only way to explain the uncomfortable phenomenon that the commentator dilates on the place Aenos.

Who is the "wolf-fodder"? Rather than seeing this (or a term describing some other relationship to wolves) as a self-pitying description of Alcaeus himself, my reading applies this to another—another person who at some recent time had also lived where Alcaeus now lives, "keeping clear of the war". This has two advantages: first, Alcaeus does not repeat φεύγων with apparent stylistic insouciance in two descriptions of himself—instead the repetition performs the function of drawing a parallel between himself and the wolf-fodder man. Second, the compound epithet now conforms to Alcaeus' attested practice, which is to use such compounds as descriptions of another but not of himself—whether complimentary epithets used in addresses to gods[53] or mortals[54] or in describing a helmet[55] or exotic birds,[56] or derogatory epithets used of his city,[57] his fellow-citizens[58] and above all his enemies.[59]

Who then is the "wolf-fodder from Aenos"? The commentator's point that Aenos is a city in Thrace is not irrelevant. What follows must here be only a brief statement of an argument that I hope to set out at length elsewhere. The name Pittacus seems itself to be Thracian[60] and the repeated accusation of his being κακοπατρίδας (cf. n. 59) would be more likely to be effective if there were some weakness in his claim to aristocratic Mytilenean descent: on the other hand, as many have pointed out, his ability to play the political game in Mytilene limits the extent to which we might ascribe any non-Mytilenean ancestry.

The invective of fr. 72 (Campbell) is crucial here. The first strophe to survive complete depicts day and night consumption of unmixed wine, and a place where the custom was to . . . Then there is a gap. The second surviving strophe refers to a man in the third person, κῆνος, as not forgetting such things when he first "created a disturbance", for he kept drinking all night. The third strophe addressed somebody in the second person, expressing outrage that somebody "descended from such a

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[53] Cf. fr. 34.6 (Campbell), perhaps fr. 261.5 (Campbell).
[54] Cf. fr. 130B.18 (Campbell), below, fr. 384.1 (Campbell).
[55] Cf. fr. 329 (Campbell).
[56] Cf. fr. 345.2 (Campbell).
[57] Cf. fr. 348.2 (Campbell).
[58] Here fr. 130B.7 (Campbell).
[59] Several times κακοπατρίδας, fr. 67.4 (Campbell), fr. 75.11 (Campbell), fr. 348.1 (Campbell), perhaps fr. 106.3 (Campbell). Diog. Laert. 1.81 (= fr. 429) lists eight terms of abuse used by Alcaeus of Pittacus: five are compounds (σαράποδα, σάραπον, χειροπόδην, ζοφοδορπίδαν, ἀγάσυρτον). By analogy θεοσύλαισι at fr. 298.18 (Campbell) points to Pittacus; λάβολον at fr. 68.3 (Campbell) refers to an enemy's father.
[60] Cf. Thuc. 4.107.3.

woman" should have the same repute as free men from noble parents. The second-person addressee must be different from the third-person κῆνος, and even without other indication might be taken most probably to be Pittacus. But what is the logic of "descended from such a woman" when at least two strophes have lambasted a male κῆνος? It makes no sense to suggest that "such a woman" is Pittacus' mother, as (e.g.) did Page, even if one supposes (plausibly enough) that this woman has been "the principal subject in the earlier part of the poem".[61] Besides a notice in the *Suda* describes Pittacus' mother as from Lesbos.[62] All becomes simpler if we note the ἐκ- in the compound ἐκγεγόνων (fr. 72.11). Although in epic poetry the verb ἐκγίγνεσθαι does regularly mean 'to be the offspring of', the noun ἔκγονος has the wider meaning of 'descendant', and sometimes the more specific meaning 'grandson'.[63] We have no other case of ἐκγίγνεσθαι in Lesbian poetry to control our translation here, but it would be rash to insist that Alcaeus cannot use it to mean 'being the grandson of'. The gain is substantial. The lady to whom Alcaeus returns in line 11 (σὺ δὴ τεαύτας ἐκγεγόνων ἔχῃς) and whom he had presumably excoriated in previous lines, now lost, becomes Pittacus' grandmother—or more precisely and relevantly, the mother of his father. It is her being that father's mother that can explain his bad behaviour—if we allow that she might be the Thracian and the source of "kakopatrid" blood. An admittedly speculative reconstruction explains several phenomena. Pittacus' grandfather could have been one of the Aeolian colonists who established Aenos at the mouth of the Hebrus.[64] That grandfather married a local girl (Thracian, and doubtless from a good family), and their son returned to Mytilene, there to father Pittacus, to give him, perhaps incautiously, a Thracian name, and to maintain the objectionable drinking habits associable with Thrace.[65] That allows the abusive "the Aenian" to be added to the list of vilificatory terms heaped by Alcaeus upon Pittacus.[66]

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[61] Page (1955) 173.

[62] Cf. *Suda* π 1659: Πιττακός· μητρὸς δὲ Λεσβίας.

[63] See LSJ s.vv.

[64] For Hdt. 7.28.3 Aenos is an Aeolian city; for Homer *Il.* 4.520 it was Thracian (at the 'time' of the Trojan War). As far as I know we have no firm evidence to date the Aeolian settlement. Given the Mytilenean claim to the Troad (Strabo 13.1.38) apparently for some time before the war with Athens over Sigeum, it is quite coherent to suppose a Lesbian interest in the territory at the mouth of the Hebrus in the first half of the seventh century (when, as discussed above, Parians and Naxians were competing for territory further west along the Thracian coast).

[65] Cf. Θρηϊκίην . . . ἄμυστιν at Callim. fr. 178.11 (Pfeiffer) and LSJ s.v. ἄμυστις II.

[66] This also allows the apparently innocuous prayer to the river Hebrus in fr. 45

All this is fragile. But if it is anywhere near the truth, then both the family of Alcaeus and that of Pittacus reaped displacements from Mytilene from their involvement in its aristocratic politics: Pittacus' grandfather in colonising Aenos, Alcaeus in two or perhaps three 'exiles', Alcaeus' brother Antimenidas in at least one of these 'exiles' and in mercenary fighting in the Eastern Mediterranean. It is vexing that we have no poems which convey the reactions to these closely similar situations from any mouth other than that of Alcaeus.

Before leaving Alcaeus mention should be made of another equally perplexing sequence, fr. 73 (Campbell):

πὰν φόρτι[ο]ν δ . . . [
δ' ὄττι μάλιστα σάλ[

καὶ κύματι πλάγεισ[α
ὄμβρωι μάχεσθαι . . . [
φαῖσ' οὐδὲν ἰμέρρη[ν, ἀσάμωι
δ' ἔρματι τυπτομ[ένα

κῆνα μὲν ἐν τούτ̣[
τούτων λελάθων ὠ . [
σύν τ' ὔμμι τέρπ[εσθ]α̣[ι συν]ἄ̣βαις
καὶ πέδα Βύκχιδος αὐ̣ . . . [

τὼ δ' ἄμμες ἐς τὰν ἄψερον ἀ̣[
αἰ καί τισαφ [. . .] . . αντ . . [
δ̣είχνυντε[

Campbell's translation (1982) runs as follows:[67]

> . . . the whole cargo . . . as much as possible (by the surf?) . . . she says she has no wish to be struck by a . . . wave and to fight against the rain (and the wild storm?) and (to be broken?) battered by a hidden reef. Let her in these circumstances (go her way; I, my friend, wish) to forget these things and to enjoy being young in company with you all, and together with Bycchis to . . .; and so we to the next (day) . . . if any . . . showing . . .

One line of interpretation of this fragment has taken the ship which appears to be the subject of lines 1–8 as an allegory either for the state or for Alcaeus' faction, thus assimilating the poem from which it comes to those represented by the more fully preserved frr. 6 (Campbell) and 208 (Campbell), both held by most scholars to be allegories.[68] The

(Campbell) to be added to those poems in which Alcaeus invokes gods to punish Pittacus—but that is another story.

[67] Campbell (1982) 277–9.

[68] Page (1955) 179–96 remains a fundamental discussion: he cites earlier views at p. 182 n. 2.

hypothesis that frr. 6 and 208 are allegories seems to me much more precarious than is usually thought, but this is not the place to scrutinise scholarship's love-affair with allegorical interpretation of Alcaeus from its beginnings in the Hellenistic period. That the ship of fr. 73 (Campbell) is indeed allegorical is much more persuasive, but it is far from clear how the allegory works. As Page observed,[69] the publication of a papyrus commentary at least part of which certainly relates to fr. 73 called into question the view that the ship "was a symbol for State or Party". His own view, based on the second column of the papyrus (*P Oxy.* 2307, fr. 306 (i) columns i and ii (Campbell)), was that either the ship is symbolic of a woman or a woman symbolic of a ship.[70] The idea that the papyrus commentary's second column is on the same poem as its first has been challenged,[71] but even without it the female subject of the first lines of fr. 73 (Campbell) remains to be explained. Certainty is no nearer than when Page wrote in 1955, but to me the easier option is to take the feminines as referring to a woman who is real, and who is compared by Alcaeus to a ship. Since 1955 we have acquired a few more lines of the poem of Archilochus that we already knew to have opened οὐκέθ' ὁμῶς θάλλεις ἁπαλὸν χρόα . . . (fr. 188.1 (West)), and these new lines have given us an example of a woman whose alleged decrepitude is linked with her being battered by many wintry winds (ἦ γὰρ πολλὰ δή σ' ἐπῆιξεν / [πνεύμ]ατα χειμερίων ἀνέμων (fr. 188.4–5 (West)), winds which seem to some degree allegorical. There is no trace of Archilochus' woman being compared to a ship, but the allegorical winds and their link with unpleasant ageing offer a parallel for the interpretation of Alcaeus fr. 73 (Campbell) which attracted Page.

On this hypothesis the first half of the poem from which Alcaeus fr. 73 (Campbell) comes will have described a woman in whom Alcaeus had once shown an interest and whom he now represents as being self-confessedly too old to want to continue the attachment—instead he claims he would like to have a good time (presumably in a symposion) with his addressees (whose names are sadly lost) and with Bycchis.

Against this interpretation stand the traces in the commentary, fr. 306 (i) col. i fr. 16 which runs:

[69] Cf. Page (1955) 193.
[70] Cf. Page (1955) 195–6.
[71] Cf. Koniaris (1966).

νό]σ̣τ̣ου λ̣ε̣λ̣άθων [
σύ]μ τ' ὔμμι τέρπε̣[σθαι
]ά̣βαις καὶ πεδὰ [Βύκχιδος.

Forgetting return home (?)
And to have fun with you people
[. . . . . . . . .] and along with Bycchis.

Since the second and third lines of fr. 16 match lines 9–10 of fr. 73 (Campbell) it is natural to take the first line as matching fr. 73.8, and Lobel argued that νόστου was likely to have been the original reading, and that for it τούτων had come in under the influence of τούτ[ in the previous line. That has given rise to the view that Alcaeus here makes reference to a return to Mytilene—νό]σ̣του—of which he despairs.[72] There are difficulties with this fragile edifice. The dismissive line 7—κῆνα μὲν ἐν τούτ̣[—does indeed offer closure to the preceding section; but that the next, proposing sympotic merriment, should start with no apparent connection with what precedes is bizarre. The merit of τούτων λελάθων (as offered by fr. 73 (Campbell) = *P Oxy.* 1234 fr. 3) is that it provides a well-paralleled retrospective connection. If something like νό]σ̣του stood in the text the commentator is quoting, it is much more likely to have been τούτου than νόστου.[73]

Another aristocrat whose response to exile might survive is Theognis, if indeed lines 1197–1202 of the *Theognidea* are about exile, and if he is the composer of these lines, as the vocative address Πολυπαΐδη in 1197 might suggest (*Theognidea* 1197–202):[74]

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[72] Thus Cucchiarelli (1997) 220 and Gaertner (p. 158 below), who interpret the description of a ship struggling with a storm in fr. 73.3–6 (Campbell) as an image not of old age, but of the poet's situation in exile and compare similar passages in Ovid's exile poetry, see p. 158 below.

[73] It is not certain that all the words of fr. 16 are verbatim quotations. The commentator might be explaining the reference of τούτων, and the genitive may have been an explicatory phrase such as [τοῦ μετὰ τῆς γυναικὸς συμπο]σίου λελάθων. . . .

[74] For the problem of the *Theognidea* see West (1974), Figueira/Nagy (1984), Bowie (1997b). West takes address to Cyrnus (which always appears in its vocative form Κύρνε) as a *prima facie* indication of authorship by a poet Theognis of Megara (whom he places towards the end of the seventh century) and most scholars have taken the vocative Πολυπαΐδη to be an alternative form of address (e.g. a patronymic) to the same individual. If that were correct then 1197–202 would have a fair chance of being by Theognis. It has some support from the appearance of Κύρνε at the beginning (183) and Πολυπαΐδη towards the end (191) of what can be argued to be a complete poem, 183–92: but there is clearly something missing at 188–9, and it cannot be certain that these lines form one poem, not parts of two. There is, therefore, some chance that Κύρνε and Πολυπαΐδη address not the same person but different individuals, and therefore that 1197–202 are not by the author of the Κύρνε poems. Given, however, disagreement on

ὄρνιθος φωνήν, Πολυπαΐδη, ὀξὺ βοώσης
  ἤκουσ', ἥ τε βροτοῖς ἄγγελος ἦλθ' ἀρότου
ὡραίου· καί μοι κραδίην ἐπάταξε μέλαιναν.
ὅττι μοι εὐανθεῖς ἄλλοι ἔχουσιν ἀγρούς,
οὐδέ μοι ἡμίονοι κυφὸν ἕλκουσιν ἄροτρον
  †τῆς ἄλλης μνηστῆς† εἵνεκα ναυτιλίης.

I have heard the cry of the bird, Polypaides, calling shrilly, the bird which has come as a herald to men of the time that is ripe for ploughing. And it smote my black heart, because other men have my blooming fields, nor is it for me that mules drag the curved plough . . . because of sea-faring.

The corruption of the last line throws the interpretation of the whole piece into doubt: was it a sea-voyage, commercially unsuccessful or simply disastrously protracted, that had caused the poet to lose control of his lands? Or had he lost them for some other reason, and has now to contemplate making a living by ναυτιλίη? Indeed has he really lost control of his land, or is it just that he has had to sell his mules, and so has been forced to rent out his land for another to plough and plant? This last interpretation would put the poem's theme closer to the passage of Hesiod's *Works and Days* (448–51) which these lines rework: there the bird-cry (that of the crane, γέρανος) pains the heart of the man who has no oxen (Hes. *Op.* 451: κραδίην δ' ἔδακ' ἀνδρὸς ἀβούτεω), and the poet may expect his audience to remember that in *Works and Days* Hesiod also sang unenthusiastically of ναυτιλίη (618–32). Furthermore the bird-cry is more likely to take place at the expected season of the year, and to be more poignant, if the poet is still located near to his lamented lands. We may, then, be hearing a complaint not of exile but of destitution.

That exiles were to be found in the symposia for which such poems as this were composed, and that consequently some reflections on exile became part, albeit a small part, of the wide range of possible subjects for sympotic song, is, nevertheless, clear from some other elegiac lines from the *Theognidea*. Of these one couplet is *prima facie* attributable to Theognis himself by reason of its vocative Κύρνε (*Theognidea* 333–4):

μήποτε φεύγοντ' ἄνδρα ἐπ' ἐλπίδι, Κύρνε, φιλήσῃς,
  οὐδὲ γὰρ οἴκαδε βὰς γίνεται αὐτὸς ἔτι.[75]

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the date of that author (late seventh cent., West (1974); *c.* 530 BC, Bowie (1997b) following the *Suda*; early sixth cent., Lane-Fox (2000)) or even on his being a single figure (Nagy (1984)), the identity of the Κύρνε and Πολυπαΐδη poems would still not give us a firm date for the latter.

[75] I see no reason to resist Bergk's αὑτὸς—hardly an emendation—for αὐτὸς in the MSS.

> Do not befriend a man who is in exile, Kyrnos, on the basis of hope, for not even when he has gone home is he still the same man.

Here the paranoid aristocrat adds exiles to his ample category of unsafe friends: the οὐδέ at the beginning of the pentameter rubs salt in the wound—the line's main point is that the friendship formed in exile cannot be relied upon to persist if the exile regains his former status in his own city; but οὐδέ, "not even", insinuates that already in exile the man can be perceived to be different from (and by implication less admirable than) what he was before being exiled.

The compiler of this section of the *Theognidea* (whatever one takes to be its boundaries) has placed 333–4 next to another couplet on exile that was also taken into the block with the highest proportion of genuinely Theognidean verses, 19–254: 332a–b (found only here in the Paris manuscript) appears with a small variation at 209–10:

> 209 οὐδείς τοι φεύγοντι φίλος καὶ πιστὸς ἑταῖρος,
> 210 τῆς δὲ φυγῆς ἐστιν τοῦτ' ἀνιηρότερον.

> A man in exile has no friend and no trusty comrade, and this is more painful than actual exile.

> 332a οὐκ ἔστιν φεύγοντι φίλος καὶ πιστὸς ἑταῖρος,
> 332b τῆς δὲ φυγῆς ἐστιν τοῦτ' ἀνιηρότατον.

> A man in exile has no friend and no trusty comrade, and this is the most painful thing about exile.

We are dealing here with the sort of minor variation that must have been even commoner in the transmission of sympotic poetry than our ample surviving cases demonstrate. The words of 209–10 are rhetorically more effective, but that can be no guide to which version was composed and sung first. Either might have provoked the response that is juxtaposed to 332a–b, viz. 333–4. The absence of the vocative Κύρνε denies us any basis for claiming that either couplet was composed by Theognis, though of course either could have been part of a longer sequence that was indeed addressed to Κύρνε; but even if it were, its focalisation through the eyes of an exile would not clinch the case for Theognis himself having endured exile. The sentiment, however, seems to have rung bells in later generations. The Polynices of Euripides' *Phoenissae* brings up the loss of friends in his long exchange on the ills of exile with Jocasta (*Phoen.* 403), and Ovid returns to it frequently.[76] Then late in the

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[76] Cf. e.g. *Tr.* 1.5.64: *me profugum comites deseruere mei*, 1.9.65, 5.6.46, 5.7.41, *Pont.* 1.3.49,

second century AD Clement of Alexandria quotes 332a (*Strom.* 6.8.1).

The last Theognidean texts are two pieces found juxtaposed very near the end of the collection often called "book 1": the two couplets that separate them from the end (1217–20) both have the vocative Κύρνε, suggesting they are attributable to Theognis, but that is unlikely to be true of 1209–10, and is certainly not true of 1211–16.

1209–10 opens with a word which (if it is an ethnic) is almost certainly corrupt, and if it is not an ethnic is unintelligible:

> Αἴθων μὲν γένος εἰμί, πόλιν δ' εὐτείχεα Θήβην
> οἰκῶ, πατρῴας γῆς ἀπερυκόμενος.

> I am an Aithon by descent, but in well-walled Thebes do I live, kept out of my native land.

The particularity of the two lines is unusual in what is predominantly a collection of γνῶμαι that can be re-uttered indefinitely, and it is puzzling that it was selected for it (though its position in the collection may be partly explained by its sharing the verb ἀπερύκειν with the preceding *sympoticon*, 1207–8). Αἴθων (or whatever word it was of which it may be a corruption) may refer to citizenship of a place in some quite different part of the Greek world, or may refer to a community in Boeotia that was swallowed up by an expanding Thebes. Dating within the archaic and classical periods is equally elusive.

1211–16 are also closely tied to a particular situation, though their contrast between the ills of exile and those of slavery may have made them more obviously re-usable in symposia where servile female attendants or entertainers may have occasionally risked cheekiness to establish a more relaxed and rewarding relationship with élite symposiasts:

> μή μ' ἀφελῶς παίζουσα φίλους δένναζε τοκῆας,
> Ἄργυρι. σοὶ μὲν γὰρ δούλιον ἦμαρ ἔπι,
> ἡμῖν δ' ἄλλα μέν ἐστι, γύναι, κακὰ πόλλ', ἐπεὶ ἐκ γῆς
> φεύγομεν, ἀργαλέη δ'οὐκ ἔπι δουλοσύνη,
> οὔθ' ἡμᾶς περνᾶσι. πόλις γε μέν ἐστι καὶ ἡμῖν
> καλή, Ληθαίῳ κεκλιμένη πεδίῳ.

1.9.15–16, 3.2.15–16: *me quoque amicorum nimio terrore metuque / non odio quidam destituere mei*. I owe these and the Euripides reference to J. F. Gaertner, who also draws attention to Citroni Marchetti (2000) 111–39 on the relation between Theognidean passages and Ciceronian and Ovidian responses to exile, cf. ibid. 158 and 334 on the desertion of exiles by their former friends, and see pp. 97, 158 in this volume.

> Do not bad-mouth my dear parents with your off-hand teasing of me, Argyris. Upon you has come the day of slavery, but upon me other ills have come, woman, in great number, since from my land I am an exile: but dire slavery has not come upon me, nor do people offer me for sale. Indeed I too have a city that is fair, reclining on the plain of the Lethaeus.

These lines too are undatable—their singer's reason for leaving Magnesia on the river Lethaeus (a tributary of the Maeander)[77] could have been internal conflict, or it could be the arrival of the Lydians (around 600 BC) or the Persians (in the 540s BC).[78] The opening couplet of what we have in the *Theognidea* has all the appearance of being the start of a poem (addressee in the vocative, asyndeton) and the last line, with its elegant meta-textual allusion to the sympotic practice of reclining,[79] could well be its end: that *rara avis*, then, a complete poem. On its first performance it purported to be addressed to a girl called Argyris—perhaps a professional name, alluding to jewellery worn. The speaker uses her claimed teasing as a way into stressing his superior status, now that of an exile, but once that of a free πολίτης of a beautiful (and famous) city, to her condition as a slave, liable to be bought and sold.[80] It may be this pungently expressed contrast that secured this song oral reperformance and entry to whatever written collection lies behind this part of the *Theognidea*. However that may be, the contrast corroborates something I noted much earlier: exile may be bad, but it is not half as bad as slavery, at least if the exile has managed to bring with him or to acquire the wherewithal to continue something like the lifestyle to which he had become accustomed.

This is clearly not the case for the two remaining sets of archaic texts I wish to consider, Tyrtaeus and Solon. Tyrtaeus takes us back to the seventh century, perhaps to the 640s BC.[81] The opening lines of the long fragment quoted by the Athenian orator Lycurgus (fr. 10.1–8 (West)) contrast the nobility of dying in battle with the life of a beggar that is

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77 Cf. Anacreon fr. 348.4 (Page).

78 That the poet says he *has* a *fine* city makes it improbable that his departure was caused by the destruction of Magnesia by the Thracian Treres *c.* 650 BC, for which cf. Strabo 14.1.40.

79 Cf. Callinus fr. 1.1 (West), Solon fr. 4a.3 (West).

80 It is tempting to see a link with 263–6, a song where the symposiast (undoubtedly male, if 265 with λαβών is indeed part of the same poem) brings a water-waitress (surely servile) into his erotic fantasies and imagines the preference shown by *her* φίλοι . . . τοκῆες for drinking their water really cold. That Argyris can be addressed by name coheres with her low social status, cf. Dickey (1996) 243–5.

81 For testimonia see Gerber (1999a).

the lot of a man (and his family) ejected from their city and agricultural land:

> τεθναμέναι γὰρ καλὸν ἐνὶ προμάχοισι πεσόντα
>   ἄνδρ’ ἀγαθὸν περὶ ᾗ πατρίδι μαρνάμενον·
> τὴν δ’ αὐτοῦ προλιπόντα πόλιν καὶ πίονας ἀγροὺς
>   πτωχεύειν πάντων ἔστ’ ἀνιηρότατον,
> πλαζόμενον σὺν μητρὶ φίλῃ καὶ πατρὶ γέροντι
>   παισί τε σὺν μικροῖς κουριδίῃ τ’ ἀλόχῳ.
> ἐχθρὸς μὲν γὰρ τοῖσι μετέσσεται, οὕς κεν ἵκηται
>   χρησμοσύνῃ τ’ εἴκων καὶ στυγερῇ πενίῃ.

> It is a fine thing for a brave man to die when he has fallen among the front ranks while fighting for his homeland, and it is the most painful thing of all to leave one’s city and rich fields for a beggar’s life, wandering about with his dear mother and aged father, with small children and wedded wife. For giving way to need and hateful poverty, he will be treated with hostility by whomever he meets.[82]

The martial context of this passage guides us in its interpretation. Just as the Spartans tried—successfully—to eject Messenians from their long-cultivated lands (Tyrtaeus fr. 5.7 (West)) so the poet in fr. 10 (West) envisages that defeat in battle would bring the same fate upon the young adult Spartan warriors (νέοι, fr. 10.15 (West)) who are his addressees. He does not, interestingly, explore the possibility that they may hang around after defeat to be sold into slavery or (the fate of the Messenians, frr. 6–7 (West)) to become serfs to their conquerors. For the poet here destitution rather than the exile itself is the source of pain. Such destitution can befall somebody simply as a result of dissipating one’s wealth on high living,[83] and can in turn lead to slavery.[84] Tyrtaeus’ verdict here is thus importantly different from that of Pindar who, perhaps echoing him a century and a half later, claims that it is held that exile itself is ἀνιαρότατον.[85]

Slavery is also represented by Solon in the 590s and 580s as an extreme evil. In his elegiac poetry, apparently composed before his Athenian legislation was implemented, Solon includes among the misfortunes suffered by the δῆμος the sale of poor citizens to other countries as slaves (Solon fr. 4.23–5 (West)):

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[82] Translation by Gerber (1999a).

[83] Cf. *Theognidea* 922: πτωχεύει δὲ φίλους πάντας, ὅπου τιν’ ἴδῃ (“He goes begging to all his friends, wherever he sees one”) and Hipponax fr. 26 (West).

[84] Cf. *Theognidea* 926: οὔτ ἂν πτωχεύων δουλοσύνην τελέοις (“Nor will you go begging and live out a life of slavery”).

[85] Cf. Pindar, *Pyth.* 4.288 with Braswell (1988) 387 ad loc.

τῶν δὲ πενιχρῶν
ἱκνέονται πολλοὶ γαῖαν ἐς ἀλλοδαπὴν
πραθέντες δεσμοῖσί τ' ἀεικελίοισι δεθέντες . . .

> And many of the poor are going to a foreign land, sold and bound in shameful fetters.[86]

Again, apparently after his reforms, Solon's ἴαμβος in iambic trimeters[87] vividly depicts the lot of those inhabitants of Attica who had been sold to a master in another πόλις (Solon fr. 36.8–12 (West)):

πολλοὺς δ' Ἀθήνας πατρίδ' ἐς θεόκτιτον
ἀνήγαγον πραθέντας, ἄλλον ἐκδίκως,
ἄλλον δικαίως, τοὺς δ' ἀναγκαίης ὕπο
χρειοῦς φυγόντας, γλῶσσαν οὐκέτ' Ἀττικὴν
ἱέντας, ὡς δὴ πολλαχῇ πλανωμένους.

> And many did I bring back to Athens, their homeland founded by the gods, men who had been sold, one legally another not, and others who had fled as a result of a compelling need, no longer speaking the Attic tongue, as one might expect from those who were wandering far and wide.

The modes of expatriation are clearly set out: some had been sold, whether justly or unjustly, and had become slaves, perhaps as close to home as Megara, Corinth, Euboea or Boeotia; others had left the country (φυγόντας) through some compelling need (ἀναγκαίης ὕπο / χρειοῦς). The situation of both these groups is comparable, it seems, to that of those in a servile condition in Attica itself whom Solon set free (cf. fr. 36.13–15 (West)). It seems that for the speaker, whose persona is that of the self-justificatory politician, the restoration of those who had left Athens ἀναγκαίης ὕπο / χρειοῦς, "through some compelling need", is as laudable as restoring those sold into slavery: these unwilling expatriates, then, deserve as much concern and pity, and Solon plays up to such responses by claiming that they were no longer speaking Attic Greek—an indication that already a sense of πόλις-identity was there to be exploited.

The poetry I have examined quite often touches on exile, but it is only one of the disasters that can afflict a singing poet or a character in a

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[86] Translation by Gerber (1999a).

[87] For arguments for the view that the political poems of Solon are *optimo iure* ἴαμβοι cf. Bowie (2001b).

poet's narrative, and despite occasional classification as ἀνιηρότατον it is not the worst imaginable fate. Now and again a poet's situation or utterance is picked up in later exilic literature,[88] but exile's competition for attention with other misfortunes, its *de facto* proximity to other sorts of displacement and the conditions of performance of archaic sympotic poetry all combined to limit to a few words what might be available for reworking by later and more voluble Greek and Latin authors.

[88] Cf. Gaertner's observations on pp. 9–10 above.

CHAPTER THREE

# EXILE: THE MAKING OF THE GREEK HISTORIAN

John Dillery

I borrow my title from an article on Thucydides by the late Sir Ronald Syme. Reviewing the historian's life, he has the following to say about Thucydides' exile:

> Twenty years away from Attica until the fall of the city in the year 404 BC, Thucydides acknowledges the advantage. It enabled him to travel and to see the other side. But there is something more, which he has not said: exile may be the making of an historian. That is patent for Herodotus and Polybius. If a man be not compelled to leave his own country, some other calamity—a disappointment or a grievance—may be beneficial, permitting him to look at things with detachment, if not in estrangement. In Thucydides there is estrangement proclaimed by the creation of a style individual, wilful, elaborate, and non-contemporary. Even did the style not avow it, the author parades as a thinker with a method all his own. He is proud, imperious, even didactic.[1]

There are details here that I will dispute, but Syme has put his finger on an important issue attaching to exile and the Greek historian. Many observers, both ancient and modern, have noted the beneficial effects of exile, in particular the positive aspects for an historian of being forced to live away from his native city.[2] Syme sees this too, even alluding to Thucydides' own remarks at 5.26.5 ("Thucydides acknowledges the advantage"). But Syme has also seen that exile involves not just the

[1] Syme (1962) 40–1. I know of this passage thanks to Hornblower (1987) 27. Cf. also Syme (1977) 49.

[2] So, e.g., compare Syme's observation with Westlake (1966) 246–7: "[Xenophon] also enjoyed the misfortune, so valuable to a historian, of having been exiled. Banishment, as Plutarch [sc. *De Exil.* 605C–D] points out, was the lot of many Greek historians; it was almost a professional qualification. Xenophon was absent from his native city for at least thirty-five years and lived for most of this period in the Peloponnese. Although he might have made better use of the opportunities for historical research afforded by his long exile, it did confer some obvious advantages, one of them being that the *Hellenica* is not written wholly from the viewpoint of a single city". See p. 62 below as well as Gaertner and Nesselrath on pp. 10–11 and 96–7 on Plut. *De Exil.* 605C–D.

physical displacement of the historian from his homeland and its attendant "advantage", namely access to different sources and a different perspective. Exile also influences the historian's style, indeed it leads to the development of a unique "method"—profound changes that shape the historian's outlook or "voiceprint".[3]

But that so many have noticed the utility of exile for the ancient historian should excite concern. If the belief is so widely held, it risks becoming an expectation. We then face the danger of slipping into serious error, creating significance for exile in the case of some historians, and even inventing it outright in the case of others. One cannot help but conclude that if exile is "the making of the historian", it would appear that a person could not be one without it in the ancient Greek world, at least one worth talking about. I exaggerate, of course, but if exile is indeed a, if not the decisive force in the shaping of the historian, it behooves us to figure out what precisely it was, why it was imposed, and which ancient Greek historians were in fact so treated. The first part of this essay will be focussed on attempting to answer these questions, if only provisionally. The second will take up larger, more general issues raised in the course of the first part, ones that will return us to the introduction and Syme's acute observation.[4]

First, a brief look at terminology. 'Exile' is an inexact term when applied to ancient Greek historians, for several figures who are routinely thought of as 'exiled' were not in fact. The Greek noun for the experience of 'exile' is φυγή, and the person who suffers it a φυγάς; to be in exile is represented by the verb φεύγειν, and to exile another is ἐλαύνειν etc. While we shall see that, e.g., both Thucydides and Xenophon were most certainly exiled, as we can tell from their own testimony (cf. Thuc. 5.26.5: ξυνέβη μοι φεύγειν; Xen. *An.* 5.3.7: ἐπεὶ δ' ἔφευγεν ὁ Ξενοφῶν), others were what we would call 'detained' or held hostage in a foreign land: the obvious example is Polybius. But we should note that in none of the ancient passages cited by Walbank in his discussion of Polybius' mandatory residence in Rome is the concept 'banishment' or 'exile' used.[5] As Polybius himself characterizes the detention of the Achaean statesmen, among whom he was one, they were "those summoned (to Italy)" by

[3] On the historian's "voiceprint", cf. Fowler (1996) 86.
[4] I am much indebted to the earlier work of Seibert (1979) vol. 1, 311–16.
[5] Cf. Polyb. 30.13, 32.1–12, Paus. 7.10.11, Livy 45.31.9. See Walbank (1957–79) vol. 1, 3 and n. 4. See also Walbank (1972) 7–8.

the Romans and detained there (Polyb. 30.32.10: τοὺς ἀνακεκλημένους; cf. 31.23.5, 32.6.4, 33.1.7,14).[6] And yet, despite the linguistic difference which stresses banishment on the one hand by the home authority, and enforced residence abroad by an external power on the other, Polybius is regularly grouped with the likes of Thucydides and Xenophon in modern discussions—note Syme's observation above.[7] Indeed, Syme compares Thucydides' experience explicitly to Polybius', and adds also Herodotus: the historiographic benefits of exile for the latter two are "patent".[8]

I do not want to lose sight of Syme's mention of Herodotus in this context for it raises another problem of terminology. All our direct testimony for Herodotus' exile is from the *Suda* and its entry for the historian and for his kinsman, the epic poet Panyassis. Let us take a close look at the entry on Herodotus (η 536): he "moved (from Halicarnassus) to Samos because of (the tyrant) Lygdamis" (μετέστη δ' ἐν Σάμῳ διὰ Λύγδαμιν), later returned to his native city and drove out Lygdamis, but then, "when he saw that he was disliked by his fellow citizens, went as a volunteer to Thurii being founded by Athenians" (ἐπειδὴ ὕστερον εἶδεν ἑαυτὸν φθονούμενον ὑπὸ τῶν πολιτῶν, εἰς τὸ Θούριον ἀποικιζόμενον ὑπὸ 'Αθηναίων ἐθελοντὴς ἦλθε), where he died some years later. As we can tell from his claims to autopsy of foreign places and to have interviewed knowledgeable locals from around the Eastern Mediterranean, Herodotus traveled extensively and hence lived for much of his adult life away from his native land; but was this because of exile *stricto sensu*? I will discuss the difficulties of trusting the *Suda*'s life of Herodotus below, but if we for the moment accept its accounting of the historian's career, it nowhere explicitly states that Herodotus was actually exiled. First we are told of a short absence "because of" (διά) Lygdamis, and later, that he went to Thurii because he had become an object of dislike by his

[6] See Walbank (1957–79) vol. 3, 461 on Polyb. 30.32.10.

[7] So, e.g., Brown (1973) 35 and (1954) 841–3. Walbank's discussion (2002) precisely centers on Gaetano de Sanctis' views towards Polybius' detention in Italy, one that became in fact a voluntary exile and hence Polybius a "turncoat" (note esp. p. 317). See also Walbank (1995/2002).

[8] At least two other historians of note, Ctesias and Alexander Polyhistor, may be said to fall into the same category as Polybius, namely historians detained or held captive abroad. Polyhistor was a Milesian who was captured in war, brought to Rome as a slave, and then given Roman citizenship by Sulla: *FGrHist* 273 T 2. It is argued by the latest editor of Ctesias (Lenfant (2004) x) that he was captured by the Persians before 401 and thus found himself the court doctor to Artaxerxes II. Cf. Tuplin's ((2004) 306) more agnostic stance towards Ctesias' life and the timing of his writing.

fellow Halicarnassians. Explicitly in the case of the second and longer period, and quite possibly also in the first, Herodotus' residence away from his home was voluntary (n.b. ἐθελοντής). Hence, under the heading 'exile' we must add the concept 'voluntary exile', as well as banishment and enforced residence abroad or captivity. Seen in this way, Herodotus' stay in Thurii was not really different from Aeschylus' voluntary exile, also in Magna Graecia (Sicily), or Euripides' in Macedon. Alternatively, we may want to think especially of Solon, who on Herodotus' own testimony, spent ten years away from Athens "allegedly for the sake of seeing the world" (Hdt. 1.29.1: κατὰ θεωρίης πρόφασιν),[9] a description that is in fact fitting for what the historian must have done himself for an extended period of time.[10]

It may well be that the net result on the development of the historian of banishment, captivity abroad or voluntary exile was in the end basically the same. So, returning to Herodotus for the moment, departure "because of" Lygdamis could well mean banishment by him, or that he chose to leave a situation made untenable by the tyrant. But how voluntary is exile when residence at home would have unpleasant, and possibly lethal consequences? Obviously there is a significant 'gray area' between voluntary and involuntary exile. On the other hand, I would note that banishment entails rejection by one's own community, whereas detention abroad involves the coercion of an outsider. It is not hard to imagine the two experiences would have a different impact on the evolving identity of the historian. Syme himself seems to be aware of the unique consequences of banishment when he refers to Thucydides' sense of "estrangement". But estrangement implies that the figure in question no longer identifies himself as a member of his own community, whereas detention abroad entails no such sense of alienation from the place of one's birth. While estrangement is not easily connected to one who is held against his will (at least at first) in a foreign land, it is a reasonable inference as a cause of voluntary exile. Clearly our categories merge and part, depending on the individual cases involved. I hope that I have demonstrated that 'exile' is a problematic term when

[9] "Seeing the world" is LSJ's rendering of θεωρίη; it is preferable to Powell's "sightseeing" ((1938) s.v.), which makes the activity sound too detached from serious and directed inquiry.

[10] As Asheri (1988 ff.) vol. 1, 283 ad loc. observes (with further bibliography). Recall that Solon visited, among other places, Egypt, as did Herodotus: cf. Solon fr. 28 (West). On Solon's travelling (and that of other intellectuals of the time) see also p. 10 with nn. 46–7 above.

applied to the lives of at least two Greek historians, insofar as it does not capture the exact nature of their life away from their native cities. To equate all the different types of exile leads first to the misinterpretation of the scant knowledge we have for the individual historians, and more generally to the formation of judgements about them and the evolution of their historiographic views that are without foundation. I will return to these issues below.

Implicit in my treatment of the terminology for exile has been a larger question: why were Greek historians exiled or forced (or not) to live abroad? Simply put, the reasons for exile determine which type it will be: banishment, foreign captivity, or voluntary exile. I should state at once that I have not found a single instance of a Greek historian who was exiled or forced to live abroad because of his historical writing. We do not even possess marginal cases where it is alleged that the historian is punished in some way for his work, such as we see in connection with philosophers and poets: Protagoras, whose books may have been burnt, and Anaxagoras, brought to trial at Athens on a charge of 'impiety' that may have been motivated in part by his published work;[11] or, alternatively, the legend that Stesichorus was temporarily blinded because of his poetry about Helen.[12] By way of contrast, Roman historians could be punished for what they wrote and have their work suppressed: the famous case here is, of course, A. Cremutius Cordus (Tac. *Ann.* 4.34–6), who had his books burned and was forced to commit suicide, but he was not alone (note, e.g., Tac. *Ag.* 2.1).[13] Greek historians, too, could face the wrath of dynasts and be put to death: Callisthenes comes to mind here, as does the Atthidographer Philochorus. But Callisthenes was executed for his opposition to Alexander's policies (*FGrHist* 124 T 7–21), especially the adoption of *proskynesis*,[14] and Philochorus more

[11] See especially Dover (1975), who supplies references and bibliography, and Parker (1996) 207–10.

[12] Cf. Lefkowitz (1981) 32.

[13] Note also the case of Hermogenes of Tarsus who was put to death under Domitian (Suet. *Dom.* 10.1): see Momigliano (1978) 70 and Jones (1996) 84–5 ad loc. For the *Annals* passage in question, see esp. Martin/Woodman (1989) 176–86 ad loc., who cite in particular Cancik-Lindemaier/Cancik (1986) 16–35; see also Moles (1998) and McHugh (2004). For censorship in Greece and Rome, consult Speyer (1970), especially 129–37, and for Rome alone, Cramer (1945) 157–96. Titus Labienus (Sen. *Con. praef.* 10.5–7; cf. Dio Cass. 56.27.1), suffered a fate identical to Cremutius', but was an orator and declaimer. For the treatment of Labienus and others, see Fantham (2005) 228 and n. 53. As Momigliano ((1978) 69) observes: "In Rome the relationship between historiography and government seems always to have been closer than in Greece".

[14] See especially Brunt (1976) 538–42 (appendix 14.8–11). Note that Arrian, *Anab.*

generally because of his role in the Chremonidean War and his opposition to Antigonus Gonatas (*FGrHist* 328 T 1).[15] In the case of Callisthenes, Philodemus even remarks that while the historian "was deifying Alexander in his histories, he resisted his obeisances" (*FGrHist* 124 T 21: ἐν μὲν γὰρ ταῖς ἱστορίαις ἀπεθέου τὸν ᾿Αλέξανδρον, ἀντέκο[ψε δ'] αὐτοῦ ταῖς προσκυνήσεσι). In other words, in his writing Callisthenes actually supported his ruler and hence was far from earning his displeasure for that reason;[16] it was in his words and actions that he opposed Alexander. Greek historians did not get into trouble with 'the authorities' because of their writing.

In fact, if one examines the ancient testimonia, if an explanation is given for a historian being exiled, the most common reason stated is political association and/or the perception of the historian as a threat. To borrow Momigliano's famous observation, it was Greece's "rejected politicians" who "formed the most conspicuous contingent of historiographers" (Momigliano (1978) 70). This is obviously the case with Herodotus and Polybius, the former because of the hostility of Lygdamis and later the Halicarnassian *demos*, and the latter because of his standing as an important member of the Achaean leadership that Rome wanted to remove. We could add others. For example, Photius reports that Theopompus was exiled because of his father's 'Laconism', presumably during a period when Chios was aligned with Athens (*FGrHist* 115 T 2).[17] The slightly older Philistus was reputedly exiled because he was perceived as an enemy by Dionysius I who had become unhinged (Diod. Sic. 15.7.3 = *FGrHist* 556 T 5b), though there may have been personal reasons as well (Plut. *Dio* 11.4–7 = T 5c); indeed, in Philistus' case it is difficult to distinguish between his private and public life because he was a courtier to dynasts and is repeatedly identified as a

4.11.9, has Callisthenes adduce historical examples to dissuade Alexander from adopting *proskynesis*.

[15] Habicht (1997) 117 notes that the exact reasons for Philochorus' death remain a puzzle, but assumes that they were political and did not have to do with his historical writing. See also Knoepfler (2001) 29. Cf. Tarn (1913) 320: "Philochoros, seer and historian, was executed for treason". Tarn elsewhere (p. 412) seems to suggest that Philochorus' history of the Chremonidean War may have contributed to his punishment, but this is speculative.

[16] I note, as a contrary piece of testimony to Philodemus on Callisthenes, that Lucian in the *Quomodo historia conscribenda* (12 = *FGrHist* 139 T 4) reports that Alexander chided Aristobulus precisely on the grounds that he was in essence heroizing him *in his historical writing*.

[17] Cf. Flower (1994) 15–16. Note that Flower has doubts about the historicity of Theopompus' exile, a position I will discuss below, cf. pp. 62–3.

man personally devoted to tyranny.[18] Timaeus of Tauromenium was the son of the man who founded his city (Andromachus), and was exiled by Agathocles (Diod. Sic. 21.17.1= *FGrHist* 566 T 4a), probably after the tyrant had captured Tauromenium; Timaeus then went to Athens where he remained for at least fifty years.[19] To these instances one could add even less well attested cases, figures such as Androtion, Demochares, and Hieronymus of Cardia. Although we do not in fact know the cause for the exile of Androtion, Jacoby speculated that he earned the wrath of Demosthenes and the anti-Macedonian party for objecting to an alliance with Persia in 344/3 BC, thus depriving Athens of a valuable ally in the struggle with Philip.[20] Similarly, while the precise reason for Demochares' exile is uncertain, it has been long held to be the result of the historian's opposition at Athens in 304/3 BC to Demetrius Poliorcetes.[21] As for Hieronymus, Jane Hornblower has argued that his close association with two Hellenistic dynasts, Eumenes in the first case, and later with Antigonus Gonatas, meant first exile from his native city, and then continued absence because of service with Antigonus; indeed, in 277 BC he may have accompanied Antigonus from the site of Cardia, then no more than a village, to the royal court at Pella.[22]

It is I think sufficiently clear that even when the reason for a Greek historian's exile is stated, and it is most often a political reason, the evidence is slender. There are two cases, however, where we seem to be better informed: Thucydides and Xenophon. While I do not believe that their comments on their own exiles, together with the post-exilic speeches of Andocides, constitute the beginnings of autobiography in the ancient world,[23] I do think that it is worth considering why our best attested cases of exiled Greek historians are also those where the information comes from the historians themselves. But first, the information they provide.

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[18] Note especially Plut. *Dio* 11.5: ὁ γὰρ δὴ Φίλιστος ἐξ ἀρχῆς τε τῇ τυραννίδι καθισταμένῃ προθυμότατον ἑαυτὸν παρέσχε. Also Nepos, *Di.* 3.2: *Philistum historicum . . . hominem amicum non magis tyranno quam tyrannidi* (= *FGrHist* 556 T 5d).

[19] Cf. Walbank (1957–79) vol. 2, 388 on Polyb. 12.25 d 1; see also Pearson (1987) 37–8 with n. 3, Meister (1970) 53–9, and Momigliano (1977).

[20] Cf. F. Jacoby, *FGrHist* IIIb, vol. 1, 90–3. Harding (1994) 23–4 has criticized this view and has concluded that "we do not know why or when [sc. Androtion] went into exile, or even if he was officially exiled or just absented himself".

[21] Cf. Smith (1962) 114–18.

[22] Cf. Hornblower (1981) 9 and 14.

[23] Cf. Zimmermann (2002) 187–95. Note Gaertner's reservations regarding Zimmermann's argument above, p. 11 n. 51.

Towards the close of his so-called 'Second Preface', Thucydides (5.26.5) tells us that "it befell me to be exiled for twenty years after my command at Amphipolis", and that "inasmuch as I was present on both sides, and not less the Peloponnesian because of the exile, free of distractions [it befell me] to perceive even better what they did" (ξυνέβη μοι φεύγειν τὴν ἐμαυτοῦ ἔτη εἴκοσι μετὰ τὴν ἐς 'Αμφίπολιν στρατηγίαν, καὶ γενομένῳ παρ' ἀμφοτέροις τοῖς πράγμασι, καὶ οὐχ ἧσσον τοῖς Πελοποννησίων διὰ τὴν φυγήν, καθ' ἡσυχίαν τι αὐτῶν μᾶλλον αἰσθέσθαι). I have already touched on how this passage has been used to support the view that exile had 'advantages' for the ancient Greek historian, specifically access to both sides during wartime. But there are two more points worth noticing. First, the matter-of-fact, indeed impersonal description of the occurrence of Thucydides' exile: 'it happened' or 'it fell out that I was exiled' (ξυνέβη μοι φεύγειν), not simply 'I was exiled' or 'the Athenians exiled me'. Contrast how the aside in book 2, where he reveals that he contracted the Plague himself and saw others laid low as well, is phrased much more personally and emphatically: "I will make [the facts of the Plague] clear, having suffered the disease *myself*, and having *myself* seen others suffering as well" (Thuc. 2.48.3: ταῦτα δηλώσω αὐτός τε νοσήσας καὶ αὐτὸς ἰδὼν ἄλλους πάσχοντας).[24] Secondly, we are not really given an explanation for the exile. It is true that "after my command at Amphipolis" (μετὰ τὴν ἐς 'Αμφίπολιν στρατηγίαν) implies the reason, but the suggestion is oblique: μετά must be temporal here, so that if the cause is to be inferred, the explanation is strictly speaking a *post hoc propter hoc* one: Thucydides was exiled *after* his command at Amphipolis, but also *because of* his command at Amphipolis. For the reasons behind Thucydides' banishment, we must turn back to his narrative of book 4 and the account of the Thraceward area for the winter of 424/3 BC. There we learn that Thucydides, "the son of Olorus",[25] was summoned from Thasos by his fellow general Eucles and the pro-Athenian citizens of Amphipolis to the city to support it in its defense against Brasidas; as he tells us himself, his aim was to relieve the city, and if that was not possible, at least to prevent Eion from also being taken (Thuc. 4.104.4–5). He

[24] On the personal emphasis, see e.g. Hornblower (1991 ff.) vol. 1, 321, and Rusten (1989) 182 ad loc.

[25] The use of the patronym instead of the ethnic by Thucydides for the narrative of his own actions, as opposed to the places where he identifies himself as historian, has often been discussed; see recently Hornblower (1991 ff.) vol. 1, 4–5 on Thuc. 1.1.1. But note that the use of the patronym also implies that it was Thucydides the historical agent ("son of Olorus") and not the historian ("the Athenian") who was to be exiled.

makes the point that he came "quickly" when summoned (κατὰ τάχος), and managed to come with only seven ships which he happened to have on hand; he also adds a little later that while Amphipolis was lost, Eion did not fall to Brasidas and the Spartans because of the "swift" arrival of Thucydides' ships (Thuc. 4.106.4: διὰ τάχους). Clearly at issue was the time it took Thucydides to answer Eucles' and the Amphipolitans' call for help; there must have been the feeling at Athens that, despite his success at Eion, Thucydides had failed because of his inability to relieve Amphipolis when it was still possible. Hence, strictly speaking his exile was not the result of political affiliation or fear of him and his 'faction', but due rather to the perception of a professional failure on his part.[26] But Thucydides does not in fact tell us these things; we are the ones who construct the story of his exile. Gomme very acutely observed that Thucydides did not allow himself many words at all of implied 'self-defense' in his narrative of these events (the speed of his response to the call for help; the meager size of his force because the only one he had on hand; the speed of his reinforcement of Eion).[27] More recently, Simon Hornblower has even suggested, in commenting on κατὰ τάχος of Thuc. 4.104.5, that "if Th[ucydides] the historian were not here talking about Th[ucydides] the general, nobody would pounce on 'at full speed' as a piece of self-justification".[28] The larger point to register here is that even in one of our better attested cases of the exiling of the historian, we are not really given very much information by the historian himself. Because the account is autobiographic does not necessarily mean it is more informative on the question of exile. Indeed, far from being forthcoming, Thucydides is elusive. Again, comparison with his statement that he himself suffered from the Plague is instructive: "[the facts of the Plague] I will make clear" (Thuc. 2.48.3: δηλώσω). In the two places where he reveals catastrophe in his own life, Thucydides is clear and direct when speaking of the Plague, but in connection with his exile, reserved and indirect.

[26] By no means an unusual cause for the punishment. So, e.g., the parallel case of King Pausanias of Sparta who went into exile in Tegea after being charged with arriving late at the battle of Haliartus (in 395 BC) and thus failing to relieve Lysander: cf. Xen. *Hell.* 3.5.25. It is true that he was sentenced to death *in absentia*, something we do not hear of in connection with Thucydides. Cf. the threatened punishment of King Cleombrotus before the battle of Leuctra (371 BC), Xen. *Hell.* 6.4.5.

[27] Cf. Gomme (1945–81) vol. 3, 578–9 on 4.104.5 and 4.106.4.

[28] Cf. Hornblower (1991 ff.) vol. 2, 334 ad loc., and cf. his remarks on p. 338 on 4.106.4.

Which brings us to the exile of Xenophon. Towards the end of the *Anabasis*, Xenophon makes a point of noting his own activities just after he had secured from the Thracian chieftain Seuthes money and property to be realized as pay for the army: "it was plain that he was preparing to go home, for not yet had the vote against him regarding his exile taken place at Athens" (*An.* 7.7.57: . . . φανερὸς ἦν οἴκαδε παρασκευαζόμενος· οὐ γάρ πω ψῆφος αὐτῷ ἐπῆκτο Ἀθήνησι περὶ φυγῆς). This is our surest indication of date for Xenophon's banishment from Athens: we know for other reasons that the context for this remark is early 399 BC, so the decree of exile must have fallen at some point afterwards.[29] Earlier in the *Anabasis*, in another passage concerning Xenophon and the transfer of wealth, he reports that, years later, after he had returned to Greece and had been settled by the Spartans on an estate at Scillus near Olympia, he purchased some nearby land and built on it a shrine to Ephesian Artemis from money that a Persian friend had kept for him and recently given back. The crucial piece of testimony comes at *An.* 5.3.7: "when Xenophon was in exile and had been living at Scillus near Olympia for a while, having been settled there by the Spartans, Megabyzus came to Olympia to see [the games] and returned to him the deposit" (ἐπεὶ δ' ἔφευγεν ὁ Ξενοφῶν, κατοικοῦντος ἤδη αὐτοῦ ἐν Σκιλλοῦντι ὑπὸ τῶν Λακεδαιμονίων οἰκισθέντος παρὰ τὴν Ὀλυμπίαν ἀφικνεῖται Μεγάβυζος εἰς Ὀλυμπίαν θεωρήσων καὶ ἀποδίδωσι τὴν παρακαταθήκην αὐτῷ). This passage does not help much regarding the facts of Xenophon's exile: as is,[30] it tells us that he lived away from his native city for a considerable period of time in the Peloponnese, for he could not have been settled on the estate at Scillus until his return to Greece in the company of King Agesilaus of Sparta in the summer of 394 BC, and the description suggests that some time had already (ἤδη) elapsed from when he took up residence there until he built the shrine to Artemis Ephesia. It is widely assumed that Xenophon was deprived of his lands at Scillus after the breakdown of Spartan control of the region in the aftermath of the

[29] See especially Badian (2004) 41 and Dreher (2004) 60. Cf. Tuplin (1987) 60, and Green (1994) 216–17, both also listing earlier bibliography.

[30] The phrase ἐπεὶ δ' ἔφευγεν is generally what is printed in modern texts (the reading of MS A); ἐπεὶ δὲ ἔφυγε and ἐπειδὴ δ' ἔφευγεν are also found in the MSS. The aorist ἔφυγε would necessitate a change in meaning, from 'while he was living in exile' to 'when/since he was exiled'—that is after a particular moment in the past. See Tuplin (1987) 61–3, and Dillery (2001) 4 n. 2. I do not believe that Xenophon was talking at *An.* 5.3.7 about anything other than his exile, *pace* Green (1994) 217, arguing that φεύγειν could refer to his having survived "that is, after Coroneia".

battle of Leuctra (summer 371 BC), specifically as a consequence of the first Theban invasion of the Peloponnese in the winter of 370/69 BC (Diod. Sic. 15.62.3; cf. Xen. *Hell.* 6.5.19).[31] External testimony (Diog. Laert. 2.53,56), combined with what some regard as a 'Corinthian' orientation to the later parts of the *Hellenica*, have convinced many that after his expulsion from Scillus he lived for the remainder of his life at Corinth, dying there sometime shortly after 355 BC.[32] Ister reports (*FGrHist* 334 F 32) that Xenophon was exiled and recalled by decree of the same man, Eubulus; this cannot be right on chronological grounds,[33] but the statement has been used to support the belief that Xenophon's exile was at some point revoked.

It should be noted that one thing Xenophon does not tell us in the passages from the *Anabasis* is why he was exiled. It is often assumed that he was present in the Spartan ranks at the battle of Coronea, and that this was the cause for the decree of exile at Athens, and hence a starting date of 394 BC.[34] Others have argued for a time closer to 399 BC (the *terminus post*, based on *An.* 7.7.57), due to Xenophon's association with Athens' hated enemy Cyrus the Younger,[35] an explanation that has the advantage of being supported by words of Socrates reported by Xenophon himself in the *Anabasis*, where the philosopher is described as worried that Xenophon's participation in the campaign of Cyrus would be cause for suspicion against his young friend at home in Athens.[36] Still others, also arguing for a date closer to 399 BC, believe that Xenophon's Socratic and oligarchic background led to his banishment, and ought to

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[31] Xenophon does speak of the independence of Scillus earlier in the same book of the *Hellenica*: Xen. *Hell.* 6.5.2. For Xenophon's loss of Scillus in this period, see especially Cartledge (1987) 60–1 and 440. Also Tuplin (1987) 60–3. Green (1994) 217 and n. 5 argues that Megabyzus' visit fell in the first Olympiad after Xenophon's return to Greece, namely, the 97th, which occurred in 392 BC. This is a reasonable inference, but not certain. Indeed, ἤδη could be taken to mean more than two years: cf. Badian (2004) 43.

[32] Though Diogenes Laertius attributes the notice that Xenophon died at Corinth to Demetrius of Magnesia (2.56), much of what he has to say about Xenophon is clearly derived from Xenophon's own work and is without independent value. Cf. Wilamowitz (1881) 330–6, Badian (2004) 38.

[33] It is possible that the exiling decree is to be dated to the archonship of Eubulides (394/3 BC): Tuplin (1987) 67, Badian (2004) 35. In general, Dreher (2004) 64–8.

[34] See the bibliography collected by Tuplin (1987) 59 and n. 2: cf. Diog. Laert. 2.51: ἐπὶ Λακωνισμῷ φυγὴν ὑπ' Ἀθηναίων κατεγνώσθη.

[35] Again, see Tuplin's summary ((1987) 59 and n. 1).

[36] Cf. *An.* 3.1.5: Σωκράτης ὑποπτεύσας μή τι πρὸς τῆς πόλεως ὑπαίτιον εἴη Κύρῳ φίλον γενέσθαι, ὅτι ἐδόκει ὁ Κῦρος προθύμως τοῖς Λακεδαιμονίοις ἐπὶ τὰς Ἀθήνας συμπολεμῆσαι, συμβουλεύει . . .

be set in the larger context of the political and social fall-out after the end of the tyranny of the Thirty at Athens.[37]

I have postponed to the second section of this paper a well-known passage from Plutarch on the subject of historians and exile. Having earlier noted the possible change of 'Herodotus the Halicarnassian' to 'Herodotus the Thurian' (*De Exil.* 604F), Plutarch continues (*De Exil.* 605C–D):

> καὶ γὰρ τοῖς παλαιοῖς ὡς ἔοικεν αἱ Μοῦσαι τὰ κάλλιστα τῶν συνταγμάτων καὶ δοκιμώτατα φυγὴν λαβοῦσαι συνεργὸν ἐπετέλεσαν. Θουκυδίδης Ἀθηναῖος συνέγραψε τὸν πόλεμον τῶν Πελοποννησίων καὶ Ἀθηναίων ἐν Θρᾴκῃ περὶ τὴν Σκαπτὴν ὕλην, Ξενοφῶν ἐν Σκιλλοῦντι τῆς Ἠλείας, Φίλιστος ἐν Ἠπείρῳ, Τίμαιος ὁ Ταυρομενείτης ἐν Ἀθήναις, Ἀνδροτίων Ἀθηναῖος ἐν Μεγάροις, Βακχυλίδης ὁ ποιητὴς ἐν Πελοποννήσῳ.
>
> Indeed the Muses, as it appears, called exile to their aid in perfecting for the ancients the finest and most esteemed of their writings. Thucydides of Athens composed the history of the war of the Peloponnesians and Athenians in Thrace at Scapte Hyle; Xenophon wrote at Scillus in Elis, Philistus in Epeirus, Timaeus of Tauromenium at Athens, Androtion of Athens at Megara, and the poet Bacchylides in the Peloponnese.[38]

With the exception of the last named, all the figures mentioned in Plutarch's list are historians. This fact suggests that Syme's dictum—exile makes the historian—was a view that was also held in antiquity.[39] Indeed, note that Plutarch makes the positive effect of exile on historians uncontroversial, even normative, by identifying the beneficiaries as "the ancients" (cf., e.g., Plut. *Mor.* 138C): if Plutarch's forebears found banishment useful to the historiographic enterprise, then it must have been so. Modern scholars have largely accepted Plutarch's list without objection, even faulting him for not including others.[40] But if exile was an expected chapter in the career of the historian, this could well have led to its invention in the biographies of ancient historians, or if not invention, then the massaging of fact. A good case in point is Theopompus. Flower has shown that the range of possible dates for the exile of Theopompus' father on a charge of 'Laconism', and therefore the

[37] Cf. Tuplin (1987) 59 n. 1, at the end of the note; add now also, Green's provocative essay (1994).

[38] Translation by De Lacy/Einarson (1959).

[39] Cf. Ziegler (1951) 819–20. See also Nesselrath, p. 97 below.

[40] Thus, e.g., Brown (1973) 35: "but this list is far from complete. Among those omitted are Ephorus and Theopompus, the best known historians of the fourth century, and Polybius, the last great Greek historian".

historian's banishment too, cannot be reconciled with the possible dates of Theopompus' birth and times when Chios could be understood as going through a period of anti-Spartan sentiment. Flower's solution is to dismiss this later testimony from Photius, and to assume that Photius conjured Theopompus' exile from the remains of his historical writing. Photius' thinking would have run something like this: other historians of note were exiled; Theopompus is notably 'kinder to Spartans' in his surviving work; since the historian was alive at the end of Alexander's reign (a fact known from Theopompus' letters), it was Theopompus' father who was exiled on a charge of 'Laconism' when the historian was just a boy.[41]

If we look closely at the evidence for the exile of the ancient Greek historian, it often appears extremely slender, and what is more, it seems often to be derived from the work of the historian himself, and thus participates in the biographical fallacy that has for some time been recognized to lie at the foundation of much of our knowledge about ancient Greek poets.[42] The chief testimony regarding Herodotus' life and exile in particular is an illustrative case in point.[43] The Halicarnassian law concerning disputed property (ML 32 = *SIG*$^3$ 45), dating to sometime between 465 and 450 BC, has demonstrated that significant details are wrong in the *Suda*'s life of Herodotus. Most importantly, it shows that there is a real problem with the identification of Lygdamis as the grandson of Artemisia. We know from Herodotus (7.99.1) that her son was a *neanias* at the time of Salamis, making it extremely unlikely for her grandson to become tyrant before 460; Meiggs and Lewis conclude that "more probably Suidas [sic!] is wrong and Lygdamis was either nephew or son".[44] But even more important for our purposes, the *Suda* made another significant claim regarding Herodotus' life that ML 32 also challenges: "on Samos he also learned the Ionic dialect, and he wrote his history in nine books" (ἐν οὖν τῇ Σάμῳ καὶ τὴν Ἰάδα ἠσκήθη διάλεκτον καὶ ἔγραψεν ἱστορίαν ἐν βιβλίοις θʹ). As Meiggs and Lewis

[41] I have closely followed Flower (1994) 16–17.

[42] Cf. Lefkowitz (1981), especially pp. 35–9, on the exile of a number of archaic lyric poets, in each case banishment being inferred from their poetry.

[43] Cf. Flower (1994) 16 n. 24: "the evidence for Herodotus' exile is from the *Suda* and may itself be a biographical invention".

[44] ML p. 72. I should note, however, that Meiggs and Lewis are wrong to posit this on the basis of Hdt. 7.99.1 "[i]f Artemisia's son was too young to command at Salamis . . ."; the passage suggests that the phrase παιδὸς ὑπάρχοντος νεηνίεω is concessive: "although she had a grown-up son", i.e., who could do the job of commanding.

have noted, insofar as the property law of Halicarnassus is written in the Ionic dialect, the *Suda* is almost surely wrong: Herodotus had plenty of opportunities to learn Ionic in his home town.[45] But the error is telling. It seems virtually certain that the *Suda* was misled when comparison was made between the dialect of Herodotus' work and the history of Halicarnassus that we see reported in its pages. The *Suda* knows he was from Halicarnassus, a foundation Herodotus tells us was Dorian and not Ionian (1.144). What is more, Herodotus is obviously sensitive to dialectical differences among the Greeks of the Asiatic littoral (1.142.3–4: Ionic divided into four sub-groups).[46] So, the *Suda* reasoned, since Herodotus' history is in Ionic, he must have picked that dialect up in a place that was Ionic-speaking and one that he clearly knew well, that is, a place about which he has a lot to say and hence where it was easy to imagine he had lived for some period of time (cf. Hdt. 3.60.1). It is probably not accidental that, immediately after telling us that Herodotus learned Ionic on Samos, we are also told that he wrote his history in nine books there. It seems the *Suda* is implying a logical progression of sorts: the historian acquired the lacking tool (Ionic dialect), and then his words began to flow.

In other words, there is really no substantive difference between Herodotus' life in the *Suda* and other lives generated from the works of other ancient Greek authors, particularly the notorious lives of the poets. Although the account of the *Suda* is basically worthless, its mere presence has exercised a powerful influence, even on the more cautious students of Herodotus: Jacoby was very careful not to put too much stock in it, though he finally came around to accepting its main points;[47] similarly, Legrand even rejected the *Suda*'s claim that Herodotus learned Ionic on Samos and wrote up his history there, but nonetheless constructed a political biography of him that is essentially what the *Suda* produces.[48] The lure of biographical data is simply overwhelming: all the great Greek historians must have been banished or lived away from their homelands. Exile is the key or defining experience, just as membership in the Senate seems required for being a Roman historian.[49]

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[45] Cf. ML p. 72.

[46] Cf. Hall (1997) 171. It ought to be noted that Herodotus himself believed that Samian Ionic was in a subgroup by itself.

[47] Cf. Jacoby (1913) 220–2, but also 246–7.

[48] Cf. Legrand (1932) 11 and n. 1, but also the entire section 9–11, entitled "Sa jeunesse; son exil a Samos". See also the "Life" of Herodotus in Waters (1985) xi–xii.

[49] For the Roman 'senatorial historian' see especially Syme (1956/1970), but already

It is tempting, in such a circumstance, to take the position of Detlev Fehling ((1989) 243–4 and n. 1) as found in the English translation of his provocative book examining (and rejecting as invented) Herodotus' sources:

> This section [i.e. on Herodotus' social status] was quite short in the first edition. Now it is even shorter. This is because I have learnt in the meantime that the biographical data of later tradition have to be entirely discounted, since they are always derived one way or another from the author's own work or are otherwise based on conjecture.

Fehling attaches a footnote to this observation, citing the work of Lefkowitz, just as I have done here. But, as with so much else in his work, while Fehling has put his finger on a real problem, his own answer is radical and extreme. It is very likely the case that we should consign to the scrap-heap the *Suda*'s entry on Herodotus, but we probably do not want to do the same for its testimonium on Philochorus. Even a quick glance at the *Suda*'s entry for Philochorus shows that it is profoundly different from that for Herodotus. In the first place it is not a capsule narrative, it is a series of small, detailed sentences, or even sentence fragments, ending with an exhaustive list of the titles of Philochorus' many works. It is not trying to tell a story, it is relaying a series of facts. Most importantly, on the punishment of Philochorus, there is no obvious link between what we are told regarding his death and the nature of his writing: "[Philochorus] was executed, having been caught by Antigonus, because he had been accused of being on the side of the kingship of Ptolemy" (*FGrHist* 328 T 1: ἐτελεύτησε δὲ ἐνεδρευθεὶς ὑπὸ Ἀντιγόνου, ὅτι διεβλήθη προσκεκλικέναι τῇ Πτολεμαίου βασιλείᾳ). To be sure, there is much here that is obscure (for starters: what is meant by "caught" or even "ambushed" by Antigonus?).[50] But however we wish to interpret these remarks, unlike what we saw in the information about Herodotus, there is no suspicious connection between what the *Suda* reports concerning Philochorus' demise and the substance of his work: the *Suda* appears not to have fabricated the details of his death on the basis of inferences it has made from his writings.

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in (1939) 5, 251, 420, 485, the last reference noting that Livy was regarded as "defective" precisely because he "had come to history from the study of rhetoric" and not through a career in the Senate.

[50] Cf. Jacoby, *FGrHist* IIIb, vol. 1, pp. 220–2. Other problems: can ἐτελεύτησε mean 'was executed'; and does the formulation προσκεκλικέναι τῇ Πτολεμαίου βασιλείᾳ mean 'sided with Ptolemy the king', and if so, why does the *Suda* not say that?

But, to return to Herodotus, if Fehling is right to discard the *Suda*'s entry, derived as it is from his history and not independent information (as appears to be the case for Philochorus), are we left with anything we can say about Herodotus' career, and in particular, about his life as an exile or *émigré*? Unlike Fehling, I do not believe we should discount as 'lies' Herodotus' many claims to autopsy and the gathering of oral testimony from around the Mediterranean world and Near East. If we accept the orientation and general purport of his work, and not judge his history a fraud on a massive scale, then we must also see a man who spent a great deal of his time travelling and living in different places. While we might in the end be making a claim which is not that different from the sorts of things we find in the *Suda*'s life of Herodotus—we are, after all, using his work to recreate his life—we are not trying to construct a precise *vita* with a distinct relative chronology, arguing that he had to be in a certain place and time before or after another place and time. Herodotus was most assuredly in Lower Egypt, Babylon, Southern Italy, and, yes, Samos, but I would hesitate to say in what order or at what particular time. But if we cannot be precise about Herodotus' travels, it is nonetheless crucial to accept that he did indeed lead an itinerant life away from Halicarnassus, and that this fact will have had consequences on his development as an historian.

The hunt for the exact cause, date, or nature of a Greek historian's life away from his home detracts from our understanding and appreciation of the effect of exile on his writing. So, for example, we shall never know the exact cause, and hence exact nature of Xenophon's exile. We probably have more information about it than in connection with any other ancient Greek historian, even two references from Xenophon's own hand. And yet one still senses that we are looking at a house of cards. Perhaps this should not surprise us. Xenophon is almost compulsively reticent when it comes to reporting facts about his own life, where those facts are relevant in his own writing: most notoriously he provides an admirable summary of the events of the *Anabasis* in his own *Hellenica*, only to refer the reader to an accounting of those events by an otherwise completely unknown historian, Themistogenes of Syracuse (Xen. *Hell.* 3.1.2).[51] Indeed, he seems deliberately to create moments in his writing where we can detect his presence as an historical agent or as a con-

[51] Almost certainly a *nom de plume* for himself. Cf. Plut. *Mor.* 345E; MacLaren (1934) 240–7, and Misch (1949) 104.

cerned party, only to have him suppress or 'efface' himself.[52] This seems an important point to register, even though it tells us little about the actual reasons or date of Xenophon's banishment. Furthermore, while Xenophon does not mention the exact reasons for his exile, he does have quite a lot to say about what his life was like during his residence at Scillus. Indeed, I think it is significant that the scholars who make best use of *An.* 5.3.7 ff. are not those who tilt at the windmill of 'solving' the reasons for his banishment, but rather are historians of Greek religion who read the passage for what it does say, rather than what it does not. Burkert, in particular, has noted how the description of the festival in honor of Artemis Ephesia emphasizes Xenophon's role as priest and host.[53] Xenophon finds a new identity in exile, as the patron and sole official of a new community he has founded, just as he had imagined doing on the march of the Ten Thousand, but without result (Cotyora, *An.* 5.6.15–16; Port Calpe, *An.* 6.4.3–8).[54] Unlike at his native Athens, Xenophon is in charge at Scillus. This analysis of the Scillus-passage advances our knowledge of the cause(s) and date of the historian's exile not at all. But it does tell us a great deal about Xenophon's historiographic orientation: his ideal world is not one of the fractious city-state, be it his native Athens or his beloved Sparta, rather it is the estate of the rural *beltistos*, the country gentleman, who supervises festival activities, entertains guests, and worships his gods in a world he has ordered: it is not the *polis* but the *oikos* of the *kalos kagathos* that is now the setting for human excellence (cf. Xenophon's *Oeconomicus*). This is an attitude that one can trace to Xenophon's own experiences, and chief among these, his exile from his native city and the refashioning of himself as an *émigré* living in Northwestern Peloponnese.

With this last picture of Xenophon at the festival to Artemis Ephesia at Scillus, we are not that far from the sense of "estrangement" or alienation from the historian's home that Syme spoke of in connection

[52] E.g. Xenophon the anonymous defender of the behavior of the Ten Thousand (*Hell.* 3.2.7); Xenophon's son not mentioned as falling before the battle of Mantinea (*Hell.* 7.5.17), though "good men" died in the action. Who is the young man interested in military science in *Mem.* 3.1? On Xenophon and "self-effacement" see Waterfield (2004) 82 n. 11 and the bibliography cited there.

[53] Cf. Burkert (1985) 259 and 67; also Parker (1996) 78 n. 41, (2004) 137–8.

[54] Cf. Dillery (2001) 30–1, (1995) 90. Parker (2004) 138 notes that the Scillus scene leaves several questions unanswered, specifically relating to the nature of Xenophon's arrangements regarding the ownership of the sacred property: does Xenophon lease the property from himself?, will his sons inherit this lease?, etc.

with Thucydides. Despite the doubtful nature of much of the information that we have regarding the exiles of ancient Greek historians, it remains the case that many of the most important ones do seem to have lived away from their home *poleis* for extensive periods of time. There is no reason not to believe the ancient testimony, stated or implied, that Hieronymus, Timaeus, and Alexander Polyhistor, for example, lived in exile in one form or another for a substantial period of their lives, in addition to the certain cases of Herodotus, Thucydides, Xenophon and Polybius. Did this fact, common to all of them, produce an effect in their work that we can detect? Is it estrangement? Is it a broader perspective than they would otherwise have had, to say nothing of an increase in available sources and data? Before getting carried away in answering these questions, it is important not to forget that Thucydides, who is so articulate about the advantages of exile, and who makes Syme think of a mind freed but simultaneously alienated from his home community, also points out in his proem that he kept an account of the Peloponnesian War from its outset (Thuc. 1.1.1). Exile was still several years away in 431 BC; it did not 'make' Thucydides an historian, for he was one already at the outbreak of the war.[55]

Another difficulty with generalizing about the effects of exile on the ancient Greek historian is that, save for the four canonical 'great' ones,[56] what we have from the other figures discussed in this paper are fragments from which it is difficult to extract grand historiographic principles. Perhaps one way to begin to answer the question whether exile had a common effect on Greek historians would be to look at counter-examples, men who wrote history while at home, safely housed in their native *poleis*. With the notable exception, it seems, of Androtion the Atthidographer, local historians were not regularly exiled (it is hard to know for certain since our information is so fragmentary). Importantly, such figures are known to have read their works in other cities, and to have been thanked in their own for writing up histories of the native *polis*.[57] The contrast (if there was one) between local historians and the luminaries mentioned above is instructive. A man like Syriscus of Chersonesus on the Black

[55] A point stressed by, e.g., Fornara (1983) 51, and Harding (1994) 25.

[56] Many would want to exclude Xenophon from this illustrious group; I am not one.

[57] The phenomenon of public readings of historical texts and related materials has been expertly discussed by L. Robert in a number of places, e.g. (1938) 14–15, (1946) 35–6, (1963) 58–9, and (with J. Robert) (1958) no. 336 and (1983) 162. Consult also Momigliano (1978) and Boffo (1988).

Sea (third cent. BC: *FGrHist* 807 = *SGDI* 3086, *IOSPE* I 184 and $I^2$ 344, Chaniotis E 7) is fully incorporated into the social fabric of his city, indeed he is one of its leading citizens and clearly in good standing: he is publicly thanked for reading his work, which treats Chersonesus' relations with "the kings of the Bosporus" as well as other cities in the region, and is awarded a golden crown.[58] His work was probably very much like that of other writers of local history in the Hellenistic period: built on the epiphanies of a local deity (the Maiden), it no doubt focused on the city and its cult, perhaps, like the Lindian Chronicle, recording both the dedications made to the shrine of the goddess, as well as reporting episodes when her intervention (epiphany) saved the city in times of need.[59] But the larger point is that this kind of history was precisely bound by the region of the particular *polis*; if the 'historical horizon' of Herodotus or Thucydides is essentially the known world, that of the local historian is his city and its *chora*.[60] Banishment, voluntary exile, detention abroad, travel—whatever the reason, prolonged residence away from one's native *polis* would in fact have made an historiographic difference.

It seems fitting to close this paper with the following question: had Syriscus been exiled (for political reasons no doubt), would his historical writing have been different? If he had continued to write history beyond the *Appearances of the Maiden of Chersonesus*, would it have been larger in scope and orientation? Would it have betrayed a feeling of alienation or estrangement? Would these changes have made him, if not an historian (for he was one already), an historian to remember? The conventional portrait of Herodotus adding to his knowledge and understanding of the past through his travels is compelling and I see no reason to modify it fundamentally, even if we need to be more careful about discussing the exact reason(s) for his life away from Halicarnassus. But for every Herodotus there were probably many more like Timaeus. A Sicilian, he was made to live in Athens for more than fifty years where he wrote his history. Yet, this notorious 'armchair' historian is precisely criticized by Polybius for writing history "in a saucer" (Polyb. 12.23.7: ἐν ὀξυβάφῳ), putting the bigwigs of Sicily on a par with "the most famous of heroes" (τοῖς ἐπιφανεστάτοις τῶν ἡρώων), and making Magna Graecia and Sicily in general a grand stage for significant deeds.[61]

[58] Cf. Chaniotis (1988) 300–1.
[59] For the comparison, see Higbie (2003) 275–6.
[60] In general, consult Dillery (2005).
[61] Cf. Walbank (2005) 13.

Polybius could be seen to say that while Timaeus was made to leave his home, he never got over being a local historian.

Exile must have profoundly affected the lives and output of the historians who experienced it. But I hope that this paper has shown that we must be on guard not to be careless in our use of the word 'exile', a term that can cover a variety of experiences, some of which would not have shaped the historian's views in quite the way Syme, for one, seems to imagine. It is also hoped that this paper has generated at least some cause for doubt regarding some of the pieces of testimony used by ancients and moderns to claim that particular Greek historians were exiled. It must be the case that some were, in fact, banished, made to live in a foreign land, or chose so to do. But we should not invent exile where we do not have solid evidence. Otherwise we risk the danger of constructing the lives of Greek historians to a set-pattern, at the center of which, it seems, must be exile, at least for those historians worth remembering.

CHAPTER FOUR

# EXILE ON MAIN STREET: CITIZEN DIOGENES

Robert Bracht Branham

It is hard to imagine how one could think about exile—ancient or modern—and not think through Cynicism. The founding fathers of Cynicism, Diogenes of Sinope and Crates of Thebes, were exiles, after all, the former involuntarily, the latter voluntarily.[1] Later in the Roman empire two exiled courtiers, Seneca and Dio Chrysostom, are among the most important writers on Cynic themes,[2] and then there is the sophist Lucian, a Syrian living in voluntary exile among Greeks,[3] duly attracted to Cynic masks and Cynic *parrhesia* (παρρησία, 'frankness', 'freedom of speech'). We might also think of Epictetus, a Stoic with an interest in Cynicism, who as a slave lives in a kind of internal exile, which he tries to re-describe as freedom. And then there are modern Cynics living in exile like Nietzsche (in exile) from Germany or Diderot from France.[4] An existential response to exile has from the very beginning been part of what makes Cynicism interesting and strangely modern—it is a response to banishment, to being cut away from society and at the same

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[1] According to Diogenes Laertius' account (6.20,37), although he also acknowledges that Diogenes' exile was considered voluntary by some of his sources.

[2] For Cynicism in the empire, see Goulet-Cazé (1990) and Branham/Goulet-Cazé (1996) 12 n. 34 and cf. Gaertner, pp. 13 n. 62 and 17 above.

[3] For Lucian's self-consciousness about being a Syrian (from Samosata) performing for Greeks see Branham (1989), chapter 1. I am using 'exile' in this paragraph and throughout the paper both in its literal sense and as a metaphor for various kinds of social and psychological dislocation and estrangement, cf. Gaertner's remarks (pp. 2–3 above) on the usage of the modern word 'exile' and its corresponding Greek and Latin words.

[4] I refer to the period when Nietzsche had left his academic post at Basel to wander around Italy, France and Switzerland without settling anywhere. He frequently reflects on his decision not to have a fixed abode (e.g. *Gay Science*, section 295) and commends his *gaya scienza* specifically "to those who have a right to call themselves homeless" (*Gay Science*, section 377). His estrangement from his fatherland and feelings of alienation from German culture are a central preoccupation of his mature work (e.g. *The Case of Wagner* and *Nietzsche contra Wagner*). For discussion see Goldhill (2000) 1–7, Branham (2004). Similarly, I refer to Diderot's voluntary relocation to St. Petersburg. It is not coincidental that both Nietzsche and Diderot shared a profound interest in Cynicism: see Niehues-Pröbsting (1996).

time having to take part; it is about getting thrown out, or dropping out, or checking out, opting out and preferring not to—not to be a citizen, i.e., a soldier, taxpayer or voter; not to be a producer, i.e., a farmer, merchant or craftsman and thus also about not being a philosopher—at least according to an Aristotelian or Platonic conception, since both are centrally concerned with how to make better citizens.[5] Hence, when Diogenes is reproached for having suffered exile (in one of the anecdotes Diogenes Laertius reports) his reply is typically forthright: "You miserable fool, that's how I became a philosopher!"[6]

Here he makes the connection as emphatically as possible between Cynicism (or his philosophy) and exile. But what is the story here? How did a philosophy emerge from the experience of exile? Or how did suffering exile get turned into a philosophy—if that is what Cynicism is—for of course there has always been some doubt about how to classify it—whether as a way of life or a full blown philosophy.[7]

When I first started reading about the Cynics I thought the story of Diogenes' exile probably had as much truth to it as the related story that he was given his philosophic mission in life—to deface the currency (παραχαράττειν τὸ νόμισμα, cf. Diog. Laert. 6.20–1)—by the Delphic or Delian oracle, a story clearly modeled on the oracle Plato's Socrates reports in the *Apology.* Such stories probably originated in a literary context—perhaps a philosophic parody by or about Diogenes—and were later treated biographically by the doxographers.[8] As Niehues-Pröbsting ((1979) 13) observes, Diogenes' image is already a product of his reception wherever we encounter it.

The ancient traditions reported by Diogenes Laertius agree that Diogenes was forced into exile but the circumstances and cause of his exile vary; in one account he is exiled because his father Hicesias was entrusted with the money of the state and defaced the coinage (cf. Diog. Laert. 6.20: δημοσίαν αὐτοῦ τὴν τράπεζαν ἔχοντος τοῦ πατρὸς καὶ παραχαράξαντος τὸ νόμισμα); according to another version of the story Diogenes' father entrusted him with the money and he defaced it, in consequence of which his father was imprisoned and died while the son fled (cf. Diog. Laert. 6.21: ἔνιοι δέ φασι παρὰ τοῦ πατρὸς αὐτὸν λαβόντα τὸ νόμισμα διαφθεῖραι· καὶ τὸν μὲν δεθέντα ἀποθανεῖν, τὸν δὲ φυγεῖν); in

[5] A major concern in Plato's *Republic* and Aristotle's *Politics*. Hence their interest in education.

[6] Cf. Diog. Laert. 6.49: ὦ κακόδαιμον, ἐφιλοσόφησα.

[7] For discussion, see Branham/Goulet-Cazé (1996) 21–7.

[8] For discussion, see Niehues-Pröbsting (1979) 43–56.

still another version, the son and the father flee together. Indeed, Diogenes Laertius is unsure whether Diogenes was formally exiled or simply fled in fear.

The fact that this story comes in several incompatible versions would seem to lessen its credibility; it would suggest that Diogenes Laertius is transmitting what was originally an oral tradition, which is typically multiform; in the first version Diogenes himself plays no role in defacing the currency; in the second he is responsible both for the defacing and for his father's imprisonment and death—not to mention his own exile. I was surprised to learn, therefore, that the factual basis of these stories is apparently confirmed by numismatic evidence discovered in the last century. According to C. T. Seltman (in Dudley (1937) 54 n. 3; cf. Bannert (1979)) there are defaced coins from Sinope dating from 350–340 BC. Other coins minted after 362 BC bear the name of the official in charge, Hicesias.

It still remains unclear whether it was Diogenes or his father who made the decision to deface the coins by smashing them with a large chisel stamp, and exactly what the motive was. Following Seltman, Dudley ((1937) 54) argues that Diogenes and his father were attempting to defend the good credit (and political autonomy) of Sinope by putting counterfeit coins out of circulation. The problem is that not all the coins so defaced were counterfeit; a small percentage were good Sinopean coins.

Be that as it may, this incident is a defining moment for Cynicism; not only does it link Diogenes' philosophical career with the act of defacing and consequent exile; the tradition makes the act of defacing the literal cause of his exile and its metaphorical meaning or justification, a meaning which Diogenes discovered only belatedly—through the experience of exile. For according to the story that Diogenes consulted an oracle (cf. Diog. Laert. 6.20–1), he initially took the idea of defacing to πολιτικὸν νόμισμα literally and discovered its metaphorical or philosophical meaning—namely, to drive the debased coin of conventional thinking out of circulation—only after he is caught and exiled. His philosophical career justifies and, in a sense, atones for the crime that made him an exile in the first place by giving it an altered meaning.[9]

[9] The story also resonates with Diogenes' defense of Cynic theft and his critique of the rules regulating exchange in other contexts: "'Very valuable things', he said, 'are sold for things of no value and vice versa" (Diog. Laert. 6.35: τὰ πολλοῦ ἄξια τοῦ μηδενὸς ἔλεγε πιπράσκεσθαι καὶ ἔμπαλιν).

Now there are at least two ways of responding philosophically to exile and its attendant deprivations. One way is to try to deny or mitigate them, as Plutarch does in his essay Περὶ φυγῆς (*De Exilio*, "On Exile") ostensibly written to console a friend who has been exiled.[10] He tells his addressee to take his plight philosophically, citing a line from Menander (*Epitrepontes* fr. 9 (Arnott): οὐθὲν πέπονθας δεινὸν ἂν μὴ προσποῇ, "You have suffered nothing terrible, if you pretend it is not so"), but what is the philosophical stance Plutarch is recommending and how convincing is it? Plutarch does strike a Cynic note at several points as when he quotes the Cynicizing Stoic Ariston of Chios denying that there is any such thing as a *patria* in nature—for things are called what they are according to the use we make of them (*De Exil.* 600E). Very well then, if there is no *patria* there is no exile—*ubi bene ibi patria*[11]—as Plutarch might but does not say. He then quotes Socrates calling himself κόσμιος, but he does not mention let alone refute the arguments Socrates makes against going into exile in Plato's *Crito.* That perhaps is less surprising than the fact that he does not cite Diogenes calling himself a κοσμοπολίτης—a citizen of the cosmos rather than of a *polis*—a word Diogenes evidently coined when asked where he was from (Diog. Laert. 6.63).[12] Since the cosmos has no citizens, I take Diogenes' neologism κοσμοπολίτης to be a witty rejection of actual citizenship—which had resulted in his exile—and an affirmation of the larger apolitical allegiances of a Cynic to nature, which are not subject to the same risks, distortions or constraints. It resonates with his assertion that "the only good government is the one in the cosmos" (Diog. Laert. 6.72: μόνην τε ὀρθὴν πολιτείαν εἶναι τὴν ἐν κόσμῳ).

Plutarch does of course make use of the example of Diogenes when he argues that exile is compatible with the exercise of *parrhesia* (cf. Plut. *De Exil.* 606C), but he also argues quite unCynically that it is even compatible with fame, a conventional Greek value that Diogenes rejected as utterly irrelevant if not inimical to happiness.

In an interesting passage (*De Exil.* 607A) Plutarch notes that the word φυγάς ('exile'), is a term of reproach (ἐπονείδιστον ὁ φυγάς ἐστι), which we certainly would have inferred from the way it is thrown in Diogenes'

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[10] For consolatory literature and exile, see Nesselrath pp. 87 ff. below, who traces a cluster of Cynic themes from Teles through Plutarch and Favorinus.

[11] Cf. Gaertner, p. 15 n. 80 above for attestations of this ancient proverb.

[12] Cf. Gaertner, pp. 11–12 n. 55 above for literature on the concept of cosmopolitanism and see p. 82 n. 36 below.

teeth in the anecdote at Diog. Laert. 6.49 (see above); but Plutarch proceeds to argue, only fools use it that way (*De Exil.* 607A: παρά γε τοῖς ἄφροσιν), the same people who think the words for 'beggar' (πτωχός), 'bald' (φαλακρός), 'short' (μικρός), 'foreigner' (ξένος) and 'immigrant' (μέτοικος) are pejorative. But this attempt to dismiss common usage is hardly persuasive. What Athenian prided himself on being a 'short bald beggar' or 'non-Athenian'? No more convincing is his attempt to contradict Euripides' Polynices in the *Phoenissae* when he laments the consequences of his exile (specifically his loss of *parrhesia*). If Plutarch's essay fails to convince, it is not just because of its loosely argued, eclectic style but rather because Plutarch really accepts the conventional view of exile as an assault on the very identity of the person banished that casts him into a state of privation which he can only try to ameliorate or ignore.[13] If it were not a dreadful misfortune, why would it elicit a consolation? The whole thrust of Plutarch's essay is to look for a silver lining—e.g., you will be free of civic duties—to argue that life after exile can be a successful continuation of life as it was before. He does not see exile, therefore, as a turning point, as Diogenes does, as the discovery of a new kind of life or as a source of philosophic insight.

If, on the other hand, we consider the ideology of Cynicism in the context of exile it becomes increasingly clear that its most important and enduring attributes take the form of a radical re-evaluation of the experience of exile itself. Cynicism is nothing less than an attempt to redescribe life as a permanent outcast as a form of enlightenment—not an easy thing to do.

Now there are two dominant themes in Cynicism, which in some respects converge and in other collide, both of which can be understood as deliberate philosophical responses to the shock of exile in that they appear to appropriate for the banished individual goods which are usually seen as inseparable from political life—by which I mean life as a citizen in a *polis*—namely, self-sufficiency (or *autarkeia* (αὐτάρκεια)) and freedom (ἐλευθερία or παρρησία). Both Plato and Aristotle see political community as emerging naturally from the fact that an individual cannot provide for all his or her own needs; only a community or *polis* can even aspire to do that. As Aristotle puts it succinctly in the *Politics* ($1261^{b}11$), a household (οἰκία) is more self-sufficient than a single person and a city

[13] For a blow by blow account of Plutarch's argument, see Nesselrath, pp. 92 ff. below.

is more self-sufficient than a household. Yet while describing himself as "without a city, without a house, without a fatherland, a beggar, a vagrant with a single day's bread",[14] Diogenes attempts to secure for himself the autonomy he was unable to secure for Sinope—if that was indeed his motive for defacing the city's coins (see p. 73 above). He does so by reversing the judgment against him, by rejecting the *polis* and its *nomoi*—"I condemned them to staying at home"[15]—in favor of the Cynic *askesis* focused on his bodily nature, the source of those needs that make us all vulnerable and dependent, in need of a *polis* or community. His method is to maximize well-being and self-sufficiency by minimizing those needs, reducing them to a natural minimum as exemplified by animals, or, in the anecdote Seneca tells,[16] a child. This is the Diogenes who would agree with Thoreau when he says "simplify, simplify, simplify"; the Diogenes who discovered his radically apolitical *modus vivendi* by observing a mouse running around in the dark;[17] the Diogenes who called poverty "the tuition-free way to study philosophy".[18]

As Leslie Kurke ((1999) 330–1) observes "for Diogenes and for much of Hellenistic philosophy in his wake, life 'in accordance with nature' essentially liberates the individual from his dependence on civic order. It is no longer the city that protects the individual from the randomness of fortune and guarantees his worth within a social order of value but his own reason and self-mastery". Indeed, when asked what he had gotten out of philosophy Diogenes responds: "If nothing else then at least this—to be prepared for every kind of luck" (Diog. Laert. 6.63: καὶ εἰ μηδὲν ἄλλο, τὸ γοῦν πρὸς πᾶσαν τύχην παρεσκευάσθαι). If Kurke's account of the political meaning of coinage is right, then the act of defacing coins is in itself a symbolic rejection of the *polis* and its way of minting citizens. Be that as it may, the philosophic rejection of the *polis*

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[14] Cf. Diog. Laert. 6.38 = Diogen. Sinop. *TrGF* 88 F 4: ἄπολις, ἄοικος, πατρίδος ἐστερημένος, / πτωχός, πλανήτης, βίον ἔχων τοὐφ' ἡμέραν.

[15] Cf. Diog. Laert. 6.49: καὶ πάλιν εἰπόντος τινός· "Σινωπεῖς σου φυγὴν κατέγνωσαν" "ἐγὼ δέ γε", εἶπεν, "ἐκείνων μονήν" and see Gaertner, p. 10 n. 45 for a similar statement by the Greek philosopher Anaxagoras.

[16] Cf. Sen. *Ep.* 90.14: [sc. *Diogenes*], *cum vidisset puerum cava manu bibentem aquam, fregit protinus exemptum e perula calicem cum hac obiurgatione sui: "quamdiu homo stultus supervacuas sarcinas habui!"*

[17] Cf. Diog. Laert. 6.22: μῦν θεασάμενος διατρέχοντα, καθά φησι Θεόφραστος ἐν τῷ Μεγαρικῷ, καὶ μήτε κοίτην ἐπιζητοῦντα μήτε σκότος εὐλαβούμενον ἢ ποθοῦντά τι τῶν δοκούντων ἀπολαυστῶν, πόρον ἐξεῦρε τῆς περιστάσεως.

[18] Cf. Stob. 4.32A.11 (p. 782 Hense): Διογένης τὴν πενίαν αὐτοδίδακτον ἔφη εἶναι ἐπικούρημα πρὸς φιλοσοφίαν.

that begins with Diogenes results directly from his perversely embracing the state of privation foisted on him by exile and re-describing it as a valued achievement—autonomy.

Now if Diogenes' disenchantment with the *polis*, with its *nomoi* and *nomismata,* as engendered by his experience of exile, leads to the Cynic reconception of *autarkeia* from a collective civic virtue to a personal one, this is no less true of the Cynic idea of freedom. Just as *autarkeia* changes its meaning—is effectively defaced—when applied to a stateless individual living in exile, so too does freedom. Clearly, the Cynic understanding of freedom cannot be that of Plato, Aristotle or the citizens of Athens, since its premise rejects the *polis* as the locus or source of freedom. Therefore, freedom cannot be a matter of legal status (or entitlement) such as that of being a citizen. The Cynic conception of freedom—"to use any place for any purpose" (cf. Diog. Laert. 6.22: παντὶ τόπῳ ἐχρῆτο εἰς πάντα)—is a license to practice *autarkeia* free from that most intimate of social fetters, shame (*aidos*), the cornerstone of conventional Greek morality.[19]

Accordingly, when nature calls, Diogenes famously does the business of Demeter and Aphrodite in public, eating and masturbating in the agora. Notoriously, Diogenes said of public masturbation: "I only wish I could be free of hunger as easily by rubbing my belly" (Diog. Laert. 6.69: "εἴθε ἦν", ἔλεγε, "καὶ τὴν κοιλίαν παρατριψάμενον τοῦ λιμοῦ παύσασθαι"). Cynic freedom means to follow nature's bidding undeterred by shame. As far as the body or nature is concerned one need is in principle no better or worse than any other. They are givens. It is culture that creates a hierarchy of desires and the proprieties governing their tendence. Diogenes' response in this anecdote is characteristic: it comically asserts the claims of nature as matters of fact while blithely ignoring the constraints of culture. They have no more claim on Diogenes than on any other canine. Here freedom and *autarkeia* go hand in hand with *anaideia*—Cynic shamelessness.

To paraphrase Heinrich Niehues-Pröbsting ((1996) 360), Cynicism originates as the conscious and demonstrative rejection of required moral attitudes, namely, that of the upstanding citizen who fits into the social order as he is supposed to. The Cynic does not fit in, is not at home even at home.[20] The proper civic or moral attitude is pushed aside

[19] The literature on shame in Greek culture is voluminous. For a sophisticated philosophical treatment, see Williams (1993).

[20] Cf. Adorno's famous statement, quoted in n. 46 below.

and replaced—as in the masturbation anecdote—by a comically amoral attitude. At that point Cynic humor comes into being, the *spoudogeloios* or seriocomic jester, or as Nietzsche put it, the "buffoon without shame" (*Beyond Good and Evil*, section 26), who speaks the truth by donning a shamelessly comic mask.[21] In so doing the Cynic makes humor into a means of perception and this is precisely how he expresses his critique of society—not by theoretical reasoning. His refusal to be laughed down, to be persuaded by others' contempt for him, is a deliberate act of self-determination, an exile's claim to freedom from the margins of society.

This feature of Diogenes' performance stands out and in my view is the most fundamental: that is its humor. Why should this be so? Most philosophy is not particularly witty, to put it mildly. Democritus' laughter is legendary,[22] but he left few traces of it behind. It would be a historicizing error to answer this question with reference to Diogenes' personality, for biting and sometimes outrageous humor was a characteristic of the whole *eidos* of Cynic discourse, according to Demetrius (*Eloc.* 259),[23] and it persists in outline right down to Lucian and even Dio Chrysostom.[24] The answer has less to do with personality than (1) with the cultural and social position of Cynics exiled by ancient society and their consequent attitude toward social convention as it bears on the private life and the body; and (2) with the rhetorical or heuristic style of philosophy that Diogenes practices, which consists of subjecting the rules and customs promulgated by society to the test of embodiment and to the vagaries of material existence as learned in exile. Making himself the medium of such arguments often puts Diogenes in direct violation of rules so familiar that they are rarely articulated, let alone enforced. The violation of the countless rules both tacit and explicit that govern our behavior, beginning with our use of language, is basic to any form of humor. As Mary Douglas has argued, the form of a joke "rarely lies in the utterance alone" and can only be understood with reference "to the total social situation" (Douglas (1968) 363).[25] The Cynics' innovation consists of exploiting this fact polemically as a way of defining themselves in

[21] Cf. Niehues-Pröbsting (1996) 350: "The Cynic of antiquity [...] was a genius at expressing contempt and, at the same time, the paragon of everything contemptible".

[22] Cf. e.g. Lucian *Vit. Auct.* 13 and Juv. 10.47–50.

[23] For Demetrius on the κυνικὸς τρόπος ('Cynic style'), see Branham (1989) 234 n. 73.

[24] Branham (1989) *passim.*

[25] For an interesting critique of her theory, see Mulkay (1988).

opposition—not to this or that rule or this or that group, but to the authority of society to dictate thought and behavior. Mary Douglas (1968) and Bakhtin have taught us that the significance of joking as an activity in a traditional society lies in its resistance to the social control of cognition. The Cynic motto—"Deface the Current Coin" (see pp. 72 ff. above)—makes joking, parody, and satire not merely a useful rhetorical tool, but an indispensable one, constitutive of Cynic ideology as such.[26] Humor is the chisel stamp of Cynic discourse. The work of Douglas and Bakhtin provides us, therefore, with the interpretive framework within which the rhetoric of the Cynics can be most usefully analyzed.

To take just two examples, let us consider reason and ritual in the *chreiai* about Diogenes. It is significant that in spite of the fact that Diogenes is said to have composed written works, there are no extended arguments of any kind attributed to him even of the length attributed to Presocratics. This might lead one to suspect that he did not use extended arguments. There are of course two formal syllogisms attributed to him by Diogenes Laertius, but both are parodic.[27] One is ostensibly offered as a justification for Cynic theft; the other, to justify transgressive eating (Diog. Laert. 6.37,69)—both violations of common social norms. The former runs:

| | |
|---|---|
| τῶν θεῶν ἐστι πάντα· | All things belong to the gods; |
| φίλοι δὲ οἱ σοφοὶ τοῖς θεοῖς· | the wise are friends of the gods; |
| κοινὰ δὲ τὰ τῶν φίλων· | friends hold things in common; |
| πάντ᾽ ἄρα ἐστὶ τῶν σοφῶν. | all things belong to the wise. |

Using the form of the syllogism allows Diogenes to invoke the authority of reason even as he parodies its procedures in a single gesture. Of course a parody does not belong to the same type (or genre) as its model. A parody of a syllogism is no more a syllogism than the parody of a tragedy is a tragedy. I do not think Diogenes offers such syllogisms as serious arguments, but as parodic examples of the kind of reasoning that other philosophers take seriously, and that he routinely mocks. In any event, such arguments are not likely to change the mind of anyone

[26] Cf. Niehues-Pröbsting (1979) 86: "Im Kynismus des Diogenes ist das Lachen ein unentbehrlicher Bestandteil".

[27] Cf. Ross (1949) 32: "Aristotle's definition of syllogism is quite general; it is 'an argument in which, certain things having been assumed, something other than these follows of necessity from their truth, without needing any term from outside' (Arist. *Pro.* 1.23)".

who is not already inclined to accept their conclusions. That cannot be their purpose. The point of the parody lies rather in the jarring contrast between the formal protocols of reason and the paradoxically Cynic conclusions they serve to produce. In the process, the instruments of reason are neatly turned against themselves in a mockery of the syllogistic method. The butt of the joke is its form.

The second syllogism is no less a joke; specifically, it works by means of a pun on ἄτοπον. The first time it is used figuratively, to mean 'absurd'; the second, it is used literally, to mean 'out of place':

| | |
|---|---|
| εἰ τὸ ἀριστᾶν μηδὲν εἴη ἄτοπον, | If to breakfast is not absurd, |
| οὐδ' ἐν ἀγορᾷ ἐστιν ἄτοπον· | it is not out of place in the agora; |
| οὐκ ἔστι δὲ ἄτοπον τὸ ἀριστᾶν· | to breakfast is not absurd; |
| οὐδ' ἄρα ἐν ἀγορᾷ ἐστιν ἄτοπον. | it is not out of place in the agora. |

This is one of the types of fallacy catalogued by Aristotle in his *Sophistical Refutations.* In both these instances, jokes—a parody and a pun—are decked out in the trappings of formal argumentation. Cynic conclusions are asserted while the rationality of the philosophers is caricatured as logic chopping and verbal sleight of hand.[28]

In her classic study of jokes and joking, Mary Douglas develops the argument that "the peculiar expressive character of the joke stands in contrast to ritual as such".[29] For if we consider the joke "as a symbol of social, physical, or mental experience", we are already treating it as a kind of rite. But what kind? As a spontaneous symbol, she says, a joke "expresses something that is happening, but that is all". It stands in contrast, therefore, to the standardized rite or ritual, "which expresses what ought to happen" and thus, unlike spontaneous joking, is "not morally neutral". Douglas spells out the opposition between joking and ritual as follows:

> A joke has in common with a rite that both connect widely differing concepts. But the kind of connection of pattern A with pattern B in a rite is

[28] It is true that one saying attributed to Diogenes seems to endorse reason: "He used to say repeatedly that to be prepared for life one must have reason or a rope" (Diog. Laert. 6.24: συνεχές τε ἔλεγεν εἰς τὸν βίον παρεσκευάσθαι δεῖν λόγον ἢ βρόχον). I would point out that this too is a pun and argue that λόγος need mean no more than Diogenes' 'opinions' or 'beliefs' (see LSJ s.v. III.2,4,5; VI.3.b). There are no examples in the *chreiai* that purport to quote him verbatim of Diogenes using λόγος in a philosophically loaded sense as 'reason' or 'right reason'. Cf., however, Diog. Laert. 6.38.

[29] Douglas (1968) 368–9.

> such that A and B support each other in a unified system. The rite imposes order and harmony, while the joke disorganizes. From the physical to the personal, to the social, to the cosmic, great rituals create unity in experience. They assert hierarchy and order. In doing so, they affirm the value of the symbolic patterning of the universe. Each level of patterning is validated and enriched by association with the rest. But jokes have the opposite effect. They connect widely differing fields, but the connection destroys hierarchy and order. They do not affirm the dominant values, but denigrate and devalue. Essentially a joke is an anti-rite. . . . The message of a standard rite is that the ordained patterns of social life are inescapable. The message of a joke is that they are escapable . . . for a joke implies that anything is possible.[30]

If this argument is correct, joking in a traditional society organized by myth and ritual tends to set itself in opposition to the prime embodiments of social reason or ideology. The methods of professional philosophers would be one example of such reason; ritual would be a far more important one. If formal philosophical reasoning is the most convention-governed form of thought, ritual is the most convention-governed form of activity. Insofar as Diogenes is an uninhibited opponent of *nomos*—unlike Antisthenes, for example, he never refers even to a *nomos* of *arete*—we would expect him to be averse to ritual per se (since it embodies and reinforces *nomos*), and he does not disappoint us. Every single reference to ritual activity—sacrifice, prayer, or purification rites—in *chreiai* is derisive (cf. Diog. Laert. 6.37,42,47,59–62,73). There are several anecdotes which suggest that Diogenes did not believe in the gods of tradition; indeed, it is hard to see how he could have. His ironic response to someone impressed by the quantity of votive offerings in Samothrace comes to mind: "There would have been far more if those who were not saved had made offerings!"[31] The opposition between Cynic jesting and traditional religion continues down to Demonax (in the second cent. AD), who is put on trial in Athens for not joining the Mysteries, but refused to take the charge seriously.[32] Where ritual is socially consolidating and conservative, the Cynic parrhesiast is antiritualistic and disruptive. That Diogenes defends stealing from temples and denies the validity of such fundamental dietary and sexual taboos as those against cannibalism

[30] Douglas (1968) 369–70, 373.

[31] Cf. Diog. Laert. 6.59: θαυμάζοντός τινος τὰ ἐν Σαμοθράκῃ ἀναθήματα ἔφη· "πολλῷ ἂν εἴη πλείω εἰ καὶ οἱ μὴ σωθέντες ἀνετίθεσαν".

[32] See Branham (1989) 57–63.

and incest coheres with this antiritualistic stance.[33] The contrast with a philosopher like Socrates who outwardly conforms is striking and significant. The Cynic's rejection of inherited patterns of conduct makes room for his own improvisations; but where do they derive their authority if, as Douglas also argues, joking "merely affords opportunity for realizing that an accepted pattern has no necessity . . . [but] is frivolous in that it produces no real alternative, only an exhilarating sense of freedom from form in general"?[34] The answer usually given to this question would be 'nature'. It is typically said, for example, that the Cynic pursues freedom or happiness by following nature, which means a life devoted to 'discipline' and 'self-sufficiency'.[35] While there is much to this characterization, if we examine the *chreiai* in Diogenes Laertius that purport to quote Diogenes verbatim, nowhere does he show any interest in nature as a philosophical concept or a *Lebenswelt*.[36]

Indeed, it turns out that the search for freedom and simplicity, for a 'life according to nature', is far from straightforward—or simple. For if Diogenes is our model 'life according to nature' means living on the streets of a large city and begging for a living. Now begging for a living, which is very well represented in the tradition but not often discussed, may have many advantages but autonomy would not seem to be one of them. Given that this is the case, the central Cynic value could be neither self-sufficiency (*autarkeia*)—since no one is more dependent than a beggar, he is in fact a kind of suppliant—nor nature as a rational order, equivalent to reason, as it is in Stoicism, but freedom. While Cynic freedom would seem to be largely negative in Isaiah Berlin's sense—'freedom from' rather than 'freedom to'—it can also be active and engaged as in the act of *parrhesia* (freedom of speech). Begging—the rejection of work, of a life considered productive by society—is entailed by the Cynic commitment to freedom in order to avoid becoming

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[33] See Diog. Laert. 6.73, Dio Chrys. *Or.* 10.30. There is of course a difference between questioning the validity of a taboo and advocating the tabooed activity. Diogenes has sometimes been misinterpreted as engaging in the latter.

[34] Douglas (1968) 365.

[35] See, e.g., Edwards et al. (1972) s.v. 'Cynics', 1.284–5, Moles (2003) 474. Contrast Sayre (1948) 5: "The Cynics accepted the principle of following nature and their amoralism was incidental to it, but 'following nature' was not the dominant idea of Cynicism and does not adequately describe it".

[36] Diogenes' statements (Diog. Laert. 6.63,72) that he is a κοσμοπολίτης and that the only good government is the one of the cosmos are inconsistent with my argument only if they are not primarily a rejection of existing governments: see the discussion on p. 74 above.

subject to society's control. *Autarkeia* is highly desirable, but freedom is imperative. Begging for a living is the price the Cynic pays for opting out of society, for choosing the freedom of exile over the constraints of citizenship. The rejection of shame is what makes possible so radical a form of freedom. Diogenes Laertius reports that Diogenes would praise those who were about to marry and did not; those who were about to travel and did not; those who were about to enter politics and did not; those who were about to live at court and did not.[37] Like Bartleby the Scrivener, Diogenes 'preferred not to'. What Diogenes means by 'useless toils' seems to cover most of what human beings spend their lives doing. Cynic freedom courts indifference (*apatheia*) and idleness, which is why Nietzsche wrote a comic poem mocking the complacency of the Cynic:

> Pressing need is cheap; without a price is happiness.
> Therefore I do not sit on gold but I sit on my ass.

Insofar as the tradition acknowledges any contradiction or tension within Cynic ideology between the abject, subaltern status of the beggar or exile and the witty superiority of Diogenes exercising his freedom on the street, it attempts to resolve it by representing begging as practiced by Diogenes as an occasion for self-assertion and social satire. Diogenes is not just another beggar in the anecdotal tradition but an aggressive panhandler—something now outlawed in many cities in the USA—who seizes every opportunity begging offers to engage in acerbic acts of *parrhesia*. To a miser who was slow to respond, Diogenes said "I'm asking you for food not for funeral expenses";[38] when he needed money he told his friends not to give something but to give something *back*;[39] when he begged of a grouch who said, "If you can persuade me", Diogenes replied "If I could have persuaded you I would have persuaded you to hang yourself".[40] His standard approach was logical: "If you have

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[37] Cf. Diog. Laert. 6.29: ἐπῄνει τοὺς μέλλοντας γαμεῖν καὶ μὴ γαμεῖν, καὶ τοὺς μέλλοντας καταπλεῖν καὶ μὴ καταπλεῖν, καὶ τοὺς μέλλοντας πολιτεύεσθαι καὶ μὴ πολιτεύεσθαι, καὶ τοὺς παιδοτροφεῖν καὶ μὴ παιδοτροφεῖν, καὶ τοὺς παρασκευαζομένους συμβιοῦν τοῖς δυνάσταις καὶ μὴ προσιόντας.

[38] Cf. Diog. Laert. 6.56: φιλάργυρον ᾔτει· τοῦ δὲ βραδύνοντος "ἄνθρωπε", εἶπεν, "εἰς τροφήν σε αἰτῶ, οὐκ εἰς ταφήν".

[39] Cf. Diog. Laert. 6.46: χρημάτων δεόμενος ἀπαιτεῖν ἔλεγε τοὺς φίλους, οὐκ αἰτεῖν.

[40] Cf. Diog. Laert. 6.59: δύσκολον ᾔτει· τοῦ δ' εἰπόντος "ἐάν με πείσῃς", ἔφη, "εἴ σε ἐδυνάμην πεῖσαι, ἔπεισα ἄν σε ἀπάγξασθαι".

already given to someone else, then give to me also; if not, then start with me".[41] He once was seen begging alms of a statue. When asked why he did this, he replied: "I'm practicing getting turned down".[42] When asked what he did to be called a dog, Diogenes replied: "I wag my tail at those who give, bark at those who don't and bite scoundrels".[43] In this last anecdote beggar, dog and Cynic satirist converge.

Accordingly, when Heracles comes up in Diogenes Laertius' account, Diogenes is said to have claimed that their lives had the same character—not because of Heracles' capacity for endurance (*askesis* or *autarkeia*) but because they both "deemed nothing more important than freedom" (cf. Diog. Laert. 6.71: τὸν αὐτὸν χαρακτῆρα τοῦ βίου λέγων διεξάγειν ὅνπερ καὶ Ἡρακλῆς, μηδὲν ἐλευθερίας προκρίνων). If happiness is an activity, then the exercise of freedom would be happiness for a Cynic and thus in need of no further justification.[44] The exercise of this freedom in words, *parrhesia*, is, as Diogenes plainly affirms, the finest thing in the world.[45] Therefore certain kinds of speech acts—those that effectively assert freedom in some context—will be quintessentially Cynic, constitutive of what it means to be a Cynic, not merely instrumental to an ideology that exists independently of them.

Now Cynicism is the only philosophic movement in antiquity to make freedom a central value and freedom of speech in particular. There is no denying that Diogenes' claim to *parrhesia* and *eleutheria* from the very bottom of the social hierarchy—as an impoverished outcast—verges on the utopian since such liberties were among the privileges of an aristocrat or the rights of a citizen in a democratic state. But what did Diogenes learn from his exile if not that freedom is not a gift from the state but a way of life and that, as another exile, Theodor Adorno, observed, "it is part of morality not to be at home in one's home".[46] It is this hard-earned lesson that made Diogenes and the

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[41] Cf. Diog. Laert. 6.49: ἔφη "εἰ μὲν καὶ ἄλλῳ δέδωκας, δὸς κἀμοί· εἰ δὲ μηδενί, ἀπ' ἐμοῦ ἄρξαι".

[42] Cf. Diog. Laert. 6.49: ἐρωτηθεὶς δὲ διὰ τί τοῦτο ποιεῖ "μελετῶ", εἶπεν, "ἀποτυγχάνειν".

[43] Cf. Diog. Laert. 6.60: ἐρωτηθεὶς τί ποιῶν κύων καλεῖται ἔφη· "τοὺς μὲν διδόντας σαίνων, τοὺς δὲ μὴ διδόντας ὑλακτῶν, τοὺς δὲ πονηροὺς δάκνων".

[44] As Sayre (1948) 7 writes: "The object of Cynicism was happiness: it was a form of eudaimonism and it is of interest as a human experiment with that end in view . . . The Cynic virtues are the qualities through which freedom was attained".

[45] Cf. Diog. Laert. 6.69: ἐρωτηθεὶς τί κάλλιστον ἐν ἀνθρώποις ἔφη· "παρρησία".

[46] Cf. Adorno (1997), chapter 18: "'Es gehört selbst zu meinem Glücke, kein Hausbesitzer zu sein', schrieb Nietzsche bereits in der Fröhlichen Wissenschaft. Dem

Cynics a paradigm of real and metaphorical exile and has shaped the perception of subsequent generations of intellectuals from the Stoics to the deracinated intellectuals of the twentieth century.[47]

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müßte man heute hinzufügen: es gehört zur Moral, nicht bei sich selber zu Hause zu sein". On exile as a sign of *virtus* see also Cohen, p. 124 below.

[47] On the reception of the Cynic discourse on exile by the Stoics and by authors of the Second Sophistic see Gaertner (pp. 12–13, 17), Nesselrath (pp. 90–1, 93) and Desideri (p. 199) in this volume. This article is partly based on my contribution to Branham/Goulet-Cazé (1996).

CHAPTER FIVE

# LATER GREEK VOICES ON THE PREDICAMENT OF EXILE: FROM TELES TO PLUTARCH AND FAVORINUS

Heinz-Günther Nesselrath

In Hellenistic times, the phenomenon of exile had been present (and even prominent) in Greek history for at least half a millennium, and the image of man in exile had already found eloquent expression in literary figures such as the lonely Odysseus in book 5 of the *Odyssey* weeping at the shore of Calypso's island,[1] or Oedipus' son Polynices in Euripides' *Phoenissae*.[2] After the break-up of Alexander's empire, the predicament of being made an exile remained as common as it had been in former times or became even more so, as the often turbulent creation of new and very large states and the demolition of smaller and older ones threatened the fundamental security of life for great numbers of people. The very frequency of exile in those times may in fact have contributed to a new development: Exile now became the object of reasoned argument and gained the attention of philosophy. The great Hellenistic schools of philosophy gave much thought to the question how human beings could or should deal with the many instances of danger or misery in their lives, and numerous treatises were written with the aim of helping people cope with catastrophic events (loss of dear relatives, of wealth, of status, even of one's own life). Most extant examples of these texts—which can be subsumed under the heading 'consolatory literature'—were produced in imperial times, but their ancestors clearly go back into the Hellenistic age and even to the writings of the Sophists of the fifth and fourth centuries BC.[3] As exile is certainly one of the things man must be consoled about from time to time, a closer examination of consolatory literature on exile should be worthwhile. What surely sets these texts apart from most others discussed in this volume is the fact

[1] Cf. *Odyssey* 5.82–4. For other Homeric references, see Bowie's observations on pp. 24–7 above.

[2] Cf. Eur. *Phoen.* 357–406 and see Fantham's remarks on pp. 174–5 below.

[3] Cf. Kassel (1958) 7–12.

that almost all of their authors did not suffer exile themselves; for the first time, then, we have to deal with various forms of a more 'theoretical' approach to this phenomenon.

Probably the earliest specimen of a treatise seeking to show that exile is not nearly as fearsome and terrible as it is often reputed to be is a text written around the middle of the third century BC[4] by a man called Teles of whom we otherwise know next to nothing,[5] except that he produced several similar pieces dealing with other human afflictions (e.g. poverty, pain and sorrow etc.). All these texts are known to us only because they were preserved in the massive late antique anthology of Stobaeus, and there not in their original form, but already shortened by another quite shadowy figure called Theodorus. Earlier scholars—not least the first important editor of *Teletis Reliquiae*, Otto Hense—thought that Theodorus had undertaken a considerable reworking of Teles' original texts; recently, however, Pedro Pablo Fuentes González in his new and quite extensive commentary on Teles' remains (1998) has made a convincing case that such opinions are not very well founded; Theodorus may have shortened but did not substantially rearrange Teles' original works. Thus, we may feel justified in regarding the text which Stobaeus presents to us as more or less a genuine product of the third century BC.

The structure of Teles' brief treatise on exile is rather simple and straightforward, namely a series of questions and answers. Their main aim is to show that being in exile is in no way harmful to a rational human being: just as a skilled worker does not lose his skills when being abroad, exile does not impair a man's reasoning. Invoking the authority of the noted Megarian philosopher Stilpon, Teles affirms that exile neither plunders nor damages any part of a man's soul (τῶν περὶ <τὴν> ψυχὴν) nor his body (τῶν περὶ τὸ σῶμα) nor his external possessions (τῶν ἐκτός). A man may even make more and better use of mental and bodily faculties abroad than in his native place, and he may just as well improve his material situation compared to that which he left at home.[6] A mythical example (Achilles' old teacher Phoenix, who in exile was

[4] See Hense (1909) p. 23.5–12 and now Fuentes González (1998) ad loc.

[5] On the earlier and rather unfounded opinions concerning his origins and home see now Fuentes González (1998) 33–6.

[6] On this 'positive' aspect of exile (as a provider of new opportunities, allowing exiles to "cross borders, break barriers of thought and experience", Said (2000) 185), which is also stressed by Plutarch (below pp. 96–7), see p. 10 ff. above.

made rich by Achilles' father Peleus) and a historical one (the famous Athenian statesman Themistocles who fared similarly well when he had to take refuge with his former Persian enemies) are summoned to prove this point. Thus exile as such is no cause of harm in any respect; people in fact often fare a worse kind of exile by literally burying (κατορύττομεν) themselves at home (p. 21.2–23.4 Hense).

After this 'prooimion', which sets up the thesis that exile is fundamentally no harmful condition, Teles then proceeds to fend off a number of counter-propositions which are raised by an imaginary interlocutor and which he patiently refutes one after the other: 1. "Exiles have no political power and no freedom of speech."—No, very often quite the contrary is true; Teles cites a number of examples drawn from 'recent' Hellenistic history, where people in exile found favour with foreign rulers and were entrusted by them with high offices (p. 23.4–15).[7]—2. "At home, however, exiles have lost all political clout."—But in this they fare no worse than women, children[8] and the elderly, all of whom do not feel any harm from that (a proposition which we might not share today). In any case—the argument goes on—there is no real advantage in enjoying a ruling position; one may just as well use one's faculties in a satisfactory way by living privately by oneself (p. 23.15–24.10).—3. "But exiles are not allowed to return home, and this is a severe restriction of their freedom."—On the other hand no human being is really free to go everywhere; there are always areas which are off limits. But this is no real hindrance to lead a happy life (p. 24.10–25.7).—4. "But does exile not mean misfortune and dishonour?"[9]—Not really, because people who have driven an honest person into exile are surely rather bad people, and it is no disgrace not to live among them any longer (p. 25.8–13).[10]—5. "But isn't just that—to be driven out by people who

[7] The cases cited (a certain Lycinus from Italy, a Spartan Hippomedon, and the Athenians Chremonides and Glaucon) probably belong to the third century BC (see Fuentes González (1998) ad loc.).

[8] Does τὰ μειράκια ταυτί point to a certain audience, where those μειράκια were present?

[9] In Hense's text, this thought is not introduced by a question like the three preceding ones; Fuentes González (1998)—taking up an idea of Barigazzi's—by slight rewriting restores the question, a rather convincing solution in my opinion.

[10] There follows an anecdote about the comic playwright Philemon, which does not follow too smoothly upon the preceding remark (a result of epitomization?) and which is apparently introduced to show that human well-being is mainly a matter of perception.

are worse than oneself—a phenomenal outrage (παροινία)?"—Well, would it be preferable to be banished by people better than oneself? A banishment deserved would reflect very badly on the banished person. "Still, wouldn't it in any case be a disgrace that such bad people who vote others into exile enjoyed better luck than those whom they banished?" Not really: the disgrace would be theirs, not that of the banished (p. 25.13–26.8).—6. "But must one not consider it at least a bad mishap to find one's native place so churlish and uncharitable?"—On the contrary: one should count oneself lucky to have found out something one did not know before (even if that knowledge is unpleasant), just as in the case of a bad wife or a bad servant (p. 26.8–15).—7. "Still, it is surely desirable to continue living in the place where one was born and grew up."—But (Teles now asks in return) would one feel the same about a house which has developed a bad state of decay, or a ship that has become old and unsafe? And is it really preferable to stay for the rest of your life in miserable little places like Cythera or Myconus, only because you grew up there (p. 26.15–27.10)?—8. "But having to endure being called a *metoikos* (resident alien) is something like a disgrace" (this is simply a variation on questions 4 and 5). Teles replies to this by pointing to two distinguished *metoikoi* of Greek myth, Cadmus and Heracles, and to the fact that the Spartans consider all those as citizens who have adopted their way of life (p. 27.10–29.1).—9. The interrogator's last question once more turns on the notion of disgrace: "Surely being denied a grave in one's native land and having to be buried in foreign soil is a disgrace?" This elicits the most detailed response from Teles and shows his Cynic convictions most distinctly (p. 29.2–30.1): how can something be disgraceful which happened to many of the best people, while the worst usually were buried in their home country? Everywhere the distance to the underworld is the same, just as all people are ultimately alike in their mortality. The Cynic contempt of ordinary man's worry about death comes out even more clearly in the following remarks—in part credited to Bion of Borysthenes—about the futility of burial customs.[11] These remarks then take the form of a spirited refutation of the famous words of the dying Polynices in Euripides' *Phoenissae*, who begs to be buried in his native Thebes:[12] It does not matter—Teles declares—whether one

[11] Cf. p. 30.1 f.: ἡ περὶ ταφῆς ἀγωνία, φησὶν ὁ Βίων, πολλὰς τραγῳδίας ἐποίησεν.

[12] Cf. Eur. *Phoen.* 1447–52, with *TrGF* Adesp. 281.1: ἐν γῆς φίλης ὄχθοισι κρυφθῆναι καλόν interspersed. See Fantham, p. 175 n. 8 below.

is buried in one's own or in a foreign country, nor even, whether one is buried at all (or simply left on the ground to be eaten up by dogs, birds or worms).[13]

These are Teles' arguments—addressed to no one in particular, but to all whom it may concern—against the presumed evils of exile, simply considering various allegedly distressful or shameful aspects of exile and downplaying them one by one. Once formulated in this way, they remained the basis for every later treatment of the same theme, as a short look at another treatise "On Exile", that by the Stoic philosopher Musonius, easily shows: Musonius' remarks, although three hundred years younger than Teles', do not offer anything really new (except perhaps a greater conciseness in style); even the historical examples and similes he uses are very much the same.[14] One other important thing common to both Teles and Musonius is the fact that the success of their arguments clearly depends on a decidedly Cynic outlook on life: to a Cynic—in the tradition of the famous Diogenes and Crates—to whom a place others may fondly call 'home' does not matter very much, who feels free to roam the earth and who shuns all emotional allegiance to particular places and to other people, the very condition of exile is actually non-existent.[15] This way of life, however, is the very antithesis of the condition in which the citizen of the classical Greek *polis* regarded himself as an integral part of his community, a way of being which Plato took to its logical extremes in the ideal state he conceived in the *Republic* and *Nomoi* (and which the Euripidean Polynices represents very well, too).[16]

It may, therefore, be all the more remarkable that this cluster of Cynic (or Cynico-Stoic) arguments form the backbone of other essays, too, which try to play down the evils of exile, essays, however, by authors who cannot be called Cynic at all: the treatises Περὶ φυγῆς by Plutarch and Favorinus. Though the common stock of motives and arguments in both can ultimately be traced back to a tradition best represented by the preachings of Teles, each of these authors manages to add his own

[13] The truncated end of this section seems to have referred to a people who embalm their dead to keep them within their very homes—just to show how varied human attitudes to death and burial may be (p. 29.1–32.2).

[14] Socrates, Diogenes, and Themistocles figure just as prominently as in Teles, and the Euripidean Polynices has to be refuted here, too.

[15] See Branham, pp. 71 ff. above.

[16] Cf. Branham, pp. 75–6 above.

individual flavour to his treatment of the theme, which makes these essays well worth reading even if one already knows Teles and Musonius and finds their presentation less than convincing.

First, Plutarch. The date and circumstances of his essay on exile are fairly clear; it has been convincingly shown that it is addressed not—as in Teles' case—to an undifferentiated general public, but to an individual addressee,[17] the young Menemachus of Sardes, who before this had already been the dedicatee of Plutarch's essay *Praecepta gerendae reipublicae* and who now has become an exile himself (5.600E: ἡ νῦν σοι παροῦσα μετάστασις). As the *Praecepta* were published only after the death of the emperor Domitian, Plutarch's *De Exilio* must be even later, perhaps after the year 100 AD; it may in fact be one of his last writings.[18]

Though a number of Teles' considerations reappear in Plutarch's treatment of the theme of exile, from the very start his approach and attitude to it are different, and this not only because we now have a distinct and individual addressee, but even more because of Plutarch's own philosophical position; as a Platonist he has (of course) an outlook distinctly different from that of Teles (and also from that of Musonius). Still, these Platonic convictions do not yet come through very emphatically in the prooimion. There, Plutarch begins by stating in general terms that people who are in an unlucky state do not need others who join them in their lamentations but rather those who offer frank and helpful advice (1.599A–C). In such a condition one should first try to gauge the gravity of the affliction one experiences as rationally as possible, for very often the human soul itself determines whether we regard an affliction as heavier or lighter to carry;[19] and one of the afflictions to which this rule applies is, of course, exile. To illustrate this, Plutarch confronts two poetical citations with each other: on the one hand the words of the Euripidean Polynices (whom we already know from Teles), who deems being deprived of one's native country the biggest evil (Eur. *Phoen.* 388–9), on the other the declaration put into the mouth of the poet Alcman that he did much better in his adopted new home at Sparta than in his home-town Sardes (*Anth. Pal.* 7.709). Obviously Alcman's much more positive personal attitude leads him to consider his new state of life much more as a gain than as a loss (2.599D–F).

[17] This friend (12.604B: ὦ φίλε), however, is first mentioned (without his name, which never appears) in 600A: τῶν νυνί σοι παρόντων . . . τὰ σὰ πράγματα).

[18] See Hani (1980) 134–6, Caballero/Viansino (1995) 8.

[19] Cf. 2.599D: ἡ . . . ψυχὴ τοῖς πράγμασι πολλάκις τὸ βάρος ἐξ αὑτῆς προστίθησιν.

Still, exile may of course be regarded as a real (and not only imagined) evil, just as many other things in life; the best way to make such things bearable is to consider whether they do not have positive aspects as well and then to emphasize those. With this regard, Plutarch reminds his friend that there are probably very many people in his native Sardes[20] who would gladly choose his present condition because of the many good things that apparently go with it (3.600A *in fine*). Therefore his friend should react like a true philosopher to his situation and make the best of it (4.600B *in fine*: χρώμενον εὐλογίστως τοῖς παροῦσιν)—an advice that sounds very much like the typically Cynic motto τὸ παρὸν εὖ θέσθαι,[21] meaning that one should concentrate on the positive aspects of one's situation,[22] and this even more, if the affliction is wholly made up by one's own imagination.

After these remarks, Plutarch again turns more directly to his addressee: he describes his predicament as a μετάστασις ἐκ τῆς νομιζομένης πατρίδος (5.600E *in fine*), and by pointedly calling the πατρίς only a νομιζομένη, he develops an interesting observation: humans in fact do not really have a 'natural' home on this earth, they only acquire something which they regard as 'home' by using it, while their real home is in heaven (5.600E–F). For this thought Plutarch cites the Stoic Ariston as well as Plato, to prove that this notion is not a peculiarity of a particular philosophical sect but rather a universal insight; further proof is provided by Heracles who in a lost tragedy[23] called not a single Greek city but all of Greece his home, and even more by Socrates who—at least in this tradition—considered himself a part of the whole world (κόσμιος).[24] This

[20] The friend's being at home in Sardes may be a major reason for Plutarch to choose the above-mentioned quotation of Alcman, who similarly had to leave his home-town and found a better life elsewhere.

[21] Cf. Soph. fr. 350 Radt; Cratinus fr. 184 Kassel/Austin: ἄνδρας σοφοὺς χρὴ τὸ παρὸν πρᾶγμα καλῶς εἰς δύναμιν τίθεσθαι; M. Aur. *Med.* 6.2.1: τὸ παρὸν εὖ θέσθαι; Ach. Tat. 5.11.4: τὰ παρόντα θέσθαι καλῶς. A similar attitude was attributed to Aristippus, founder of the Cyrenaic school: see Aristippus fr. IV A 45 Giannantoni (1990, II p. 23 = Hor. *S.* 1.17.13–21) and IV A 51 (II p. 29 = Diog. Laert. 2.66) and Classen (1986) 268 and n. 21 on p. 275.

[22] Cf. 4.600D: οἱ μὲν νοῦν ἔχοντες ἐκ τῶν ἀγαθῶν τοῖς κακοῖς ἐπαρυτόμενοι τὸν βίον ποιοῦσιν ἡδίω καὶ ποτιμώτερον, . . . διὸ κἂν ἀληθῶς κακῷ τινι καὶ λυπηρῷ περιπέσωμεν, ἐπάγεσθαι δεῖ τὸ ἱλαρὸν καὶ τὸ εὔθυμον ἐκ τῶν ὑπαρχόντων καὶ ὑπολειπομένων ἀγαθῶν τῷ οἰκείῳ τὸ ἀλλότριον ἐκλεαίνοντας· . . .

[23] Cf. *TrGF* Adesp. 392.

[24] For this meaning of κόσμιος see LSJ s.v., where also Epictetus *Diss.* 1.9.1 is cited which is very similar to Plutarch's sentence (τὸ τοῦ Σωκράτους, μηδέποτε πρὸς τὸν πυθόμενον ποδαπός ἐστιν εἰπεῖν ὅτι 'Αθηναῖος ἢ Κορίνθιος, ἀλλ' ὅτι κόσμιος); the same

cosmos is the real home of all human beings, and no one is an exile or fugitive in it. The notion of a universe encompassing all living things and ruled by a supreme divine being[25] sounds markedly Stoic, but is again illustrated by a quotation from Plato; this again establishes it as a universally accepted doctrine. Seen against this cosmic background—so Plutarch continues—the fact that his friend is at the moment not able to inhabit his beloved Sardes becomes rather insignificant (6.601B); in fact all earth—regarded within cosmic dimensions—is so small that no place on her surface is far from any other, and yet people behave like ants[26] or bees clinging to their respective hives (6.601C). By confining themselves to a very small corner of the earth such people deprive themselves of all the rest. Fortunately there are plenty of examples showing that man may actually thrive if he dares to give up his small former home: the case of Themistocles was already cited by Teles; Plutarch adds the famous Egyptian deserters known from Herodotus (2.30), Demetrius of Phalerum and—of course—the Cynic Diogenes who came to see his banishment from Sinope as a liberation (6.601D–7.602A).

In the next section, Plutarch at first somewhat tempers the apparent contempt he has shown for homebodies in the previous chapters: one should certainly not lightly pack up and leave one's own country, even when it is disfigured by certain faults.[27] When, however, some mishap (ἡ τύχη) deprives one of one's native place, one may freely choose another more to one's liking, and time will make it one's home. In fact it is better to live in a place where one is not constantly subjected to costly and

is already found in Cic. *Tusc.* 5.108: *Socrates quidem cum rogaretur, cuiatem se esse diceret, "mundanum" inquit; totius enim mundi se incolam et civem arbitrabatur.* For the concept of Socrates as a 'cosmopolitan' (something not found in the sources of the fourth century BC) see also Muson. p. 42.1 f. Hense (1905) and Hexter, p. 216 n. 23 below. On the concept of cosmopolitanism see Gaertner, pp. 11–12 n. 55 above (with literature).

[25] Cf. 5.601A–B: οὗτοι τῆς πατρίδος ἡμῶν ὅροι [εἰσί], καὶ οὐδεὶς οὔτε φυγὰς ἐν τούτοις οὔτε ξένος οὔτ' ἀλλοδαπός, ὅπου τὸ αὐτὸ πῦρ ὕδωρ ἀήρ, ἄρχοντες οἱ αὐτοὶ καὶ διοικηταὶ καὶ πρυτάνεις ἥλιος σελήνη φωσφόρος· οἱ αὐτοὶ νόμοι πᾶσι, ὑφ' ἑνὸς προστάγματος καὶ μιᾶς ἡγεμονίας τροπαὶ βόρειοι τροπαὶ νότιοι ἰσημερίαι Πλειὰς 'Αρκτοῦρος ὧραι σπόρων ὧραι φυτειῶν· εἷς δὲ βασιλεὺς καὶ ἄρχων· "θεὸς ἀρχήν τε καὶ μέσα καὶ τελευτὴν ἔχων τοῦ παντὸς εὐθείᾳ περαίνει κατὰ φύσιν περιπορευόμενος· τῷ δ' ἕπεται Δίκη τῶν ἀπολειπομένων τοῦ θείου νόμου τιμωρός" (Pl. *Leg.* 716A), ᾗ χρώμεθα πάντες ἄνθρωποι φύσει πρὸς πάντας ἀνθρώπους ὥσπερ πολίτας.

[26] The ant comparison is another Cynic topos; see Lucian *Icarom.* 19, *Hermot.* 5 and Helm (1906) 94.

[27] Cf. 8.602B: οὐ γὰρ δοκεῖ καλὸν οὐδὲ δίκαιον εἶναι καταλιπόντα τὴν ἑαυτοῦ νέμειν ἑτέραν. "Σπάρταν ἔλαχες, ταύτην κόσμει" (Eur. fr. 723.1 Kannicht), κἂν ἄδοξος ᾖ κἂν νοσώδης κἂν ταράττηται στάσεσιν ὑφ' ἑαυτῆς καὶ πράγμασι μὴ ὑγιαίνουσιν.

time-consuming liturgies, has to undertake embassies to Rome and wait on the provincial governor; even living on a small and forsaken island may be better than having to perform all these tasks all of the time (8.602C). With these remarks, Plutarch evokes in very clear language the often tiresome obligations which wealthy and high-born Greeks had to fulfil in the Roman East during the time of the High Empire; his addressee, of course, belonged to this class. And Plutarch continues his praise of small islands: some of them were home to mighty mythical heroes; already Alcmaeon was glad to reach a newly-formed island as a refuge from political strife and venomous intrigue, and more recently the emperor Tiberius felt quite the same when he retreated to the island of Capri (8.602D–9.602E).[28] Still further mythical examples confirm that a large country is not necessarily a source of great happiness: Tantalus was not spared his catastrophic downfall by being king over a country of impressive dimensions, while the Phaeacian king Nausithous preferred to resettle his people on a small and far-out island to escape the dreadful neighbourhood of the Cyclopes. The Cycladic islands, favourite places of banishment in Roman times, were formerly inhabited by famous mythical personalities;[29] great philosophers (like Plato and his followers, though not Aristotle) were content with a patch of land as small as the Academy. Already Homer is full of praise for various small islands,[30] and a remarkable number of famous Homeric heroes were fond of dwelling on them: νῆσον οἰκεῖν φησι τὸν θεοφιλέστατον Αἴολον, τὸν σοφώτατον Ὀδυσσέα, τὸν ἀνδρειότατον Αἴαντα, τὸν φιλοξενώτατον Ἀλκίνουν (10.603D). Plutarch pursues this encomium of small islands still further: every man, who is not vainglorious and totally addicted to crowds, will find no fault with such an island, because it will give him nothing but good and deprive him of nothing but trouble.[31] Even the

[28] The testimony of poets is added, too: Already Pindar (*Pae.* 4.50–3) praised the tranquillity of life that such a small place is able to give, and just like Callimachus (fr. 1.18 (Pfeiffer)) exhorts us not to measure wisdom by the Persian σχοῖνος, one should not measure happiness by the length and breadth of the place which one lives in: τί γὰρ ἡ πλατεῖα χώρα πρὸς τὸν ἄλυπον βίον; (9.602F–10.603A).

[29] Like the sons of the Cretan king Minos and the sons of the Attic king Codrus (10.603B).

[30] Plutarch cites four different references from the *Iliad* to prove this (10.603C–D).

[31] Cf. 11.603E: ἀνὴρ δὲ μὴ τετυφωμένος παντάπασι μηδ' ὀχλομανῶν οὐκ ἂν οἶμαι μέμψαιτο τὴν τύχην συνελαυνόμενος εἰς νῆσον, ἀλλ' ἐπαινέσειεν ὅτι τὸν πολὺν ἄλυν καὶ ῥέμβον ἑαυτοῦ καὶ πλάνας ἐν ἀποδημίαις καὶ κινδύνους ἐν θαλάσσῃ καὶ θορύβους ἐν ἀγορᾷ περιελοῦσα μόνιμον καὶ σχολαῖον καὶ ἀπερίσπαστον καὶ ἴδιον βίον ὡς ἀληθῶς δίδωσι,...

smallest island has everything one really needs (περίπατον λουτρὸν ἰχθῦς λαγωοὺς), most of all ἡσυχία, which can never be found in one's native city, where one is constantly bothered by sycophants and busybodies of all kinds (11.603F).

When after this rather lengthy praise of the happy and tranquil life on small islands Plutarch turns once more to his addressee, we find out—a bit to our astonishment—that this man has not been consigned to such an island, but has 'only' been banished from his particular native city, so that all other parts of the civilized world are open to him.[32] Apparently we have to take all the preceding remarks as a kind of *argumentum a maiore*: if even those who are confined to one small island are not to be lamented but praised, how much more fortunate must someone be who is only excluded from just one place!

Next, we get the refutation of an objection already familiar from Teles: people often stress τὸ ἄδοξον, i.e. the exile's loss of influence, honour and reputation among his citizens. Instead (Plutarch argues) one should stress the newly-found freedom from care and the additional time for one's private interests and leisurely pursuits[33] (and, in the particular case of the addressee, his now considerably enhanced possibilities to attend interesting spectacles all over the civilized world,[34] to which he apparently could not have gone before his banishment).

Because of these advantages many eminent persons even finished their life abroad, where they found so many things so much more to their taste. Plutarch cites the examples of Euripides, Aeschylus, Simonides, Herodotus and then a number of philosophers of various schools (13.604D–14.605B).[35] Of course, Plutarch has to concede that all these were not really exiles; but out of this concession he quickly fashions another argument: if in present times, too, the people with the best reputation and abilities voluntarily[36] prefer to live abroad, exile must

[32] Cf. 12.604B: σοὶ δ' οὐχ ἑνὸς δεδομένου μόνον, ἀλλ' ἀπειρημένου τόπου, πασῶν ἐστιν ἐξουσία πόλεων ἡ μιᾶς κώλυσις.

[33] Cf. 12.604C: τὴν ἀπραγμοσύνην καὶ τὴν σχολὴν καὶ τὴν ἐλευθερίαν, 604D: σχολὴ περίπατος ἀνάγνωσις ὕπνος ἀθορύβητος.

[34] Cf. 12.604C: ἔξεστι δήπου καὶ τῷ μεθεστῶτι μυστηρίοις ἐν Ἐλευσῖνι διατρίβειν, Διονυσίοις ἐν ἄστει πανηγυρίζειν, Πυθίων ἀγομένων εἰς Δελφοὺς παρελθεῖν, Ἰσθμίων εἰς Κόρινθον, ἄνπερ ᾖ φιλοθέωρος. For this motif of 'new horizons' see n. 6 above.

[35] On the association of exile with philosophy see Gaertner, pp. 10–11 above; cf. the similar list of philosophers in exile given by Cicero in *Tusc.* 5.107.

[36] Cf. 14.605B–C: οὐ μετασταθέντες ἀλλὰ μεταστάντες οὐδὲ φυγαδευθέντες ἀλλὰ φυγόντες αὐτοὶ πράγματα καὶ περισπασμοὺς καὶ ἀσχολίας, ἃς αἱ πατρίδες φέρουσι.

truly be a desirable thing! In older times it even led to most memorable cultural achievements, as is shown by what happened to Thucydides, Xenophon, Bacchylides and other prominent writers; they all used their exile to create long-lasting literary achievements, while those who banished them are long forgotten (14.605C–D). Thus the argument that exile leads to ἀδοξία is stood on its head.[37]

The next chapter (16) deals at length with the famous indictment of exile by the Euripidean Polynices (taken from the *Phoenissae*, verses 388–93, 396–7, 402–5). Already Teles made use of this figure (see above); now Plutarch tries to refute every single point of Polynices' charges (16.605F–607A): First, it is wrong to call the inability to speak one's mind (as may happen to exiles) the condition of a slave; there are many other situations in which keeping silent is the best policy for a sensible man. Second, "to bear the folly of the mighty" is something which may be even more necessary at home than in exile. Third, it is simply not true that banishment deprives one of free speech; many famous exiles fearlessly availed themselves of this possibility.[38] The next point raised by the Euripidean Polynices is refuted as well: harbouring vain hopes is not a typical characteristic of exiles, but of stupid people in general. Nor is Polynices justified in claiming that his exile deprived him of friends and of the advantages of his noble birth, because not only did he secure for himself a most noble marriage on account of his kingly birth, he also acquired new and mighty friends when he won the king of Argos as father-in-law and ally. Lastly, Plutarch also criticizes the lament of Polynices' mother that she was not able to perform the customary rites at his marriage—she should rather have been happy that her son found such a noble marriage as he did.

There follows the refutation of another alleged disadvantage of exiles that was already countered by Teles, namely the opinion that exile is a condition fraught with disgrace and shame (ἐπονείδιστον). Again this can only be claimed by stupid people who also reproach others for bodily

[37] Plutarch adds that this applies not only to those writers but also to other figures: the Cynic Diogenes (once more), Themistocles and also to Roman statesmen such as Camillus and Cicero (15.605D–F). On the historians referred to by Plutarch see Dillery, pp. 51 ff., particularly p. 62, above.

[38] Among the people cited, we find once more the Cynic Diogenes and—for the first time—the Carthaginian Hannibal (16.605B–C), whose exile is alluded to by Silius Italicus: see Harrison p. 143 below and cf. Gaertner, p. 9 n. 43 and pp. 16–17, on free speech and exile, and Branham, especially pp. 75 ff. above, on the central role of *parrhesia* in the anecdotes about the Cynic Diogenes.

disadvantages (like being small or bald) and for similar things which the reproached cannot possibly remedy themselves.[39] Again, a catalogue of the most respectable people in Greek myth (even gods), who either were exiles themselves or closely related to them, shows the total absence of disgrace in this condition (17.607B–C).

Plutarch concludes his essay with an observation which he already hinted at in its first part (5.600F–601B) when he implicitly claimed that man's true home is not on earth but in heaven. This is now made explicit by a quotation drawn from the Presocratic philosopher Empedocles who had declared himself a down-fallen daemon, who had been assigned his earthly exile as a punishment for certain transgressions. Plutarch generalizes this remark and very clearly states—in a typically Later Platonic way of thinking—that we all are fallen spirits and only exiles down here; and if the earth as a whole is thus to be regarded as a place of exile, no spot on the earth is actually better than any other; everywhere down here we are called upon to exercise our good sense and our virtues (and thus our efforts to attain happiness), and we all have to bear our earthly predicament alike (and philosophers such as Anaxagoras and Socrates show how this is to be done); it is only fools like Phaethon or Tantalus who brazenly ascended to heaven and then fell because of their folly.

In Plutarch's essay, then, the notion of human exile as a condition which may afflict individual people is dissolved—or wrapped up—within a much larger notion of the universal human condition as a general exile of spirits who have been cast down from heaven,[40] but who may—perhaps with divine help—hope somehow to get back to their former celestial home; in this perspective, an individual human exile down here loses all importance. It is interesting how the Cynic Teles and the Platonist Plutarch arrive at the same destination—the negation of exile as a condition of suffering—by choosing quite different roads: the Cynic tries to fortify the individual as much as possible by reducing him to his strictly rational, thinking (but in no way feeling) self and

[39] Cf. also Branham, p. 75 above.

[40] Compare the description of the souls of good men dwelling in a pure ethereal region around the moon after their earthly death in Plutarch's *De Facie* (28.943C): οἷον ἐξ ἀποδημίας ἀνακομιζόμεναι φυγαδικῆς εἰς πατρίδα γεύονται χαρᾶς... Other texts where the idea of the exile of the human soul from a divine realm can be found are listed in Whitmarsh (2001a) 270 n. 5. Cf. also Gaertner, p. 12 above and Hexter, pp. 218–20 below.

stripping away all ties to the outward world;[41] the Platonist tries to raise man's awareness to another world by comparison to which this earthly one shrinks to an insignificant temporary abode where such a thing as individual exile loses all importance.

After metaphysics, rhetoric—or thus we might (perhaps a bit unfairly) characterize the transition from Plutarch's to Favorinus' treatment of the theme of exile. Favorinus' speech on this subject—preserved (not, alas, without significant gaps especially at its beginning and its end) on a papyrus which first came to scholarly attention in 1931—is in fact the longest text now extant of this very prolific writer, who (it seems) consciously tried to rival Plutarch's productivity.[42] Thanks to a number of sources we know quite a bit of Favorinus' colourful life which has been lucidly set out elsewhere[43] and need not be repeated here. To the facts (or allegations) which can be found in Gellius, Philostratus, Cassius Dio, the *Historia Augusta* and even the *Suda*, our papyrus seemed to add an important detail, namely that Favorinus himself was apparently exiled after falling out of favour with the emperor Hadrian; and this would indeed set him apart perhaps from Teles and surely from Plutarch who did not experience being driven out of his native place. In recent years, however, the alleged 'fact' of Favorinus' exile has increasingly come under attack, especially from Anglo-Saxon scholars (while those of more southern parts of Europe still tenaciously cling to it):[44] English scholars well versed in imperial Greek literature such as E. L. Bowie, S. Swain and L. Holford-Strevens have either strongly affirmed or at least earnestly considered that Favorinus' long disquisition on exile may not be an autobiographical speech on self-experienced banishment and how to overcome its affliction, but a declamation put into the mouth of another speaker invented by the author.[45] In the age of the Second Sophistic, when such declamations were part and parcel of every public speaker's repertoire, this is indeed a very distinct possibility. In recent years, several scholars[46] have pointed to a probably decisive

[41] Cf. Branham's remarks on p. 76 above.

[42] Cf. *Suda* φ 4: ἀντεφιλοτιμεῖτο γοῦν καὶ ζῆλον εἶχε πρὸς Πλούταρχον τὸν Χαιρωνέα εἰς τὸ τῶν συνταττομένων βιβλίων ἄπειρον…

[43] Cf. Barigazzi (1966), Holford-Strevens (1988) 72–92, Barigazzi (1993), Holford-Strevens (1997), Lakmann (1997).

[44] See, e.g., Follet (2000) 419.

[45] Cf. Holford-Strevens (1988) 75 nn. 15 and 16, Swain (1989), Bowie (1997a) 5.

[46] Cf. Gleason (1995) 148, Holford-Strevens (1997) 196.

clue which should make it rather improbable that Favorinus' *De Exilio* is an autobiographical statement: at one point, the speaker earnestly considers that his offspring might come to call home the very place where their father started as an exile;[47] it is, however, an undisputed fact that Favorinus, presumed to be a victim of Reifenstein's syndrome, was himself quite unable to produce such offspring, and this fact was very well known already in his lifetime; after all, Favorinus himself in a famous saying calls himself a "eunuch".[48] All this makes an autobiographical reference to offspring in Favorinus' own mouth not only highly unlikely, but also rather inappropriate and disconcertingly funny; if Favorinus should have had any serious purpose with a speech on his own exile, this remark would surely have destroyed it. Therefore this seems to be the most convincing piece of evidence that what we have here is a fictitious declamation; even the recent efforts of the Italian scholar (and Favorinus specialist) Eugenio Amato[49] to re-establish autobiographical authenticity to this speech have failed to convince me.

But do we actually need a 'real' exile of Favorinus to be able to reach an adequate (perhaps even favourable) judgement of this speech? Must the fact that it probably is a declamation necessarily detract from its value with regard to later Greek thinking about exile? In my following remarks I would like to show that this speech contains a number of interesting features, regardless of its ulterior purpose; for this, we now again need to look at its structure and the movement of its thoughts.

Favorinus' long disquisition on exile (put into the mouth of a speaker who himself is in exile[50] and to whom henceforth I shall simply refer to as 'the speaker') has—except for a few quotations to be found in

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[47] Cf. 10.2 (col. 9.2): εἰ δὲ τοῦτό ἐστιν πατρίς, τὸ | σύνηθες τοῖς προγόνοις χωρίον, τί δὴ | οὐχὶ τῇ αὐτῇ γνώμῃ καὶ ταύτην φιλη|τέον, ἐν [ᾗ] τὰ νῦν διατρίβομεν; πο|λὺ γὰρ ἑκά[στῳ ἐγγυτέ]ρω ἐν ᾗ αὐτός τις οἰκεῖ ἐν ᾗ οἱ πρόγονοι | αὐτοῦ ᾤκ[ησαν, τοῖς δ]ὲ ἐξ ἐμοῦ γενησομένοις ἡ αὐτὴ αἰτία καὶ | πολὺ δικα[ιοτέρα τὴν] ἐμὴν ἀναγκαίαν ἐνδιαίτησιν πατρίδα | ποιεῖν…

[48] Cf. Philostr. *VS* 1.8 p. 489:…ὡς παράδοξα ἐπεχρησμῴδει τῷ ἑαυτοῦ βίῳ τρία ταῦτα· Γαλάτης ὢν ἑλληνίζειν, εὐνοῦχος ὢν μοιχείας κρίνεσθαι, βασιλεῖ διαφέρεσθαι καὶ ζῆν.

[49] Cf. Amato (2000). Amato believes to have found a certain self-reference to Favorinus' exile in the last sentence of the Pseudo-Dionean speech Περὶ τύχης ([Dio Chrys.] *Or*. 64.27): καὶ οὐδέν μοι δοκεῖ ὁ βίος τῶν ἀνθρώπων πομπῆς διαφέρειν ἐν ταῖς ἡμερησίαις (Emperius: ἡμετέραις codd.) μεταβολαῖς; but the text of this sentence has always been problematic, and even if we accept it in the form favoured by Amato it does not really yield the sense Amato wishes it to have. Amato (2003) does not add decisive new arguments.

[50] See chapter 1 and more clearly 2.2. E. L. Bowie has suggested to me that some of

Stobaeus—solely been preserved by a papyrus,[51] which especially at the beginning and the end is rather mutilated. Because of this, the train of thought in the introductory section (1) is barely recognizable; but already here the importance of εὐθυμία ('cheerfulness') is stressed as a necessary precondition for weathering all kinds of crisis, including exile.[52] The speaker then seems to have cited his own case as proof that he is not merely churning out well-rounded phrases but effectively trying to live up to his own convictions, thus being able to provide an example to others.[53]

The mutilated condition of the text extends into the beginning of the next section (2), where a roster of Cynic heroes is presented (from Diogenes of Sinope to the Roman Musonius), all of whom successfully grappled with exile by accepting it as an essentially human condition.[54] Again the importance of εὐθυμία is evoked: a person able to exercise εὐθυμία in such a predicament will not only himself successfully overcome such a predicament, but will also be an inspiration for others; and our speaker expressly declares that it is the very purpose of his remarks to provide something like a guide to people of future times, so that they may better withstand the sorrows of an exile.[55] A good part of this guidance can be derived from the examples of former great men, especially that of Socrates who remained true to himself even in prison and under the threat of imminent death.

The invocation of Socrates apparently triggers the speaker's introduction of the famous simile (beloved, it seems, by Cynics and Stoics)[56]

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the details the speaker drops about his person might be applicable to Favorinus' great enemy, the sophist Polemo of Laodicea; one might wonder, then, whether Favorinus might purposely have made his speaker look like Polemo, in order to frighten him a bit with the prospect of becoming an exile himself.

[51] Pap. Gr. Vat. 11.

[52] Cf. I a (= Stob. 4.44.76 p. 977 Hense): ἀνὴρ…ἐν μεγαλοψυχίᾳ| ἀληθινῇ| καὶ φιλοσοφίᾳ| τεθραμμένος πρὸ τῶν ξυμφορῶν τὴν εὐθυμίαν ἐν τῇ| γνώμῃ| ἀπόθετον ἔχει.

[53] At the end of the section, Favorinus evokes the examples of Empedocles, Heracles and of someone new (i.e. not mentioned by Teles or Plutarch): the Roman general Mucius.

[54] τὰ παρόντα | π̣ταί̣σ̣ματα πάντα ὡς ἀνθρώπινα ἀσπαζόμε[νο]ι.

[55] Cf. 2.2 (col. 1.47–9): ἀνακείσεται δὲ ἥδε ἡ γρα | φὴ κτῆμα καὶ ἄλλῳ ποτὲ αὖθις, ὅστις ὁμοίᾳ | τύχῃ περιπεσὼν οὐχ ἱκανὸς αὐτὸς αὑτῷ πο|ρίζειν τὰ τοιαῦτα. Cf. Desideri (p. 203 below) for a similar thought in Dio Chrysostom's thirteenth speech. Ruth Webb has drawn my attention to the unusual fact that the speaker does not refer to his λόγος, but to his γρα|φή; the implications of this are not altogether clear.

[56] See Teles p. 5.2–6.1 Hense (citing Bion of Borysthenes), 16.4–7, 52.2–4, Epictetus

of man as actor on a stage, who has to be content not only with whatever role the (divine) stage-director may assign to him, but also with every change of role he is subjected to. In the same way human beings should accept every change of role in the 'drama of life', as this does not affect our inner self, but just the 'costume' of our outer appearance.[57] Those who have to play poor and down-trodden people may in fact be better and more successful actors—on stage as well as in life—than those playing princes and leaders (3).

Having developed this simile in much detail, the speaker ends his introductory remarks by pointing once more to the inspiring example of great men of old: Diogenes, Heracles, Odysseus (who gets most of the space)—all three proved themselves most worthy when confined to dire straits (4).

The speaker now explicitly re-introduces himself as willing to master his own current predicament,[58] and with this statement he embarks on the main part of his speech, which is largely dominated by another simile, namely that of the athlete in a great contest who has to face a number of redoubtable opponents.[59] Just like such an athlete who has

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*Ench.* 17, *Diss.* 4.2.10, Synes. *Aegypt.* 1.13.106A. In all of these places the simile is evoked to stress how important it is that everyone on earth should play his particular role well; Favorinus, however, uses the simile to demonstrate that man should put up with every change of role that fortune or fate—or, in Favorinus' case, God and divine providence—has in store for him (see for this also Epictetus fr. 11 p. 464.7–14 Schenkl, Lucian *Nec.* 16, Maximus of Tyre 1.1).

[57] Cf. 3.3: ἡμεῖς δὲ ἀγανακτήσομεν ἐν τῷ τοῦ βίου δρά|ματι πειθόμενοι τῷ ἅπαντος τοῦδε τοῦ κόσμου | ποιητῇ θεῷ, ἐὰν ποτὲ μὲν ἄρχοντας ποτὲ | δὲ φυγάδας, ποτὲ δὲ πλουσίους αὖθις δὲ πένη||[τας κελεύῃ ἡμᾶς ὑπο]κρίν[ασ]θαι; κα[ὶ ἐ]ν|[μὲν ἀρχαῖς τε καὶ δ]υναστείαις ὄντες | [οἱ ὑποκριταὶ λαμπροὶ] καὶ εὐδαίμονες εἶ|ν̣[αι] ν[ομι]ο[ῦσιν] βέ̣[βαι]α τὰ παρόντα ἡγού|μενο̣[ι], ἐν δ[ὲ δυσπραγία]ις καὶ φυγαῖς κακο|δαίμονες [ὡς πάντων ἀ]πεστερημένοι, | ἀλλ' οὐ σχήματο[ς μὲν σ]κευὴν καὶ προσω | πεῖον μεταβεβ[λῆσθαι, ο]ἱ δὲ αὐτοὶ εἶναι ἔν|δοθεν, ὥσπερ σ̣ω[μ]ά[τια], ο̣ὓ̣ς ἐ̣ξ̣ ἐ̣μ̣βρύων | καίσ[αρα]ς καὶ ἄ̣ρ̣χ[οντ]ας ἀν[έστ]ησαν ἔν|δοθεν, κατὰ τὰς ὑ̣π̣[ο]κρίσ̣εις παντοῖα σχήμα|τα μετ̣[α]β̣αλ̣λ̣ό̣μενοι;

[58] Cf. 5.1: ἐγὼ̣ ν̣[ῦν ὑπεῖ]ξ[αι οὐ θέλω] ἢ ἀπ[ο]κάμνειν | μ̣' ἐ̣π̣[οτρύνων ο]ὐκ ἐ̣ν̣ [εὐπρα]γίαις μόνον οὐδὲ | ἄ[λ]λ̣α̣ις, [ὥ]σ̣περ τινές, [τύχαις, ἀ̣]λ̣λὰ καὶ ἐν τούτοις | π̣[ο]λὺ μᾶλλο̣ν εἶνα[ι σοφὸς κα]ὶ ἐν[ε]π̣ιδείξασθαι.

[59] "Tale impostazione e sviluppo dell'immagine fuori del consueto è opera dello scrittore, insieme a qualche particolare nell'elaborazione" (Barigazzi (1966) ad loc.). Stephanie West draws my attention to Paul's *Epistle to the Ephesians* 6.12–13: οὐκ ἔστιν ἡμῖν ἡ πάλη πρὸς αἷμα καὶ σάρκα, ἀλλὰ πρὸς τὰς ἀρχάς, πρὸς τὰς ἐξουσίας, πρὸς τοὺς κοσμοκράτορας τοῦ σκότους τούτου, πρὸς τὰ πνευματικὰ τῆς πονηρίας ἐν τοῖς ἐπουρανίοις. διὰ τοῦτο ἀναλάβετε τὴν πανοπλίαν τοῦ θεοῦ, ἵνα δυνηθῆτε ἀντιστῆναι ἐν τῇ ἡμέρᾳ τῇ πονηρᾷ καὶ ἅπαντα κατεργασάμενοι στῆναι. In §§ 14–17 Paul changes the simile, exhorting his addressees to take up metaphorical weapons and armour like

thoroughly trained before entering the contest, a conscientious human being should have prepared himself well (by good schooling, by conversing with other worthy people and by collecting manifold experiences by travelling all over the world),[60] before he is thrust into critical situations—like exile—, where he has to rely most of all on firmness of character; for like the athlete he then faces adversaries whom he can hold out against only if he is able to employ all his strength. In the case of exile, these opponents are the following (Favorinus lists all of them briefly, before discussing each of them at greater length):

1. the longing for one's native place (τῆς πατρίδος ἐπιθυμία);[61]
2. the longing for relatives and friends, acquired by long familiarity with them (τῶν ξυγγε]|ν̣ῶν τε κα[ὶ φίλων στοργὴ καὶ] ξύν[τρο]|φος ξυνουσ[ία]);
3. the enjoyment of one's possessions, of one's home and of all the comforts that go with it (π[λούτ]ο̣υ̣ τε κ[αὶ οἴκο]υ καὶ ο[ἰ]κεί|ας κτ̣ήσε[ως] ἀπόλαυ[σις]); closely connected are the longing for honour and fame in one's own country (τι]μῶν τε | καὶ δόξης ἐπιχωρ̣ί̣[ου ὄρεξις]) and—the reverse side of the coin—the fear of public dishonour and infamy (ἀ̣[δοξίας] κ̣αὶ δυσφη|μίας δημοποιήτ̣ο̣υ̣ [ἀ]πο[στ]ροφή);
4. lastly: the enormous urge to be free from anxiety about one's situation and able to provide for oneself (ἀ]δείας τε καὶ αὐτε|ξουσίου νομῆς π[ερι]πό[θ]ητος ἐλευθε|ρία).

Most items of this catalogue can already be found in Teles (see above); but by presenting each of them as personified and vicious opponents who are ready to attack and subdue the exile's anxious soul Favorinus evokes their dangerousness much more vividly. The image of the athletic contest as a metaphor for a critical situation in life can be found in

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warriors.—There is an interesting application of the simile in Ps.-Longin. 35.2: ἡ φύσις…ἡμᾶς…ὡς εἰς μεγάλην τινὰ πανήγυριν εἰς τὸν βίον καὶ εἰς τὸν σύμπαντα κόσμον ἐπάγουσα, θεατάς τινας τῶν ἄθλων αὐτῆς ἐσομένους καὶ φιλοτιμοτάτους ἀγωνιστάς, εὐθὺς ἄμαχον ἔρωτα ἐνέφυσεν ἡμῶν ταῖς ψυχαῖς παντὸς ἀεὶ τοῦ μεγάλου…

[60] Cf. 5.2: τοῦτο μὲν πα|λαιῶν ἔργων τε καὶ λόγων ἐς ἀρετὴν φερόν|των μαθήσει, τοῦτο δὲ τῶν καθ' ἡμᾶς ἀξίων | λόγου ἀνδρῶν ξυνουσίᾳ, καὶ μὴν καὶ χώ|ρας ἐπὶ πλεῖστον Ἑλλάδος τε καὶ βαρβάρου | ἐφόδῳ, ὄψει τε καὶ ἀκοῇ καὶ μνήμῃ τῶν ἐν | ἑκάστῃ καὶ ὑπὲρ ἑκάστης χώρας γενομένων…

[61] The term here has fallen victim to a mutilation of the papyrus, but can be supplied from a later part of the treatise (namely the beginning of chapter 7).

other authors, too;[62] but the way Favorinus uses this image may well be novel: this may in fact be the first time that grappling with a critical situation is depicted on such a scale as a wrestling or battling of the human soul with spiritual or metaphorical opponents, and thus Favorinus may be the very inventor of the concept of 'psychomachia', which the Latin poet Prudentius later applied with so much success to the Christian soul resisting various kinds of temptation.

Favorinus' speaker deals with each of these opponents in turn: much space is allotted to the very first of these adversaries of the exile's soul (ch. 7–14): how can an exile overcome the longing for his home, city or country? Just like Plutarch (and Teles), the speaker takes on the Euripidean Polynices: it is wrong—so the argument goes—to pine for one's native place if one has been forcibly driven away from it, and it is even worse to try to get back there by force; everything one really needs one can find everywhere else (7). The gods will help good people everywhere and bad people nowhere; one does not need a particular place to address the gods in prayer, provided one is a worthy human being (8). Even to the dead one can sacrifice from the most far-out places, as Odysseus has shown (in the Homeric *Necyia*), and thus it is silly to prefer a particular spot for burial (9). What, in any case, is a 'fatherland'? If it is simply the region to which one's forebears got used to, one should rather more love the place oneself has become familiar with. Well-nigh every group of people at one time or another changed places (and we get a substantial list of examples for this); the very few who boastfully claim to have originated in the land they still live in (the so-called autochthones) pride themselves on something which lowly insects and other animals could claim just as well, being sprung up from the earth, too, according to ancient belief (10). All animals, in fact, regard the domain they live in as their universal home: birds the air, fish the sea, land-creatures the land; only humans set about dividing the earth into ever smaller parts and particles, which leads to strife and conflict of every kind, even within the same city (11). No bird fights with another bird for a piece of air, nor a fish with another for a stretch of sea; and even some people have shown virtue in giving up their so-called native land, when they had to preserve more important things, as e.g. the Athenians and Phocaeans their freedom from foreign oppression. Peoples like Amazons, Scythians, and

[62] See e.g. Maximus of Tyre 1.4.A–E, 1.6.B–E, 8.7.B, 12.9.D–F, 34.9.E–G.

Sauromates even regard a nomadic way of life as the only suitable way of living (12). Those, however, who regard any displacement from their home—not only that by exile—as something bad condemn themselves to be exiles in the very place they live in. Our speaker, on the contrary, even before his exile loved travelling and thus sees no reason now to lament his being banished from home, especially after his family died; after these family ties are gone, he feels fully able to rely on his γνώμη, which no well-meaning god will deprive him of (13); he is fully willing to regard his new residence as his god-given home and city, and its people will certainly become familiar to him in the course of time (14).

The second adversary to be overcome in this metaphorical wrestling bout is longing for one's friends and relatives (ch. 15–18). Our speaker regards this adversary as more easily to be overcome, because human beings can do something which one's native country or city evidently cannot, i.e. move about; thus a friend can visit an exile in his very place of banishment (15). As proof, the speaker presents famous examples of good men not staying behind when their friends had to leave their native places: the Argonauts accompanied Jason, all Greek heroes accompanied Menelaus on the quest to win back his wife, and neither Pylades nor Theseus abandoned their respective friends. Thus our speaker justifiably expects his friends to come and visit him in his exile (16). In this way exile will in fact show who are one's real friends and who are not, namely the stay-behinds (17); thus exile can even be regarded as a reliable test for firm friendship.

The third adversary in the agon imagined by the speaker is the very human love for prestigious external things (wealth, honour, high reputation) and their loss by having to undergo exile. This complex of issues is again treated quite extensively (ch. 19–27): The first argument is—on a Stoic line of thought—that all these things are ἀλλοτριώτατα for a human being, even more so than native places and relatives. No animal has ever thought of acquiring wealth and honour; only humans strive for such things (19). Outward signs of honour and power are ultimately worthless, as tragic figures like Oedipus and Jocasta (and other persons in the same family) show; ultimately, all of us have the same humble origin, be it Prometheus' clay or Deucalion's stones (20). Once again, Odysseus is presented as an exemplary figure always full of εὐψυχία and θάρσος, who gracefully resigns himself to every change of situation which the divine leader of the world may deem right for him. Similarly, we all—who ourselves use lesser beings, i.e. animals, as we see fit and

who think it right to obey human laws and lawgivers—should unquestioningly accept the will of the gods who are so much more superior to us than we are to animals (21). All that we have is only on loan from the gods and will be asked back after our allotted time has run out. We should accept this with good grace and not behave like bad debtors, especially as in this case this behaviour would not only be criminal but impious. To emphasize this point our speaker again presents a roster of illustrious men (Greek and Roman, mythical and historical) who willingly gave back what they had when fate and fortune ordered them to (22). Their losses of eyes, of hands or even their life were in fact more fortunate—and here Favorinus waxes rather paradoxical in a way distinctly reminiscent of the New Testament[63]—than the ill-fated use others made of these 'possessions' (again a host of antithetical examples follows; 23). Human judgement is generally fickle and deficient—another welter of examples proves this[64]—, and therefore no condemnation (to death, to exile or whatever) can be regarded as incontrovertible proof of a man's unworthiness (24). Moreover, man must always reckon with sudden changes of fortune; he should learn from the bad luck of others that no one is safe; a sudden catastrophe is all the more horrifying; caution and foresight are always needed (25). To be able to exercise εὐθυμία—once more this key term comes up—, one should look at others less well off, when oneself is having a lucky time, while one should regard people with even bigger trouble, when oneself is experiencing bad luck. To do this, one need only look around oneself: human misery is ubiquitous and was already present, even before Hesiod's Iron Age set in. Hesiod himself, however, should stop lamenting about his own situation and consider how much he has been favoured by the gods who gave him the gift of poetry (26). Towards the end of this section the papyrus exhibits great gaps, but our speaker seems to have concluded on a note of hope: if man stays obedient to the gods and preserves calm of mind

[63] Compare the stern admonishments given by Jesus in the Gospels, Matth. 5.29–30: εἰ δὲ ὁ ὀφθαλμός σου ὁ δεξιὸς σκανδαλίζει σε, ἔξελε αὐτὸν καὶ βάλε ἀπὸ σοῦ· συμφέρει γάρ σοι ἵνα ἀπόληται ἓν τῶν μελῶν σου καὶ μὴ ὅλον τὸ σῶμά σου βληθῇ εἰς γέενναν. (30) καὶ εἰ ἡ δεξιά σου χεὶρ σκανδαλίζει σε, ἔκκοψον αὐτὴν καὶ βάλε ἀπὸ σοῦ· συμφέρει γάρ σοι ἵνα ἀπόληται ἓν τῶν μελῶν σου καὶ μὴ ὅλον τὸ σῶμά σου εἰς γέενναν ἀπέλθῃ. Similarly Matth. 18.8–9, Mc. 9.43,45,47.

[64] Among them, of course, the famous case of Socrates, in which not even the testimony of the god Apollo was heeded by the Athenians.

and good cheer, he may well attain more than earthly happiness at the end of his life[65] (27).

The last and perhaps most redoubtable opponent to be dealt with in this spiritual struggle (ch. 28–9) is the ordinary man's pervasive fear that exile may irrevocably abolish his freedom[66] and cause his strength and very nature to wither away: to this our speaker replies that real freedom is not something external but a possession of the soul which no material confinement can take away (28); spiritual freedom actually consists in the ability to renounce things that are not really necessary for one's well-being, while the longing for things which are contrary to divine ordination and impossible to have means real enslavement. Why would one lament not being able to leave the island one is confined to and reach the continent nearby, when it would be much more desirable—but much less possible, too—to leave earth and go up into heaven? Soon after the speaker returns to his own condition of island exile,[67] the lacunose condition of the papyrus prevents us from discerning any further thoughts of the speaker, so that we do not know whether he ended his speech with a more general *peroratio* or simply brought the exiled soul's struggle with its last spiritual foe to an undoubtedly successful finish.

It will have become clear from this survey of the contents of Favorinus' speech that the thoughts he has to offer—and even the at times overwhelming richness of examples with which he fleshes them out—are by no means original. He might claim, however, that the form in which he presents these thoughts is rather novel and attractive; and compared with the mainly Cynic ancestors of thinking about exile (Bion, Teles, Musonius), Favorinus tries much less to shield man from the woes of exile by putting him into the Cynic armour of exclusive self-reliance than gently nudge him to look beyond himself and this world towards

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[65] Cf. 27.2: ἐὰν δὲ πει|θόμενος ε̣[ὐγνωμόνως] ἔχῃ̣ς, καλῶς καὶ ἀπταίστως | τὸν τοῦ βίου δ̣[ρόμον ἐξ]ανύσας τῇ ἐκείνου προ|νοίᾳ̣ ἐπιβήσ̣ε̣[ι ἐς τὸν] λιμένα ἄκλυστον εὐδαι|μονίας, ἧ̣ ε̣κ̣βήσε[ι κα]ὶ τὰ πάλαι θ[ρυ]λούμενα Ἠ|λυσίων π̣ε̣δ[ί]ων [ἀγ]αθὰ ὄψει, κἀκεῖ μένων οὐ|κ ἐμφοβήσει μ̣ὴ̣ τ̣ὸ [σκ]άφος ἀπὸ τοῦ μεγίστου κυ|βερνήτου . . . . ε̣. [. .]. ει σωζόμενόν τε καὶ πορ|θμευόμενον ἄλλους ἐξ ἄλλων ἐπιβάτας ἀνα|λήψεται. This is the most conspicuous spot in this text, where the author raises his eyes above the earthly situation of man.

[66] Cf. 28.1: ὁ δ̣' ἄ̣λ̣λ[ος] καὶ μέγιστος κλῆρος λείπε|ται ὥσπερ ἐφεδ[ρ]εύων περὶ τοῦδε τοῦ τῆς εὐ|θυμίας σ̣[τ]εφάνου, ἐλευθερία, κατὰ πιθανό|τητα̣ π̣ρ̣[οβε]βλημένος ὡς ἄρα ο̣ὔτ̣' ἄνετον εἴη μο[ι] | τὸ τῆς φυ[γῆς] οὔτ' αὐτεξούσιον, ἀλλ' ἐν μιᾷ̣ νήσῳ̣ | κατακεκλεισμένῳ̣ πᾶσάν τ̣ο̣ι . . . . . . δίαιταν | καὶ ἐλευθέριον νομὴν ἀφῃ̣ρημ̣έ̣νῳ̣, . . .

[67] In 16.3 (col. 14.40) we get a hint that this island is Chios.

the gods and their benevolent guidance of the universe. There may be some Stoicism in this; there certainly is much Platonism in it, and here we recognize the influence of Plutarch who—in his own contribution to Greek thinking about exile—stresses even more man's strong bonds with the transcendent realm of the gods which make him a universal exile on this earth compared to which the earthly condition of exile is no longer of any account. Though both Plutarch and Favorinus draw heavily on former (mainly Cynic and Stoic) efforts to make exile bearable, in fact they reformulate the earlier answers and cast them into a much more spiritual mould, which is quite in keeping with the general tendencies of Later Antiquity to seek help for human life and its many problems from the gods and what they may have in store for us.

CHAPTER SIX

# CICERO'S ROMAN EXILE

Sarah T. Cohen

To say that exile is a state of absence, and in particular of the loss of one's homeland, may seem obvious. But it is worth repeating if only because, in Roman eyes, discussion of exile always includes as its unspoken counterpart some comment on the *patria*. This paper will examine the relationship of *exilium* and *patria* by considering how Roman understandings of exile might change when something is wrong with the *patria*. In what follows I will argue that, in writings produced during Caesar's dictatorship, Cicero uses exilic paradoxes to comment on the *res publica* and to define his own position in the newly-established autocracy.

I will begin with a brief discussion of Cicero's attitude toward his own exile, his behavior during the war between Caesar and Pompey, and his return to Rome in 47 BCE. The bulk of the paper, however, will focus on a set of works produced by Cicero after his return to Rome, in which he addresses both the state of the *res publica* and his proper role within it: first, a section of the *Paradoxa Stoicorum*, a philosophical work produced at the beginning of 46 BCE, and second a set of letters written in the same year to Marcus Marcellus, the consul of 51 BCE, then living in exile in Mytilene.[1] I will argue that in both these texts Cicero builds on the rhetoric he developed to refashion his own exile in order to address the problems he and other Roman politicians faced under Caesar's dictatorship.

Cicero's attachment to the city of Rome is justly famous. In addition to the homesickness seen in the letters he wrote from exile, we have this passage of a letter written in June 50 BCE to Caelius Rufus (*Fam.* 2.12.2):

> *urbem, urbem, mi Rufe, cole et in ista luce vive; omnis peregrinatio, quod ego ab adulescentia iudicavi, obscura et sordida est iis quorum industria Romae potest inlustris esse.*

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[1] Tullia's death in February of 45 BCE marks a change in Cicero's obsessions from the political to the private.

> The city, my Rufus, dwell in the city and live in that brightness; every absence, as I determined in my youth, is obscure and worthless for those whose talent can be brought to light in Rome.

He writes this not from exile but as the proconsular governor of Cilicia, an honorable and even desirable part of any political career. Although proud of the job he did there, Cicero was determined to return to Rome as soon as he could.[2] Not only was Rome, as he claims here, the only proper locale for human achievement, it was also the only place where he might influence the crisis in the Republic. Even on the verge of civil war, when there may have been good reasons to leave the city, Cicero's devotion to the site of Rome remained unshaken. When Pompey announced that he intended to abandon the city to Caesar's approaching forces in January of 49 BCE, Cicero imagined the following exchange (*Att.* 7.11.3, written mid-January 49 BCE):

> *"urbem tu relinquas? ergo idem, si Galli venirent?" "non est", inquit, "in parietibus res publica." "at in aris et focis."*
>
> "Are you leaving the city? Would you have done the same if the Gauls were coming?" He answers, "The state is not in the house-walls." "But it is in the altars and hearthstones."

The reference to altars and hearths is not accidental: the sacred sites within the city were integral to Roman identity, and without them it was not clear what kind of state Rome might be.[3]

In light of this attitude, Cicero's own exile is often seen as a deeply traumatic event for him, so much so that authors attempt to apply modern psychological terminology based on the letters he wrote during this period.[4] Many commentators find the apparent glimpses into Cicero's emotional state disturbing or disappointing, although Hutchinson's re-evaluation of these letters as "forceful and articulate pieces of writing", provides a welcome contrast.[5] Upon his return to

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[2] As Fuhrmann (1990) 123 writes, "from the outset, Cicero regarded the governorship which had been imposed on him as an onerous duty and he was anxiously concerned that it should last no longer than the year which the Senate had ordained. An unusually large number of letters have been preserved from the year and a half of his absence from Rome . . . In all these letters no theme recurs as frequently as the wish, the request, the admonition to the recipient that he should do everything in his power to ensure that the governorship was not extended". See also p. 14 n. 74 above.

[3] The *locus classicus* is Livy, book 5. See Edwards (1996) 44–52, Kraus (1994).

[4] Rawson (1983) 118 describes him as "very near a nervous breakdown".

[5] Cf. Hutchinson (1998) 28. Claassen (1999a) 108, too, points to Cicero's self-

Rome, Cicero's response to the problem of his own exile was to deny any separation between himself and the city—the true city, at any rate.[6] He rewrote his departure as a kind of *devotio*, a sacrifice of his own career to save the city from civil war.[7] Even so, the *res publica* succumbed to anarchy during Clodius' tribunate (according to Cicero), and it too needed restoration (*Red. Pop.* 14):

> *itaque, dum ego absum, eam rem publicam habuistis ut aeque me atque illam restituendam putaretis. ego autem in qua civitate nihil valeret senatus, omnis esset impunitas, nulla iudicia, vis et ferrum in foro versaretur, cum privati parietum se praesidio non legum tuerentur, tribuni plebis vobis inspectantibus vulnerarentur, ad magistratuum domos cum ferro et facibus iretur, consulis fasces frangerentur, deorum immortalium templa incenderentur, rem publicam esse nullam putavi. itaque neque re publica exterminata mihi locum in hac urbe esse duxi, nec, si illa restitueretur, dubitavi quin me secum ipsa reduceret.*
>
> So, in my absence you had such a *res publica* that you thought both it and myself equally in need of restoration. As for me, I did not consider that a commonwealth existed in a community in which the Senate counted for nothing, everything went unpunished, the law courts were non-existent, armed violence was rampant in the forum, private persons defended themselves with house-walls not laws, tribunes were wounded before your eyes, magistrates' houses attacked with fire and the sword, a consul's fasces broken, and the temples of the immortal gods put to the torch. And so I did not think that I had any place in this city when the *res publica* had been banished, nor did I doubt that if ever the *res publica* were restored, it would bring me back with it.

The *res publica* accompanied Cicero into exile, leaving the city a wilderness. What Cicero provides here is a description, in the negative, of the attributes of the legitimate Roman state, and it seems that it was precisely the experience of exile which encouraged Cicero to develop a rhetoric of political legitimacy.

Between 54 and 51 BCE he produced the *De Re Publica*, which includes the first formal definition of the state (*Rep.* 1.39):

> *est igitur, inquit Africanus, res publica res populi, populus autem non omnis hominum coetus quoquo modo congregatus, sed coetus multitudinis iuris consensu et utilitatis communione sociatus.*

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conscious creation of an anti-consolatory genre in these letters. The discomfort with Cicero's letters from exile may begin in antiquity (e.g. Dio Cass. 38.18–29; see also p. 4 above); a modern example might be David Stockton's conclusion ((1971) 190) that "Cicero in exile reminds one of a petulant and emotionally self-indulgent child".

[6] Cf. May (1988) 93, Narducci (1997) 66–7.

[7] Cf. Claassen (1992) 32–6, Narducci (1997) 59–63.

> Therefore, Africanus said, a *res publica* is the property of a people, but a people is not any group of human beings crowded together in any kind of way, but the assembly of a large number associated by agreement in regard to justice and by common utility.

If these criteria are not met, there can be no state; Cicero focuses on this definition of the *res publica* precisely because it allows him to consider the question of legitimacy. That is, it enables Cicero to argue that tyranny, oligarchy and anarchy (usually represented as bad forms of government) are in fact not governments at all because they lack legitimacy.[8] This in turn underlies his assertion that because Clodius' tribunate was a period of anarchy, there was no legitimate state in Rome during Cicero's exile. The notion that the exile of a leading statesman damaged the state was not unknown; Cicero's innovation here is to link his exile explicitly with the question of the legitimacy of the government he left behind.[9]

At least part of the longing for Rome seen in the letter to Caelius quoted above might be due to Cicero's knowledge that the situation in Rome was critical. The tension between Caesar and his opponents came to a head when Caesar was denied the privilege of standing for election in absentia; rather than return to Rome as a private citizen and face a politically-motivated prosecution, Caesar brought his legions into Italy under arms, triggering civil war. On January 7th 49 BCE, the Senate demanded that Caesar lay down his command and return to Rome; a few days later (January 10th or 11th), Caesar crossed the Rubicon with his legions behind him, entering Roman territory illegally under arms. Pompey collected an army of his own and departed from Italy on March 17th; most of the leading senators accompanied him. Cicero had returned to Rome in 50 BCE, too late to bring about a compromise; in any case, it is not clear that any of the major players were by that point interested in compromise.[10]

He was left with the choice between staying in Italy (which would be read as support for Caesar) and following Pompey; he also toyed with

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[8] Cf. *Rep*. 3.43–5 and Schofield (1995) 74.

[9] Metellus Numidicus, one of Cicero's favorite *exempla* of virtue in exile, provides our earliest Roman example of the claim that the exiled statesman is not 'really' an exile. Writing from Rhodes, he claims that *illi* [i.e. those responsible for his exile] *vero omni iure atque honestate interdicti, ego neque aqua neque igni careo et summa gloria fruniscor* (quoted in Gellius' *Noctes Atticae* 17.2.7). By making a pun on the decree of *aquae et ignis interdictio*, which formalized a Roman's exile, he implies that in his absence there can be neither justice nor honor at Rome. Cicero will take the argument a step further in his assertion that without justice there can be no state.

[10] So Cicero came to believe: cf. Shackleton Bailey (1971) 136–8.

the idea of simply retiring into exile for the duration. None of these options appealed to him, and his decision to join Pompey in the end had more to do with Cicero's sense of obligation to him than with his belief that Pompey was the lesser of two evils.[11]

Unenthusiastic about civil war from the beginning, Cicero deserted Pompey's side as soon as was decent—almost immediately after Pompey's defeat at the battle of Pharsalus—and went back to Italy in the middle of October, apparently at Caesar's invitation.[12] Unfortunately Caesar himself was still in Egypt and Africa fighting Pompey's former supporters, and Mark Antony, left in charge of Italy, nearly insisted that Cicero leave again and only relented in the most embarrassing possible way: having first announced that all of Pompey's supporters were barred from Italy, he then issued a proclamation exempting Cicero by name.[13] He remained in Brundisium for about a year, until Caesar came back to Italy in September of 47 BCE; then, finally, Cicero returned to Rome. His position during this period was anomalous: other former Pompeians had gone to Africa to continue fighting or retired into exile. But one should not forget that quite a few Romans switched sides after Pharsalus and took active positions in Caesar's administration—among them a number of perfectly respectable names.[14] Marcus Brutus, for instance, who would famously change sides again in 44 BCE and conspire to assassinate Caesar, was during this time serving in Caesar's administration in Asia.

The Rome Cicero found on his return was not the republic he remembered.[15] Caesar's victory over Pompey had left him in sole control of the Roman state. During the civil war he had assumed the office of dictator. Traditionally, a dictator was a magistrate appointed with supreme power (including power over consuls and Senate) for a limited period to face a specific emergency; Cornelius Sulla, victor in an earlier

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[11] Cf. Brunt (1986), especially pp. 27–8. This is not the only view of the two sides which Cicero adopts: elsewhere he describes the victory of Caesar over Pompey as that of might over right (e.g. *Fam.* 4.7.2). See also Stockton (1971) 256–9 for Cicero's decision-making process and a discussion of his desirability to Caesar and his supporters.

[12] As a proconsul with *imperium*, and the senior proconsul present, he was offered command of Pompey's forces after the defeat; he refused and was nearly killed for it. See further Rawson (1983) 202.

[13] Along with another man, D. Laelius; cf. *Att.* 11.6.2, 11.7.2–4, 11.9.1.

[14] Indeed, had Cicero switched wholeheartedly to Caesar's side, his position would have been much more secure; cf. Stockton (1971) 270.

[15] In addition to the political changes, Rawson ((1983) 208) notes that "many of his friends and rivals were dead; so too were many of the younger generation".

round of civil wars, had taken on the title during his settlement of the Roman state, but before that it had not been used for over a century. In 46 BCE Caesar was consul and appointed to the dictatorship for a ten-year period—extraordinary, considering that the maximum term for a dictatorship was six months. In 44 BCE, his dictatorship was made permanent.

In a letter written near the end of 46 BCE (*Fam.* 9.15.4), Cicero described the new political process: laws (*senatus consulta*) were written in private, and Cicero's name attached to them without his knowledge. He refers repeatedly to his powerlessness under the new system: his position rests in the show of support he can grant, rather than in any ability to act independently.[16] With political action severely restricted, Cicero turned to writing. This was one of the most productive periods of his life: a host of philosophical and rhetorical works can be dated to these years.

One of the earliest of these works was the *Paradoxa Stoicorum*, a treatment of six Stoic paradoxes dedicated to Marcus Brutus, a Stoic himself and a leader among Caesar's more recent adherents. It was written in early 46 BCE, before the news of Cato's death had reached Rome. The work itself is a mixture of rhetoric and philosophy and has at times been dismissed as a poor example of both. As Walter Englert (1990) has demonstrated, however, the combination of rhetoric and philosophy makes this a crucial work for our understanding of Cicero's philosophic project. Its purpose, as Cicero himself put it, was to bring philosophy into the forum in the most striking way: to take *topoi* which were so counter-intuitive that even Cicero had mocked them in public and demonstrate their use in a forensic setting. The paradoxes he chose may have been a traditional set; they are "only what is right is good", "virtue is sufficient for happiness", "all wrong acts are equal", "every fool is insane", "only the *sapiens* is free", and "only the *sapiens* is rich".[17] The relevance of this work to the political situation in Rome is open to question; some recent work focuses on the philosophical background of

[16] Cf. e.g. *Fam.* 4.14.1.

[17] It had been suggested that there were originally seven paradoxes, and that the heading attached to paradox 4 ("every fool is insane") belongs to a lost section of the work; in this case the real heading of paradox 4 would be something like 'the *sapiens* cannot be exiled' or 'every fool is an exile'. But there are enough references to Clodius' insanity in the text of paradox 4 to make this unlikely. For the suggestion of a traditional set of paradoxes, see Sigsbee (1976).

the work, and especially Cicero's combination of Stoic and Academic arguments, whereas others, especially Kumaniecki (1957) and Wallach (1990), stress its political implications.[18]

Exile was, it seems, much on Cicero's mind as he wrote. He had only recently returned from his liminal position at Brundisium and he was, as we will see, heavily involved in arranging the recall of a set of prominent Pompeians in exile. The *Paradoxa Stoicorum* includes a striking reference to his own departure from Rome, hidden in what appears to be an off-hand comment on the quality of the work (*Parad.* 5):

> ... *non enim est tale ut in arce poni possit quasi illa Minerva Phidiae, sed tamen ut ex eadem officina exisse appareat.*
>
> ... for it isn't the sort of thing one would place on the Acropolis like Phidias' statue of Minerva, but nevertheless it may seem to come from the same workshop.

This may recall the statue of Minerva that Cicero put up on the Capitol before leaving Rome in 58 BCE; that statue would even in his absence represent his devotion to the *res publica*. This work might, perhaps, serve the same purpose.[19]

Cicero's major argument about exile appears in the fourth paradox, "that every fool is insane". The argument is structured roughly as follows: (a) it is impossible that Cicero was exiled, (b) Clodius believed that he exiled Cicero, and therefore (c) Clodius is insane. It is not, on the face of it, the most straightforward way of proving the point, and the argument is made even more complex by the grounds Cicero uses to prove that he was never an exile. There was a good Stoic argument available, that the *sapiens* is not an exile because he understands that the whole universe is his *patria*.[20] Cicero mentions this argument in paradox 2 to demonstrate that the virtuous need not fear death or exile (*Parad.* 18):

> *mortemne mihi minitaris, ut omnino ab hominibus, an exilium ut ab improbis demigrandum sit? mors terribilis est iis quorum cum vita omnia exstinguuntur, non iis quorum laus emori non potest; exilium autem iis quibus quasi circumscriptus est habitandi locus, non iis qui omnem orbem terrarum unam urbem ducunt.*
>
> Do you threaten me with death, that I must leave all men, or with exile, that I must leave the wicked? Death is terrible to those who lose everything

[18] Ronnick (1991) would deny that the paradoxes are 'political code' aimed specifically at Brutus, but that does not deny that the issues raised in these paradoxes would be relevant to the Rome of 46 BCE.

[19] Cf. Grimal (1990) 3.

[20] Cf. Narducci (1997) and see Gaertner and Nesselrath on 6 n. 28, 12, 15 and 93–4 above.

> with life itself, not those whose fame cannot die; exile to those whose dwelling-place is marked by a boundary, not those who consider the whole world a single city.

He might have chosen to use this cosmopolitan argument (cf. *omnem orbem terrarum unam urbem ducunt*) to demonstrate Clodius' insanity, but he does not; such an argument would not suit his rhetorical and political ends. Instead he returns to the speeches he gave upon his return from exile, and to the discourse about legitimacy he developed there and in the *De Re Publica*. The argument begins with the assertion that Cicero was not exiled because there was no state from which he could be banished (*Parad.* 27–8):

> *non igitur erat illa tum civitas, cum leges in ea nihil valebant, cum iudicia iacebant, cum mos patrius occiderat, cum ferro pulsis magistratibus senatus nomen in re publica non erat. praedonum ille concursus et te duce latrocinium in foro constitutum et reliquae coniurationis a Catilinae furiis ad tuum scelus furoremque conversae, non civitas erat. itaque pulsus ego civitate non sum, quae nulla erat.*
>
> Therefore, there was no state at that time, when the laws had no power in it, when the law courts lay dead, when ancestral tradition was ruined, when, once the magistrates had been driven out by force, the name of the Senate no longer existed in the commonwealth. That was a congregation of bandits and brigandage established in the forum under your leadership and the remains of a conspiracy transferred from the madness of Catiline to your own criminal madness, not a state. And so I was not exiled from the state, because there was none.

In the speech *Post reditum ad populum* Cicero claimed that while he was gone there was no legitimate state at Rome; here we see that because there was no legitimate state in Rome, Cicero was not really an exile. Exile depends, it seems, on having a place to be exiled from. And in Cicero's case, as soon as the state was reconstituted, he was recalled: the re-establishment of consuls and Senate, the *consensus populi liberi*, and the *iuris et aequitatis... memoria* are the sign for his own re-establishment. They are also a restatement of the elements of the legitimate state as defined in the *De Re Publica*: the consensus of the people about the common good—here, about justice and equity—is what sets citizens apart from a mob and a collection of individuals from a state.

Clodius is presented as doubly a fool: not only did he mistakenly believe that he had exiled Cicero, but he himself was the one who made Cicero's exile impossible by destroying the legitimate state.[21] Indeed,

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[21] At the opening of *Parad.* 29, Cicero seems to refer to the idea that virtue is the only

instead of harming Cicero, Clodius actually provided him with a moment of glory (*Parad.* 29): *reditum mihi gloriosum iniuria tua dedit, non exitum calamitosum*. In the following sections, Cicero takes the argument a step further: not only did Clodius fail to exile Cicero, but he also managed to exile himself in the attempt. Clodius' greatest accomplishment, driving Cicero into exile, is recast as Cicero's triumph and Clodius' loss of citizenship (*Parad.* 29–30):

> *ergo ego semper civis, et tum maxime, cum meam salutem senatus exteris nationibus ut civis optimi commendabat, tu ne nunc quidem, nisi forte idem hostis esse et civis potest ... potes autem esse tu civis, propter quem aliquando civitas not fuit?*
>
> Thus, I have always been a citizen, most of all at that moment when the Senate entrusted my safety as that of an excellent citizen to foreign nations, whereas you are not a citizen even now, unless by chance the same man can be a citizen and a public enemy ... But can you be a citizen, because of whom there was at one time no state?[22]

Clodius' destruction of the Roman state, as described earlier in the *Paradoxa Stoicorum*, allows Cicero to define him as a *hostis*. Moreover, Clodius has (Cicero claims) committed numerous crimes for which exile is the penalty (*Parad.* 31). Whether he leaves Rome or not, he is a criminal and subject to exclusion from the citizen body:

> *omnes scelerati atque impii (quorum tu te ducem esse profiteris) quos leges exsilio affici volunt, exsules sunt, etiam si solum non mutarunt.*
>
> All criminal and wicked men (whose chief you admit that you are) on whom the laws would inflict exile, are exiles even if they did not leave the country.

Cicero uses the technical term for exile here (*solum mutare* or *vertere*). What he suggests is impossible in legal terms: *soli mutatio* is what differentiates an exile from someone who is away from Rome for any other reason.[23] As the rest of this argument makes clear, however, the legal niceties are not on his mind. Clodius, Cicero goes on to assert, is subject to a specific decree which had exile as its penalty, as a result of the Bona Dea affair. This was a major political scandal in 62 BCE: Clodius had disguised himself as a female flute-player in order to attend a religious

true possession, although even here 'virtue' is recast in political terms like *constantia* and *consilium*.

[22] Similar language is seen already in Cic. *Dom.* 72.

[23] Cf. *Caec.* 100, Liv. 43.2.1 and Gaertner's remarks on pp. 2–3 above.

ritual limited to women from the leading families of the Roman state and held, that year, in Julius Caesar's house; the rumor was that he was trying to seduce Caesar's wife. He was discovered and managed to escape, but was put on trial for intruding on the ritual, cf. *Parad.* 32:[24]

> *familiarissimus tuus de te privilegium tulit ut, si in opertum Bonae Deae accessisses, exsulares: at te id fecisse etiam gloriari soles. quo modo igitur, tot legibus eiectus in exilium, nomen exsulis non perhorrescis? "Romae sum", inquit. et quidem in operto fuisti. non igitur, ubi quisque erit, eius loci ius tenebit, si ibi eum legibus esse non oportebit.*
>
> Your own dear friend brought a special bill in your case, that if you had been present at the Bona Dea festival, you should go into exile: but you are accustomed to brag that you did this. How, then, since you have been sentenced by so many laws to exile, do you not shudder at the name 'exile'? "I am at Rome", he says. And you were at the festival, too. A person does not, therefore, have the right to remain in a place, wherever he happens to be, if by law it is unfitting for him to be there.

This argument would be stronger had Clodius not been acquitted of the charge. Cicero's insistence that Clodius, not himself, is the real exile, has led him to rewrite Clodius' history just as he rewrote his own. But the point of the argument here is not reality but legitimacy, not where Clodius actually was but where he ought to have been. Likewise, not how the state functions in the real world, but how it ought to function and how a good citizen ought to relate to it.

Cicero's logic in this argument is somewhat slippery. He claims that he is always a citizen, even when the *res publica* has been destroyed, although in fact it is not clear whether or not the *res publica* has been destroyed: something appears to have survived to go into exile with Cicero (*Parad.* 30):

> *et me tuo nomine appellas, cum omnes meo discessu exsulasse rem publicam putent?*
>
> And you call me by the name that belongs to you [sc. 'exile'], when everyone believes that the *res publica* went into exile at my departure?[25]

So did Clodius destroy it, or not? Does Cicero see himself as a *populus* of one? Cicero does not need to decide: he is more interested in rhetoric here than in philosophy. His goal is to assert the conditions for legitimacy

[24] Although he had not broken any law, he was tried for *incestum*, which was redefined for this purpose as 'intrusion into the rites of the Bona Dea'. See further Tatum (1999), chapter 3.

[25] Compare Cic. *Dom.* 72.

and his own close connection with the legitimate state. To do this he creates a new paradox, "political rather than Stoic", as Wallach ((1990) 181) notes, in which the real exiles are in Rome and the true citizen in a foreign land. The argument reasserts Cicero's own prestige in a political situation which might have undermined it: without a functioning *res publica* to participate in, Cicero needs to develop a new role for himself, and his experience of exile provides him with one ready-made.

The statesman who embodies the state was an appealing role for Cicero during the civil war, and provided him with reason to look back to the period of his exile and return for a model of that role. But the attack on Clodius in this section of the *Paradoxa Stoicorum* raises questions about the nature of the parallel Cicero is drawing in this text. Can we see his criticisms of Clodius as a veiled critique of the Rome in which he wrote? Is Clodius simply a stand-in for Cicero's real target, the dictator Caesar?[26] It is certainly true that, in light of Cicero's attachment to Rome itself, his return to the idea that the *res publica* can be separated from the physical site of the city must indicate a serious problem. But it would be too crude to read Clodius as a simple stand-in for Caesar, and to assume that Cicero already sees Caesar's government as wholly illegitimate. Caesar, after all, was still fighting in Africa when this was written, and Cato, as far as Cicero knows, was still alive; Caesar's dominance might have been the most likely outcome, but it was not perfectly assured. Even if Caesar were to emerge the victor, Clodius' tribunate represents a kind of worst-case scenario for Cicero, while Caesar might yet be persuaded to bring this *Sullanum regnum* to a suitably Sullan end, by restoring republican forms and laying down his own powers. It is possible to read the *Paradoxa Stoicorum* as a political work without recourse to such an analogy: the notion that the 'true republic' survived in the hearts of men like Cicero and Brutus would have been comforting to many Romans at this time. The lesson of Cicero's exile here is that the legitimate state, as defined by Cicero, can be brought back from disaster, provided that good citizens (defined by intention and action, not birth or current residence)[27] come together to preserve it.

The implicit comparison between the period of Cicero's exile and the period in which he wrote the *Paradoxa Stoicorum* is made explicit in a set

[26] Leach (2000/1) 356–7 notes the importance of Cicero's exile to his self-image, and the importance of Clodius to that exile; it might have been more surprising had Cicero managed to raise these issues without mentioning Clodius.

[27] Something even Clodius is forced to admit: cf. *Parad.* 29.

of letters written in the same year, especially those concerned with the recall of Marcus Claudius Marcellus, the consul of 51 BCE and one of Caesar's fiercest opponents. Much of Cicero's activity at this time was concerned with attempts to secure the recall of prominent followers of Pompey, so exile and return are frequent subjects in these letters.[28] Among the list of exiles on whose behalf Cicero worked are names like Aulus Caecina, Q. Ligarius and Nigidius Figulus.[29] Marcellus was the most prominent member of this group and also, it seems, the most difficult personality. It is on his behalf that Cicero finally broke his self-imposed public silence and delivered a speech of thanks to Caesar for his decision to recall Marcellus; this happened toward the end of September of 46 BCE. He describes the episode in a letter to Servius Sulpicius, who had been Marcellus' colleague in the consulship (*Fam.* 4.4.3):

> *fecerat autem hoc senatus, ut, cum a L. Pisone mentio esset facta de Marcello et C. Marcellus se ad Caesaris pedes abiecisset, cunctus consurgeret et ad Caesarem supplex accederet. noli quaerere: ita mihi pulcher hic dies visus est ut speciem aliquam viderer videre quasi reviviscentis rei publicae.*
>
> The Senate, however, had arranged that all the senators rose and approached Caesar in supplication as soon as L. Piso had made mention of Marcellus and C. Marcellus had thrown himself at Caesar's feet. Do not ask. This seemed to me such a fine day that I thought I saw some vision of a reviving republic.

This passage is extraordinary. How can Cicero describe a consular at the feet of a dictator and the senators rising in supplication as the revival of the *res publica*? The answer lies in the status exile has granted Marcus Marcellus. The association between Cicero and the *res publica* which we saw in the speeches delivered upon his return and in the *Paradoxa Stoicorum* has been extended to include Marcellus, whose return from exile will be (as Cicero's was) the return of legitimate government.

Marcellus' special status may also be seen in some equally interesting passages from Brutus' *De Virtute* (cited in Seneca's *Consolatio ad Helviam*).[30] Here Brutus has stopped on Lesbos on his way back from Asia to visit

[28] Some of what he writes falls into the consolatory tradition, for instance his claim that exile is no disgrace, particularly when one has done no wrong (*Fam.* 7.7.3). On Cicero and the consolatory tradition see also pp. 4 and 15 above.

[29] These letters are brought together in Shackleton Bailey's edition (1977) as nos. 221–47. Other addressees are Cn. Domitius Ahenobarbus, T. Ampius Balbus, Cn. Plancius, A. Manlius Torquatus and C. Toranius.

[30] For the identification, see Hendrickson (1939) and Fantham's remarks, p. 181 below.

Marcellus, probably in an attempt to persuade him to return to Rome. He describes his departure from the island as follows (Sen. *Helv.* 9.4):

> *Brutus, in eo libro quem de Virtute composuit, ait se Marcellum vidisse in Mytilenis exulantem et, quantum modo natura hominis pateretur, beatissime viventem neque umquam cupidiorem bonarum artium quam illo tempore. itaque adicit visum sibi se magis in exilium ire, qui sine illo rediturus esset, quam illum in exilio relinqui.*
>
> Brutus, in the book entitled *De Virtute*, says that he saw Marcellus living in exile in Mytilene, and that he was living as happily as human nature permits, nor was he ever more devoted to the liberal arts than at that time. And so he adds that it seemed to him that he was going into exile, who was returning without Marcellus, rather than leaving him behind in exile.

This is a striking passage. The Senate, at least for men like Brutus and Cicero, represented the heart of the *res publica*, and yet in this passage Rome yields to Marcellus as the point from which exile is to be measured. As the true representative of the legitimate republic, Marcellus, like Cicero before him, can never be exiled. Seneca, it seems, understood the implication (Sen. *Helv.* 9.6):

> *illi quidem reditum inpetravit senatus publicis precibus, tam sollicitus ac maestus ut omnes illo die Bruti habere animum viderentur et non pro Marcello sed pro se deprecari, ne exules essent si sine illo fuissent…*
>
> The Senate did indeed by public petitions obtain his recall, being so troubled and sad that on that day they all seemed to feel as Brutus did and to plead not for Marcellus but for themselves, lest they should be exiles if they should be without him…

Seneca and (perhaps) Brutus emphasize Marcellus' virtue as a philosopher: his happy self-sufficiency makes him the model of a Stoic *sapiens*. Cicero, however, has a more political reading of Marcellus' exile: the *reviviscens res publica* of his letter to Sulpicius is not, as we will see, the result of a philosopher's homecoming. Instead, Cicero will use Marcellus' exile to present a political paradox as difficult as any he addressed in the *Paradoxa Stoicorum*.

Brutus' assessment of Marcellus' happiness may have been accurate, since persuading Caesar to recall his old enemy was only half the task; Marcellus himself was reluctant to leave exile and return to Rome. To return was to accept Caesar's *clementia*, which implied the acceptance that Caesar was his superior: *clementia* is something a superior grants to an inferior.[31] Cicero's solution was ingenious: he tells Marcellus that he

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[31] Cato's suicide is a sign of his refusal to accept Caesar's pardon and his right to

can return to Rome without leaving exile. The paradox will be reversed: where Brutus had Marcellus living away from Rome but not in exile, Cicero would place Marcellus (and by extension himself) in Rome and in exile at the same time.

Cicero's introduction of the theme of exile in his letters to Marcellus is careful. Despite his purpose, to persuade his correspondent to return, he concedes that Marcellus' exile has brought him great praise (*Fam.* 4.7.3):

> *fateor a plerisque, vel dicam ab omnibus, sapiens tuum consilium, a multis etiam magni ac fortis animi iudicatum.*
>
> I admit that most people, or really everyone, judges your course of action a wise one, and many think it a sign of courage and high-mindedness.

He portrays the decision to go into exile and remain there in a largely positive light.[32] He never suggests that exile is, in itself, disgraceful. Cicero admits that their actions after Pharsalus differed (Marcellus settled on Lesbos, Cicero chose to return to Italy), but he deliberately blurs the difference between the two at the time of writing. He denies, for example, that Marcellus' exile allows him any independence from Caesar (*Fam.* 4.7.4, written Sept. 46 BCE):

> *tamen id cogitare deberes, ubicumque esses, te fore in eius ipsius quem fugeres potestate.*
>
> Nevertheless you should consider that wherever you may be, you will be in the power of that man whom you would flee.[33]

In terms of their relation to the central power, there is no difference between life in Mytilene and life in Rome (*Fam.* 4.7.4):

> *qui si facile passurus esset te carentem patria et fortunis tuis quiete et libere vivere, cogitandum tibi tamen esset Romaene et domi tuae, cuicuimodi res esset, an Mytilenis aut Rhodi malles vivere. sed cum ita late pateat eius potestas quem veremur ut terrarum*

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grant a pardon: killing himself is an act of rebellion against Caesar's authority. In Plutarch's biography of Cato, he rejects Caesar's clemency on his deathbed: "Caesar acts illegally in saving, as if a master (ὡς κύριος) those over whom he has no right to rule (δεσπόζειν)" (66.2). Marcellus seems to have felt the same.

[32] The only exception is in his references to the danger to Marcellus' person and his property. But Cicero himself had proved quite resistant to this kind of argument in 49 BCE, when Caelius Rufus used similar objections to try to persuade him not to join Pompey.

[33] Cicero here touches on the different quality of exile under Caesar's dictatorship, when (as later under the principate) exiles were still under the control of those who banished them: see pp. 16–17 above.

> *orbem complexa sit, nonne mavis sine periculo tuae domi esse quam cum periculo alienae?*
>
> If he was to allow you to live in peace and liberty, but without your home and your fortunes, you would still have to consider whether you would rather live in Rome and in your home, regardless of how things are, or in Mytilene or Rhodes. But given that the power of him we fear reaches so far that it embraces the entire world, would you not prefer to live safely in your own home than to live in danger in someone else's home?

The choice of Rome rather than Mytilene is not one of *patria* or *exilium*; it is simply a matter of comfort and familiarity in exile. Cicero here refers to a point which he has already made to Marcellus in an earlier letter, that Rome is as much a place of exile, and as good a place of exile, as Mytilene. In this earlier passage, written in mid-July of 46 BCE, Cicero makes the argument that Marcellus ought to return to Rome and work for the return of the *res publica*, and presents him with a set of alternatives (*Fam.* 4.8.2):

> ... *ut, quod ego facio, tu quoque animum inducas, si sit aliqua res publica, in ea te esse oportere iudicio hominum reque principem, necessitate cedentem tempori; sin autem nulla sit, hunc tamen aptissimum esse etiam ad exsulandum locum.*
>
> ... so that you may consider, as I do myself, that if there is some sort of commonwealth the first place in it belongs to you in the judgment of the people and in fact, even though you would necessarily be yielding to the conditions of the time, and that, if there is no commonwealth, this place is still the best also for living in exile.

This is a striking assertion. Cicero does not emphasize the benefits of being in Rome, but rather suggests that Marcellus' future life in Rome would not be dissimilar to his present life in Mytilene. It must have seemed to many Romans that Marcellus' self-imposed exile provided him with a kind of independence from Caesar, and his refusal to ask for a pardon questioned both Caesar's right to recall him and the desirability of returning to Rome. Cicero seems to recognize the importance of exile to Marcellus' definition of himself as an opponent of Caesar, and he lures Marcellus back with the promise that his return will not damage that status. He raises the possibility of being in exile in Rome to persuade Marcellus that he ought to return: that is, exile is presented as a desirable state, not a hardship. As in the *Paradoxa Stoicorum* and the passage from Seneca's *ad Helviam*, the point from which exile is judged has shifted: not distance from Rome, but from the *res publica*, the true *patria* of all good Romans. The paradox here comes from the notion that under Caesar's dictatorship, that form of government has ceased to

exist, driving all good Romans into exile, wherever they happen to be.[34] Rather than asserting that true Romans carry the *res publica* within them, and thus are never exiles, Cicero claims that all true Romans are now exiles. What makes this different is Cicero's insistence that in this case to be in exile in Rome is not a sign of moral failure. Quite the opposite: it is the mark of a good citizen to understand that he is in exile.

In light of this complex of ideas, Cicero's response to Marcellus' recall becomes explicable. What gives him hope is not the action of the Senate but Caesar's decision to recall Marcellus: it is this which Cicero links with the return of republican government. Marcellus' unwillingness to return made him even more appealing as a figurehead; by refusing to play the suppliant, Marcellus turned his exile from a misfortune to a sign of his superior *virtus*. In exile, he is the true representative of the Republic, and Caesar's decision to recall him can be read, at least by Cicero, as a promise to restore a republican government. But the idea raised in the letters, that Marcellus could be in exile even in Rome, makes his physical return a moment of particular significance: is this a true return, of Marcellus along with the *res publica*, or will he (and Cicero, and others like them) be left in perpetual exile wherever they are?

That Cicero placed himself in exile alongside Marcellus is clear from another letter (*Fam.* 7.3), written to M. Marius, probably a connection from Arpinum, to explain his actions after Pharsalus. If Shackleton Bailey's dating is correct, this letter predates the letters to Marcellus by a couple of months; this is dated to April of 46 BCE, and the earlier of the two letters to Marcellus to July of that year. It would seem, then, that Cicero developed the idea of exile in Rome to use first in his own case, and only later applied it to Marcellus, cf. *Fam.* 7.3.4–5:

> *veni domum, non quo optima vivendi condicio esset, sed tamen, si esset aliqua forma rei publicae, tamquam in patria ut essem, si nulla, tamquam in exsilio*...*notum tibi omne meum consilium esse volui, ut*...*scires*...*nunc*..., *si haec civitas est, civem esse*

[34] In fact, Cicero's attitude to the state of the *res publica* under Caesar is complex. At best it is sick or wounded, at worst dead. The possibility that Cicero does not believe that Caesar's government in Rome represents any kind of *res publica* is raised by Cicero himself in the letter in which he describes Marcellus' recall (*Fam.* 4.4.4); his concern at this point is to prevent Caesar from suspecting that this is what he believes, rather than to deny that he believes it. The expectations he expresses are generally tailored to his audience, and it is difficult to determine what Cicero actually thought; nor is it necessary that his beliefs about the possibility of Caesar's restoration of the *res publica* were constant. For one interpretation, see Mitchell (1991) 281–8.

*me, si non, exsulem esse non incommodiore loco quam si Rhodum <me> aut Mytilenas contulissem.*

I came home, not because it would be the best place to live, but nevertheless, if there should be any kind of *res publica*, that I should seem to be in my homeland, and if not, I would seem to be in exile . . . I wanted you to be acquainted with all my views, so that you might know . . . that now . . ., if this is a legitimate state, I am a citizen, and if not, I am an exile in no more uncomfortable place than if I had taken myself to Rhodes or Mytilene.

It is possible that Cicero believed that Rome was subject to a legitimate government, and therefore that he was a citizen rather than an exile. The tone of this passage, however, suggests that although Cicero may have had hope for the future, he believed that at least at the moment, he was in a kind of exile; *si haec civitas est* must be either ironic or resigned.

The appeal of such a position can be seen in another letter, this one to Papirius Paetus (*Fam.* 9.18). Here Cicero compares his cultivation of Caesar's friends to Dionysius II of Syracuse's decision to teach philosophy in exile, cf. *Fam.* 9.18.1:

. . . *ex quibus intellexi probari tibi meum consilium, quod, ut Dionysius tyrannus, cum Syracusis pulsus esset, Corinthi dicitur ludum aperuisse, sic ego sublatis iudiciis, amisso regno forensi ludum quasi habere coeperim.*

. . . from which I have gathered that you approve of my decision to begin to keep a kind of school, now that the law courts are abolished and I have lost my forensic kingdom—just as the tyrant Dionysius is said to have opened a school at Corinth after being expelled from Syracuse.[35]

This half-serious statement raises all sorts of delicate issues, especially the question of whether Caesar's dictatorship might be seen as a tyranny. Cicero cast himself as the tyrant in exile, rather than refer to the actual tyrant who was responsible for the fact that Cicero no longer has a public role. Caesar's dictatorship has forced Cicero to play the role of an exile, wherever he happens to find himself. The fact that here Cicero is making a joke about his situation does not reduce the political implications of Cicero's claim that he himself was in some way in exile.[36] At the very least, by implying that he is in exile, Cicero could distance himself from Caesar's regime and deny that, by his very presence in Rome, he was

[35] On philosophy as a typical pastime of exiles see Gaertner p. 11 above.

[36] See also *Fam.* 7.28.2. Cicero's use of the motif of internal exile to describe his position in Rome has been documented by Herescu (1959) and Doblhofer (1987) 231–41. My intention here is to examine the implications of this metaphor for Cicero, and the reasons for its appeal to him.

collaborating with the dictatorship. More seriously, any claim by Cicero that he is in exile must carry with it the notion that the legitimate *res publica* no longer exists: the complex of ideas Cicero had associated with his exile in 58–7 BCE, and in particular his close association with the *res publica*, makes this interpretation difficult to avoid.

In these letters, Cicero's and Marcellus' exiles are represented as evidence of their superior understanding: they know themselves to be in exile as a result of the destruction of their *patria*, wherever they happen to be living. This is the reverse of the argument frequently made in the consolatory literature, that the philosopher understands that he is not in exile, wherever he happens to be living, because he understands the true nature of exile.[37] It is also the reverse of the situation in the *Paradoxa Stoicorum*, where the fact that Clodius was in exile in Rome while the *res publica* was destroyed was a sign of his wickedness. The meaning Cicero assigns to exile seems to change depending on the needs of the argument, but the usefulness of exile as a tool for examining his political situation is constant: the paradox of exile in Rome allows him to play with questions of legitimacy and citizenship in ways that pose no direct challenge to Caesar's dominance, but which are nevertheless meaningful to his audience.

To be in exile and in Rome is presented in the *Paradoxa Stoicorum* as an abomination and in the letters of 46 BCE as a mark of political virtue. The great difference between Cicero and Marcellus on the one hand, and Clodius on the other, is Cicero's assertion that Clodius intended to destroy the *res publica*. But where does this leave Caesar? Is he, like Clodius, unaware of his true state of exile? Or is he a knowing exile, like Cicero and Marcellus, anxious to re-establish himself in his true *patria*? Both are possible, but Caesar also can represent the point from which exile is measured. As Cicero writes to Trebonius, who was on his way to Spain with Caesar in December of 46 BCE (*Fam.* 15.20.2):

> ...*olim solebant qui Romae erant ad provincialis amicos de re publica scribere, nunc tu nobis scribas opportet, res enim publica istic est.*
>
> ...once, those in Rome used to write to friends in the provinces about the *res publica*, but now you ought to write to me, for the *res publica* is there.

The role of the man at Rome and that of the man in the provinces are now reversed. Just as Rome is no longer the center, the provinces are no

[37] Cf. Nesselrath, pp. 87 ff. above, imprimis pp. 93, 98, 104–5.

longer on the peripheries of power. What constitution there is resides in Caesar's person: in that sense, the dictator himself is the only man not in exile from the Republic. Cicero emphasizes the identity of Caesar and the *res publica* in the very speech he gave on Marcellus' behalf (*Marc.* 22):

> *equidem de te dies noctesque, ut debeo, cogitans casus dumtaxat humanos et incertos eventus valetudinis et naturae communis fragilitatem extimesco, doleoque, cum res publica immortalis esse debeat, eam in unius mortalis anima consistere.*
>
> For my part, as I think about you day and night, as I must, I dread only human misfortunes, the uncertain outcomes of ill-health and the frailness of our common nature, and I mourn that, while the *res publica* ought to be immortal, it hangs upon the breath of a single mortal man.

The survival of the *res publica* is here dependent on Caesar's survival. Of course this is a speech delivered before Caesar, and Trebonius was also one of Caesar's partisans. Cicero cannot say openly that the *res publica* has been destroyed by Caesar, so he says instead that the *res publica* now resides in Caesar's person. An audience accustomed to Cicero's tendency to associate himself with constitutional government could be left to draw their own conclusions.

Exile was thus a particularly fruitful rhetorical theme for Cicero during this period. It enables him to emphasize his close association with republican government and provides a way of reassuring both himself and his audience that his connection to the *res publica* survived the destruction of the Republic itself. In the *Paradoxa Stoicorum*, he demonstrates that his status as a good citizen is independent of his physical location, and possibly even of the health of the *res publica*. He looks back to his own triumphant return from exile, and perhaps forward to some future restoration. The letters also look forward to the restoration of legitimate government in the form of the return of good exiles to the state. Cicero's own belief that in exile he embodied the *res publica* is here expanded: all good Romans carry the *res publica* within them, wherever they may be. But the letters to Marcellus admit a more pessimistic reading of the situation: if the *res publica* is not restored, Cicero and all those like him may be left in permanent exile, even in Rome. The absence of a legitimate *res publica* threatens not only their identities but even the special nature of the city of Rome, otherwise so dear to Cicero's heart.[38]

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[38] See Harrison, p. 141 below, for a similar discourse of exile and legitimization in Lucan's *Civil War.*

Although Cicero generally held back from politics and from criticism of Caesar, this metaphor does carry a political meaning. Cicero's choice of exile, like that of the Pompeians and neutrals who stayed away from Rome, was a challenge to Caesar's power. Indeed, the idea of a metaphorical exile opens this challenge to include men who joined Caesar in Rome; the similarity which it allows Cicero to construct between both Caesarians and Pompeians may even allow him to draw new lines for a future struggle in Rome, between the supporters of the *res publica* and those of autocracy. Cicero, of course, was uninvolved with the assassination which restored a form of republican government to Rome, but his readiness to return home to the Republic and to take up a position of leadership in it (as well as the fact that that position remained available to him) suggest that whatever the political situation in Rome, Cicero never allowed the *res publica* and his own association with it to disappear. The metaphor of exile permitted Cicero to maintain his loyalty to that system even as he lived under a very different one.

Finally, there is the issue of Cicero's originality. Whatever else is said of Cicero's writings, he is rarely singled out as an original thinker. Yet in this case, the idea of the internal exile of a good citizen whose state has changed around him may be his own invention. The statesman in exile was a well-established figure in ancient historiography, as was the statesman whose exile did serious damage to the state from which he was exiled, but the statesman in exile in his own land was an oxymoron.[39] But in the *res publica perturbata* of Caesar's Rome, only a paradox could suitably explain the situation of a man like Cicero. This metaphorical exile does not involve the separation of Cicero from the *res publica*; instead, as I have shown, it keeps that bond as strong as possible under the circumstances. No other metaphor expressed Cicero's new life so well as this one, or could serve so many purposes in his communication with others. In the metaphor of internal exile, Cicero has found an expression which is effective, appropriate, and original.

[39] The difficulty of a metaphorical exile, especially a voluntary one, is underlined by the rarity of such an image. Doblhofer (1987) 231–41 applies the term 'internal exile' to Cicero during this period and at the end of his life. A modern point of comparison may be found in the somewhat controversial idea of the 'innere Emigration' of certain German authors who remained in Nazi Germany. Brief overviews of this phenomenon may be found in Grunberger (1971) 354–5 and Taylor (1980) 264–90, especially pp. 266–8 and 277–83. The term 'innere Emigration' was coined by Frank Thiess; for the origin of the idea and of the controversy surrounding it, see Mann/Thiess/von Molo (1946).

CHAPTER SEVEN

# EXILE IN LATIN EPIC

Stephen J. Harrison

Exile, in the broad sense of extended and/or enforced absence from home with imperilled or impossible prospect of return,[1] is a fundamental element of Greco-Roman epic plots. Such chronic and perilous dislocation of the normally localised existence of the ancient world gave special scope for heroic adventure, and thus fitted the most elevated and defamiliarised form of literary discourse.[2] Latin epics inherit exile as a plot-feature from the Greek epic tradition, especially the theme of ktistic or foundational exile, where a hero leaves his homeland to set up a new culture;[3] in Latin epic before Vergil, some treatment of the story of Aeneas as an exile from Troy and founder of the Roman race occurred in both Naevius' *Bellum Punicum* and Ennius' *Annales*, while on the more historical level Cicero's exile in Greece and triumphant return to Rome in 58–7 BC appear to have been key events in his own lost *De Temporibus Suis*.[4]

In what follows I want to trace the theme of exile in the six main preserved Latin epics (Vergil's *Aeneid*, Ovid's *Metamorphoses*, Lucan's *De Bello Civili*, Silius' *Punica*, Valerius Flaccus' *Argonautica* and Statius' *Thebaid*), and to show how it illustrates and promotes the central concerns of each of the poems.

Ktistic exile is naturally at the centre of the plot of the *Aeneid*. Aeneas appears from the very first as *fato profugus* (1.2), going to exile in Italy from the Trojan perspective, though his Italian destination is later skilfully rebranded as the Trojans' original home through their distant descent from the Italian Dardanus, who himself left Italy to found Troy (3.167–8, 8.134–7): this anticipates (but reverses in direction) Aeneas' role as

[1] See Gaertner, pp. 2–3 above, on the ancient terminology and on the need for a broad definition of 'exile' when dealing with Greco-Roman antiquity.

[2] It is interesting that exile is not one of the typical plot elements listed in the lively discussion of Lowe (2000).

[3] See Bowie on pp. 24–7 above and Gaertner's remarks on pp. 7–8 above.

[4] Cf. Harrison (1990) and pp. 14–15 n. 76 above.

ktistic exile moving from Troy to Italy. Aeneas' departure from Troy and wanderings around the Mediterranean are consistently presented as a form of exile, and when Aeneas complains to his mother that he is *Europa atque Asia pulsus* (1.385) he uses a word which is standard for exilic expulsion.[5] The theme of exile and its sufferings is naturally prominent in Aeneas' own narrative in books 2 and 3: at 2.637–8 Anchises initially refuses to join his son in leaving his homeland for exile in old age (*abnegat excisa vitam producere Troia / exsiliumque pati*), while the ghostly Creusa does not spare Aeneas in her foretelling of future wanderings and lengthy exile (2.780: *longa tibi exsilia et vastum maris aequor arandum*). Aeneas as retrospective narrator is fully conscious that he is leading his men into a long and arduous exilic journey around the Mediterranean, cf. 2.798: *collectam exsilio pubem*, 3.4–5: *diversa exsilia et desertas quaerere terras / auguriis agimur divum*, 3.11–12: *feror exsul in altum / cum sociis natoque penatibus et magnis dis*.

At Carthage, Aeneas encounters Dido, another ktistic exile already busy founding a new city, evidently matching Aeneas' own mission (cf. 1.437 (Aeneas speaking): "*o fortunati, quorum iam moenia surgunt*"). As has often been noted, the pair's shared exilic experience and ktistic role provide a psychologically plausible motivation for their immediate mutual attraction, and Dido herself declares to Aeneas that she knows from experience what he has been through (1.628–30):

> *me quoque per multos similis fortuna labores*
> *iactatam hac demum voluit consistere terra:*
> *non ignara mali miseris succurrere disco.*
>
> A similar fortune has tossed me, too, through many toils and has willed that in the end I should settle down in this land. Having experienced distress myself I know how to aid wretched people.[6]

But exile puts Dido in a vulnerable position as well as one of sympathy. She is a single woman with enemies (cf. 4.325–6: Pygmalion or Iarbas), whose disastrous dalliance with Aeneas leaves her exposed to local vengeance, and in her despair she cannot face a second exile (cf. 4.545–6: *quos Sidonia vix urbe revelli, / rursus agam pelago...?*). Dido's ktistic exile, initially so similar, is not in the end a positive role model for Aeneas, and though she succeeds in founding her city, her death and curse

[5] Cf. *TLL* s.v. *pello* 1011.72–1012.49.
[6] Unless otherwise noted, all translations are mine.

doom it ultimately to destruction under Rome, something famously foreshadowed in the narrative of her end (cf. 4.669–71).

More positive as a model for ktistic exile for Aeneas is Antenor, who has preceded Aeneas in establishing a Trojan outpost in Italy—cf. 1.242–9:

*Antenor potuit, mediis elapsus Achivis,*
*Illyricos penetrare sinus atque intima tutus*
*regna Liburnorum et fontem superare Timavi,*
*unde per ora novem vasto cum murmure montis*
*it mare proruptum et pelago premit arva sonanti.*
*hic tamen ille urbem Patavi sedesque locavit*
*Teucrorum, et genti nomen dedit, armaque fixit*
*Troia; nunc placida compostus pace quiescit.*

Antenor escaped from the throng of the Achaeans and was able to make his way safely through the Illyrian gulfs and the kingdom of the Liburnians and cross the spring of Timavus, from where through nine mouths it goes as a bursting sea with the mighty roar of a mountain and covers the fields under a sounding sea. There however he placed the city of Patavum and the new home of the Trojans, and gave a name to the people and set up the Trojan arms; now he rests buried in a quiet peace.[7]

As successful founder of the stable and peaceful city of Padua, Antenor offers encouragement for the future foundation of Aeneas' proto-Roman state. Less positive, again, are the other Trojan exiles Helenus and Andromache, with their pathetic city in Epirus which slavishly replicates the topography of Troy (3.294–471).[8] This shows the sterility of nostalgically cloning Troy in exile, without dynamic forward thrust: the New Troy in Italy will and must be different, and will indeed ultimately lose the name of Troy (cf. 12.826–37).

Exile is also presented in the *Aeneid* as the fate of some of the victorious Greeks from Troy as well as that of Aeneas' and Antenor's defeated Trojans. When the Trojans arrive in Italy, their former enemy Diomedes, now in self-chosen exile on the Italian Adriatic coast (11.246–7), is sent for by Turnus (8.9) to join the Latin forces, but famously refuses to fight the Trojans again (11.252–93). Though Diomedes' professed fear and respect for Aeneas' military ability (11.282–7) is very different from his encounter with Aeneas in the *Iliad* where the Trojan is wounded and rescued from death only by the intervention of his divine mother

[7] Translation by Fairclough/Goold (1999), modified.
[8] See Hardie (1998) 67 and 84 (gathering earlier literature).

Venus (*Il.* 5.297–317), his refusal to fight again points to the inevitability of Aeneas' victory this time. The war in Italy, in many ways a second Trojan War,[9] thus neatly excludes the most important Greek survivor of the first Trojan War who could have participated. The motif of exile for a former opponent from the victorious Greek side at Troy is also found in the case of Idomeneus. When the Trojans arrive in Crete, their old Iliadic adversary has been exiled from the island (cf. 3.121–2: *fama volat pulsum regnis cessisse paternis / Idomenea ducem*). Thus both these fearsome warriors are in exile, and though one is in exile close to Aeneas both are conveniently removed or disarmed, so that Aeneas never meets in battle the same adversaries who defeated his city.

In general, Italy itself seems to abound in ktistic exiles before Aeneas reaches it.[10] Quite apart from the recently-arrived Antenor (above), Evander is in exile from Greece with his Arcadians at Pallanteum (8.333–5):

> *me pulsum patria pelagique extrema sequentem*
> *Fortuna omnipotens et ineluctabile fatum*
> *his posuere locis.*
>
> Almighty Fortune and an inevitable fate have placed me in these places, me, who am expelled from my native land and follow the most distant tracts of the sea.

This exilic status, and the location of Pallanteum at the site of the future Rome, clearly parallels him with Aeneas as a successful founding immigrant; the mythographic tradition that Evander went into exile after killing his father under persuasion from his mother, recorded by Servius on Verg. *A.* 8.51, is conveniently erased in the search for a positive parallel with Aeneas, conversely famous for saving his father. Italy seems to have been the home of exiles from its earliest times: even Saturn, the presiding deity of the Italian Golden Age, came to Italy in exile from Olympus when overthrown by Jupiter (8.319–25). Again the parallel with Aeneas is clear: the immigrant ruler establishes a peaceful regime and turns the suffering of exile into the prosperity of a new state.

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[9] See Gransden (1984), with earlier literature.

[10] The *Aeneid* conveniently omits supposed foundations of companions of Odysseus, such as Baius, putative founder of Baiae (see Servius on Verg. *A.* 3.441 and 6.107); for the general phenomenon of claims of legendary ancestry from the Trojan period by Roman *gentes* see Wiseman (1974).

The Latins who face Aeneas in the war in Italy also have exilic connections. Turnus, though Italian-born, is a kind of Greek abroad, an Argive in Italy, as Juno with her own close Argive connections (cf. *Il.* 4.50–4) is keen to present him (7.371–2):

*et Turno, si prima domus repetatur origo,*
*Inachus Acrisiusque patres mediaeque Mycenae.*

And, if we go back to the first origin of his house, Inachus and Acrisius and Mycenae itself are the ancestors of Turnus.[11]

This identity of Turnus as a hostile Greek is an important element in the re-run of the Trojan War; he is the opposite of Evander's surprisingly friendly Greek Arcadians (cf. 6.96–7: *via prima salutis / (quod minime reris) Graia pandetur ab urbe*) in representing traditional Greek hatred of the Trojans. Mezentius, echoing the Tarquins and other tyrants, is shown as in exile for his over-violent rule and as a refugee in the service of Turnus (8.489–93), but by a characteristically Vergilian twist his initially invidious exile is ultimately made the source of sympathy in his lament for his dead son Lausus at 10.849–50:

*heu, nunc misero mihi demum*
*exilium infelix, nunc alte vulnus adactum!*

Ah! Now at last my exile is bitter, now my wound is driven deep indeed!

Here a text-critical point is involved. *Exitium* (MPR) is read by Mynors, but *exilium* (P[1], Servius) read by Williams and Geymonat, is clearly right, as I have argued elsewhere:[12] the point is not that death is now unfortunate for Mezentius (indeed the opposite is true in context, as he has lost his beloved son and has nothing to live for), but that only now does the misery and loneliness of his exile become fully clear after the loss of his son's companionship. Mezentius the evil exile thus becomes the pitiable exile as he moves towards death.

A parallel figure of an evil exile with a more attractive child is to be found in the character of Metabus, father of the Amazonic Camilla (11.539–43):

*pulsus ob invidiam regno virisque superbas*
*Priverno antiqua Metabus cum excederet urbe,*

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[11] Cf. also 7.789–92, where the Argive heroine Io (similarly addened by Juno) is depicted on his shield and 7.794, where his forces are named as *Argiva…pubes*.
[12] Cf. Harrison (1991) 273.

> *infantem fugiens media inter proelia belli*
> *sustulit exsilio comitem, matrisque vocavit*
> *nomine Casmillae mutata parte Camillam.*
>
> When Metabus, expelled from his kingdom because of ill-feeling and his arrogant strength, left Privernum, the ancient city, as he fled through the centre of the battle, he took with him his child as a companion in exile and called her after her mother Casmilla's name, but slightly changed, Camilla.

The evident thematic link with Mezentius the exiled tyrant is here reinforced by verbal resemblance (11.539: *pulsus ob invidiam regno* ~ 10.852: *pulsus ob invidiam solio*), and as with Mezentius this invidious image is softened by a moving presentation of the tyrant's fatherly care. This occurs in the famous episode where Metabus ties his baby daughter to a spear and throws it over the river to safety, and rears her alone amid wild animals (11.547–72).

Thus the *Aeneid* presents as its central structural feature the triumphant overcoming of exilic danger and uncertainty: the destructive reverberations and geographical dispersals necessarily consequent on the end of the Trojan War are turned to a positive and civilising purpose in establishing a proto-Roman foundation in Italy. It also presents a plot where the exile of the hero and his companions is a key mode of engendering sympathy. A number of other exilic figures appear, who are made to reflect in various ways on Aeneas and his mission in Italy and whose stories are manipulated so as to relate appropriately to the poem's primary plot of successful emigration and foundation. Some of these figures are motivated to interact with Aeneas on the basis of their shared exilic experience, while others present morally inferior kinds of exiles, expelled from their communities not (like Aeneas) by the fortune of war but by political misbehaviour, reminding us by contrast of Aeneas' kingly qualities.[13] But even these 'evil exiles' (Mezentius and Metabus) can be softened in presentation through sympathetic children for whom they show fatherly care, thus underlining the *pietas* which is a key theme of the *Aeneid*.

Modern scholarship on Ovid's *Metamorphoses* has often stressed its diverse explorations of its eponymous theme of transformation.[14] One form of

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[13] On kingship in the *Aeneid* see Cairns (1989) 1–84.
[14] See conveniently Feldherr (2002).

transformation not much considered in this literature is exile: but exile as a permanent move of domicile is surely a kind of metamorphosis, and it is therefore perhaps not surprising that exile is a major theme in Ovid's poem. Another motivation for the prominence of exile in the *Metamorphoses* is its prominence in the plot of the *Aeneid*, just seen; here as in other respects Ovid's epic is coming to terms with its great predecessor. A third potential reason is Ovid's own exile: scholars are fast moving to the position that at least some of the *Metamorphoses* was written or rewritten from Tomis and thus from a post-exilic standpoint, which gives an extra weight and interest to the theme of exile in the poem.[15]

The first exiled character in the poem is Io, driven in bovine form by divine persecution from Greece to Egypt (*Met.* 1.583–746). Her move to Egypt is the penultimate stage in a series of metamorphoses, since she is also changed from woman to cow for concealment in Greece and from cow to the goddess Isis in Egypt. Her exile and overall career recall that of Aeneas: she is described as *profugam* (1.727, cf. Verg. *A.* 1.3: *profugus*), her journey involves a long Mediterranean voyage (but West-East rather than East-West), she is subject to divine persecution by Juno, and achieves divine status at her final resting-place. Similarly reminiscent of Aeneas is Cadmus in *Metamorphoses* 3:[16] sent into quasi-exile from Tyre by his father in the search for Europa (cf. 3.7: *profugus*) and promised real exile if he fails to return with his sister (3.4–5: *si non invenerit, addit / exilium*), Cadmus moves from a great Asiatic city to found a settlement in a new country to the West after a series of oracular instructions, all evidently Vergilian elements, and as for Aeneas, his ktistic exile and foundation of Thebes leads (at least temporarily) to successful emigration (cf. 3.131–2: *iam stabant Thebae: poteras iam, Cadme, videri / exilio felix*), though in Cadmus' case his descendants are about to bring tragic sufferings to his new city. A further exile in the poem with Vergilian connotations is Lycabas, the ringleader of the sailors' plot to kidnap the god Bacchus narrated by Acoetes to Pentheus. He recalls Vergil's Mezentius as an evil exile and a killer of Etruscan origin—cf. *Met.* 3.623–5:[17]

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[15] For the most convincing post-exilic allusion at *Met.* 15.871–9 see Kovacs (1987) 463–5, and for the specific case of Daedalus see below. For some advocates of post-exilic revision of the *Metamorphoses* see Hardie (1995) 213 n. 47. Cf. also p. 155 n. 4 below.

[16] See Hardie (1990).

[17] For the link see Anderson (1996) 400.

*furit audacissimus omni*
*de numero Lycabas, qui Tusca pulsus ab urbe*
*exilium dira poenam pro caede luebat.*

Lycabas raged, the boldest of all the group, who had been expelled from the Tuscan city and was atoning through his exile for an awful slaughter.

*dira... caede* clearly recalls the *infandas caedes* inflicted by Mezentius on his citizens (Verg. *A.* 8.483), and Lycabas (like Mezentius) is punished for his wrong-doing.

Just as some stories in the *Metamorphoses* contain repeated physical metamorphoses (e.g. that of Peleus and Thetis, *Met.* 11.221–65, or that of Arachne, *Met.* 6.103–28), so there is at least one exile story in which the motif of exile is repeated several times. This is the narrative of Medea. In *Met.* 7 we see her leaving her home of Colchis for Iolcus with Jason (155–8), her departure into exile from Iolcus after the death of Pelias (351: *fugit*), her departure from Corinth after her filicide (397: *effugit*), her cordial reception as an exile (402: *excipit*) by Aegeus in Athens, and her final flight after attempted poisoning of Theseus (424: *effugit*). These repeated exiles have an important structural function in the poem, linking up the Argonaut story from the end of book 6 with the Theseus cycle of books 7 and 8. Thus exile can be used as part of the narrative grammar of the *Metamorphoses*, and perhaps, given its role as a form of metamorphosis, help to hold the poem together by repeatedly referring to its overt topic of transformation.

Finally, we come to two stories where a character's exile tempts the reader to make connections with the post-exilic Ovid. In book 8 we find the great inventor Daedalus trapped in effective exile on Crete, longing to return to his home in the metropolis of Athens (*Met.* 8.183–5):

*Daedalus interea Creten longumque perosus*
*exilium tactusque loci natalis amore*
*clausus erat pelago.*

Meanwhile Daedalus, who had come to hate Crete and his long exile and was touched by love for his native land, was shut in by the sea.

The picture given in this famous episode of the supreme artificer in exile across the sea, longing to return to a great city and trying unsuccessfully to use his powers of creation, sets up a seductive parallel with the Ovid of the exile poetry seeking to get back to Rome through his poetic art.[18]

[18] See Hinds (1985) for Ovid's attempt to "book the return trip" in exile, and Sharrock (1994) 168–73 for the specific link between the exiles of Daedalus and Ovid.

This is strengthened by a series of allusions in the exile poetry which compare Ovid's fate with the story of Daedalus and Icarus:[19] Ovid fears his poetic book will suffer Icarus' fate at *Tr.* 1.1.90, compares his 'fall' to that of Icarus at *Tr.* 3.4.21, and wishes for the wings of Daedalus at *Tr.* 3.8.7–8 so that he can return to see *patriae... dulce solum*. Daedalus in fact did go on to Italy according to the *Aeneid* (6.14–19), joining the collection of exiles in Italy noted above; the *Metamorphoses* records him only as far as Sicily (*Met.* 8.260), but the idea that Daedalus escapes ultimately to Italy adds to the resemblance to the exiled Ovid who would like to do the same.

The figure of Pythagoras in *Metamorphoses* 15 has sometimes been seen as a parallel for the poet himself.[20] Exile is one element which the sage and the poet share (*Met.* 15.60–2):

> *vir fuit hic ortu Samius: sed fugerat una*
> *et Samon et dominos odioque tyrannidis exul*
> *sponte erat.*
>
> There was a man of Samian origin: but he had fled both from Samos and from its rulers and was a voluntary exile because he hated tyranny.

It has been persuasively but briefly suggested that this intellectual in exile fleeing from tyrannical power could reflect Ovid's own exilic situation.[21] The suggestion becomes even more tempting when we remember that Pythagoras discourses in Ovid's poem at extraordinary length (*Met.* 15.75–478) about metamorphosis in a speech which has often been seen as an encapsulation of the whole poem and which is (anachronistically) addressed to and fully absorbed by a ruler of Rome (Numa, 15.479). Could this be a meditation of the exiled Ovid on the chances of his *Metamorphoses* and other poetry successfully reaching the ear of Augustus?

Thus in Ovid's *Metamorphoses* we see the theme of exile operating in several different ways. First, the poem clearly shows the influence of the *Aeneid* in the presentation of divinely-driven, ktistic and violent exiles. Second, it also demonstrates interest in the theme of repeated exile and its role in drawing together a narrative line, relating to a key issue in the poem of how to unify a vast and potentially dispersed congeries of

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[19] Collected by Sharrock (1994) 168–73, but see now also Gaertner (2005) on Ov. *Pont.* 1.2.97.

[20] See e.g. Hardie (1995) 212.

[21] Cf. Hardie (1995) 214.

material, and suggesting that exile itself is a form of the poem's central unifying topic of metamorphosis. Finally, the poem's inclusion of exiled intellectuals with thoughts of home or interest in lengthy discourse about metamorphosis points at least potentially to the poet's own exile in Tomis.

Lucan's epic faithfully reflects a key feature of the civil war between Caesar and Pompey—the fact that most of its crucial events took place outside Italy. Thus this civil war is largely fought out by two sides at least temporarily in exile: the action moves soon (by the end of book 2) from Italy to Gaul, Illyria, Greece and Egypt, even Troy, never returning to Rome or Italy in the incomplete text we have.[22] Some on the losing Pompeian side suffered exile in the long term too: C. Claudius Marcellus, allowed to return from Mytilene to Rome by Caesar's clemency in 46 BC,[23] was one of the lucky ones. This exilic aspect is part of the general presentation of a world out of joint: Romans are presented in a series of alien environments pursuing the negative project of the effective destruction of the Roman state. Exile here is in effect anti-ktistic, inverting the Vergilian master narrative of successful emigration and new foundation: Rome is unmade by geographical dispersal, not created by integrative settlement.

Exile is a clear debating topic between the sides in the opening book of Lucan's poem, where both use it to argue for their own position. At 1.277–9 Curio claims that the right is with him and the Caesarians since they have been forced out of Rome and are enduring exile willingly—only Caesar's victory will re-establish normality and the rule of law:

> *at postquam leges bello siluere coactae*
> *pellimur e patriis laribus patimurque volentes*
> *exilium: tua nos faciet victoria cives.*

> But after the laws have fallen silent because of the war, we are forced away from the Lares of our fathers and suffer exile voluntarily: your victory will make us citizens again.

This is wonderfully ironic in the circumstances, since Caesar is about to cross the Rubicon, thus both returning 'home' from Gallic 'exile' and himself contravening the laws. This willing exile is matched by the

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[22] Whether it did or not in the original plan can only be conjectured: for some views about the planned shape of the poem see Ahl (1976) 306–32.

[23] Cf. Cicero's *Pro Marcello* and the observations by Cohen and Fantham, pp. 120 ff. above and 182–4 below.

unwilling exile of Pompey and his supporters who abandon Rome and Italy as Caesar approaches. It has long been pointed out that Pompey's departure from Rome is a systematically perverted re-run of Aeneas' departure from Troy;[24] the Trojans flee to establish the firm future of Rome, whereas here Romans, Senate, magistrates and people, flee the city itself into the uncertainty of exile—cf. e.g. 1.488–92:

> ... *invisaque belli*
> *consulibus fugiens mandat decreta senatus.*
> *tum, quae tuta petant et quae metuenda relinquant*
> *incerti, quo quemque fugae tulit impetus urguent*
> *praecipitem populum* ...

> ... and the Senate fled and left to the consuls the hated declaration of war. Then uncertain which safe places they should seek or which dangerous places they should leave, wherever the thrust of the flight carried them, they tread the heels of the hastening people....

This flight into exile and civil war is summed up in a typically brilliant *sententia* (1.503–4): *sic urbe relicta / in bellum fugitur.*

Here as elsewhere the emotional colouring of exile is used to elicit sympathy for the Pompeian cause. Another example is the simile which compares Pompey to a defeated bull as he retreats to Brundisium and (ultimately) the sea (2.601–9):[25]

> *pulsus ut armentis primo certamine taurus*
> *silvarum secreta petit vacuosque per agros*
> *exul in adversis explorat cornua truncis*
> *nec redit in pastus, nisi cum cervice recepta*
> *excussi placuere tori, mox reddita victor*
> *quoslibet in saltus comitantibus agmina tauris*
> *invito pastore trahit, sic viribus inpar*
> *tradidit Hesperiam profugusque per Apula rura*
> *Brundisii tutas concessit Magnus in arces.*

> Just as a bull, driven out from his herd in his first battle, seeks the recesses of the forests and, as an exile in the deserted fields, tests his horns on the tree-trunks and does not return to the pastures until his neck has recovered and his muscles have grown strong, and soon leads the herd he has regained accompanied by the bulls to whichever glades he pleases, victorious, against the herdsman's will: so Pompey, inferior in strength,

[24] Cf. e.g. Fantham (1992) 8–9.

[25] For good comments on this simile and its symbolic aspects see Fantham (1992) 196–8.

> surrendered Italy and as a fugitive retreated through rural Apulia to the safe fortresses of Brundisium.

This simile seems to convey Pompey's hopes of *reculer pour mieux sauter*, hopes which are ironically not fulfilled (he will not return or achieve free movement ever again); Caesar is a more effective controlling *pastor* than the one in the simile, and Pompey's exile will be permanent. Even in death Pompey will not return to his homeland (cf. 8.837: *exul adhuc iacet umbra ducis*); indeed he will end up out of the world altogether (9.1–14). As he finally leaves Italy Pompey is again the new Aeneas, going into exile with sons, household gods and a band of followers (2.728–30):

> *cum coniuge pulsus*
> *et natis totosque trahens in bella penates*
> *vadis adhuc ingens populis comitantibus exul.*

> Driven out with your wife and your sons, taking with you the entire household into war, you [i.e. Pompey] go away, mighty still as an exile, accompanied by entire nations.

The notion that despite his best intentions he will never return is strongly played for emotional colour at the beginning of book 3, recalling the similar stress on exilic departure at the matching structural point of the *Aeneid* (3.4–5 and 11–12, see p. 130 above)—cf. 3.4–7:[26]

> *solus ab Hesperia non flexit lumina terra*
> *Magnus, dum patrios portus, dum litora numquam*
> *ad visus reditura suos tectumque cacumen*
> *nubibus et dubios cernit vanescere montis.*

> Magnus [i.e. Pompey] alone did not turn away his eyes from the Italian soil, while he saw grow dim and vanish before his eyes his native harbours, the coast he was never to see again, the hilltops covered with clouds and the mountains.

Once the Pompeians are out of Italy, ironies arise about political authority in exile. In the Senate-in-exile called in Epirus at 5.1–64,[27] the paradox of the position is exploited: the senators meet in a humble camp, not in the mighty Curia, and in northern Greece, not in Rome, "a foreign and a lowly place" (Braund's translation (1992): cf. 5.9–10: *peregrina ac sordida sedes / Romanos cepit proceres*). Lentulus, the presiding

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[26] Cf. the comments of Hunink (1992) 28 on the Vergilian models here (though he does not make the point about the matching third books).
[27] For discussion of the scene see Masters (1992) 93–106.

consul, tendentiously contrasts this (legitimate) Pompeian Senate with the (illegitimate) Senate of Caesarians at Rome (5.29–34):

*non umquam perdidit ordo*
*mutato sua iura solo. maerentia tecta*
*Caesar habet vacuasque domos legesque silentis*
*clausaque iustitio tristi fora; curia solos*
*illa videt patres plena quos urbe fugavit:*
*ordine de tanto quisquis non exulat hic est.*

Never has this order [sc. the Senate] lost its rights because of a change of place. Caesar controls the weeping houses and the empty homes [sc. of Rome] and the silenced laws and a forum closed in grim holiday. That Senate there only contains senators which the [true] Senate expelled when the city had not yet been deserted. Whoever has not been exiled from this great order [i.e. the true Senate] is here.

The last line formulates a typically brilliant paradox: the Caesarian Senate at Rome is 'in exile' because it gathers those who were disreputably expelled from Rome previously, whereas the Senate in Epirus is the 'real' Senate.[28]

Finally, the emotional power of exile is used to characterise Pompey in several different ways during and after the crisis of Pharsalus, especially in connection with his fatal decision to go East in defeat, consistently presented as a further and more alien stage in the exile from Rome which began with his departure from Italy. He himself holds out his own potential further exile in defeat as a motivation to fight in his speech to his troops (7.379: *Magnus, nisi vincitis, exul*), while the poet-narrator sympathises with the defeated Pompey as he sets off for Egypt on a second and more humiliating stage of his exile from Rome, suggesting paradoxically that victory would have been even worse (7.703–6):

*quidquid in ignotis solus regionibus exul,*
*quidquid sub Phario positus patiere tyranno,*
*crede deis, longo fatorum crede favori,*
*vincere peius erat.*

Whatever you will suffer alone as an exile in unknown countries, whatever you will suffer under an Egyptian tyrant, believe the gods, believe the favour of the fates that has lasted so long: victory would have been worse.

[28] The idea has a close precedent in Cicero's reflections on exile and legitimisation, cf. Cohen's observations on pp. 120 ff. above, especially p. 127.

This second exile will not only throw Pompey on the mercy of an eastern potentate; it will also feature lesser eastern potentates such as Deiotarus as companions (8.208–9: *terrarum dominos et sceptra Eoa tenentis / exul habet comites*). The transformation of circumstances from Pompey's departure from Italy at the end of book 2, accompanied by the Roman people, not by eastern kings (cf. 2.730: *vadis adhuc ingens populis comitantibus exul*—see above) is a striking index of his desperation and decline.

Thus the theme of exile is deployed to several literary purposes in Lucan's epic. Firstly, it is used to allude to and present differences from the positive ktistic plot of the *Aeneid*: Pompey leaves his homeland like Aeneas, but there is no founding mission and no happy issue of his journey—Rome is doomed like Troy and there is no resulting new city, only the destruction of the old one under future imperial tyranny. Secondly, the quasi-legal issue of who is in exile and who is not during a civil war graphically frames a situation in which the normal mechanisms of the state have broken down to produce a political and legal vacuum in which either of the two sides can make competing claims of legitimacy and hard treatment. Finally, the emotional power of exile is enlisted to present Pompey as a character: the two stages of his exile, leaving Rome and Italy and then heading for the East after Pharsalus, form a narrative of increasing humiliation and despair which elicits readerly sympathy.

Though much of the action of Silius Italicus' *Punica* takes place when one or other of the two protagonists (Hannibal and Scipio) is away from his native land and perhaps in exile in some sense, most of the firmer references to exile in fact encompass events outside the story-time of the poem, looking back to the literary and mythological antecedents of the poem's action or forward to consequences in the future.

The first pair of references to exile (like so much in Silius) looks back to the world of the *Aeneid*, once again underlying the treatment of exile in a post-Vergilian epic.[29] When Juno/Tanit stirs up Hannibal to fight the Romans at the beginning of the poem, she refers scornfully to the exile of Aeneas from Troy which founded the Roman state (1.42–4):

> *"intulerit Latio, spreta me Troius", inquit,*
> *"exul Dardaniam et, bis numina capta, penates*
> *sceptraque fundarit victor Lavinia Teucris…"*

[29] On the use of Vergil in Silius see von Albrecht (1964) 166–84, Feeney (1991) 301–12 and Hardie (1993).

"Against my will", she said, "the Trojan exile has brought to Latium Dardania and his household gods, deities that have been taken prisoners twice, and victorious he has founded a Lavinian kingdom for the Trojans…"

This verbal attack, adducing the shame of exilic beginnings, is neatly reversed at 1.444–6, where the Saguntian Daunus taunts Hannibal with his city's origin in the exile of Dido, contrasting this with the higher status of Saguntum:

*non haec Sidonia tecta*
*feminea fabricata manu pretiove parata,*
*exulibusve datum dimensis litus harenis.*

This is not a Sidonian city, built by the hand of a woman and bought for money, nor a shore with measured space of sand, given to exiles.[30]

In both cases the word *exul* has a derogatory quality and is deployed as an insult.

The eventual future exile of Hannibal after the events of the poem, wandering from Hellenistic court to court until his death in 183 BC, is twice anticipated in the poem, each time with similar negative colouring. The poet's intervention at the end of book 2 foretells this future exile, anticipated as a counterpoint to his high moment of victory in the capture of Saguntum (2.701–3):

*vagus exul in orbe*
*errabit toto patriis proiectus ab oris,*
*tergaque vertentem trepidans Carthago videbit.*

Homeless, as an exile he will wander over the whole world, expelled from his native land, and fearful Carthage will see him retreating.

This humiliation of Hannibal in exile beyond the poem is again foreshadowed at 13.883–5 in the prophecy of the Sibyl:

*pro! quanto levius mortalibus aegra subire*
*servitia atque hiemes aestusque fugamque fretumque*
*atque famem, quam posse mori!*

Ah! How much easier is it for mortals to suffer bitter slavery and cold and heat and exile and the dangers of the sea and hunger than to die!

In both cases the exile of Hannibal is emphasised by its positioning as the climax of a major prophetic scene. The poem's insistence on the

[30] Translation by Duff (1927), modified.

ultimate exile of Hannibal after its own events stresses that he is indeed punished in the long term for his villainy in attacking Rome, even if he is not killed at Zama.

In book 10 we see exile again as disreputable, this time as part of a cowardly plan by Metellus and a band of conspirators to beat a tactical retreat over the sea after the disaster of Cannae (10.418–21):

> *trans aequor Tyrios enses atque arma parabant*
> *Punica et Hannibalem mutato evadere caelo.*
> *dux erat exilio non laetus Marte Metellus,*
> *sed stirpe haud parvi cognominis.*

> They were preparing to evade Tyrian swords and Punic arms and Hannibal by changing the sky they gazed upon across the sea. The leader in this exile was Metellus, not successful in war, but of a family of great name.

This is an expression of moral disapproval for the plan to abandon Italy: such deliberate self-exile is clearly the last refuge of the coward, and Scipio intervenes dramatically to suppress the conspiracy of Metellus (10.426–48).

Exile can also be used to gain sympathy in the poem, when seen from the point of view of the exile him/herself rather than as a derogatory label. At 3.567–9, in a scene which reworks *Aeneid* 10.51–62,[31] Venus uses the exile of Aeneas and the Trojans as an argument to Jupiter for favouring their Roman descendants:

> *parumne est*
> *exilia errantis totum quaesisse per orbem?*
> *anne iterum capta repetentur Pergama Roma?*

> Is it not enough that we have wandered over the entire earth in search for a place of exile? Or shall we return to Pergama again once Rome has been taken?

Jupiter then reassures her with a prophecy of Roman victory which stretches well beyond the end of the Punic wars to the exploits of the Flavian dynasty (3.570–629). Another complaint by a female character using the emotional weight of exile to generate sympathy is that of the sea-nymph Cymodoce, who suggests rhetorically to Proteus in book 7 that the success of Hannibal means that she and her sisters will be obliged to leave the shores of Italy and go into exile in Africa (7.433–4):

[31] See Spaltenstein (1986) 247.

*patria num sede fugatae*
*Atlantem et Calpen extrema habitabimus antra?*

Will we be driven from our native place and inhabit the most remote caves of Atlas and Calpe?

There is a neat irony here, as it is Hannibal (as we have seen) who will ultimately go into exile *from* Africa, not the nymphs *to* Africa, and Proteus then confirms the vanity of Cymodoce's fears by prophesying the victory of Scipio in the current Second Punic War and that of his grandson in the future Third (7.487–93). As in book 3, the momentary pathos of exile as a protest against potential loss of divine favour for Rome is answered by a comfortingly glorious prophecy of eventual Roman success.

Sympathy is generated likewise by the idea of exile in the case of the virtuous Capuan Decius, who vainly opposed the submission of his city to Hannibal in book 11 (155–258) and was sent off in chains to Carthage by Hannibal to await future cruel punishment.[32] The poem presents him as unjustly exiled in the mind of his fellow-citizens as their city is captured by Rome (13.279–81):

*nec vulgum cessat furiare dolorque pavorque.*
*nunc menti Decius serae redit et bona virtus*
*exilio punita truci.*

Nor do grief and fear cease to make the crowd rage. Now, too late, Decius and his great virtue, punished by harsh exile, come to their mind.

The sympathy for his exile here is linked with their regret at not heeding his views in book 11, which would have prevented the sack of their city by Rome. Decius can perhaps be seen as the counterweight to Metellus in book 10: the dishonourable Metellus urges exile from Italy as a cowardly exit after Hannibal's triumph at Cannae, while Decius' unjust exile after Hannibal's occupation of Capua is a mark of his virtue. A similar positive use of exile in the presentation of a Roman hero is to be found in the apostrophe by Fabius Cunctator of the great Camillus and his return from exile to defeat the Gauls in 390 BC and celebrate a triumph in the city which had so recently expelled him (7.557–9):

*quantus qualisque fuisti,*
*cum pulsus lare et extorris Capitolia curru*

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[32] However, Silius narrates, his ship was diverted to Cyrene and he avoided torture in Carthage: 11.377–80.

> *intrares exul, tibi corpora caesa, Camille,*
> *damnata quot sunt dextra!*
>
> How great and what a man you were, Camillus, when you—expelled from your home and banished, an exile—entered the Capitol in a chariot, how many bodies were slain by your right hand that had been punished [sc. with exile]!

The point here is that Camillus was too noble to hold a grudge against Rome for his exile and willingly returned to save his country.

Thus the main deployment of the theme of exile in the poem seems to be to use the idea's emotional weight to carry ideological disapproval or approval and sympathy. On the one hand, it is emphatically deployed as an insult in verbal attack and negative comment, and as the anticipated and just punishment for the villainous Hannibal for his war against Rome. On the other hand, we find the emotionally sympathetic power of exile deployed to good effect in scenes of momentary doubt about the eventual outcome of the war, and in presentations of Roman and Italian heroes as noble exiles. The theme of exile belongs mainly to events in the past or future: only the inglorious proposed exile of Metellus and the unjust exile of Decius present exile as a contemporary event in the Second Punic War, which stresses its symbolic and ideological function.

The voyage of the Argo is a mythological plot-line which involves the temporary exile of the main hero and his companions and results in the permanent exile of the heroine. By contrast with the *Aeneid*, we here have an epic voyage which moves from West to East rather than East to West, and which is avowedly a temporary absence from Greece rather than a foundational journey into exile. In Valerius Flaccus' version in the *Argonautica*, the theme of exile is largely prominent in the treatment of Medea, though it is not forgotten that Jason and the Argonauts are exiles of a kind. This is stressed once in a disparaging and tendentious reference by the tyrant Aeetes, presenting them as the scourings of Greece rather than as the impressive list of heroes they actually are (7.43–5):

> *quinquaginta Asiam (pudet heu) penetrarit Iason*
> *exulibus meque ante alios sic spreverit una,*
> *una ratis, spolium ut vivo de rege reportet?*
>
> Shall Jason make his way through Asia with fifty exiles (what a shame!) and shall one, one!, boat treat me before others with so little respect as to carry away spoils from a living king?

The model of the exile Phrixus, Jason's relative who fled from Greece to Colchis and stayed there to marry Aeetes' other daughter, is also a strong underlying presence in the poem from its very beginning.[33] The devious tyrant Pelias claims at 1.41–50 (clearly falsely)[34] that Phrixus' ghost appeared to him demanding vengeance for his murder by Aeetes, thus suggesting a moral motive for the expedition, which he urges upon his nephew Jason as a punitive one to avenge Phrixus' death. However, it is clear that Phrixus was in fact well received by Aeetes, married his daughter Chalciope, and died a natural death (5.224–5,233–5). In a vision which clearly matches that of Pelias in book 1 and links the two tyrants as characters, Phrixus' ghost even appears to Aeetes in Colchis to give a helpful warning that he must be careful to guard both the Golden Fleece and Medea (5.233–40), an important moment in the plot which looks forward to the battles with the Argonauts in book 6:

*<o> qui patria tellure fugatum*
*quaerentemque domos his me considere passus*
*sedibus, oblata generum mox prole petisti,*
*tunc tibi regnorum labes luctusque supersunt,*
*rapta soporato fuerint cum vellera luco.*
*praeterea infernae quae nunc sacrata Dianae*
*fert castos Medea choros, quemcumque procorum*
*pacta petat, maneat regnis ne virgo paternis.*

Oh you, who have allowed me to settle in these places when I had been exiled from my native land and was looking for a home, who soon offered his offspring to me as bride and sought me as his son-in-law: the ruins of your kingdom and weeping will be left to you once the Golden Fleece has been taken from the sleep-drugged grove. Moreover Medea, who is now sacred to Diana of the underworld and leads chaste choruses, must be betrothed to any one of her suitors in order that she may not remain a virgin in the kingdom of her father.

Phrixus' own career (here as often in the poem) is clearly suggested as a point of comparison and contrast for that of Jason:[35] where Aeetes had received the older Thessalian princely exile and given him his daughter, presumably in order to secure the Golden Fleece, the younger Thessalian prince is only a temporary exile, out to take both the Fleece and the other daughter back to Greece, and does not deserve the friendly

[33] On Phrixus in the poem see now Manuwald (2006).
[34] Cf. Wijsman (1996) 129.
[35] See Zissos (2004) 73.

reception given his older relative. It is ironic of course that this point is made by Phrixus himself.

The role of Medea as exile, as already suggested, forms a key focus of interest in the poem, which tells how she was induced to leave her homeland for love. Even before the Argonauts reach Colchis, we find the song of Orpheus on the theme of the story of Io, clearly suggestive of the future career of Medea (4.348–421).[36] The brief summary prefixed to the song makes the point clear (4.349–51):

> *refert casusque locorum*
> *Inachidosque vias pelagusque emensa iuvencae*
> *exilia…*

> He [i.e. Orpheus] tells the history of these places, the wanderings of Inachus' daughter, and the exiles of the heifer that wandered so far across the sea…

The eastward wandering of the princess Io across the sea (picked up from Ovid's *Metamorphoses*—see p. 135 above) prefigures the similar and impending westward voyage of Medea, likewise forced to leave her homeland because of erotic involvement. Both are headed for permanent exile, Io in Egypt (4.407–21), Medea in various cities of Greece. This parallel with Io is raised again in the scene in book 7 where Aeetes renegues on his agreement to hand over the Golden Fleece, Jason departs in anger and Medea is left forlorn (7.26–152). There the hapless Medea is compared to Io at the edge of the sea (7.111–15):

> *qualis ubi extremas Io vaga sentit harenas*
> *fertque refertque pedem, tumido quam cogit Erinys*
> *ire mari Phariaeque vocant trans aequora matres,*
> *circuit haud aliter foribusque impendet apertis*
> *an melior Minyas revocet pater…*

> Just as wandering Io felt the sandy shore and put forth her foot and put it back again, Io, whom the Fury forced to go on to the swelling sea and whom the Egyptian mothers called across the sea: just so she [i.e. Medea] moves around and clings to the open doors, waiting to see whether her father might recall the Minyae in a better mood…

The explicit point of comparison is her hesitation, waiting to see if her father will change his mind, matching that of the bovine Io as she holds back from the water she will have to cross, but it seems clear that the link already made in Orpheus' song between Io's future exile and travel and

[36] See Aricò (1998).

those of Medea is invoked here;[37] Aeetes' refusal of the Fleece means that Medea will need to betray her family and go into exile to achieve union with Jason.

This is reinforced in the same scene when Medea enquires of her sister (7.119–20) about her brother-in-law Phrixus and his arrival from Greece (matching Jason's coming), and that of her aunt Circe and her exit from Colchis in a chariot drawn by winged serpents (matching her own wish for departure).[38] The allusion to Circe also marks out Medea's future career as a repeated exile: the snake chariot of 7.120 surely also recalls that in which Medea escapes the final carnage of her tragic Corinthian exile in Seneca's *Medea* (1023–4: *squamosa gemini colla serpentes iugo / summissa praebent*), moving to a further and equally destructive exile in Athens.[39] This picks up the Ovidian presentation in the *Metamorphoses* of Medea as a serial exile which was noted earlier (see p. 136 above), but also looks forward to the ruthless aspect of Medea's character. This is likely to have been shown in her killing of her brother Apsyrtus in Valerius' poem,[40] though our extant text ends before that point in the narrative, and Medea's murderous future career in Corinth is explicitly anticipated in the paintings in the Temple of the Sun at 5.442–51 and in the prophecy of Mopsus at 1.225–6.[41]

Exile is naturally central to the plot of Statius' *Thebaid*, with its story of fratricidal division between the two brother kings Eteocles and Polynices, the exile of Polynices for a year by the rule of the lot, and his return from exile to claim his share of rule, heading the Seven against Thebes in the disastrous attack on his home city. Exile is of course in the family, for these are the sons of Oedipus, who as this version of the Theban story opens is still in the royal palace at Thebes (along with a living Jocasta), but who will at its end set out on his own career as an exile at the command of his brother-in-law Creon (see the scene at 11.665–756, esp. 11.730: *exul erit*). In both cases the disturbance of normal family bonds and living arrangements is an index of the moral dysfunction of the ruling household of Thebes, the central theme of

[37] Cf. Perutelli (1997) 221.
[38] Cf. Perutelli (1997) 226.
[39] For other allusions to Seneca's *Medea* (but not this one) in Valerius see Grewe (1998).
[40] Cf. Hershkowitz (1998) 15–16; for further views on the possible endings of the poem see Nesselrath (1998).
[41] Cf. Adamietz (1976) 76.

the poem. Exile, indeed, goes back further in the Theban royal house: we are twice reminded in the opening book that Thebes was founded by Cadmus, exiled from his homeland of Tyre (1.153–4: *Tyrii… / exulis*; cf. also 1.178–85), a story famously narrated at the opening of the third book of Ovid's *Metamorphoses* (see p. 135 above). The suggestion is that the Theban royal house is tainted from the start, by the disgrace of exile as well as by the ancestral fratricide of the Spartoi, both to be renewed in the generation of the sons of Oedipus (cf. 1.184–5).[42] Exile thus leads to catastrophe for Thebes: as in Lucan, this deployment of exile in the context of disastrous internecine strife and the effective destruction of a city constitutes a neat reversal of exile as the means of the foundation of Rome in the *Aeneid* and the larger tradition of ktistic epic (see p. 129 above).

The role of exile as a key indicator of the dysfunctional relationship between the two brothers is most forcefully put by the virtuous and doomed seer Maeon in his attack on Eteocles at 3.71–4:

> *bellum infandum ominibusque negatam*
> *movisti, funeste, aciem, dum pellere leges*
> *et consanguineo gliscis regnare superbus*
> *exule.*
>
> Deadly one! You have initiated an accursed war and stirred forth an army forbidden by the omens, while you desire to drive away the laws and rule yourself in pride, while he who shares your blood is in exile.

Here the word *exule* is both postponed to the end of its clause and isolated by enjambment to achieve maximum emphasis and contrast with *consanguineo*: allowing blood relatives (let alone brothers) to remain in exile as a result of unjust retention of power is clearly presented as especially morally repugnant. Here as elsewhere (cf. 1.312, 4.77) Polynices, the central exile of the poem, is referred to simply as *exul*, a word which occurs with unusual frequency in the poem, almost always in reference to him.[43] This is especially useful in the description of the final duel between the two brothers, where the shorthand *exul* allows a swift narrative pace to be maintained while switching the focus from Eteocles to Polynices (cf. 11.503,516,540).

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[42] Note that Polynices himself can be called *Tyrius… exul* (3.406), thus stressing the continuity between himself and Cadmus.

[43] 32 times; contrast no occurrences in the *Aeneid*, nine in Ovid's *Metamorphoses*, 14 in Lucan, one in Valerius Flaccus, and five in Silius Italicus.

The pitiful nature of exile from a more sympathetic viewpoint is also much exploited (as in Silius' *Punica*, see pp. 144–5 above).[44] This comes out above all in the repeated scenes where supporters of Polynices present his case as unjust and pathetic and use it in contexts of rhetorical suasion. At 3.696–8 his wife Argia pleads with her father Adrastus to aid Polynices:

> *da bella, pater, generique iacentis*
> *aspice res humiles, atque hanc, pater, aspice prolem*
> *exulis; huic olim generis pudor.*

> Grant war, my father, and consider the humble plight of your wretched son-in-law, and consider, my father, this offspring here of an exile; one day it will suffer the shame of its descent.

The prospect that her son and her father's grandson will have the shameful status of the child of an exile clearly carries considerable emotional weight.[45] Likewise, Antigone in book 11 tries desperately to avert the final duel between her brothers while similarly stressing her own personal appreciation of Polynices' exiled sufferings (11.377–9):

> *tu mihi fortis adhuc, mihi, quae tua nocte dieque*
> *exilia erroresque fleo iam iamque tumentem*
> *placavi tibi saepe patrem?*

> Are you still stubborn to me, who wept over your exile and wanderings day and night and again and again appeased your father when he grew angry against you?

The emotional value of exile can be deployed as a flexible rhetorical argument in the poem. Polynices' mother Jocasta, addressing her son with his Argive army assembled outside Thebes in an attempt to make him negotiate with his brother, ironically evokes the pathos of his exile with which he has persuaded his allies to help him (7.500–1):[46]

> *tune ille exilio vagus et miserabilis hospes?*
> *quem non permoveas?*

> Are you that wanderer in exile, that miserable guest? Whose heart would you not move?

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[44] On the emotional power of the word *exul* in the *Thebaid* see Dewar (1991) 68.

[45] Snijder (1968) 260 aptly compares Verg. *A.* 10.851–2, where Mezentius claims that the shame of his exile has injured the reputation of his son Lausus.

[46] As Smolenaars (1994) 231 notes, *exilio vagus* picks up the earlier description of Polynices as *vagus exul* at 1.312.

Similarly rhetorical is the evocation of Polynices' exile by his closest friend and ally, Tydeus, earlier in the poem. Sent as ambassador to Thebes, Tydeus invokes the misery of Polynices' exile in attempting to persuade Eteocles to give up the throne after his year according to the brothers' agreement, perhaps unwisely stressing that Eteocles is due to enjoy the same discomfort (2.400–5):

*astriferum iam velox circulus orbem*
*torsit et amissae redierunt montibus umbrae,*
*ex quo frater inops ignota per oppida tristes*
*exul agit casus; et te iam tempus aperto*
*sub Iove ferre dies terrenaque frigora membris*
*ducere et externos summissum ambire penates.*

The fast circle has already turned the star-bearing orbit and the lost shadows have returned to the mountains since your poor brother has led the sad life of an exile in foreign cities, and the time has come for you to spend days under the open sky and to suffer the earth's cold with your body and to seek support submissively at foreign homes.

The graphic evocation of exile here is inevitably counterproductive, matching the summary with which Tydeus' speech is introduced, "hard but fair" (2.392: *iustis miscens ... aspera*).

Tydeus himself is of course an exile from his home city of Calydon, as we are told at his first appearance at 1.401–4:

*ecce autem antiquam fato Calydona relinquens*
*Olenius Tydeus (fraterni sanguinis illum*
*conscius horror agit) eadem sub nocte sopora*
*lustra terit...*

There however Olenian Tydeus, leaving behind ancient Calydon because of fate—horrible guilt of fratricide drives him—wears out the same long periods under the sleepy night...

This exile and the (accidental) fratricide which caused it[47] are clearly elements which pair Tydeus with the already exiled and eventual fratricide Polynices, an affinity which is augmented by their marriages to the two sister Argive princesses in book 2. Polynices recognises this emotional bond of exile early on, referring to the two of them as *exulibus...patriaque fugatis* (2.190), and it is raised with especial emotional power in the scene where Polynices laments over the dead Tydeus at 9.49–53:

[47] For the details of the story see Heuvel (1932) 200.

*hasne tibi, armorum spes o suprema meorum,*
*Oenide, grates, haec praemia digna rependi,*
*funus ut invisa Cadmi tellure iaceres*
*sospite me? nunc exul ego aeternumque fugatus,*
*quando alius misero ac melior mihi frater ademptus.*

Oenides, last hope of my arms! Is this my gratitude, is this the due reward that you lie here, dead, in the hated land of Cadmus, while I am still alive? Now I am for ever an exile and a fugitive, since, wretched me, I have lost another brother and a better one.

Polynices' exile is now truly miserable without the companionship of Tydeus, sharer of his fortunes in exile and war, and a truer brother than the evil Eteocles.[48]

A final exilic figure in the poem outside the central plot is the Lemnian princess Hypsipyle, encountered by the Argive army en route to Thebes as the ineffective nursemaid to the hapless Nemean prince Opheltes. Her story is famously told at great length in book 5 (28–498), rounding off with her description as *exul / Lemnias* (5.499–500). Scholars generally agree that the evident points of contact between this Lemnian episode and the shorter Lemnian episode in Valerius Flaccus (2.82–427) suggest that Statius knew and wrote after Valerius.[49] If this is so, there is a further, metaphorical sense in which Hypsipyle is an exile: she is in exile from another mythological story, that of the Argonauts, and if the common relative dating and direction of intertextuality is accepted, she could even be said to be 'in exile' through her literary displacement from another contemporary poem.

As suggested initially, this rapid survey of the use of the theme of exile in six major Latin epics aims to show how each poem uses this element for its own particular purposes as well as demonstrating that such a dramatic idea has a natural place in the most elevated of literary genres. The ktistic aspect of exile so central to the *Aeneid* unsurprisingly underlies most of the later uses of the theme: though Ovid's *Metamorphoses* makes much of the links between exile and physical transformation and perhaps hints at Ovid's own exile, it also clearly follows several strands of ktistic exile story, while both Lucan and Statius' *Thebaid* present exile as an indicator of national catastrophe, plainly inverting the foundational role of exile in the *Aeneid*.[50] Silius deploys exile for ideological and emotional

[48] See the sympathetic analysis of this scene at Dewar (1991) 67–8.
[49] See the views collected by Aricò (1991) and Hershkowitz (1998) 66.
[50] Apart from the tradition of ktistic exile in Greek and Latin epic, Cicero's use of

weight, while still referring back to Vergilian antecedents, and Valerius Flaccus provides an interesting variation in the temporary exile of the Argonaut expedition, avoiding any ktistic reference, the permanent exile of Medea herself, and the metaphorical 'exile' of Hypsipyle from another epic story. Though the different poems make varied use of the motif outside their responses to the Vergilian national or foundational exile, the emotional power of the theme of exile is continually evident, and the traumatic concept of radical displacement and its consequent moral colouring are constantly deployed to elicit both sympathy and indignation from a Roman readership. Thus the theme of exile contributes much to the grand passions and grand moralising of Latin epic as well as constituting a key element in its grand master plots.*

exile to describe the political situation during and after the Civil War, too, may have exerted an influence, cf. Cohen's remarks on Cicero, pp. 120 ff., above, especially p. 127.

* I am grateful to Gesine Manuwald for many helpful comments on a previous draft.

CHAPTER EIGHT

# OVID AND THE 'POETICS OF EXILE': HOW EXILIC IS OVID'S EXILE POETRY?

Jan Felix Gaertner

Of the many ancient exiles and writers on exile, Ovid is clearly the most prominent figure: not only have his exilic works influenced later Latin writers on exile from Seneca to Boethius,[1] but his poetry and his persona have also been a central point of reference for medieval and modern imaginings of exile.[2] Banished in AD 8 for the loose morality of his *Ars Amatoria* and for some obscure *error* which, according to the poet himself, personally offended the emperor,[3] Ovid spent the rest of his life in Tomis (today's Constanța, Rumania), on the shore of the Black Sea. Largely, but maybe not entirely,[4] abandoning other poetic endeavours, Ovid chose his banishment as subject for his last three works of poetry: the *Ibis,* a venomous attack on an unnamed enemy, and the *Tristia* and the *Epistulae ex Ponto*, two collections of literary epistles centred around the experience of the poet's exile.

There has been a long tradition of viewing Ovid's exile poetry as fundamentally different from his earlier works. Ultimately, this idea goes

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[1] Cf. Innocenti Pierini (1980), Fantham p. 191 n. 61 (in this volume) on Seneca, and Claassen (1999a) 248 on Boethius. Cf. also Bouquet (1982), Fo (1989), and Tissol (2002) on echoes of Ovid's exile poetry in Dracontius and Rutilius Namatianus, and p. 19 above on Ovidian reminiscences in Stat. *Silv.* 3.3.154–64.

[2] On the medieval reception of Ovid's exile poetry see Hexter (1986) 83 ff., and pp. 209 ff. in this volume; for a survey of some of the modern reception see Froesch (1976) 131–44, Hexter (1986) 83 n. 2 and p. 210 n. 4 in this volume, as well as Claassen (1999a) 252 ff.; von Albrecht (1971) discusses Pushkin's and Grillparzer's responses to Ovid's exile, Willige (1969) an echo in Goethe's *Italienische Reise*, Condee (1958) Milton's reception of Ovid's exile poetry.

[3] Cf. *Tr.* 2.207: *carmen et error*, Syme's detailed discussion ((1978) 215 ff.), and Hexter pp. 212–14 below; the many, often fairly fanciful conjectures on the nature of Ovid's *error* have been gathered by Thibault (1964) 125–9 and Verdière (1992).

[4] Parts of the *Metamorphoses* and the *Fasti* may have been rewritten by Ovid in Tomis, and *Heroides* 16–21 may have been entirely composed during the poet's exile: cf. Ov. *Tr.* 1.7.33–40, Bömer (1969–86) vol. 1, pp. 488–9 (with further literature), and Harrison p. 135 n. 15 above on the *Metamorphoses*, Bömer (1957–8) vol. 1, pp. 18–19, Gesztelyi (1974/5), Syme (1978) 21 ff., Fantham (1998) 3 on the *Fasti*, and Tracy (1971), Kenney (1996) 25–6, and p. 161 n. 37 below on the *Heroides.*

right back to the author himself, who claims again and again that his relegation to Tomis on the Black Sea has destroyed his former poetic genius.[5] Though harsh statements like that of Hosius ((1935) 248–9), in whose eyes the pitiful thing about the exile poetry was the poetic form rather than the plight of the poet, have become rare, Ovid's situation in exile is still seen as the main reason for differences in style and content between his exilic and his non-exilic poetry: Doblhofer ((1978), (1980)) has interpreted Ovid's exile poetry along the lines of "Verzweiflung" and "Selbstbehauptung", explaining e.g. the motif of continuous weeping and Ovid's puns in the *Tristia* and the *Epistulae ex Ponto* as outpourings of his soul and attempts at self-consolation; similarly, Claassen (1999b,c) has argued for a systematic and deliberate un-punning of elegiac terms from Ovid's earlier poetry; González Vázquez ((1987), (1997), (1998) 110, 116) has seen redundant expressions and typical features of Norden's 'Neuer Stil' in Ovid's exile poetry as results of the poet's fear of being forgotten in Rome and of his tendency towards psychological "interiorisación"; Videau-Delibes (1991) has developed a "poétique de la rupture" which negates *ars* and has as its sole objective the communication of personal suffering,[6] and Malaspina ((1995) 141) has proposed that such a rhetoric has made Ovid adopt a more prosaic and colloquial, even negligent style.[7] Such interpretations turn Ovid's exile into a *condicio sine qua aliter* for the form and content of Ovid's *Tristia*, *Ibis*, and *Epistulae ex Ponto*, i.e. they suggest that Ovid's banishment not only prompted the author to choose his own life in exile as subject for his poetry, but also fundamentally changed his way of writing. But are Ovid's *Tristia, Ibis*, and *Epistulae ex Ponto* really so fundamentally different from the poet's earlier works?[8]

I shall begin by taking a closer look at the themes and motifs of Ovid's exile poetry.[9] Many of the typical features of *Tristia* and *Epistulae ex*

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[5] Cf. e.g. *Tr.* 1.1.45–8, 3.14.33, 5.12.21–2, *Pont.* 1.5.3–8, 3.4.11, 4.2.15, 4.8.65–6.

[6] Cf. Videau-Delibes (1991) 506: "absence d'inspiration et absence d'art, inaptitude à la célébration ou impossibilité de la mettre en oeuvre, incapacité à plaire à un public choisi vu l'imperfection du poème et refus de la gloire conviennent à la situation de l'exil comme lui conviennent aussi la tristesse et l'imperfection de la *materia* et de l'*elocutio*".

[7] Cf. also Bernhardt (1986), who has interpreted the catalogues in Ovid's exile poetry as a means to ward off the threat of losing the mother tongue (see the criticism of Chwalek (1996) 131–2 and Gaertner (2001a) 298 on the literary tradition).

[8] Cf. Holzberg (1997) 200: "Die Grundfrage, die sich allen Erklärern der Exilelegien Ovids stellt, ist die nach dem Grad des Einflusses, den die besondere Schreibsituation auf Form und Gehalt dieser Dichtung ausübt".

[9] As the scholarly debate on the 'exilic' qualities of Ovid's exile poetry has been

*Ponto* have close precedents in earlier literature on exile and therefore cannot simply be attributed to the condition of exile, but may rather be a reworking of a literary tradition on exile before Ovid. The elegy *Pont.* 1.3 reveals that Ovid was well acquainted with the tradition of consolatory treatises on exile,[10] and this very tradition offers precedents not only for Ovid's stereotypical descriptions of his surroundings in Tomis,[11] but also for the repeated comparisons between the poet's plight and the wanderings of mythical characters such as Odysseus and Aeneas and the exile of historical persons such as Themistocles or Aristides.[12] Ovid's imitation of the Theognidean version of the myth of the end of the Bronze Age in *Pont.* 1.6.29–30[13] suggests that his frequent claim to

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centred around the *Tristia* and the *Epistulae ex Ponto*, I, too, shall concentrate on these two works.

[10] Cf. the detailed analysis by Wilhelm (1926), as well as Kassel (1958) 5 n. 6, Davisson (1983), Alvar Ezquerra (2001), and Gaertner (2005) ad loc. For Ovid's use of such material in his earlier works see Pohlenz (1913) 20 n. 3 (*contra* Prinz (1914) 61); on the wide dissemination of such treatises in antiquity see Kassel (1958) *passim* and Pohlenz (1916) 557.

[11] As Wilhelm (1926) 161 has seen, Ovid's description of Tomis as barren and barbarian (cf. e.g. Ov. *Tr.* 3.9.2, 5.7.45, *Pont.* 1.3.48) not only takes up clichés about the cold, inhospitable Scythia (on these stereotypes see Ehlers (1988) 149, Helzle (1988b) 73, Williams (1994) 3 ff., Claassen (1999a) 190 ff.), but also reformulates a typical complaint of exiles refuted in the consolatory treatises Περὶ φυγῆς: cf. Muson. p. 41.6 (Hense): [sc. φυγή] ὕδατος μὲν καὶ γῆς καὶ ἀέρος, ἔτι δὲ ἡλίου καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἄστρων οὐκ ἀπείργει ἡμᾶς οὐδαμῶς, ἀλλ' οὐδὲ ἀνθρώπων ὁμιλίας, ἁπανταχοῦ γὰρ καὶ πάντῃ τούτων μετουσία ἐστίν, Sen. *Helv.* 9.1: *at non est haec terra frugiferarum aut laetarum arborum ferax; non magnis nec navigabilibus fluminum alveis inrigatur; nihil gignit quod aliae gentes petant, vix ad tutelam incolentium fertilis; non pretiosus hic lapis caeditur, non auri argentique venae eruuntur* (partly influenced by Ovid's description of Tomis, cf. Innocenti Pierini (1980) 122–6), Plut. *De Exil.* 602C: αἱρήσεται καὶ νῆσον οἰκεῖν φυγὰς γενόμενος Γύαρον ἢ Κίναρον (*TrGF* Adesp. 393 Kannicht/Snell = Com. Adesp. 1238 Kock (deest in Kassel/Austin))· "σκληρὰν ἄκαρπον καὶ φυτεύεσθαι κακήν".

[12] Ovid's list of exemplary exiles in *Pont.* 1.3.63–80 (Rutilius, Diogenes of Sinope, Themistocles, Aristides, Patroclus, Jason, Cadmus, Tydeus, Teucer) shares many items with the treatises Περὶ φυγῆς by Teles (Themistocles, Cadmus), Musonius (Diogenes of Sinope, Themistocles, Aristides), Plutarch (Diogenes of Sinope, Themistocles), and Favorinus (Diogenes of Sinope, Themistocles, Aristides, Jason, Cadmus, Tydeus, Teucer); moreover, the frequent, often implicit, references to Odysseus as an exile or wanderer (cf. Holzberg (1997) 183 ff.) have a precedent in Cic. *Leg.* 2.3 and *De Orat.* 1.196: *ac si nos, id quod maxime debet, nostra patria delectat, cuius rei tanta est vis ac tanta natura, ut Ithacam illam in asperrimis saxulis tamquam nidulum adfixam sapientissimus vir immortalitati anteponeret, quo amore tandem inflammati esse debemus*... Even the refutation and inversion of consolatory motifs in *Pont.* 1.3 is anticipated by Cicero: cf. Claassen (1999a) 84 on Cic. *Att.* 3.15. For further affinities between Ovid and Cicero cf. Herescu (1960) 9 (on *desiderium urbis* in Cicero and Ovid), Fuchs (1969) (on Cicero and Ov. *Tr.* 4.10.115–22), Nagle (1980) 33–5, Innocenti Pierini (1998), Citroni Marchetti (2000) *passim*.

[13] Cf. *Pont.* 1.6.29–30: *haec dea, cum fugerent sceleratas numina terras, / in dis invisa sola remansit humo* and Thgn. 1135–6: Ἐλπὶς ἐν ἀνθρώποισι μόνη θεὸς ἐσθλὴ ἔνεστιν, / ἄλλοι δ' Οὔλυμπόν δ' ἐκπρολιπόντες ἔβαν (on the myth see Gatz (1967) 50–1).

have been deserted by most of his former friends[14] may at least in part be a reworking of similar sentiments that can be found in the *Theognidea*, cf. Thgn. 209–10 (~ 332a–b):

οὐδείς τοι φεύγοντι φίλος καὶ πιστὸς ἑταῖρος·
τῆς δὲ φυγῆς ἐστιν τοῦτ' ἀνιηρότερον·[15]

A man in exile has no friend and no trusty comrade, and this is more painful than actual exile.[16]

Likewise, the prominent imagery of 'shipwreck' (cf. e.g. *Tr.* 1.5.17, *Pont.* 1.2.60, 1.5.39–42) may go back to Alcaeus fr. 73.3–6 (Campbell), where the poet from Lesbos, too, seems to compare his plight in exile[17] with a ship in stormy weather,[18] and the motif of the exile's mental journey to his faraway home (cf. e.g. Ov. *Tr.* 3.4.55 ff., 3.8.1 ff., *Pont.* 1.2.47–50, 1.8.31 ff.) has a close parallel already in a simile in Apollonius' *Argonautica* (2.541–7):

ὡς δ' ὅτε τις πάτρηθεν ἀλώμενος, οἷά τε πολλά
πλαζόμεθ' ἄνθρωποι τετληότες <ἄλλοτε ἄλλῃ>, [οὐδέ τις αἶα
τηλουρός, πᾶσαι δὲ κατόψιοί εἰσι κέλευθοι,]
σφωιτέρους δ' ἐνόησε δόμους, ἄμυδις δὲ κέλευθον
[ὑγρή τε τραφερή τ' ἰνδάλλεται ἄλλοτε ἄλλῃ]
ὀξέα πορφύρων ἐπιμαίεται ὀφθαλμοῖσιν·
ὣς ἄρα καρπαλίμως κούρη Διὸς ἀίξασα...[19]

Just as when someone wanders around far from his native land (as we men often wander, now this way, now that, and endure it) and sees in his mind

[14] Cf. e.g. *Tr.* 1.5.64, 1.9.65, 5.6.46, 5.7.41, *Pont.* 1.3.49, 1.9.15–16, 3.2.15–16.

[15] On the influence of the *Theognidea* on Ovid's exile poetry see Citroni Marchetti (2000) 111–39, 158, 334. The motif of desertion is also found in Euripides' *Phoenissae*, cf. Eur. *Phoen.* 403: τὰ φίλων δ' οὐδέν, ἤν τις δυστυχῇ (cf. Fantham (p. 175 n. 8 in this volume) on the influence of Euripides' *Phoenissae* on consolatory treatises on exile and see Nesseltrath p. 97 on Plutarch's response to the Euripidean line).

The importance of the literary tradition on the theme of 'desertion in exile' is accentuated by the fact that Ovid's claim to have been deserted by his friends is incompatible with passages where he refers to letters that his friends sent to him: cf. e.g. *Pont.* 1.3.3–8, 1.9.1, 2.8.1–2. (Claassen (1999a) 129: "[sc. Ovid] remains surrounded by a virtual zone of silence" overstates.)

[16] Translation by Bowie, cf. p. 44 above.

[17] This is suggested by fr. 73.8 where Lobel has convincingly argued for reading νόστου λελάθων in place of τούτων λελάθων, cf. Page (1955) 190, Voigt (1971) ad loc., Cucchiarelli (1997), and the different interpretation by Bowie p. 42 in this volume.

[18] Cf. the detailed discussion in Cucchiarelli (1997). The passages from the *Theognidea* and Alcaeus show that there was a tradition of autobiographic writing on exile long before Cicero (*contra* Claassen (1999a) 29, Williams (2002) 338).

[19] On the text cf. Gaertner (2001b) 227–31; on the motif of 'mental travel' see also Nagle (1980) 91–9, Doblhofer (1987) 146–7 (with Cat. 63.50–73, Liv. 5.54.2–3, Sen. *Med.* 207 ff.), Claassen (1999a) 299 n. 77 (with Cic. *Fam.* 15.16, *Tusc.* 5.114,115).

his home, and, at the same time, thinking swiftly, grasps with his eyes the way [there]: so swiftly darting down, the daughter of Zeus…

Furthermore, both the pathetic, mythological colour with which Ovid describes his experience in exile and the theme of suicide have close precedents in Cicero,[20] the prominent motif of endless weeping[21]—interpreted by Doblhofer ((1980) 71) as containing "spezifisches Exilpathos"—is not only anticipated by Cicero,[22] but also is a theme that is generally common in Ovid's oeuvre, particularly in the *Metamorphoses*,[23] and the motif of 'exile as death' can be traced back as far as to Ennius' *Medea* (*scen.* 231 Jocelyn = 272 Vahlen): *mihi* [sc. *Medeae*] *maerores, illi luctum, exitium illi, exilium mihi.*[24] Thus, in his exile poetry Ovid continues to take account of and respond to his literary predecessors: just as he reworked traditions of elegiac, didactic, aetiological, and epic poetry in his *Amores, Ars Amatoria, Remedia, Metamorphoses*, and *Fasti*, in his exile poetry he reworks traditions of writing on exile.

The continuity, however, goes much further, for Ovid not only freely draws from earlier literature on exile, but fuses this tradition with

[20] Cf. Nagle (1980) 33 and Cic. *Att.* 3.3, 3.7.2, Ov. *Tr.* 1.5.5, *Pont.* 1.6.41–4, 1.9.21–2 on the theme of suicide, Galasso (1987) on tragic pathos in Cicero's and Ovid's letters from exile, and Claassen (1999a) 209 on Cicero's presentation of his career in his poem *De Temporibus Suis*.

[21] Cf. e.g. *Tr.* 1.9.37–8, 4.1.95, *Pont.* 1.2.27.

[22] Cf. Nagle (1980) 34 with Cic. *Fam.* 14.2.1, *Q.fr.* 1.3.3, and André (1993).

[23] Cf. Hollenburger-Rusch (2001) on Ovid's use of the motif in the *Metamorphoses*. Moreover, the hyperbole of continuous weeping is a literary commonplace, cf. Gaertner (2005) on Ov. *Pont.* 1.2.27: *fine carent lacrimae*.

[24] This is, as far as I can see, the first attestation of a comparison between exile and death (cf. also Pl. *Capt.* 519: *neque exilium exitio est*, Pub. *Sent.* e.9: *exul, ubi ei nusquam domus est, sine sepulcro est mortuus*, and Claassen (1996b) on Cicero's, Ovid's, and Seneca's use of the motif). The effective pun *exilium/exitium* (unparalleled in Ennius' Greek model, Eur. *Med.* 374–5; cf. Jocelyn on Enn. *loc. cit.*) suggests that the conceit may be of Latin rather than Greek origin (cf. also La Penna (1990) on a general tendency in Latin to juxtapose *exilium* with other words containing the same prefix). Given that Cicero quotes the Ennian line in *N.D.* 3.66, it is hardly surprising to find the motif of 'exile as death' in his letters from exile, cf. Cic. *Q.fr.* 1.3.1: *ne vestigium quidem eius* [i.e. *Ciceronis*] *nec simulacrum sed quandam effigiem spirantis mortui* and Doblhofer (1987) 166 ff. Nagle ((1980) 22) and Helzle ((1988b) 78) adduce Leonidas Tarent. *Anth. Pal.* 7.715.3 = Gow-Page, *HE* 2537: τοιοῦτος πλανίων ἄβιος βίος, which, however, does not imply a comparison of exile and death but qualifies a life of wandering as being "destitute" (Gow-Page ad loc.; cf. however Stroh (1981) 2645–6 on parallels between Leonidas Tarent. *Anth. Pal.* 7.715 = Gow-Page, *HE* 2535–40 and Ov. *Tr.* 4.10.115–30). The idea of 'life on earth as exile from heaven', first expressed by Empedocles (Empedocles fr. 107.13 Wright (1981) = *VS* 31 B 115.13, quoted at Plut. *De Exil.* 607C, see p. 12 above) and adduced by Claassen (1999a) 20 as a precedent for the motif of 'exile as death', is clearly not the same thought.

elements of his own earlier poetry. Thus Ovid's use of the 'exile as death' motif in his epistolary elegies combines the pun on *exilium/exitium* (see above) with the supposed origin of elegy as a funeral dirge[25] and with the prominent theme of 'death' in Latin love elegy;[26] the plea for support, which Ovid already found in Cicero's exilic letters,[27] suits the rhetorical elements of the "werbende Dichtung" of Latin love elegy (Stroh (1971)); the motif of suffering and ill-health in exile is not only equally indebted to the vocabulary of love-sickness in elegy[28] and to Ovid's predecessor Cicero,[29] but also easily shades over into the medical imagery of consolatory treatises on exile,[30] and the interaction between the exiled poet and his wife in Rome resembles that between poet and mistress in the *Amores*.[31] In addition to these borrowings from the inventory of Ovidian love-elegy, there are also strong resonances of the *Metamorphoses* and the *Fasti*, such as Ovid's recollection of *Fast.* 2.235 ff. in *Pont.* 1.2.3–4, or his frequent comparisons between himself and various characters of the *Metamorphoses*, e.g. Actaeon (*Tr.* 2.105–6, cf. *Met.* 3.138 ff.), Triptolemus (*Tr.* 3.8.1–2, cf. *Met.* 5.646–7), Niobe (*Pont.* 1.2.29–30, cf. *Met.* 6.148 ff.), the Heliades (*Pont.* 1.2.31–2, cf. *Met.* 2.340 ff.), or Erysicthon (*Pont.* 1.10.9, cf. *Met.* 8.830–1).[32]

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[25] Cf. Nagle (1980) 22–32, Claassen (1999a) 211 ff., *Etym. Magn.* p. 326.47 ff., LSJ s.v. ἐλεγεῖον I.2, Chantraine s.v. ἔλεγος.

[26] Imagining one's own death is a theme that gains particular prominence in the elegiac poets, imprimis Propertius and Ovid, cf. Lyne (1980) 141, 274.

[27] Cf. e.g. Cic. *Att.* 3.7.1, *Q.fr.* 1.3.5, and Claassen (1999a) 105 ff.

[28] Cf. Nagle (1980) 61–3, Claassen (1999a) 211 ff.

[29] Cf. Nagle (1980) 34 and Cic. *Att.* 3.15.2: *dies autem non modo non levat luctum hunc sed etiam auget. nam ceteri dolores mitigantur vetustate, hic non potest non et sensu praesentis miseriae et recordatione praeteritae vitae cottidie augeri.*

[30] Cf. e.g. *Pont.* 1.3.5–8: *utque Machaoniis Poeantius artibus heros / lenito medicam vulnere sensit opem* [cf. Prop. 2.1.59: *tarda Philoctetae sanavit crura Machaon*, 2.1.64: *sensit opem*], *sic ego mente iacens et acerbo saucius ictu / admonitu* [i.e. the consolatory words of Ovid's friend Rufinus] *coepi fortior esse tuo*; on the notion that consolation is medical treatment of the soul see p. 13 n. 64 above and cf. Kassel (1958) 20–1 and *passim.*

[31] Cf. Nagle (1980) 43–54, Davisson (1984), Holzberg (1997) 182, Claassen (1999a) 211 ff.; cf. also Kenney (1965) 46 on Ov. *Pont.* 3.3 and *Rem.* 555 ff., Colakis (1987) on echoes of the *Ars* in *Pont.* 3.1, and Labate (1987) 93–4.

[32] Cf. Williams (2002) 378–81; for a Ciceronian precedent for Ovid's use of mythology see pp. 14–15 n. 76 above and cf. Claassen (1999a) 209. In view of the parallels with literary traditions on exile and in view of Ovid's borrowings from the *Metamorphoses* and *Fasti*, it would be wrong to interpret the *Tristia* and the *Epistulae ex Ponto* primarily as a reversal or palinode of Ovid's love poetry (thus Lechi (1978), Claassen (1986) 166, cf. also Holzberg (1997) 181 ff.). Mislead and misleading are the pseudolinguistic arguments put forth for such an interpretation: Nagle ((1980) 61–8) adduces everyday Latin words such as *miser, tristis, infelix, maestus, sollicitus, cura, malum, labor, dolor, amarus, lacrima, fletus, metus, luctus, taedium, desiderium, cupido, carere, spes, improbus, crudelis, durus, saevus, mitis, lenis,*

Far stronger is the case for a change of style in Ovid's exile poetry. Ovid repeatedly claims that he has lost his former poetic genius and devotes less care to the composition of his poetry,[33] and that his sole intention is to communicate his suffering and alleviate his pain.[34] Such statements are still taken very seriously by scholars such as Doblhofer ((1978), (1980), (1987)), Malaspina (1995), González Vázquez (1998), but the many Callimachean[35] and Horatian[36] echoes lurking behind these statements of self-depreciation have given rise to the suspicion that we may simply be dealing with a "pose of poetic decline" (Williams (1994) 50 ff.). Allusions to Callimachean and Horatian tenets show that the exiled poet was still operating in the same poetological framework as before (Helzle (1988a) 138), but they cannot settle the question of how serious Ovid's self-depreciatory statements really are. The latter question can only be decided by an examination of the philological facts, to which I shall turn next.[37]

The style of Ovid's exilic poetry is still a matter of disagreement, both with regard to the linguistic facts and with regard to their interpretation.

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*laedere, crimen, scelus, culpa, error, poena, deus, numen, supplex, preces, votum, auxilium, solacium, levare, fides, memor, inmemor*, and *utilitas* as evidence for a systematic transfer of elegiac, erotic diction to the poet's situation in exile, and Claassen ((1998), (1999b, c)) has used these and other everyday words attested in Ovid's *Amores*, *Ars*, and *Remedia* as well as in the *Tristia* and the *Epistulae ex Ponto* to argue for a systematic un-punning of elegiac vocabulary ("[sc. Ovid] has sent these words in new directions…he has rewritten their context, thereby giving earlier use of the words a new innocence" ((1999b) 163)). I very much doubt that these words possess elegiac resonances that are strong enough to warrant such conclusions: on the basis of the material and the argumentation of Nagle and Claassen, we could more or less establish any pre-Ovidian Latin text as the stylistic model for the *Tristia* and the *Epistulae ex Ponto* and would have to wonder about elegiac undertones in basically every roughly contemporary passage containing words such as *scelus* or *culpa*; moreover, it would seem that Ovid, should he have wished to write about his banishment without evoking his love-poetry, would have been forced to turn to Greek, Sarmatian, or Getic.

33 Cf. *Tr.* 1.1.45–8, 3.14.33, 5.12.21–2, *Pont.* 1.5.3–8, 3.4.11, 4.2.15, 4.8.65–6.

34 Cf. *Tr.* 4.10.117–18, 5.7.67–8, *Pont.* 1.5.53–6, Doblhofer (1987) 262–3.

35 Cf. e.g. *Pont.* 1.2.121 ~ Callim. fr. 114.14–15 (Pfeiffer) with Lechi's discussion (1988), and Helzle (1988b) 75–6, Williams (1991), (1994) 73–4, 123.

36 Cf. Nagle (1980) 125 ff., Helzle (1988a).

37 In doing so I exclude the *Ibis* and concentrate on the *Tristia* and the *Epistulae ex Ponto*. I have assumed that the *Heroides* are (apart from *Ep.* 15) Ovidian (*contra* Beck (1996), Lingenberg (2003)), and I have not differentiated between *Ep.* 1–14 and the double letters (*Ep.* 16–21), which may belong into the time of Ovid's exile (cf. the metrical and stylistic observations in Tracy (1971) and Kenney (1996) 20–6). For convenience I use the following labels: 'Republican poetry' (Lucretius, Catullus); 'Augustan poetry' (Vergil, Horace, Propertius, Tibullus, Ovid); 'Silver Latin poetry' (Sen. *trag.*, Lucan, Valerius Flaccus, Silius, Martial, Statius, Juvenal).

Luck, Nagle, and Claassen have stressed the continuity of the Ovidian oeuvre, reaching the conclusion that stylistically *Tristia* and *Epistulae ex Ponto* do not differ significantly from Ovid's earlier works.[38] Likewise, Baeza Angulo ((1992) 163) asserts in the as yet most exhaustive study of the language of Ovid's exile poetry: "Ovidio utiliza pocos términos estrictamente no poéticos en los más de 3100 versos de *Ponto*, en concreto, salvo error u omisión, sólo 25". Axelson, on the contrary, had already stated in 1945 that the *Epistulae ex Ponto* were less polished and contained more unpoetic expressions than his earlier works.[39] Similarly, González Vázquez ((1998) 67)—on the basis of extremely scarce evidence[40]—observed a "relajación con respecto a la rigurosa selección de la época clásica, relajación que se manifesta en el empleo de algunos terminos o expressiones vulgares o coloquiales, proprios de la lengua hablada". Before González Vázquez, Malaspina ((1995) 72 ff.) had already given a list of about sixty linguistic phenomena, which according to her are both colloquial or prosaic, and feature, within Ovid's oeuvre, only or particularly frequently in *Tristia* and *Epistulae ex Ponto*. Unfortunately, however, Malaspina's evidence, too, is of varying solidity. She does not adduce any evidence at all for the prosaic or colloquial nature of a dozen of her phenomena,[41] and several other features are already fairly common in Ovid's pre-exilic works;[42] in particular, Malaspina's

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[38] Cf. Luck (1961), Nagle (1980) 69–70, Claassen (1999b).

[39] Cf. Axelson (1945) 63: "in seiner allerletzten, weniger gefeilten Dichtung".

[40] All the phenomena which González Vázquez cites—*sarcina*; adverbial phrases in the ablative involving *mente: aversa mente, forti mente, aequa mente, inoblita mente*; "abundantes adjectivos en *-osus*" like *ambitiosus, invidiosus, operosus*—are also found in Ovid's pre-exilic poetry and González Vázquez does not demonstrate that these features are particularly frequent in the *Tristia* and the *Epistulae ex Ponto*.

[41] Malaspina gives no evidence for the prosaic/colloquial nature of *age* + imperative (*Pont.* 4.3.21), *alicui animos facere in aliquem* (*Tr.* 5.8.3), *parte tenere aliquid* (*Tr.* 3.3.16) and *esse in parte alicuius rei* (*Tr.* 5.14.9, *Pont.* 2.2.102) in place of *participare* and *particeps esse, notitiam ferre* (*Tr.* 1.9.52), *vera facis* ('you are right', *Pont.* 2.6.7), *omnibus annis* ('semper', *Pont.* 2.10.43), *gratia quod* + indicative (*Pont.* 3.5.48, cf. Richmond (1990) ad loc.), *rationis* . . . *usum* (*Pont.* 3.6.47), *fastiditus* . . . *ero* ('fastidiar', *Tr.* 1.7.32), *(im)ponere* followed by a local ablative instead of an accusative of direction (e.g. *Tr.* 1.7.16, 1.7.20), and *obligor* in place of *cogor* (*Tr.* 1.2.83).

[42] This concerns Malaspina's claims on *subit* and *succurrit* ('it happens that', already at *Met.* 2.755, *Fast.* 5.333), *verba dare* (already at *Am.* 2.19.50, *Rem.* 95), the use of the personal pronoun in conjunction with an imperative (already at Ov. *Am.* 1.4.30, 1.7.63, 2.3.9 etc.; cf. HS 173), of *de* in place of *ex* (e.g. *Tr.* 1.7.38: *de* . . . *funere rapta*, cf. *Met.* 5.137: *calido de vulnere raptam* (~ 6.430, 15.840); cf. HS 262–3), of *facio* + acc. and inf. (e.g. *Pont.* 2.7.76: *ille etiam vires corpus habere facit*; earlier already at *Met.* 7.690–1, 10.356–7; cf. HS 354), of intensifying *bene* before adjectives (*Tr.* 1.7.15, earlier already at *Ars* 2.263: *bene dives ager*), of *littera* for *epistula* (already at *Am.* 1.12.2, 2.18.33, *Ars* 1.483 etc.; cf. *TLL* s.v.

argument that legal[43] and declamatory[44] expressions as well as medical formulations such as *cicatricem ducere* (*Tr.* 3.11.66, *Pont.* 1.3.15) indicate a more prosaic style for Ovid's letters from exile does not take into account that Ovid has always been fond of legal expressions (cf. imprimis Kenney (1967), (1969), (1970)), that his poetry is heavily imbued with declamatory elements and features of the so-called 'Neuer Stil',[45] and that technical language, particularly medical Latin, is also found in Ovid's other works and is typical of the Hellenistic poets and their Roman followers.[46]

Once this, and some other doubtful evidence, has been subtracted from Malaspina's material, quite a number of prosaic and colloquial features still remain. However, these phenomena are for the most part fairly infrequent in Ovid's exile poetry and thus difficult to evaluate statistically;[47] far more significant are some changes in Ovid's use of

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*littera* 1528.37 ff.), of the imperative *vade* (already at Ov. *Am.* 2.11.37, *Rem.* 152, *Met.* 4.649, 11.137, and e.g. Verg. *A.* 3.462,480, 4.223, 5.548), of *facere cum aliquo* (*Tr.* 4.1.54, earlier at *Ars* 3.762; cf. *TLL* s.v. *cum* 1351.1–9, s.v. *facio* 123.33–45), of *da veniam* (already at Ov. *Ep.* 4.156, 7.105, *Ars* 2.38, *Met.* 11.132, *Fast.* 4.755), *habere* + inf. in place of *posse* + inf. (*Pont.* 3.1.82: *laedere rumor habet*, earlier already *Met.* 9.658: *quid . . . dare maius habebant?*, cf. *TLL* s.v. *habeo* 2454.12 ff. and HS 314–15), *in morem venire* (according to Malaspina only in Ov. *Fast.* 5.283, *Pont.* 2.7.39, Liv. 42.21.7), *immo ita* ("seltene Elision" (Luck on *Tr.* 1.2.99; cf. *Tr.* 3.14.7), earlier at *Met.* 7.512), and *quid mihi/tibi/sibi cum . . . ?* (already at *Am.* 1.7.27, 3.6.87, 3.8.49, *Fast.* 4.3); it is particularly true of some metrically convenient syntactical features, e.g. the use of the future perfect in place of the future (cf. HS 324 (with further material)), and some features that are generally attested in poetry, e.g. the use of adjectives in *-bilis* with a dative of the agent (cf. HS 97; Malaspina (1995) 82 distorts Luck's (1967–77) note on *Tr.* 5.8.27), *ne* + present imperative (cf. HS 340 (with further material)), the use of a final infinitive after verbs indicating movement (cf. HS 344–5), the use of an infinitive (instead of a gerund) to qualify nouns (cf. HS 351 (with further material)).

[43] Malaspina refers to *Pont.* 2.2.43: *mandatique mei legatus suscipe causam*, 2.2.54: *confessi . . . rei*, 4.15.11: *testere licet*, and 4.15.42: *libra . . . et aere*.

[44] Malaspina mentions the use of *obligor* for *cogor* (*Tr.* 1.2.83) and the expressions *pro parte virili* (*Tr.* 5.11.23, *Pont.* 2.1.17), *fallor an . . . ?* (*Tr.* 1.2.107, *Pont.* 2.8.21), *adde quod* (*Tr.* 1.5.79, *al.*), *o bene quod . . . !* (*Tr.* 1.2.41), *Lingua, sile!* (*Pont.* 2.2.59).

[45] Cf. e.g. Norden (1898) 892 ("wie ein Deklamator"). Given that Ovid has been a follower of the 'Neuer Stil' already before his exile, González Vázquez' view ((1998) 116) that Ovid's exile prompts the poet's conversion to the new style is unconvincing.

[46] On the use of technical or scientific language in Latin poetry and its Hellenistic models see Langslow (1999) and Zanker (1987) 124–7.

[47] This applies to the following, fairly rare usages gathered by Malaspina: *causa* 'thing' (*Tr.* 1.2.17, cf. *TLL* s.v. *caussa* 700.62 ff.), *ad summam* ('altogether', in Ovid only at *Pont.* 4.1.15), *comparare* + inf. (*Tr.* 2.267–8, cf. *TLL* s.v. *comparo* 2015.43–7, 2016.54–8), *probator esse* ('probare', in Ovid only at *Pont.* 2.2.104, cf. *TLL* s.v. *probator* 1455.63–72), *estur* (in Ovid only at *Pont.* 1.1.69, cf. *TLL* s.v. *edo* 99.39–43), *cum venia* (in Ovid only at *Tr.* 1.1.46, 4.1.104, in pre-Ovidian poetry only at Hor. *S.* 1.4.105, later at Sen. *Phaed.* 440, common in prose), *in facto meo* (*Tr.* 4.1.24, according to Malaspina (1995) 79 n. 87 the only attestation in poetry, common in Cic., Sen. *phil.*, Quint., Just. *Dig*), *acceptum*

fairly common and subject-independent words and expressions: thus Malaspina rightly accentuates Ovid's increased use of *crede mihi*,[48] *sustinere* + inf.,[49] and *fac modo*.[50] From my own work on Ovid's exile poetry I can add that most of the 12 Ovidian attestations of the prosaic *fortasse*[51] and of the quasi-prepositional use of the ablative of *exceptus*[52] belong to Ovid's letters from exile, and that Ovid is also more liberal in his use of prosaic *constanter*,[53] *condicio*,[54] *credibilis*,[55] *posteritas*,[56] *tempus ad hoc*,[57]

*refero* + inf. (in Ovid only at *Tr.* 2.10, cf. *TLL* s.v. *accipio* 314.13 ff.), *commilitium* (in Ovid only at *Pont.* 2.5.72, cf. *TLL* s.v. *commilitium* 1882.12–66), *censere de* (*Pont.* 2.5.73, 3.1.75, cf. Galasso (1995) on *Pont.* 2.5.73), the cases of ellipsis in *Pont.* 1.1.4: *excipe, dumque aliquo, quolibet abde loco* and *Tr.* 1.2.51: *nec letum timeo, genus est miserabile leti*, and the emphatic construction *Sarmatis est tellus, quam mea vela petunt* (*Tr.* 1.2.82) in place of *Sarmatidem tellurem mea vela petunt*.

[48] *crede mihi* is common in Cicero's correspondence (12x), Prop. (7x), Ov. (30x), Petr. (3x), Mart. (12x), but is otherwise fairly rare; of the 30 attestations in Ovid's oeuvre, 14 belong to his exile poetry.

[49] According to Malaspina (1995) 75, *sustinere* + inf. first occurs in poetry at Ov. *Tr.* 3.14.32, 4.1.87–8, 4.4.14, 4.10.74, 5.12.16, *Pont.* 1.5.18; cf. HS 347.

[50] Of the six Ovidian attestations of the colloquial *fac modo (ut)* + subj. (Ov. *Ep.* 20.180, *Ars* 2.198, *Tr.* 4.9.4,5, 5.4.49, *Pont.* 2.6.35) four belong to the exile poetry. Before Ovid, this usage occurs only in Pl. *Poen.* 580 and Cic. *Att.* 3.4.

[51] On the prosaic character of *fortasse* cf. Cledon. *G.L.* 5.66.29–30, Löfstedt (1911) 47, Axelson (1945) 31–2; the statistics for Ovid are: 3x *Ep.* (12.209, 17.259, 20.83), 1x *Ars*, 1x *Fast.*, 2x *Tr.*, 5x *Pont.*

[52] Quasi-prepositional *exceptus* in the ablative is common in (scientific) prose (e.g. Plin. *Nat.* (>40x), Serv. (>40x)), but occurs in Republican, Augustan, and Silver Latin poetry only at Verg. *A.* 7.650, Prop. 1.15.2, Luc. 5.230, and 4x in Horace (2x *S.*, 2x *Ep.*), and 11x in Ovid (1x *Ep.*, 2x *Met.* (2.60, 8.868), 4x *Tr.*, 5x *Pont.*).

[53] *constanter* occurs in Republican, Augustan, and Silver Latin poetry only at Hor. *S.* 2.7.6, Ov. *Ep.* 16.154, *Tr.* 3.2.27, 4.5.23, 5.4.49, *Pont.* 1.5.41, Sil. 15.820 (cf. also Lucr. 3.491: *inconstanter*); it is common in prose, e.g. Cic. >30x, Liv. 8x, V.Max. 8x, Sen. *phil.* 4x, Tac. 4x, Plin. min. 7x.

[54] *condicio* is common in prose (e.g. Cic. >200x, Liv. >100x, Sen. *phil.* >70x), but occurs in Republican, Augustan, and Silver Latin poetry only at Lucr. 2.301, Verg. *A.* 12.880 (a speech), 2x in Prop., 5x in Hor. (1x *S.*, 2x *Ep.*, 2x *Carm.*), 4x in Mart., and 10x in Ovid: 1x *Ep.*, *Met.*, *Fast.*; 3x *Tr.*; 4x *Pont.* The use of *condicio* in the sense of 'state', 'nature' (*OLD* s.v. 6 and 8, *TLL* s.v. 133.54–135.46) referring to a place is confined to Ovid's exile poetry (*Tr.* 3.5.54, *Pont.* 1.2.72, 2.5.16) and prose (e.g. Sen. *Nat.* 6.1.11, Quint. *Inst.* 12.10.2; poets prefer *natura*).

[55] *credibilis* is common in prose (e.g. 39x Cic., >100x Quint.), but occurs in Republican, Augustan, and Silver Latin poetry only at Hor. *S.* 1.9.52, Sen. *Thy.* 754, Mart. 4.32.4, and 19x in Ovid: 1x *Ars*; 2x *Ep., Pont.*; 3x *Fast.*; 4x *Am.*; 7x *Tr.* (3x *Tr.* 2); not in *Met.*

[56] *posteritas* is common in prose (e.g. 42x Cic. (27x *or.*)), but avoided in Republican, Augustan, and Silver Latin poetry (only 1x Prop., Luc., Mart.; 2x Sen. *trag.*, Juv.) except Ovid's exile poetry (2x *Tr.*, 4x *Pont.*, compared to three occurrences in all his other works: 1x *Ep.*, 2x *Fast.*).

[57] *tempus ad hoc* ('up to this point in time', e.g. Cic. *Ver.* 1.98, Caes. *Gal.* 2.17.4, Liv. 26.41.19) occurs in Republican, Augustan, and Silver Latin poetry only at Ov. *Pont.* 1.5.27, 4.14.60, *Ib.* 1.

impersonal *liquet*,[58] and *nemo* (poets generally prefer *nullus*)[59] and with regard to the colloquial usage of *ecquid*.[60] Whereas Ovid's increased use of words like *clementia*,[61] *patrocinium*,[62] *officiosus*,[63] and *utilitas*[64] at least in part reflects the contents of the exile poetry, the higher frequency of subject-independent words such as *constanter*, *ecquid*, *fortasse*, and *nemo* cannot be explained in this way, but suggests that Ovid's *Tristia* and *Epistulae ex Ponto* are indeed composed in a markedly different style, which is more prosaic and colloquial than that of his earlier works.

These stylistic observations are corroborated by a similar "relajación" (González Vázquez (1998) 67) with regard to some metrical conventions: in his study of monosyllables in the Latin hexameter, Hellegouarc'h ((1964) 16–17) has established a correlation between the frequency of monosyllables and the genre or stylistic register. Monosyllables are far more frequent in Horace's *Epistles* (1650x/1000 hexameters) and *Satires* (1692) than in Vergil's *Aeneid* (*A.* 1&2: 1216, 6&7: 1213; cf. *Ecl.*: 1439, *G.*: 1199), Ovid's *Metamorphoses* (*Met.* 13&14: 1330) and *Fasti* (1276), or Lucan's *Bellum Civile* (Luc. 1&2: 1084, 6&7: 1031). If one compares the frequency of monosyllables per 1000 hexameters in the *Tristia* (1744) and the *Epistulae ex Ponto* (1796) with that in other works of Augustan poetry, Ovid's exile poetry and the double letters of the *Heroides* (*Ep.* 16–21: 1959) differ considerably from the metrical practice in Ovid's other

58 Impersonal *liquet* (Cic. *or.* 5x, *phil.* 4x, Quint. 8x) is rare in Republican, Augustan, and Silver Latin poetry: only 9x Ovid = 1x *Am.*; 2x *Met.*; 3x *Tr.*, 3x *Pont.*, and Sen. *Her. F.* 446, Luc. 5.22, 6.433; cf. Bömer (1969–86) on *Met.* 11.718.

59 On the Latin poets' disliking for *nemo* see Axelson (1945) 76–7; in Ovid (24x) it is most frequent in his exile poetry: 1x *Rem.*, 1x *Fast.*, 2x *Am.*, 5x *Met.*, 7x *Tr.*, 8x *Pont.*

60 *ecquid* ('at all') is typical of colloquial Latin (KS 2.515, Ernout/Meillet s.v. *ecce*, *TLL* s.v. *ecquis* 57.67–58.18) and occurs in Augustan poetry only at Verg. *A.* 3.342 (Andromache speaking), Hor. *Ep.* 1.18.82, Prop. 1.11.1, as well as 20x in Ovid, mostly in his exile poetry: 4x *Met.*, 2x *Fast.*, 8x *Tr.*, 6x *Pont.*

61 While common in prose, *clementia* is extremely rare in Latin poetry: within Augustan poetry it is confined to Prop. 2.28.47 (but cf. *inclementia* at Verg. *G.* 3.68, *A.* 2.602) and Ovid: *Met.* 8.57 (a line deleted by Knoche (1940) 53, but retained by Tarrant (2004)), *Tr.* 2.125, 3.5.39, 4.4.53, 4.8.39, 5.4.19, *Pont.* 1.2.59, 2.2.119, 3.6.7, 4.1.25.

62 Ov. *Tr.* 1.1.26, *Pont.* 1.2.68 are the only attestations of *patrocinium* in Latin poetry before *CE* 1383.4 (sixth cent. AD), cf. *TLL* s.v. *patrocinium* 774.30–1.

63 *officiosus* commonly features in prose, but is within Republican, Augustan, and Silver Latin poetry confined to Horace (2x = *S.* 2.5.48, *Ep.* 1.7.8), Martial (5x), and Ovid: 10x = 2x *Ep.*, 1x *Ars*, 1x *Fast.*, 1x *Tr.*, 5x *Pont.* On *officium* in Ovid's exile poetry cf. p. 169 n. 82 below and see Froesch (1968) 40–7.

64 *utilitas* (e.g. Cic. >400x) occurs 10x in Lucretius, once in Horace's *Satires* (1.3.98), and 15x in Ovid (= 1x *Rem.*; 2x *Ars*, *Met.*, *Fast.*; 3x *Tr.*, 5x *Pont.*), but is otherwise absent from Republican, Augustan, and Silver Latin poetry. On *utilitas* as a key concept of Ovid's exile poetry see Froesch (1968) 40–7, Williams (2002) 339.

works (*Am.*: 1500, *Ep.* 1–14: 1501, see above) and in Tibullus (1634), Propertius (1557), and Vergil (see above), and have their closest metrical parallel in Horace's *Epistles* (1650) and *Satires* (1692).[65] Moreover, Braum and Nilson have shown that higher poetry avoids placing monosyllables before the main caesurae, and Braum has already pointed out that, within the Ovidian oeuvre, the frequency of monosyllables placed before the penthemimeres caesura and the other main caesurae is highest in Ovid's exile poetry.[66]

Superficially, all these data seem to support the view of Malaspina, Videau-Delibes, Hansen, and others that the exiled poet attributed greater importance to the communication of his suffering in exile than to the polishing of his poetry or that the heavy blow of exile even made it impossible for him to continue writing in the same fashion as before.[67] That this interpretation cannot be right, however, becomes instantly apparent, once we leave the general characteristics behind and turn to individual passages in the *Tristia* and *Epistulae ex Ponto.* Whoever compares lines such as *Tr.* 3.7.1–6:

*vade salutatum, subito perarata, Perillam,*
*littera, sermonis fida ministra mei.*
*aut illam invenies dulci cum matre sedentem,*
*aut inter libros Pieridasque suas.*

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[65] The figures for Vergil, Horace, Ov. *Met.*, and Lucan are taken from Hellegouarc'h (1964) 15, those for Tib., Prop., Ov. *Am., Fast., Ep.* 1–14, 16–21, *Tr.*, *Pont.* from Hansen (1993) 116 ff.

[66] Cf. Braum (1906) 62, Nilsson (1952) 87, Gaertner (2004a) 119 and (2005) 36–8. According to my own count the frequency (as per 1000 hexameters) of long monosyllables before trithemimeres (T), penthemimeres (P), and hephthemimeres (H) is considerably higher in *Pont.* 1 (T: 348; P: 55; H: 152) than in *Ars* 1.1–500 (204; 32; 112), *Am.* 1.1–8 (219; 31; 131), and *Fast.* 3.1–500 (172; 24; 72).

A third metrical peculiarity of Ovid's exile poetry concerns the pentameter ending. In Ovid's pre-exilic poetry two-syllable words are the rule at the end of the pentameter (cf. Sturtevant (1914), G. A. Wilkinson (1948), Platnauer (1951) 15–17, L. P. Wilkinson (1970) 123–4). Within the Ovidian corpus, the attestations of three-syllable (*Pont.* 1.1.[66], 1.8.[20],[40], 3.5.40, 3.6.46, 4.9.[26]), four-syllable (*Ep.* 19.202, *Fast.* 5.582, 6.660, *Tr.* 1.3.6, 1.4.20, 1.10.34, 2.232, 3.5.40, 3.9.2, 3.10.4, 4.10.2, 5.6.30, *Pont.* 2.2.6, 70,76, 2.3.18, 2.5.26, 2.9.42, 4.3.54, 4.5.24, 4.6.6,14, 4.8.62, 4.9.48,80, 4.13.28,46, 4.14.4,18, 56, 4.15.26), five-syllable (*Ep.* 16.290, 17.16, *Tr.* 2.212,294,514, 4.5.24, *Pont.* 1.2.68, 2.9.20, 4.3.12, 4.13.44), and six-syllable words (*Ib.* 508: *Berecyntiades*) almost exclusively belong to the works written in exile. However, some passages have been suspected to be spurious, cf. imprimis Zwierlein (1999) 429, and the qualifications in Zwierlein (2000) 80 n. 161.

[67] Cf. Videau-Delibes (1991) 506 and *passim*, Hansen (1993) 116–17, and Malaspina (1995) 140–1: "Ovidio antepone alla forma letteraria la pressante realtà del proprio vissuto".

*quidquid aget, cum te scierit venisse, relinquet,*
*nec mora, quid venias, quidve, requiret, agam.*

Go and greet Perilla, hastily written letter, faithful servant of my words. Either you will find her sitting together with her sweet mother, or amid books and her poetry. Whatever she is doing, she will leave it, when she has learnt that you have come, and immediately she will ask why you come and how I am.

with passages like *Tr.* 3.8.1–6:

*nunc ego Triptolemi cuperem consistere curru,*
*misit in ignotam qui rude semen humum;*
*nunc ego Medeae vellem frenare dracones,*
*quos habuit fugiens arce, Corinthe, tua;*
*nunc ego iactandas optarem sumere pennas,*
*sive tuas, Perseu, Daedale, sive tuas.*

Now I wish I could stand in the chariot of Triptolemus, who cast uncultivated seed onto unknown ground; now I wish I could steer the snakes which Medea had when she fled from your citadel, o Corinth; now I wish I could take and flap your wings, Perseus, or yours, Daedalus.

—two passages chosen at random[68]—will notice that beyond the generally more prosaic and colloquial diction of the *Tristia* and the *Epistulae ex Ponto* there are considerable stylistic differences. The first of the two passages quoted is addressed to Ovid's fellow poet Perilla and strikes a rather informal note: apart from the use of *Pierides* for 'poetry',[69] the Ovidian expressions *perarata* (in place of *exarata*: cf. *TLL* s.v. *peraro* 1189.44 ff.) and *fida ministra* (paralleled only at *Am.* 1.11.27, *Met.* 2.837, and Luc. 6.572), and the poetic *nec mora*[70] the lines are dominated by everyday words (*salutare, invenire, sedere, agere* (2x), *scire, venire* (2x), *relinquere*) and colloquialisms (*subito, littera*).[71] The second passage, on the contrary, which expresses Ovid's wish to travel swiftly back to Rome, not only features learned references to Triptolemus' journey around the world, Medea's flight from Corinth, and the myths of Perseus and Daedalus,

[68] Cf. also Gaertner (2004a) 121–4 on *Pont.* 1.4.47–58, 1.5.15–18, 1.8.11–16, and Gaertner (2005) *passim.*

[69] Up to Pliny the Younger, *Pierides* features in Latin prose only at Cic. *N.D.* 3.54, where Cicero qualifies the word as a poetic usage: *tertiae* [sc. *Musae*] *Piero natae et Antiopa, quas Pieridas et Pierias solent poetae appellare*.

[70] Cf. Norden (1957) on Verg. *A.* 6.177 and Wölfflin (1900) 366.

[71] On the colloquial nature of *subito* and the Latin poets' preference for this word (instead of *repente*) see Axelson (1945) 32–3; on *littera* (in place of *epistula*) see Löfstedt (1933–42) 1.43, Galasso (1995) on *Pont.* 2.7.1, and Serv. *A.* 8.168.

but also strikes a far loftier note: cf. the apostrophe of Corinth, Perseus, and Daedalus, the strictly Ovidian iunctura *iactare pennas* (paralleled only at *Met.* 2.835, 4.789; cf. also *Ars* 2.61: *iactabimus alas*), the predominantly poetic uses of *humus* for 'land', 'region' (cf. *TLL* s.v. *humus* 3123.35 ff.), of *pennae* for 'ala' (cf. *TLL* s.v. *penna* 1087.4–7), and of *frenare bestiam* vel sim. in the sense of 'freno cohibere, regere' (cf. *TLL* s.v. *freno* 1288.47–53), as well as the poetic transfer of the epithet *rude* from *humum* to *semen*.[72]

Such differences in style are evidently incompatible with a poetics or a condition of intellectual decline, for it is difficult to see how Ovid's alleged failure to devote more care to the composition of the *Tristia* and the *Epistulae ex Ponto* should have lead to stylistic variations or passages such as *Tr.* 3.8.1–6, which altogether lack features of colloquial and prosaic style. Obviously, the interpretations of Ovid's style and poetics advanced by, among others, Videau-Delibes, Hansen, and Malaspina are far too rigid to do justice to Ovid's exile poetry. If we turn once again to the general stylistic tendencies and the metrical features discerned above, it is striking that the metrical innovations of Ovid's exile poetry have one of their closest parallels in Horace's *Epistles*, and that the generally more liberal handling of colloquial and prosaic features in the *Tristia* and the *Epistulae ex Ponto* can be compared to the stylistic differences between Horace's *Odes* and *Epistles*.[73] The similarities between Ovid's exile poetry and Horace's *Epistles* suggest that the stylistic and metrical differences between Ovid's pre-exilic and exilic works may be related to conventions of ancient epistolography.[74] Indeed, Ovid's more liberal use of prosaic and colloquial elements closely corresponds to his own advice concerning the style of *billets doux* (*Ars* 1.467–8):

*sit tibi credibilis sermo consuetaque verba,*
*blanda tamen, praesens ut videare loqui.*

Your speech should be convincing, and your words should be familiar, but seductive, so that you yourself may seem to speak to her in person.

As Thraede ((1970) 51) has emphasized, Ovid's guidelines on the style of love letters are firmly rooted in ancient epistolographic theory, according to which letters should be written in a style that is close to the

[72] The iunctura *semen rude* is unparalleled; cf. Ov. *Met.* 5.646–7: *Triptolemo... rudi data semina iussit / spargere humo* and *Am.* 3.6.16: *semina venerunt in rude missa solum.*

[73] On the more colloquial and prosaic diction of Horace's *Epistles* see Ruckdeschel (1910), Axelson (1945) 18 and *passim*, and Bonfante (1994).

[74] In passing, this has already been suspected by González Vázquez ((1998) 67).

spoken language (cf. *praesens ut videare loqui*)[75] and suits the sender's and the addressee's respective circumstances.[76] Following these precepts, Ovid not only adopts a generally more colloquial and prosaic style in the *Tristia* and the *Epistulae ex Ponto*, but also adjusts the tone to the respective addressees and subjects of his letters, thus choosing a more informal register when addressing close friends such as the poetess Perilla, and writing in a more poetic style when fantasizing about a journey back to Rome.[77]

The explanation that Ovid may have adjusted his stylistic practice in the *Tristia* and the *Epistulae ex Ponto* to ancient epistolographic theory is further corroborated by his use of standard motifs of ancient epistolography. Already Cazzaniga ((1937) 1–6) has drawn attention to the fact that Ovid repeatedly likens his epistles to a *colloquium*,[78] thus picking up a commonplace of ancient epistolographic theory, which goes back at least as far as Artemon, the editor of Aristotle's correspondence,[79] and is prominent in Cicero and Seneca.[80] Likewise, the idea that a letter is a gift (δῶρον) and a service of friendship (φιλοφρόνησις), first expressed in Demetrius' *De Elocutione*,[81] has close parallels in Ovid's *Tristia* and *Epistulae ex Ponto*.[82] The same applies to what Thraede ((1970) 44, 52) has

[75] Cf. Demetr. *Eloc.* 223, Cic. *Fam.* 9.21.1, Sen. *Ep.* 75.1, Quint. *Inst.* 9.4.19, and Thraede (1970) 22–3. In Ov. *Ars* 1.467–8 this advice is combined with what Thraede (1970) 44, 52 has termed the παρουσία-motif (cf. *praesens*, and see p. 170 below).

[76] Cf. Cic. *Fam.* 2.4.1, 4.13.1, *Att.* 9.4.1, and Thraede (1970) 27 ff.

[77] Consequently, the rhetorical function attributed by Nagle ((1980) 171), Helzle ((1988a) 138), and Williams ((1994) 52, (2002) 359) to Ovid's claim of poetic decline is questionable. Ancient readers would have been sensible to Ovid's careful variation of stylistic register and would have immediately noticed that Ovid's self-depreciatory statements are a pose; hence, they would not have believed that a (at least partial) rehabilitation was necessary in order that Ovid could write decent poetry again.

[78] Cf. e.g. *Tr.* 4.4.23: *tecum loquor*, *Pont.* 1.2.6: *loquar tecum*, 2.4.1: *accipe conloquium gelido Nasonis ab Histro*. Of course, the same comparison can be found also in the *Heroides*, cf. *Ep.* 21.17–18: *ne quis nisi conscia nutrix / colloquii nobis sentiat esse vices*, and Thraede (1970) 49.

[79] Cf. Demetr. *Eloc.* 223: Ἀρτέμων μὲν οὖν ὁ τὰς Ἀριστοτέλους ἀναγράψας ἐπιστολάς φησιν, ὅτι δεῖ ἐν τῷ| αὐτῷ τρόπῳ διάλογόν τε γράφειν καὶ ἐπιστολάς· εἶναι γὰρ τὴν ἐπιστολὴν οἷον τὸ ἕτερον μέρος τοῦ διαλόγου.

[80] Cf. Cic. *Fam.* 12.30.1: *aut quid mi iucundius quam, cum coram tecum loqui non possim, aut scribere ad te aut tuas legere litteras?*, Sen. *Ep.* 75.1: *qualis sermo meus esset, si una sederemus aut ambularemus, inlaboratus et facilis, tales esse epistulas meas volo*.

[81] Cf. Demetr. *Eloc.* 224: ἡ δὲ [sc. ἡ ἐπιστολή] γράφεται καὶ δῶρον πέμπεται τρόπον τινά; cf. also [Isoc.] 1.2: ἀπέσταλκά σοι τόνδε τὸν λόγον δῶρον.

[82] Cf. e.g. Ov. *Tr.* 4.4.11: *officium nostro tibi carmine factum*, *Pont.* 1.1.19–20: *nec vos hoc vultis, sed nec prohibere potestis, / Musaque ad invitos officiosa venit* (~ 3.6.53–8), 4.12.1–6, and Froesch (1968) 40–7.

termed the "παρουσία-Motiv": just as Cicero mentions that he has the impression that, while writing, the addressee is standing right in front of him, or, when reading a letter, he feels the presence of the sender,[83] Ovid tells us that through his letters he seeks to be close to his friends in Rome (*Tr.* 5.1.79–80: *cur scribam, docui; cur mittam, quaeritis, isto? / vobiscum cupio quolibet esse modo*) and asks his friend Cotta Maximus to send him more often *studii pignora . . . tui* so that he can enjoy the feeling of being with him (*Pont.* 3.5.29–30: *quod licet, ut videar tecum magis esse, legenda / saepe, precor, studii pignora mitte tui*).[84] Moreover, also Ovid's claim that the main purpose of his exile poetry is to alleviate his plight and to allow him to forget his miserable situation,[85] his pleas for support, and his gratitude for soothing words[86] have close precedents in ancient epistolographic theory: both the epistolographic treatises by Demetrius and Pseudo-Libanius, and Cicero mention a "consolatory type" (cf. Demetr. *Typ. Epist.* 5: παραμυθητικὸς τύπος, Ps. Libanius 25: παραμυθητική [sc. προσηγορία]) or a sad and wretched type of letter which should contain promises of help and consolation for the addressee's sorrow (cf. Cic. *Fam.* 4.13.1: *triste quoddam et miserum . . . genus litterarum . . . in quo debebat esse aut promissio auxili alicuius, aut consolatio doloris tui*); moreover, the idea of an autotherapeutic effect of letter writing, too, is anticipated in Cicero, cf. *Att.* 8.14.1 (dated 2 March 49 BC):

> *ut nihil ad te dem litterarum facere non possum, et simul, crede mihi, requiesco paulum in his miseriis, cum quasi tecum loquor, cum vero tuas epistulas lego, multo etiam magis.*
>
> It is impossible for me not to write to you, and, at the same time, in this misery, believe me, I find a little relief when I am as it were talking to you [sc. through my letters], and I find much greater relief even when I am reading your letters.[87]

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[83] Cf. e.g. Cic. *Fam.* 2.9.2: *te autem contemplans absentem et quasi tecum coram loquerer*, 15.16.1: *fit enim nescio qui, ut quasi coram adesse videare, cum scribo aliquid ad te*.

[84] Far more frequently Ovid employs the παρουσία-motif without linking it to the epistolographic context: cf. *Tr.* 3.4.55–6, 4.2.57: *haec ego summotus, qua possum, mente videbo*, *Pont.* 2.4.7–8, 3.4.69–70: *magnaque pars animae mecum vixistis, amici: / hac ego vos absens nunc quoque parte colo*, 4.4.45. For similar sentiments in the *Heroides* cf. e.g. *Ep.* 18.30: *et, quo non possum corpore, mente feror.*

[85] Cf. e.g. *Tr.* 5.7.67: *carminibus quaero miserarum oblivia rerum* (~ *Pont.* 1.5.55–6).

[86] Cf. e.g. *Tr.* 1.3.101–2: *et absentem . . . / vivat* [sc. *uxor Ovidii*] *ut auxilio sublevet usque suo*, 5.13.11: *quod tua me raro solatur epistula, peccas*, *Pont.* 1.6.15–20, 2.3.67: *tum tua me primum solari littera coepit*, 2.11.11–12: *grande voco meritum maestae solacia mentis, / cum pariter nobis illa tibique dares*, 3.6.11–14.

[87] Cf. also Cic. *Fam.* 4.13.4, 6.13.1, 6.22.1; Stroh (1981) 2648 ff. explores poetic

Hence, Ovid's handling of style and metre in the *Tristia* and the *Epistulae ex Ponto* is not only influenced by, but firmly embedded in his use of epistolographic conventions. Metre and style in the *Tristia* and the *Epistulae ex Ponto* cannot be explained by a pose or even a condition of poetic decline, and they are not related to a poetics of exile or to general characteristics of exile or exilic literature. In the end the only feature of the *Tristia* and the *Epistulae ex Ponto* that was prompted by the poet's experience of exile is his decision to write about his exile.[88] All other features can easily be explained by the choice of the genre of epistolography or by the fusion of earlier traditions of writing about exile on the one hand and elements adopted by the poet from his earlier works on the other.

precedents for the concept of 'tröstende Musen'. Yet another feature common to ancient epistolographic theory and practice on the one hand and Ovid's literary epistles from exile on the other hand is the prominence of proverbs and popular philosophy: cf. the theoretical statements by Demetr. *Eloc.* 232, Gregory of Nazianzus *Ep.* 51.5, 51.7, and Julius Victor *Ars Rhet.* 27, Cicero's entertaining use of philosophy in *Fam.* 15.16 (cf. the discussion in Thraede (1970) 43–4), and Ovid's reworking of consolatory treatises Περὶ φυγῆς in *Pont.* 1.3 (cf. p. 157 above), his treatment of typical Roman pastimes in *Pont.* 1.5.45–50 (~ Cic. *Sen.* 57–8, Col. 1.8.1–2, Quint. *Inst.* 12.11.18, Plin. *Pan.* 82, Suet. *Cl.* 5) or the concept of sleep as a *medicina publica* in *Pont.* 1.2.41 ff., 3.3.7 (~ Hippoc. *Aph.* 2.1–3, Men. *Mon.* 783, Cic. *Fin.* 5.54, Cels. *pr.* 69, *al.*, Plin. *Nat.* 26.118, Petr. 17.7), and his extensive use of proverbs and proverbial expressions such as *Tr.* 1.5.27–8: *dum iuvat et vultu ridet Fortuna sereno, / indelibatas cuncta sequuntur opes* (cf. 1.9.5–6, *Pont.* 2.3.23–4), 1.9.43–4: *sive aliquod morum seu vitae labe carentis / est pretium, nemo pluris emendus erat*, 1.9.66: *qua bene coepisti, sic pede semper eas* (cf. *Rem.* 390), 5.4.10: *nec pleno flumine cernit aquam* (cf. Prop. 1.9.15–16: *nunc tu / insanus medio flumine quaeris aquam*), or *Pont.* 4.2.13: *frondes erat addere silvis* (for a fuller collection of proverbial expressions in Ovid's exile poetry cf. Malaspina (1995) 80–1). Moreover, there are structural parallels (e.g. between *Pont.* 1.2.129–36,145–50 and the exemplary letter of friendship in Demetr. *Typ. Epist.* 1), and, in contrast to other corpora of literary epistles (e.g. the letters attributed to Plato and Epicurus as well as Seneca's *Epistulae Morales*), Ovid follows ancient epistolographic conventions (cf. Demetr. *Eloc.* 227 and 231) by inserting quite a few glimpses of his own character and life and of those of his recipients: he not only furnishes an autobiography (*Tr.* 4.10; cf. Fredericks (1976)), describes his house and garden outside Rome (*Pont.* 1.8.41–8), and mentions that his wife belonged to Fabius Maximus' *familia* (*Pont.* 1.2.136) and that he composed a *carmen nuptiale* for Fabius Maximus (*Pont.* 1.2.131–2) and a dirge for Messalla (*Pont.* 1.7.29–30), but the *Epistulae ex Ponto* also "carry precious pieces of information about events and persons" (Syme (1978) 37) of the Roman aristocracy (but also e.g. about the literary interests of the Thracian king Cotys, cf. *Pont.* 2.9.47–8 and Antip. Thess. *Anth. Pal.* 16.75.5–6). Cf. also Holzberg (1997) 182–3 who proposes Greek epistolary novels as a possible model for the *Tristia* and the *Epistulae ex Ponto*.

[88] Rahn (1968) 478–9 rightly accentuates the novelty of the poet's fate becoming a topic of poetry, which is a further development of the form of the elegiac epistle, which Ovid shaped in the *Heroides*.

This observation should not only warn us against analysing Ovid's exilic works using psychological paradigms[89] but also immediately calls into question the general category of exile literature: if Ovid was acquainted with literary traditions on exile and thence adopts motifs such as that of the inhospitable place of exile or the repeated comparisons with earlier mythical and historical exiles, we must generally ask whether the typical traits of exile literature discerned by Doblhofer, Claassen, and others (e.g. 'Sprachnot', self-heroization) are indeed prompted by the condition of exile or merely reflect the *Traditionsstrom* of literary motifs. Just as Ovid fashioned (and possibly even perceived)[90] his experience of exile along the lines of earlier myths and historical accounts of exile and displacement, later authors may fashion and/or perceive their experience along the lines of their literary predecessors, including Ovid.[91] In this sense exile literature is neither a collection of psychograms nor a literary "genre" or "mode",[92] but rather a stock of literary roles that keep being re-enacted.

[89] Hence, it is problematic to speak, with regard to the *Ibis*, of "obsessive tendencies" or "a manic alternative to the melancholy" of the *Tristia* and the *Epistulae ex Ponto* (thus Williams (2002) 378, whose view is to some degree anticipated by Doblhofer (1987) 218); likewise problematic are psychologizing interpretations of stylistic phenomena, such as Bernhardt's interpretation (1986) of the catalogues of Ovid's exile poetry (cf. n. 7 above) or González Vázquez' (1987) and Williams' ((2002) 365) interpretation of tautological expressions and adynata. Cf. also Chwalek's criticism of Claassen's differentiation between different personas of the exiled poet and his accentuation of the "poetische Verfremdung" or fictionalization of the poet's personal experience ((1996) 23 and *passim*). The high degree of fictionalization has even led Fitton Brown (1985) and others (cf. the survey of the question in Claassen (1986) 24) to doubt the reality of Ovid's banishment.

[90] Cf. pp. 4–5 (with n. 18) above, Rahn (1968) 492: "Die erlebte Wirklichkeit wird mit Hilfe der grandia exempla gedeutet", Besslich (1972) 183, and e.g. the role play in Petr. 9.5: *gladium strinxit* [sc. *Ascyltos*] *et "Si Lucretia es", inquit, "Tarquinium invenisti"*.

[91] This seems to be the case with Seneca, who clearly takes over from Ovid the motifs of uncivilized surroundings and intellectual decline as well as the imagery of 'collapse', cf. Innocenti Pierini (1980) 120 and 135, Gahan (1985), and Fantham pp. 179 n. 19 and 191 in this volume. On Ovid as an exemplary exile see also pp. 18–20 and Hexter, pp. 214 ff.; on exile and self-fashioning cf. pp. 4–6 and 11, 18–20 of the introduction above.

[92] Thus Claassen (1999a) 13–14.

CHAPTER NINE

# DIALOGUES OF DISPLACEMENT: SENECA'S CONSOLATIONS TO HELVIA AND POLYBIUS

Elaine Fantham

One element in common between Seneca's treatment of exile and that of Cicero, Seneca's most prominent predecessor in Latin prose, is the marked discrepancy between what these men wrote about exile during their own banishment and their treatment of exile in their earlier and later works. Just as Cicero's letters from exile show none of the political or philosophical rationalizations of his speeches on his return and of his moral treatises,[1] there is a marked difference between Seneca's treatment of exile in his consolations to Helvia and Polybius, written during his exile in Corsica, and the treatment of exile in his other works.

In the *Consolatio ad Marciam* written under Caligula, before Seneca's banishment, and again in works dated after his years in Corsica, exile is treated with little empathy.[2] Exile figures in the *Consolatio ad Marciam* (*Dial.* 6)[3] in conventional enumerations of life's misfortunes; thus in *Marc.* 20.2, Nature frees men from slavery and prison, and shows exiles *in patriam semper animum oculosque tendentibus*... *nihil interesse infra quos quis iaceat*, and at *Marc.* 22.3 exile follows natural disasters (*incendia, ruinae, naufragia*) and precedes imprisonment and suicide in the rising scale of external

[1] Miserable during his exile, Cicero recovered his philosophical and political equanimity on his restoration: Contrast the letters to Quintus (1.3) and Tullia (*Fam.* 14.1–4) with the self-justifying rationalizations of *Sest.* 42–50, and see Claassen (1999a) 133–9, 158–62 and Cohen, pp. 109 ff. above.

[2] On the dating of Seneca's prose works see Griffin (1976) App. A 395–6, with notes: Griffin largely retains the dating of Giancotti ((1957), cf. Giancotti (1976)), but takes into account Abel (1967). Ferrill (1966) 254 and n. 4 suggested the middle of AD 42 for *ad Helviam*, about a year after the banishment, and eighteen months before *ad Polybium.* See Manning (1981) introduction for *ad Marciam.* I am not convinced by the arguments of Bellemore (1992) for a late Tiberian dating (AD 34–7).

[3] I have used Reynolds' Oxford text (1977), with the introduction and notes of Traina (1987) for all three dialogues, and have also found useful for *Helv.* and *Polyb.* the edition and commentary of Duff (1915).

misfortunes: the pattern is repeated with variations in *De Providentia* (*Dial.* 3.4) and the 24th letter of the *Epistulae Morales* from Seneca's last years, in which the Roman statesman Rutilius Rufus is presented as the standard example of an exile.[4] Although exile is a fundamental element of the plot in Seneca's tragedies—as in Latin epic[5]—, the sorrows of exile are either rationalized or omitted: when Thyestes returns from exile, he markedly offsets his few complaints about the wandering of exile with platitudes about the merits of being humble and variants of the Epicurean doctrine λάθε βιώσας (*Thy.* 446–70).[6] So too in imitation of Seneca and allusion to the *ad Helviam* the author of the *Octavia* will put into Seneca's mouth the lines ([Sen.] *Oct.* 381–90):

*melius latebam procul ab invidiae, malis*
*remotus inter Corsici rupes maris*
*ubi liber animus et sui iuris mihi*
*semper vacabat studia recolenti mea.*
*o quam iuvabat, quo nihil maius parens*
*Natura genuit, operis immensi artifex,*
*caelum intueri, solis et cursus sacros*
*mundique motus, noctis alternas vices*
*orbemque Phoebes, astra quam cingunt vaga,*
*lateque fulgens aetheris magni decus.*

I was better off when hidden far from envy's mischief, out of the way amidst Corsica's sea crags, where my mind was free and sovereign and always at liberty for me to pursue my studies. Oh, what a delight it was to gaze at the greatest creation of Mother Nature, architect of this measureless fabric—the heavens, the holy paths of the sun, the movements of the cosmos, the recurrence of night and the circuit traced by Phoebe, with the wandering stars around her, and the far-shining glory of the great firmament.[7]

Surprisingly, in his adaptation of Euripides' *Phoenissae* Seneca has chosen to omit the generalizations about the condition of exile in Polynices'

[4] In *Ep.* 24.4 (only) Seneca adds the example of Metellus Numidicus. Apart from the passages cited above, Seneca returns to exile without adding any new considerations in similar passages at *Ep.* 67.7, 79.14, 82.11, and 98.12.

[5] Cf. the paper by Harrison, pp. 129 ff. above, and see Gaertner, p. 13 above.

[6] Compare the preceding chorus, 380–404, with the notes of Tarrant (1985), and Innocenti Pierini (1992): Lo Piccolo (1998) discusses Thyestes' speech in relation to *Oedipus* and the *Octavia* (see next note) but does not relate the tragic material to the treatment of exile in the prose works.

[7] Translation by Fitch (2004). Ferri (2003) ad loc. cites both the parallels from *ad Helviam* and from Seneca's other prose works.

dialogue with his mother (Eur. *Phoen.* 388–405) and keeps to the issue between Polynices and his usurping brother.[8]

Of the works written by Seneca during the time of his exile—the epigrams attributed to his banishment are probably a later forgery[9]—only the consolations to Helvia (*Dial.* 12) and Polybius (*Dial.* 11) consider the topic of exile, and in each of these *Dialogi* Seneca treats the issue both as it affects him personally, and in more general terms: but both texts are remarkable for their indirections.[10] Thus in these formal consolations Seneca avoids any clear reference to the circumstances that had led to his banishment. Nominally, Seneca had been banished on the grounds of adultery, but the real reason for his banishment is more likely to have been his partisanship with the enemies of the emperor's wife Messalina. The condemnation of Livilla, sister of Caligula and cousin/niece of the new emperor Claudius, on the grounds of adultery in AD 41 demanded the implication and condemnation of someone as her partner.[11] While Seneca was probably quite innocent, and so theoretically had good reason to raise the issue of the grounds for his banishment, the reason for his silence about this matter is the fact that the two dialogues—despite their respective addressees and their personal tone[12]—are

[8] This is all the more remarkable as the dialogue of Polynices with his mother in Euripides' *Phoenissae* had been a model for all Greek moralizing about exile, used briefly by Musonius (*De Exilio*, p. 48.6 Hense/p. 72 Lutz) and more extensively by Plutarch (*De Exil.* 605F–607A, see Nesselrath, pp. 91, 97, 104 above); of course Seneca was not free to say with Polynices "The folly of the mighty must be borne".

[9] On the epigrams see Innocenti Pierini (1990b) 129, 141, 149 and (1995a,b). On the continuing question of their authenticity see now Holzberg (2005).

[10] Ferrill (1966) describes the *Helv.* as "insincere", but only because he recognizes that the dialogue is intended for an audience of the emperor and his advisers, and is unlikely to have been Seneca's first direct communication with his mother from exile.

[11] On the historical background cf. Giancotti (1976) 37–49, Grimal (1978) 90–8 and Griffin (1976) 59–62, based on Tac. *Ann.* 14.63.2, Suet. *Cl.* 29.1, Dio Cass. 60.8.5. It is generally thought that the same kind of politically convenient accusations explain the relatively mild treatment of some of the alleged adulterers of the elder Julia in 2 BC and of Silanus, the supposed adulterer of her daughter Julia in AD 8, whom Tiberius permitted to return to Rome. The real target was the princess involved, and adultery probably masked actual or feared political conspiracy. This is made explicit by Tac. *Ann.* 14.62, where Anicetus is promised an easy exile if he will admit to adultery with the innocent Octavia.

[12] In this respect they resemble Ovid's *Epistulae ex Ponto* (cf. p. 171 n. 87 above), and Seneca's two dialogues from exile have the same kind of addressees as the two extremes of Ovid's spectrum: his mother, an apolitical woman, whom he could surely trust to believe his innocence and work for pardon, as Ovid trusted his wife, and Polybius, the emperor's trusted freedman, with whom we might compare Ovid's correspondents close to the imperial family (particularly Fabius Maximus, Salanus, Suillius Rufus). Seneca never names Ovid or any other exile of the principate in connection with exile itself,

public documents, in which Seneca cannot protest his innocence without accusing the emperor Claudius either of injustice or of being misled.[13] Instead, Seneca had to imply his own guilt and appeal to the emperor's clemency in order to be recalled.[14]

I have called the consolations for his mother Helvia and the imperial freedman Polybius 'dialogues of displacement' for more than one reason. Firstly and most obviously, they are dialogues of displacement because of Seneca's own displaced status in exile in Corsica. Secondly, the consolations to Helvia and Polybius are marked by a generic displacement, for Seneca, as we shall see, displaces elements typical of one type of consolation (consolation for exile) to another type (consolation for bereavement).[15] Thirdly, the generic displacement is also personal, as Seneca shifts the focus away from himself to the losses suffered by Helvia and Polybius.

I shall begin with Seneca's consolation to Helvia. First it is remarkable how much of *ad Helviam* is focussed away from Seneca, from exile, and

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but Ovid was the obvious precedent, and Seneca has been shown to know and use his poetry from exile: cf. Innocenti Pierini (1990b) 105–66 and p. 172 n. 91 in this volume.

[13] Thus Seneca's situation is very similar to that of Ovid as characterized by Tarrant (1995) 73: "Ovid's rhetorical position in the exile-poetry is … compromised by the limits placed on what he could say about his situation. Unable to disclose the nature of the *error* that had angered Augustus, he cannot credibly argue that his punishment was out of proportion to the offence; bound to endorse the image of the *princeps* as clement, he cannot adequately express his conviction that Augustus has treated him cruelly".

[14] Along with the imposed silence about his alleged offence comes what we might call an imposed explicitness, since the writer cannot guarantee his loyalty without explicit praise of the imperial house—or at least those of its members currently in good odour. This can be seen even before Seneca's exile in his *Consolatio ad Marciam*, with its enumeration of the sorrows of the dynasty, from Livia and Octavia (*Marc.* 2–4) to Augustus and Tiberius (*Marc.* 15), foreshadowing the prominence given to Claudius and the imperial bereavements in *ad Polybium*.

[15] On the development of the genre of consolation see Kassel (1958), and on the classical tradition of exile prior to Seneca, Motto/Clark (1993). Although consolation for bereavement is the most fundamental form of *consolatio*, there is no need to see consolation for exile as modelled upon it. Each situation had its basis of topoi, and each required comfort of the recipient for loss—of a beloved person, or of them all, family, friends and native land; but the latter was reversible and would seem to justify pity rather than grief. Greek and Roman examples of consolation over exile survive, starting from Teles in the third century BC. Apart from Teles, Plutarch and Favorinus (see Nesselrath pp. 87 ff. above), mention must be made of Cic. *Tusc.* 5.106–9, and Musonius (who is preserved in extracts and notes made by pupils, see Lutz (1947) 3–20, Morford (2002) 203–8). Musonius writes from his own exile on the island of Gyaros to console an anonymous addressee; towards the end of the pagan tradition there is the long harangue delivered to the exiled Cicero by a certain 'Philiscus' in Dio Cass. 38.18–29, cf. Gaertner, p. 4 above.

from Corsica. True to his dedication Seneca concentrates his opening (1–3) and most of the last third of the dialogue (14–19) on Helvia's own situation, balancing her loss in his exile first against her family bereavements, then against her surviving consolations. Half the dialogue is focussed on Helvia as *materfamilias*. Seneca moves to the personal core of his argument when he sets out his premises in 4.1:

> *constitui enim vincere tuum dolorem, non circumscribere. vincam autem, puto, primum si ostendero nihil me pati propter quod ipse dici possim miser, nedum propter quod miseros etiam quos contingo faciam, deinde si ad te transiero et probavero ne tuam quidem gravem esse fortunam, quae tota ex mea pendet.*
>
> For I have decided to overcome your grief, not to confine it. But I shall overcome it, I think, if I first show that I suffer nothing for which I myself could be called wretched, nor anything for which I should make those close to me miserable, and finally if I turn to you and prove that your situation, which entirely depends on mine, is not serious either.

Sections 5–13 expand on his own situation chiefly by considering exile in the most general, indeed universal, terms, then in 14 he leads back to Helvia's circumstances, arguing that she should not feel sorrow either at her loss of protection, or in longing for her son. Only with the final section 20 are we brought back to Seneca and a positive representation of his own activities.

The dialogue is upbeat: Seneca begins by stressing the originality of his own conception and arguments,[16] alluding confidently to his own triumph over misfortune (1.1: *ne a me victa fortuna aliquem meorum vinceret*) before listing the harsh blows fortune has inflicted upon his mother and their family (2.2: *omnis... luctus*, and 2.4: *nullam tibi fortuna vacationem dedit*). Fortune is the safest abstraction to hold responsible for bereavements, but also for misfortunes in life. Thus Fortune is prominent in the early stages of all three consolations (*ad Marciam, ad Helviam, ad Polybium*) when one's losses are still being reviewed, and reproaches still permitted, but in *ad Helviam* Seneca is quick to assert the positive affirmation of values that transcend death and hardship (5–6), and lays increasing stress not on arbitrary Fortune but on nature and necessity (6.8: *lex et naturae necessitas*) as the unquestionable controller of all events.

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[16] Cf. *Helv.* 1.2–3: *cum omnia clarissimorum ingeniorum monumenta ad compescendos moderandosque luctus composita evolverem, non inveniebam exemplum eius qui consolatus suos esset... quid quod novis verbis nec ex vulgari et cotidiana sumptis adlocutione opus erat homini ad consolandos suos ex ipso rogo caput adlevanti?*

The main focus of 1–3 has been on Helvia, recalling for her, but more for his readers, each of her recent losses, and pointedly assimilating her grief over the blow of his exile (itself compared to death) with her mourning over the blows of those recently taken from her by death.[17] It also sets up, as he does for Marcia (*Marc.* 1.2–2.5, 16, 24–6), a portrait of the family which is her world. It is a world of three generations, which opens with a list of losses that reaches from the deaths of Helvia's mother, who died in giving her birth (*Helv.* 2.4), to the death of a loving uncle and of her husband within one month (2.4), to the deaths of three grandchildren, including the loss of Seneca's own little son whom she had buried only weeks before he was taken from her (2.5: *filium meum in manibus et in osculis tuis mortuum funeraveras*). Even his own bereavement is expressed only as *her* loss, his exile as being taken from *her*, dramatized in the eloquent figure of *her* mourning for the living (2.5: *hoc adhuc defuerat tibi, lugere vivos*).

Seneca does little in the first part of his consolation (1–4) to balance this with Helvia's surviving family. This is because he will enumerate her living family, as he did Marcia's (*Marc.* 16), later (*Helv.* 18–19) where it will bring her most comfort. So starting in *Helv.* 18 he reminds his mother of his brothers whom Fortune has left unharmed, and of their children Marcus and Novatilla. Marcus is praised for his charm, Novatilla not for herself, but for her potential as mother of great-grandchildren, and her need, as a motherless girl, for Helvia's protective upbringing. From Helvia's side of the family, Seneca mentions her living but absent father and last of all devotes *Helv.* 19 to her devoted sister who had looked after him for many years and as a widow provided a heroic model of wifely modesty and loyalty for Helvia's comfort. Thus, Seneca's consolation to his mother takes full account of his addressee's personality and needs, of the sources of pride and affection proper to an elite Roman *materfamilias*.

However, our concern is exile itself, and we need to consider what Seneca has to say about exile in general, before considering an important passage which provides displaced comment on his own attitude, and the few direct evocations of Seneca's own situation. Seneca begins

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[17] Cf. with *ex ipso rogo caput adlevanti* quoted above, references to *vulnera tua* (1.1, 3.1), *luctus* (1.2, 2.2, 2.4 and 2.5), and the medical imagery applied to both loss by death and loss by exile. See also p. 13 n. 64 (medical imagery in consolations) and p. 159 n. 24 ('exile as death' theme) above.

his argument in *Helv.* 5.1 with the idea that man needs little to live well: *id egit rerum natura ut ad bene vivendum non magno apparatu opus esset*—the wise man has always worked to achieve self-sufficiency. He writes that he has used the thoughts of philosophers as his support in preparing himself for misfortune (5.2), treating Fortune as ready to take away from him anything she has given: this is how the wise man can keep an unconquered spirit (5.5). Although exile seems terrible in popular opinion (5.6), all it means in fact is a change of place (6.1: *loci commutatio*, cf. 8.1: *commutatio locorum*, 10.1: *loci mutatio*),[18] which may additionally entail the evils of poverty (10–12), shame (13.1: *paupertas tolerabilis est, si ignominia absit*) and contempt (13.6: *nemo ab alio contemnitur nisi a se ante contemptus est*, 13.8: *hoc fuit contumeliam ipsi contumeliae facere*). First then he will show that men have constantly moved away from their country: Rome itself is full of immigrants attracted by the rewards it offered to both virtues and vices (6.2–3: *nullum non hominum genus concurrit in urbem et virtutibus et vitiis magna pretia ponentem*). Using an argument that is expanded more fully in Plutarch's Περὶ φυγῆς (602A–603B; see Nesselrath, p. 95 above) he names islands used as places of exile, like Seriphus, Gyara and Cossura (Pantelleria), which none the less attract some travellers for pleasure (*Helv.* 6.4).[19] Seneca's main argument moves from voluntary travel to a theory that human restlessness is a product of man's heavenly nature, since the constellations also travel. Next he moves from individual to national migrations (7.1: *gentes populosque universos mutasse sedem*), to Greek colonies and foreign conquests, all as proof of human instability (7.2: *levitas*) which he goes so far as to call "communal exile" (7.5: *publica exilia*) including the foundation of Rome itself and Patavium. As in Ovid's sequence of heroic founders of Italian cities in *Fasti* 4 (63–80), Aeneas follows Evander, Diomedes and Antenor, and national history is the climax of his argument: Rome itself was founded by an exile, and in turn

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[18] Cf. Gaertner, p. 3 n. 10 above, for parallels and links with ancient etymological thinking.

[19] In describing Corsica in *Helv.* 9 (cf. *Polyb.* 18.9) Seneca freely departs from the traditional arguments. Without naming Ovid, as Innocenti Pierini (1990b) 122–35 has shown, Seneca incorporates clear echoes of Ovid's highly coloured description of Tomis and the neighbouring peoples. Gahan (1985) 145–7 shows that the barrenness and barbarity of Corsica alleged by Seneca (6.5, cf. 8 and 9.1) is disproved by accounts in Diodorus Siculus (5.13), Strabo (5.2.7) and Pliny the Elder (*Nat.* 16.197) of its abundant fruit trees, and fine harbours, and is adapted from Ovid's portrayal of the more barbarous world of Tomis.

sent out colonies (7.7); here he personalizes his argument with a miniature history of Corsica and its successive waves of Greek, barbarian and Roman colonists (7.8–10).[20]

It is at this point that Seneca approaches the moral high ground (8.1–10.1) and cites two republican authorities for the two assets men cannot lose in exile: Varro for the glory of nature which can be found everywhere, and Brutus for the virtue which a man can take with him wherever he goes. These universal blessings easily outbalance the three reproaches against exile that it brings poverty, shame and contempt.

First Seneca deals with poverty (10.1), chiefly by disparaging its opposite, luxury: We do not know for certain that Seneca enjoyed his own revenues on Corsica, just as we do not know in what kind of house he lived, what domestic staff he had or even whether he had a wife—Pompeia Paulina or an earlier wife—staying with him. Seneca's silence about his daily life, like that of Ovid, may simply be dictated by a sense of generic propriety, and the belief that a man's private lifestyle should not be part of his public persona.[21] We know that adulterers forfeited half their property under the *lex Iulia*,[22] but it is unlikely that Claudius cut off the rest of Seneca's private resources. Instead of a discussion of his personal circumstances the mention of poverty leads into a too familiar and unrealistic diatribe against luxury and the claim that poverty can rescue men from the excesses of wealth (10.2–11.4); its essence returns towards the end of 11: the man who keeps to his natural needs will not feel poverty, since he is rich in the wealth of the spirit. Free of material luxury, the spirit is light and unfettered, akin to the gods and equal to every world and age. But poverty matters, and it is noticeable that the repudiation of wealth and noble poverty of moral exempla like Socrates and Regulus occupy a far greater part of Seneca's dialogue than shame and contempt. Only in 13, the last section before he restores the focus on Helvia, does Seneca move on to shame, though he distinguishes it as able to break men's spirit even without exile or poverty. His answer is that spiritual wisdom can overcome every kind of misfortune and human weakness: the wise man has withdrawn from the opinions

[20] Cf. Gaertner and Bowie on pp. 7–8, 24 ff. above on the tradition of foundation myths and tales of colonization.

[21] Cf. Desideri, p. 195 below, for a similar silence about the daily life in exile in the speeches of Dio Chrysostom.

[22] Cf. Treggiari (1991) 295–6, citing Paulus, *Sent.* 2.26.4: the adulteress forfeited half her dowry and one third of her property; the adulterer half of his property.

of the common crowd, and can make a criminal execution like that of Socrates into a badge of pride (13.4: *neque enim poterat carcer videri in quo Socrates erat*). So too with political rejection (13.6–7), illustrated by the case of Cato (defeated as candidate for the consulship), and Aristides (who was ostracized but returned to help save Athens in 480 BC). Seneca's last claim is that exile rises above contempt: when a great man falls, he remains great in his downfall (13.8: *si magnus vir cecidit, magnus iacuit*).[23] There is no idea here that does not find a parallel in the Stoic Musonius or in Plutarch.[24]

But let us return now to the republicans Varro and Brutus. When did Varro say that universal nature was a compensation for exile? Is it not likely that he wrote this after Pharsalus, before he was formally authorized by Caesar to return to Italy? Or when he was considering the undeclared exile of so many Pompeians from Nigidius Figulus to Caecina or Ligarius?[25] For although Caesar had declared the lives forfeit of anyone who continued to oppose him in battle after Pompey's death,[26] the status of those who fought only until Pharsalus was far more indefinite: they were not, as far as we know, named and condemned, but even Varro had to wait before he could return. Brutus is introduced in 9.4–7 of Seneca's *ad Helviam*, in order to quote from his moral treatise *De Virtute*, identified by Hendrickson[27] with the letter of comfort that he sent Cicero before 46 BC. Cicero mentions the work in his dialogue *Brutus*[28] and describes how he was heartened by Brutus' *epistula ex Asia missa*, a letter that must have been written in the period after Pharsalus,

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[23] Traina (1987) notes the echo of *Iliad* 16.776.

[24] Compare the excerpts from Musonius: exile as relocation, as source of leisure for contemplation, making men healthy by withdrawal of luxury, not imposing shame on men in view of unjust condemnation of Aristides; and Plutarch's treatise: that nature is universal and no land is peculiarly native (600E), that men have voluntarily left home and prospered abroad (604D–605B), that exile does not mean loss of liberty, honour, fame and respect, but brings leisure (602C–604C); see Nesselrath's analysis, pp. 93–8 above.

[25] Compare Cicero's correspondence with these men in *Fam.* 4.13 (Nigidius), 6.6–8 (Caecina), and 6.13–14 (Ligarius) and see Cohen, p. 120 above.

[26] See Gelzer (1968) 243, 253.

[27] See Hendrickson (1939) 401–13 and Douglas (1966) xi. Seneca refers to Brutus only three times; only once in a political context (in the late *De Beneficiis* 2.20, for his obligation to Caesar for his pardon), but twice, here and at *Ep.* 95.45, for his ethical writings. *Ep.* 95.45 alludes to his Περὶ τοῦ καθήκοντος.

[28] Cf. Cic. *Brut.* 11–12 (Atticus speaking): *legi…perlibenter epistulam quam ad te Brutus misit ex Asia…nihil ante epistulam Bruti mihi accidit quod vellem aut quod aliqua ex parte sollicitudines adlevaret meas.* It is likely that *Brut.* 250: *vidi enim Mytilenis nuper virum atque, ut dixi, plane virum,* is also a paraphrase from Brutus' treatise.

before Caesar made him governor of Cisalpine Gaul. But what Seneca tells us is that Brutus found Marcellus, another republican,[29] living in exile at Mytilene, and living most happily, more eager for liberal studies than at any other time. Indeed the man's nobility of spirit made Brutus feel that it was he, not Marcellus, who was going into exile.[30] Brutus apparently went further, writing that Caesar passed by Mytilene so as not to meet Marcellus, because he could not bear to see the man disfigured (*Helv.* 9.6). But while Brutus had given Caesar a humane and generous reason for avoiding the encounter,[31] Seneca, not Brutus, adds, that Caesar could not bear to see Marcellus out of shame (9.6: *Caesar erubuit*), and Seneca rubs it in, constructing for Marcellus one of his ever-ready speeches *in persona—prosopopoeiae.*[32] Proud that everywhere is the wise man's country, Seneca's Marcellus contrasts Caesar, already kept away from Rome and Italy for ten years and dragged by the civil war to Africa, then to Spain, distracted by treacherous Egypt (this is not chronological order) and the whole world (9.8):

> *nunc ecce trahit illum ad se Africa, resurgentis belli minis plena, trahit Hispania, quae fractas et afflictas partes refovet, trahit Aegyptus infida, totus denique orbis… aget illum per totum orbem victoria sua.*
>
> Now he is drawn to Africa, which is full of threats of war flaring up again; he is drawn to Spain, which is restoring his opponents' broken and battered forces; he is drawn to treacherous Egypt, in short he is drawn to the whole earth… his victory is driving him across the entire world.

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[29] Cf. Grimal (1978) 98 on Seneca's *interpretatio Stoica* of Marcellus (an adherent of the Peripatetics) and Brutus (an Academic). Marcus Marcellus had opposed Caesar violently as consul of 51 BC but is not known to have been involved even as a non-combatant like Varro and Cicero in the Thessalian campaign. In 46 BC Marcellus was the focus of a major political effort by Cicero and other senatorial conservatives to have Caesar agree to his return to Italy (see Cohen, pp. 120 ff. above), and Cicero diverges from his rule of not discussing the living (*Brut.* 248: *quam vellem… de his etiam oratoribus qui hodie sunt tibi dicere luberet*) for only two orators in the *Brutus*, for Caesar and Marcellus (*Brut.* 248–53), but without a hint of their political differences: it is literary praise, and a stylistic description (χαρακτήρ) which steers his juxtaposition of the two political antagonists.

[30] Cf. Cohen pp. 120–1 above.

[31] Caesar probably had sound political motives, because we know the people of Lesbos were deeply loyal to Pompey, cf. Rowe (2002) 113–15, and Lucan 5.723–4, and Pompey's speech, 8.109–46.

[32] Cf. *Helv.* 9.7–8. *Prosopopoeiae*, or speeches in character, were a rhetorical exercise included by *grammatici* in both the Hellenistic and Roman curriculum, and developed by rhetoricians, teaching older pupils to compose *suasoriae* or advice to a historical figure. Griffin (1976) App. B 413–15 has pointed out the prominence of both anonymous interlocutors and identified persons as speakers in Seneca's dialogues, suggesting that it is this impersonation which has given the treatises the name of *Dialogi.*

Caesar's victory will drive him over all the earth: "let foreign races revere and worship him, but you [sc. Marcellus] can live content with the admiration of Brutus" (9.8: *illum suspiciant et colant gentes: tu vive Bruto miratore contentus*).

In this passage Seneca does not criticize Caesar except by implication: if he says Caesar blushed to see Marcellus, this is only very slightly different from Brutus' tactful claim that Caesar did not want to see Marcellus ruined, and if Brutus felt that he was himself going into exile in leaving Marcellus behind, this need not imply that he felt life under Caesar's domination was exile. But let us consider instead how Seneca is implying a parallel with his own case. Like Marcellus (*Helv.* 9.4: *beatissime viventem, neque umquam cupidiorem bonarum artium quam illo tempore*), Seneca is a lover of wisdom, and so lives most happily in the pursuit of philosophical studies. Seneca adds another detail: when the Senate supplicated Caesar to let Marcellus return, it was so melancholy that it seemed everyone shared Brutus' attitude, and were pleading not for Marcellus but for themselves, as if they would feel themselves exiled by suffering his absence (9.6).[33] Could Seneca have coined any parallel more flattering to himself and more negative in its implications about life at Rome in his absence?

Innocenti Pierini ((1990b) 105–66) has shown that Seneca uses Ovidian themes in exile, but does so without naming his predecessor in imperial displeasure:[34] he avoids even the favoured exemplum of Rutilius Rufus as long as he is himself in exile, since Rutilius refused to return when invited. Marcellus is a different case: because the principate had always distanced itself from Caesar's period of sole and autocratic power as dictator,[35] it was possible for Seneca to use the Pompeians exiled or excluded by Caesar after Pharsalus and the implied loss of freedom of speech under Caesar without also implying the analogy with the political oppression under the principate, from which Seneca himself might seem freer in Corsica than at Rome.[36] It must have been in the context

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[33] He does not add what we know from Cicero's letters (*Fam.* 4.8–12) that Marcellus had to be cajoled into agreeing to return, and was killed in Greece without ever coming back to Rome. Cf. Cohen pp. 121–4 above.

[34] Cf. Innocenti Pierini (1990b) 105: "L'opera poetica Ovidiana dell'esilio, che non viene mai citata *ex professo*".

[35] On Augustan reticence over Caesar see Syme (1939) 317–20. As for freedom of speech, it began to be curtailed in the last decade of Augustus (after AD 4) with the exploitation of the charge of *maiestas* whether by the emperors themselves or by those who wished to eliminate their political and personal enemies.

[36] As Musonius points out (9.73–5, trans. Lutz (1947) = p. 48.15 ff. Hense), "it is not

of Marcellus that Brutus declared it was enough if men were free to take their virtues into exile with them (*Helv.* 8.1: *satis hoc... quod licet in exilium euntibus virtutes suas secum ferre*). The allusion to Marcellus is Seneca's most pointed displacement, set as it is at the heart of his dialogue of consolation.

After recalling to Helvia the comfort she can derive from pride in her virtue (16.3, 16.5: *non potes itaque ad optinendum dolorem muliebre nomen praetendere, ex quo te virtutes tuae seduxerunt*), from the examples of republican mothers who bore the deaths of their sons bravely (16.6), or went with them into exile (as Rutilia, sister of Rutilius Rufus, followed Cotta into exile (16.7)), from turning to philosophical studies (17.3: *liberalia studia*),[37] and from her surviving family (18), Seneca leads gradually into a eulogy of her sister whom he proposes to Helvia as a model of loyalty and fortitude in bereavement (19.4–5: *carissimum virum amiserat... dum cogitat de viri funere nihil de suo timuit...*, 19.7: *huic parem virtutem exhibeas oportet*). Only in the short final section does he return to his own life in exile (20.1): *laetum et alacrem velut optimis rebus*.[38] His mind is free of routine obligations and at leisure for literary studies (*levioribus studiis*) and the study of natural science, of earth, the tides of the sea, the meteorology of the lower atmosphere and finally for contemplation of the divine upper atmosphere and its own immortal nature (20.2: *aeternitatis suae memor*).[39] Without protesting his innocence, Seneca has presented himself throughout the dialogue as a man of clear conscience, and austere physical habits—even the *libido* we might have associated with the charge of adultery (cf. p. 175 above) is reduced to its reproductive function and dismissed in 13.3.[40]

The consolation to Polybius, Claudius' freedman secretary *a libellis*, presents a very different state of mind: the opening is lost but Seneca's first allusion to himself in our text is pathetic (2.1):

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as exiles that men fear to say what they think, but as men afraid lest from speaking pain or death or punishment... shall befall them. Fear is the cause of this, not exile. For to many people... even though dwelling safely in their native city, fear of what seems to them dire consequences of freedom of speech is present". On freedom of speech see also p. 9 n. 43 and pp. 16–17 above.

[37] Seneca makes it clear that she was prevented from sharing in his youthful study of philosophy by his father: 17.1 picks up the allusion from 15.3.

[38] Cf. 8.5: *alacres itaque et erecti quocumque res tulerit intrepido gradu properemus.*

[39] On exile making possible, or even inspiring to, philosophical and other studies see pp. 10–11, 17, 94–5 above.

[40] Cf. 13.3: *si cogitas libidinem non voluptatis causa homini datam sed propagandi generis.*

> *non recuso quicquid lacrimarum fortunae meae superfuit tuae fundere; inveniam etiam nunc per hos exhaustos iam fletibus domesticis oculos quod effluat…*
>
> I do not refuse to shed for your fortune whatever tears my own fortune has left me; even now I shall find some that will flow from my eyes, which are already drained by my personal woes…[41]

Without following the argument of the treatise,[42] let me concentrate on three issues: firstly the spirit in which it is written; secondly the peculiar rhetorical features that mark its architecture, and finally what Seneca has to say about his condition and the incentives to relieve him which Polybius could duly transmit to Claudius.

This dialogue's flattery of the freedman Polybius and of his imperial master has troubled many scholars from the age of enlightenment on. How did it relate to the fawning appeal to Messalina and various freedmen which Dio (61.10.2) claims Seneca wrote? As Atkinson and Innocenti Pierini note, Diderot tried to exonerate what he saw as Seneca's unworthy fawning on Polybius by treating the surviving text as a forgery prompted by Dio's tale,[43] but it is far more likely that our text is a genuine revision of Seneca's original and possibly private appeal to Polybius, and perhaps modified by the composition of a new opening for inclusion in the published *Dialogi.* But the opening (whether new or original) was either lost or rejected as an interpolation.[44] The only problem I see with assuming late publication is the fact that as Nero's principate progressed, it grew increasingly fashionable to mock Claudius. Should we instead read the dialogue as ironic? Momigliano, Alexander, and Marchesi[45] and some recent scholars[46] have tried to exonerate Seneca from flattery by assuming irony. But there is no place for irony in the genre of *consolatio*, nor was Seneca's exile as a political suspect the time for such experimentation.[47] Innocenti Pierini accepts the work as

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[41] Translation by Basore (1932), modified.

[42] For an extended discussion of this dialogue, see Atkinson (1985) 860–84.

[43] Atkinson (1985) 860–7 and Innocenti Pierini (1990b) 213–14, citing Diderot's *Essai sur les règnes de Claude et Néron et sur la vie et les écrits de Sénèque, pour servir d'introduction à la lecture de ce philosophe*, Paris 1782.

[44] This is compatible with, but goes further than Abel (1967) 92 and n. 61.

[45] Cf. Momigliano (1934) 75–6, Alexander (1943), Marchesi (1944).

[46] See Atkinson (1985) who after a considered discussion of the prejudices behind scholars' acceptance or rejection of irony, cites troubling or inconsistent elements in the dialogue and holds out for a secondary and ironic meaning.

[47] Compare Traina (1987) 20: "la posta in gioco era troppo grossa perchè Seneca potesse concedersi il rischioso lusso dell'ironia".

conformist panegyric, and panegyric was necessary for Seneca's purpose. I heartily agree with Miriam Griffin's comment that Pliny the Younger understood the realities of despotism, and the level of flattery required for powerful freedmen; as with the Senate's honorific decree for Pallas under the same emperor. Tacitus (*Ann.* 12.53) and Pliny (*Ep.* 8.6.3 and 8.6.13) accepted the obsequious language at face value: these writers knew the level of flattery required in addressing or referring to the living emperor.[48] Emperors were not more stupid than other readers, to let irony sail over their imperial heads; on the contrary they were deeply suspicious.[49] I will go further: we should not let Tacitus' automatic resentment of the power of imperial freedmen, and the racism and snobbery that made them the butt of satirists like Juvenal, blind us to the fact that these Greeks and ex-slaves were highly educated. Seneca knows about Polybius' literary enterprises.[50] Why exclude the possibility that his literary interests brought him to know and actually like, maybe even respect, Polybius, who seems to have been less of an intriguer[51] than his peers? Again the generic tradition of panegyric which had evolved from Vergil's *Georgics* onward made it useless, even counterproductive, for a writer to raise issues that concerned the emperor without adopting the forms and levels of eulogy expected in any genre.

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[48] See Griffin (1976) Appendix B.3, pp. 415–16, adducing the similar case of senatorial panegyric of Pallas. Surely the reiterated formulaic praise for the restraint of every member of the imperial family in the recently published *senatus consultum de Gnaeo Pisone patre* from the time of Tiberius confirms the degree to which this type of conformism was now required.

[49] See the general thesis of Bartsch (1994), who nonetheless favours ironic subtexts in many works under Nero and the Flavian dynasty.

[50] Polybius' *studia* (cf. 8.2, 11.5, 18.1) included prose versions of Homer and Vergil, each translated into the other language, cf. 11.5: *carmina quae tu ita resolvisti ut quamvis structura illorum recesserit permaneat tamen gratia (sic enim illa ex alia lingua in aliam transtulisti ut... omnes virtutes in alienam te orationem secutae sint).*

[51] On Polybius' culture, amiability, and (relative) innocence of intrigue, see Grimal (1978) 99–100.

We have no evidence for Tacitus' prejudice against Polybius himself, despite his resentment of the power of freedmen (cf. *Ann.* 12.60.6 on Claudius). The extant text of the *Annals* does not report Polybius' participation in any intrigue. Suetonius mentions only that Polybius walked in the position of honour between two consuls (*Cl.* 28), and the same envy of his power is reflected in the anecdote (cited by Bartsch (1994) 76–7 from Dio Cass. 60.29.3) of the theatre audience applying to the ex-slave Polybius a line of Menander "unbearable is a whipping slave's success"—to which he quickly retorted with another quotation: "yes, former goatherds oft rose to be kings". He tried to counter Messalina's intrigue with Silius and was executed for it (Dio Cass. 60.31.2); we need not believe the rumour that Polybius too had been her lover (compare the similar gossip about other imperial women cited in n. 11 above).

So I shall read this *consolatio* straight, taking for granted the traditional themes of the genre of consolation.[52] In *ad Marciam* Seneca had noted that the regular practice was to begin with recommendations and end with examples (*Marc.* 2.1: *a praeceptis incipere… in exemplis desinere*); in accordance with this rule Seneca opens *ad Polybium* with recommendations for his addressee's behaviour (the *praecepta* of 2–12) and then moves on to models (*exempla*: 14–17), with a reprise of *praecepta* in 18.1–9.[53] At its heart (12.3–14) is the emperor Claudius, already praised in *Polyb.* 6.5–8.2, where the central claim is: *fas tibi non est salvo Caesare de fortuna queri* (7.4). At 7.4, and again in 12.3 (*in hoc uno tibi satis praesidii, solacii est*) Claudius' success and his merits are the best reason for Polybius to be consoled. But Claudius is not only a reason for consolation (14.1: *publicum omnium hominum solacium*), he will be an active consoler: he is not only an *exemplum*, but one who will himself provide Polybius with a chain of *exempla* for his edification in 14.2–16.3 (cf. 14.2: *has adloquendi partes occupaverit:… omnem vim doloris tui divina eius contundet auctoritas*).

Seneca is of course using Polybius as a discreet form of mediation with the princeps: although his official function was secretary *a studiis*, the dialogue shows he was also functioning *a libellis*, and so the proper recipient of petitions to the emperor: but there is also good literary precedent for the petitioner not to address himself directly to the ruler.[54] Rhetorically, however, the format of this particular dialogue should give us pause. Griffin (1976) has argued convincingly that Seneca called his treatises *Dialogi* because of their rhetorical technique of utilizing fictional objections from his addressee, or involving real or historical interlocutors in his argument.[55] Such snatches of imaginary speech are a form of *sermocinatio*, and correspond, according to Quintilian,[56] to one use of the Greek term διάλογος. But Seneca goes well beyond this routine rhetorical figure, using apostrophe to turn his comment away from his addressee towards absent and even abstract beings, and as we saw, he favours a still bolder figure, ventriloquizing or impersonating other men's admonitions (*prosopopoeiae*) in the dialogues. In this respect

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[52] On these see the detailed treatment by Innocenti Pierini (1990b) 218–29, and Motto/Clark (1993) 189–96.

[53] Cf. Abel (1967) 74, 91–2.

[54] We may compare Ovid's use of Fabius Maximus in the early poems of the *Epistulae ex Ponto*, and of Salanus as his intermediary to Germanicus in *Pont.* 2.5 and Suillius in *Pont.* 4.8.

[55] See Griffin (1976) App. B.2, especially p. 414.

[56] Cf. Quint. *Inst.* 9.2.31 and other passages cited by Griffin (1976) 415–16.

the consolation to Polybius goes way beyond its predecessors. Thus the early consolation for Marcia raises a number of imagined objections, in the conventional form of single topic sentences (cf. 7.1, 9.1, 12.3, 16.1). In addition Seneca impersonates the philosopher Areus' admonitions to Livia (4.3–5.6), creates a one liner for Cornelia, mother of the Gracchi (16.3), and four lines of speech for Marcia herself (16.8). His most complex impersonation conjures up a speech warning a man intending to go to Syracuse of both the pleasures and hardships of the journey (17.2–5) and balances it with a justification of life's vicissitudes by Nature, before converting his own argument into a corresponding displaced speech: *puta nascenti me tibi venire in consilium* (18.1 leading into the speech of 18.2–8). Finally he imagines, or perhaps recalls, the dying words of Marcia's beloved father Cordus to his daughter (23.6 (three lines)). These figures are dropped in the last phase of this and other dialogues, but we should view all but the simplest objections as rhetorical pitches for variety. The consolation to Helvia is plainer, with routine interlocutors at 6.2 and 9.1, to whom he quotes a reply (9.3), and again at 11.1, and 13.1. Seneca once gives the words of his own potential admonitions to a third party, this time, to imaginary *luxuriosi* at 10.6–8. And, if only once, he puts himself in the position of Helvia herself, lamenting his absence (15.1, covering 7 lines of text). But these departures from direct address are few, short, and functional. This is far outstripped by the level of speaker displacement in *ad Polybium.* Using the same criteria and categories, we find two separate apostrophes reproaching Fortune in 2.2–2.7 and 3.4–5, both full scale σχετλιασμοί; a speech put into Polybius' own mouth at 9.1–3, another apostrophe full of reproaches against Fortune at 13.1 and an exclamatory apostrophe at 13.4: *o felicem clementiam tuam, Caesar.* All this culminates in the more than full length catalogue of exempla which Seneca put into Claudius' mouth in 14.2–16.3. A brief note by Dahlmann seventy years ago[57] demonstrated that Seneca not only put a speech into Claudius' mouth, but wrote it in character, reflecting Claudius' notorious tendency to total recall—at least of historical precedent and antiquarian details. But after this *tour de force* Seneca speaks directly and without interruption to Polybius, his addressee.

Seneca's use of speaker displacement in *ad Polybium* is, however, not only remarkable because of its scale, but also because of the prominent role of the theme of personified Fortune in these passages. Fortune was

[57] Cf. Dahlmann (1936) 374–5.

regularly held responsible for natural deaths, but the goddess is in fact exceptionally intrusive in Seneca's consolation to Polybius. Where the consolation to Helvia balanced the arbitrary and random acts of Fortune (1.1, and four times in section 5) towards Seneca and others, against the unchallengeable decree of the *fata* in accordance with nature (8.3), the consolation for Polybius deliberately opens with a repudiating mockery of conventional lamentation (1.2: *eat nunc aliquis et singulas comploret animas*... *eat aliquis et fata tantum aliquando nefas ausura sibi non pepercisse conqueratur*). This dictates the tone for the set-pieces of lamentation and reproach (*conquestio*: cf. *conqueramur* in 2.2 and 3.4) against Fortune and the Fates alike (*fata* at 1.2,4, 3.3, 4.1) for their cruelty in bringing premature death to Polybius' young brother.[58] Seneca only brings this to an end when he is ready to change his tune and represent Polybius' eminence as good fortune which carries its own loss of liberty (6.4: *magna servitus est magna fortuna*). Seneca makes it clear that these reproaches are futile and ethically misguided (4.1: *diutius accusare fata possumus, mutare non possumus*... *proinde parcamus lacrimis nil proficientibus*) but he will exploit this topos to the full before he changes to a positive mode, halfway through the dialogue, at 9.4: there Seneca argues that the dead man is happier, because he has no longer any need of fortune, than the living one who enjoys ready good fortune, and thus concludes that Polybius' brother is only now free, safe and immortal (9.7). At this level of philosophical exaltation we do not need to look for political irony. In section 11 Seneca goes even further by stating that the unexpected early death of loved ones is not the injustice of the Fates, but the insatiability of human greed which will not accept that life is only on loan, despite the fact that there is a proper doom (11.4: *fatum suum*) for each man and nation. Even so Fortune returns briefly as villain in the prayer for Claudius (cf. 13.1) and even shares in Caesar's own reproaches at 16.2,3: *Fortuna impotens! quales ex humanis malis tibi ipsa ludos facis!*... *bis me fraterno luctu adgressa fortuna est.*[59] After his prolonged and daring impersonation of the father of his people (*parens publicus*) in 14.2–16.3 Seneca returns to treating the scolding of Fortune as a kind of routine or refrain, with the idiom

[58] These passages are among those singled out by Atkinson (1985) 872–9 as evidence for irony; but he does not realize that Seneca himself has set up the grievances against Fortune only in order to knock them down and move on to a wiser, more 'philosophical' reaction.

[59] Cf. the opening words of 'Seneca' in [Sen.] *Oct.* 377–80: *quid, impotens Fortuna, fallaci mihi / blandita vultu, sorte contentum mea / alte extulisti, gravius ut ruerem edita / receptus arce totque prospicerem metus?*

*convicium facere* evoking the public abuse associated with the custom of *flagitatio* (16.5):[60] *faciamus licet illi convicium non nostro tantum ore sed etiam publico*, and again turns away from this ritual by pointing out that we cannot change Fortune, her violence and her injustice (*ibit violentior… iniuriae causa*).

The many references to Fortune in this dialogue, are present, I believe, because of the many things Seneca felt he could not say about the dynastic intrigues of which he had been made a victim, but perhaps they are also to reinforce the unspoken link between Polybius and himself as victims of different kinds of misfortune. Seneca only turns full attention to his own exile (hinted at early in our surviving text, cf. 2.1: *quicquid lacrimarum fortunae meae superfuerit*) after his central vows for the emperor's long life (12.5: *di illum deaeque terris diu commodent. acta hic divi Augusti aequet, annos vincat*) and prayer to Fortune (13.1: *abstine ab hoc manus tuas, Fortuna*), to spare Claudius, who is depicted as a healer of the wounds inflicted by Gaius (*mederi… quicquid prioris principis furor concussit*) and a pacifier, whose clemency, his most important virtue, shows Seneca promise of restoration (13.2: *quorum me quoque spectatorem futurum… promittit clementia*). It is Fortune that has stricken Seneca (cf. *impulsum a fortuna*) but Claudius who held him up and set him gently down, using his moderation to beg the Senate for Seneca's life (13.2: *vitam mihi non tantum dedit sed etiam petit*). Either Claudius' natural justice will see the strength of Seneca's case or his clemency will give it strength (13.3: *vel iustitia eius* [sc. *causam*] *bonam perspiciat, vel clementia faciat bonam*). Thus, it will be a *beneficium* from Claudius whether he knows that Seneca is innocent, or wishes him to have been so. If Seneca can be said to admit his guilt by this remark it is only because he needs the admission to give the emperor credit for clemency. For Seneca's best hope was to make his pardon an opportunity for Claudius to gain the moral high ground of clemency. The theme of the tug of war between Fortune and Mercy reaches its furthest development after the great impersonation of the princeps, with the wish that merciless Fortune will learn mercy from Claudius, and be mild to the mildest of emperors (16.6: *fiatque mitissimo omnium principum mitis*).

After a recapitulation of precepts to help Polybius forgive Fortune (17.1, 18.3) and celebrate the memory of his departed brother, Seneca

[60] *Convicium* is a word for abuse common in popular comedy. *flagitatio* was the old Italian practice of publicly shaming a debtor or false friend or adulterer by gathering a group at his door to demand (*flagitare*) compensation, and denounce his actions.

ends with the typical self-deprecation of the artistic letter writer—be it Catullus (68a), Horace, or Ovid—a brief but pointed excuse of any inadequacy in view of his own condition: his mind is blunted by long disuse (18.9: *longo... situ*),[61] and if his attempts to console seem feeble, Polybius must realize how helpless anyone is to console others when he is beset by his own misfortunes, and how awkwardly Latin words will come to a man surrounded by grunting (*fremitus*) that is offensive even to the more civilized among the barbarians (18.9). With his last words, Seneca has taken a highly recognizable leaf out of Ovid's works,[62] but the *fremitus* of armed attack by Dacians beyond the empire goes far beyond the mere uncouth accents of the settled Corsicans. If there were brigands among the Roman settlers and provincials of Corsica under Claudius, he would have been ill advised to say so.

But then these letters from exile are a tour de force of discretion, in which displacement is the major rhetorical strategy that enables Seneca to maintain emotional impact and persuasive power. Besides the relatively conventional generic displacement which enables him to use consolation of bereavement as a tool of self-consolation for exile in *ad Helviam* he is proudly aware of his innovative displacement from consoling to self-consoling: to both addressees he conspicuously marks the rejection of conventional lament and reproach of Fortune in favour of positive consolation in memory of the dead and surviving kin. Writing to Helvia he transfers into the old civil war context the pride and self-sufficiency of the philosophical exile, leaving at the remove of almost a century any suggestion of oppression at Rome. Writing to Polybius, he casts the freedman in the burdensome position of power and responsibility which is a more modest surrogate for the emperor's burdens and power to confer benefits. Instead of disparaging reproaches against Fortune, he now displaces onto the deity whatever in his punishment might otherwise have been attributed to Claudius (or Messalina), and makes of Claudius both a sufferer from bereavements inflicted by Fortune and a healer of the empire's distress, who has already mitigated Seneca's fate and so shown himself open to appeal. Others, noting that the *ad Polybium* reverses the arguments of the *ad Helviam*, have read the dialogue as proof of his abject humiliation: it would be a better

[61] This is clearly an Ovidian echo, cf. *Tr.* 3.14.33–6 cited by Innocenti Pierini (1990b) 116–17.

[62] Cf. Innocenti Pierini (1990b) 112–22 and n. 19 above.

assessment of his rhetorical skills to see the two 'consolations' as arguing both sides of his case, offering first the proud claims of philosophical self-sufficiency, then later the humble appeal to his audience and to the changing (if premature) expectation of political relaxation with the passage of time. The issue is not one of sincerity, but one of effective persuasion and a double audience. While paying every courtesy and respect to his addressees, Seneca has successfully created his own image for the wider and unmentioned audience which he hopes will read over the shoulders of his mother and of the emperor's adviser.

CHAPTER TEN

# DIO'S EXILE: POLITICS, PHILOSOPHY, LITERATURE

Paolo Desideri

Many passages of the speeches (or λόγοι) which make up the oeuvre of the Bithynian φιλόσοφος Dio, who lived between the end of the first and the beginning of the second century AD,[1] contain references to an exile (φυγή) which the author had experienced in previous years.[2] Although the nature and extent of this exile and even the question whether it happened have been much discussed among modern scholars,[3] my opinion remains that a technical measure of banishment was in fact taken. This conviction of mine rests first of all on the external evidence for Dio's life. Dio's contemporary Pliny the Younger, whose rich testimony is absolutely consistent with Dio's own remarks,[4] does not mention Dio's exile at all (there was, however, no reason why he should!), but the event

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[1] Cf. Desideri (1978), Jones (1978). A still fundamental work is von Arnim (1898). For a brief review (with a bibliographical update) see Desideri (1994) 841–56; for an exhaustive outline of Dio's reception in modern times see Swain (2000b) 13–48.

[2] Cf. Desideri (1978) 187–200, Jones (1978) 45–55. Recently the problems of Dio's exile were re-examined by Sidebottom (1996), and more thoroughly by Verrengia (2000) 66–91. An entire chapter of Whitmarsh's book ((2001b) 156–67) is devoted to Dio's exile; however, I cannot accept his general thesis that "the trope of exile was used to construct identity in the Greek literature of the early principate" (p. 178), at least if it is intended to mean that this is the main thing to be said about Dio's exile.

[3] When expounding some aspects of Dio's biography in his *Vitae Sophistarum* (1.7 p. 488), the Severan age author Philostratus said that "he [sc. Dio] had not been ordered to go into exile", but simply "vanished from men's sight, hiding himself from their eyes and ears, and occupying himself in various ways in various lands, through fear of the tyrants in the capital [i.e. Rome] at whose hands all philosophy was suffering persecution" (trans. Wright (1921), [sc. οὐ] προσετάχθη αὐτῷ φυγεῖν…τοῦ φανεροῦ ἐξέστη κλέπτων ἑαυτὸν ὀφθαλμῶν τε καὶ ὤτων καὶ ἄλλα ἐν ἄλλῃ γῇ πράττων δέει τῶν κατὰ τὴν πόλιν τυραννίδων, ὑφ᾽ ὧν ἠλαύνετο φιλοσοφία πᾶσα). This position was revived in recent years by Brancacci (1985) 97–104, and most recently by Civiletti (2002) 377–8, but is generally rejected by scholars (see Verrengia (2000) 66 n. 1).

[4] In one of Pliny's epistles toTrajan (and in the emperor's reply; cf. Plin. *Ep.* 10.81–2) Dio is mentioned as someone who is apparently on good terms with Trajan himself, and who is, at the same time, a politician of the Bithynian Prusa, a member of one of the city's prominent families, who is involved in an important civic project, who is attacked by one of his countrymen, well-known as a former protégé of Domitian: see Desideri (1978) 1–2 and 401–6; none of these details is at odds with Dio's texts.

is assumed, to say the very least, in an important passage of Marcus Aurelius' *Meditations* (1.14) and in Lucian's *Peregrinus* (18), where Dio is included in lists of political 'martyrs' and exiled philosophers.[5]

Dio's own testimonies have sometimes been discarded as literary fictions,[6] and it is possible, even likely, that Dio embellished some of his experiences in order to give his moral discourse a more interesting aspect and greater persuasive force.[7] However, the literary dimension can hardly be proved to be the main interest in any of Dio's speeches, which are nearly always the written version of what had originally been orally delivered speeches.[8]

After Verrengia's objections I am no longer so positive that Dio was exiled only from the territory of his home town, the Bithynian city Prusa, or from the province of Bithynia at the most.[9] For our present purpose, however, the important thing is that during a certain (long) period Dio apparently lived an exile's life, and, above all, that he subsequently presented this period as that of an exile's life. In fact it is highly probable that some of Dio's preserved speeches were pronounced or written during his exile.[10] Although I must admit that it is impossible to demonstrate this beyond doubt, one should not deny that such speeches had existed. For when speaking about the way he had behaved during his exile towards an unnamed bad emperor (in fact, Domitian), Dio explicitly says in front of his Prusaean countrymen that he had chal-

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[5] Cf. Desideri (1978) 13–20.

[6] See pp. 199 ff. below (especially on Dio's speech *In Athens, On his Exile*).

[7] This may be the case of one of his most famous speeches, in which exile is mentioned, the *Borysthenitic* (*Or.* 36.1); the same can be said of other speeches, too, which contain important autobiographic references, like the *Euboean* (*Or.* 7), the *Olympic* (*Or.* 12), and the *Charidemus* (*Or.* 30) (if the latter is Dionean, as some scholars are now inclined to think: see Moles (2000) and the discussion by Menchelli (1999) 29–52). For an assessment of the relationship between the moral and literary aspects of Dio's oeuvre see Anderson (2000).

[8] There are of course some Dionean texts which cannot properly be termed 'speeches', like *Or.* 18 (*On Training for Public Speaking*), which ought to be considered a letter, or *Or.* 52 (*Aeschylus, Sophocles, and Euripides, or the Bow of Philoctetes*), which is actually a literary essay—on this text see Luzzatto (1983). Many Dionean 'literary' texts have not been preserved: see Desideri (1991b) 3922–5.

[9] Cf. Desideri (1978) 192–4 and Verrengia (2000) 78–85, whose judicial arguments in favour of a ban extended to Italy (and Rome) I fear I must accept (as for his interpretation of the relations between sections 14 and 29 of *Or.* 13 (*In Athens, On his Exile*) I am much more uncertain).

[10] Cf. Desideri (1978) 200–37.

lenged the emperor openly and had not put off speaking or writing about the evils afflicting the people.[11] It is hard to believe that Dio would have risked being immediately proved false in a public assembly.

Dio dedicated only few words—at least in the extant works—to the material consequences of his exile, i.e. the loss of his goods, the flight of his slaves, vel sim. However, he refers to this aspect of his exile in two of his *Bithynian* speeches. In *Defence of his Relationship with his Native City* Dio stresses the correctness of his behaviour towards Prusa and claims he had forgiven all those countrymen who had profited from his exile to wrong him in many ways (*Or.* 45.10). He had not tried to recover his possessions (*Or.* 45.10) "although so many slaves had run away and obtained freedom, so many persons had defrauded me of money, so many were occupying lands of mine, since there was no one to prevent such doings" (τοσούτων μὲν εἰς ἐλευθερίαν ἀφεστηκότων οἰκετῶν, τοσούτων δὲ χρήματα ἀπεστερηκότων, τοσούτων δὲ χωρία κατεχόντων, ἅτε μηδενὸς ὄντος τοῦ κωλύσοντος).[12] In another speech, *On Concord with the Apameians*, Dio says that he has a very good reason for not wanting to be involved in problems of civic administration (*Or.* 40.2):

> ἔπειτα, οἶμαι, καὶ τοῦ σώματος δέον ποιήσασθαί τινα πρόνοιαν, ἐκ πολλῆς καὶ συνεχοῦς ταλαιπωρίας ἀπειρηκότος, καὶ τῶν περὶ τὴν οἰκίαν, κομιδῇ φαύλως διακειμένων,...ὅπου γὰρ ἀποδημία δεσπότου χρονίσαντος ἱκανὴ διαφθεῖραι καὶ τὴν μεγίστην οὐσίαν, τί χρὴ προσδοκᾶν ἐν τοσούτοις ἔτεσι φυγῆς;
>
> A second reason is that, in my opinion, I should take some thought, not only for my body, exhausted as it is from great and unremitting hardship, but also for my domestic affairs, now in thoroughly bad condition...For when a proprietor's absence from home, if protracted, suffices to ruin even the greatest estate, what should one expect in the course of so many years of exile?[13]

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[11] Cf. *Or.* 45.1: τὴν μὲν γὰρ φυγὴν ὅπως διήνεγκα...καὶ ταῦτα οὐ θωπεύων αὐτὸν οὐδὲ τὴν ἔχθραν παραιτούμενος, ἀλλὰ ἐρεθίζων ἄντικρυς καὶ <τὰ> προσόντα κακὰ μὰ Δί' οὐ μέλλων νῦν ἐρεῖν ἢ γράψειν, ἀλλὰ εἰρηκὼς ἤδη καὶ γεγραφώς. I would not say that in this passage Dio is speaking of his railings against Domitian as the cause of his exile: cf. Whitmarsh (2001b) 157 and 160.

[12] Translation by Crosby (1946–51). The comparison later in this passage (*Or.* 45.11) with the situation Odysseus faced when coming back to Ithaca after twenty years is intended to underline Dio's own moral superiority over the ancient Greek hero. On Odysseus as a paradigmatic exile cf. also pp. 5, 9–10, 18–19, 25 n. 17, 102, 104, 105, 157 above and p. 201 n. 33 below.

[13] Translation by Crosby (1946–51).

As strong as these statements may appear (especially the first), they are the only comments on the material consequences of his exile in all of Dio's preserved speeches. This does not mean that Dio considered this kind of consequence of exile of little importance, but that in his opinion the psychological and particularly the intellectual consequences were what really mattered.[14]

The former of the last two passages is part of a larger section of a speech (*Or.* 45.1 ff.) in which Dio presented his merits to both the general population of the world and to his countrymen in particular during the terror of the emperor Domitian. Dio's main point is to deny that he has had any personal interest in obtaining from the emperor Trajan the political and administrative improvements his hometown Prusa had been endowed with in the previous few years.[15] To this end he tries to persuade his audience that his attitude towards the emperors had always been characterized by a spirit of freedom and courage. In mentioning his exile, in particular, Dio intends to show that he had made use of it as an instrument of political struggle against a dreadful enemy, who was (*Or.* 45.1)

> οὐ τὸν δεῖνα οὐδὲ τὸν δεῖνα τῶν ἴσων τινὰ καὶ τῶν ὁμοίων ἐνίοτε φθεγγομένων, ἀλλὰ τὸν ἰσχυρότατον καὶ βαρύτατον καὶ δεσπότην ὀνομαζόμενον καὶ θεὸν παρὰ πᾶσιν Ἕλλησι καὶ βαρβάροις, τὸ δὲ ἀληθὲς ὄντα δαίμονα πονηρόν
>
> not this or that one among my equals, or peers, as they are sometimes called, but rather the most powerful, most stern man, who was called by all Greeks and barbarians both master and god, but who was in reality an evil demon[16]

—in other words, the Roman emperor. On the one hand it is clear that Dio tends to present his exile as a gigantic struggle against a πονηρὸς δαίμων; as Dio himself acknowledges towards the end, this is an ever recurring theme in his political speeches, which had become boring for his countrymen (*Or.* 45.2; cf. 3.13). On the other hand it is clear that in Dio's opinion one could only cope with this δαίμων by (*Or.* 45.1) "trusting in a greater power and source of aid, that which proceeds from the gods" (κρείττονι πεποιθὼς δυνάμει καὶ βοηθείᾳ τῇ παρὰ τῶν θεῶν).[17]

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[14] Fantham, p. 180 above, accentuates a similar silence about the material consequences of exile in the works of Ovid and Seneca the Younger and speaks of "generic propriety". Xenophon, however, is a different case: see Dillery p. 67 above.
[15] On this point see p. 206 below.
[16] Translation by Crosby (1946–51).
[17] Translation by Crosby (1946–51).

Both elements—the global relevance of this struggle, and its religious character—can be found also elsewhere in Dio's speeches and are usually connected to one another. The most important passage in this respect occurs in the middle of the first speech *On Kingship* (Περὶ βασιλείας). It is highly probable that the addressee of this speech—one of four speeches devoted to a more or less theoretical definition of the nature and limits of the imperial power—is the emperor Trajan.[18] In this speech Dio first expounds on the virtues of the good emperor and deals briefly with the qualities of Zeus, the emperor of the universe and the most obvious model for an earthly ruler; then the orator suddenly breaks off his argument, and we are confronted with what Dio calls a μῦθος, or rather, as he specifies immediately (*Or.* 1.49) "a sacred and withal edifying parable told under the guise of a myth" (ἱερὸν καὶ ὑγιῆ λόγον σχήματι μύθου λεγόμενον).[19] This parable, Dio adds, had been told to him by an old woman of Elis or Arcadia, a region where he happened to be wandering during his exile (cf. *Or.* 1.51–2).[20] The mention of his exile offers Dio the opportunity to express his (*Or.* 1.50) "gratitude to the gods that they prevented my becoming an eyewitness to many an act of injustice" (χάριν…τοῖς θεοῖς, ὅτι με οὐκ εἴασαν θεατὴν γενέσθαι πολλῶν καὶ ἀδίκων πραγμάτων).[21] Dio's words in this passage make it very clear that he considered his exile a result of the intervention of a divinely inspired providence, a point which I will take up again later. More important with regard to the relevance of the myth is the fact that the old woman telling it proves to be the priestess of a sort of rural sanctuary of Heracles, and has been endowed with the gift of divination by the Mother of the Gods.

What interests us now, of course, is not so much the myth itself, the old Prodicean story of Heracles at the crossroads,[22] which, disguised in political semblance, is proposed to the emperor as a model to be imitated. Rather we must consider the preliminary words which are put into the priestess' mouth (*Or.* 1.55–6):

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[18] Cf. Desideri (1978) 304; for a narratological analysis of this passage see Whitmarsh (2001b) 197–200. In contrast to Nerva and Nero (cf. *Or.* 45.2 and 32.60) Trajan is not mentioned in Dio's extant works. In Desideri (1991a) 3897–901 I have collected all of Dio's explicit and implicit references to the Roman emperors.

[19] Translation by Cohoon (1932–40).

[20] As for the meaning of this localization of the episode see Desideri (2000) 99–101.

[21] Translation by Cohoon (1932–40).

[22] Cf. Desideri (1978) 314.

> "καὶ σὺ δὲ ἐλήλυθας", ἔφη, "οὐκ ἄνευ θείας τύχης εἰς τόνδε τὸν τόπον· οὐ γὰρ ἐάσω σε ἀπελθεῖν μάτην". καὶ μετὰ τοῦτο ἤδη προέλεγεν ὅτι οὐ πολὺς χρόνος ἔσοιτό μοι τῆς ἄλης καὶ τῆς ταλαιπωρίας, οὔτε σοί, εἶπεν, οὔτε τοῖς ἄλλοις ἀνθρώποις.... "συμβαλεῖς δέ", ἔφη, "ποτὲ ἀνδρὶ καρτερῷ, πλείστης ἄρχοντι χώρας καὶ ἀνθρώπων· τούτῳ μήποτε ὀκνήσῃς εἰπεῖν τόνδε τὸν μῦθον, εἰ καί σου καταφρονεῖν τινες μέλλοιεν ὡς ἀδολέσχου καὶ πλάνητος."
>
> "And you too", she continued, "have come into this place by no mere human chance, for I shall not let you depart unblest". Thereupon she at once began to prophesy, saying that the period of my wandering and tribulation would not be long, nay, nor that of mankind at large... "Some day", she said, "you will meet a mighty man, the ruler of very many lands and peoples. Do not hesitate to tell him this tale of mine even if there be those who will ridicule you for a prating vagabond."[23]

We find here expressed in the clearest terms the idea that, according to Dio, his exile had been not only a personal fate, but a sort of symbol of the condition of the entire human race, which had been brought about by the misdeeds of the alleged ruler who was in fact nothing but a πονηρὸς δαίμων. In another passage of the same speech, when speaking of the Homeric idea of kingship, Dio asserts plainly (*Or.* 1.14):

> οὐδείς ποτε πονηρὸς καὶ ἀκόλαστος καὶ φιλοχρήματος οὔτε αὐτὸς ἑαυτοῦ γενέσθαι δυνατὸς ἄρχων οὐδ' ἐγκρατὴς οὔτε τῶν ἄλλων οὐδενός, οὐδ' ἔσται ποτὲ ἐκεῖνος βασιλεύς, οὐδ' ἂν πάντες φῶσιν Ἕλληνες καὶ βάρβαροι καὶ ἄνδρες καὶ γυναῖκες, καὶ μὴ μόνον ἄνθρωποι θαυμάζωσιν αὐτὸν καὶ ὑπακούωσιν, ἀλλ' οἵ τε ὄρνιθες πετόμενοι καὶ τὰ θηρία ἐν τοῖς ὄρεσι μηδὲν ἧττον τῶν ἀνθρώπων συγχωρῇ τε καὶ ποιῇ τὸ προσταττόμενον.
>
> No wicked or licentious or avaricious person can ever become a competent ruler or master either of himself or of anybody else, nor will such a man ever be a king even though all the world, both Greeks and barbarians, men and women, affirm the contrary, yea, though not only men admire and obey him, but the birds of the air and the wild beasts on the mountains no less than men submit to him and do his biddings.[24]

Dio's exile assumes here a cosmic—so to speak—relevance.

Even though Dio apparently could move freely in various parts of the empire (except in the province of Bithynia, of course, and probably Italy),[25] he leaves us with the sensation that—since the Roman conquest had made of the entire οἰκουμένη a single political entity—exile

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[23] Translation by Cohoon (1932–40).
[24] Translation by Cohoon (1932–40). The same idea is also formulated in the *Fourth Speech on Kingship* (*Or.* 4.25).
[25] See n. 9 above.

risked becoming banishment from all the world, except for the barbarian regions which were outside the borders of the Roman Empire or for the remotest places inside these borders. In this situation, which rendered the conditions of an exiled person harder than in the entire previous history of Hellenism,[26] the sole possibility of resistance left was, according to Dio, the aid of the gods: apart from personal resources they were the only support available. Through the combination of these two elements—personal resources and religion—an exiled person could become active as an anti-governmental preacher all over the world and could thereby provoke, or at least facilitate, the collapse of an unlawful government. However, before Dio was able to rationalize his banishment in this way, he had to experience hopelessness, isolation from the rest of the world, and uprootedness from all that constituted his former life. This kind of experience may, in my opinion, explain the sense of estrangement from any social context which permeates Dio's so-called *Diogenians* (in which the figure of the Cynic Diogenes stands out) and some other minor speeches of Dio.[27]

The text which offers the most detailed account of Dio's way of living and reacting to the experience of exile is the thirteenth of his preserved speeches, *In Athens, On his Exile* ('Εν 'Αθήναις, περὶ φυγῆς).[28] In this speech Dio, who is apparently speaking in a public meeting in Athens, narrates how it happened that he was banned, and how he was able, thanks to divine counsel, to accept and even take advantage of the new situation. At the end Dio reproduces for his audience two specimens of the

[26] On this observation see also pp. 16–17 above.

[27] Cf. Desideri (1978) 200 ff. I cannot open here the dossier of Dio's relationship with Cynicism, which concerns in particular the theme of αὐτάρκεια; instead, I must limit myself to a reference to the most important recent works on this subject: Moles (1983), Jouan (1993), Brancacci (2000) and Brenk (2000), (2002/3) 85–90.

[28] On this speech the bishop Synesius built his theory of Dio's conversion from sophistry to philosophy (see his *Dio*, written at the beginning of the fifth century AD, in particular pp. 233–6 Terzaghi), which was subsequently assumed by von Arnim (1898) as the basis for his general interpretation of Dio's life and works. For a critical discussion of the Synesian essay see Desideri (1972/3) and (with emphasis on the "fictitious" aspects of Dio's text) Moles (1978). For the 'mediatic' aspects of the thirteenth speech see Desideri (1991b) 2932–3, 3938–9. A general analysis of this text (together with a study of its textual tradition, an edition, a translation, and a commentary) is offered by Verrengia (2000), who re-examines in particular (pp. 66–91) the external evidence of Dio's exile; for a sensitive and subtle interpretation of the literary aspects see now Whitmarsh (2001b) 160–7.

Socratic lesson[29] he used to present to the peoples both of some unspecified place and of Rome. In my opinion the speech belongs to a late phase of Dio's exile, or was, as seems even more likely, composed after the end of his exile. It provides a vivid picture of the degraded political context in which Dio's banishment had been decreed. According to Dio, his exile was the consequence of his friendship with an important person who had fallen out of the emperor's (i.e. Domitian's) grace (*Or.* 13.1):

> ἔθος γάρ τι τοῦτό ἐστι τῶν τυράννων, ὥσπερ ἐν Σκύθαις τοῖς βασιλεῦσι συνθάπτειν οἰνοχόους καὶ μαγείρους καὶ παλλακάς, οὕτως τοῖς ὑπ' αὐτῶν ἀποθνήσκουσιν ἑτέρους προστιθέναι πλείους ἀπ' οὐδεμιᾶς αἰτίας.
>
> For just as among the Scythians it is the practice to bury cupbearers and cooks and concubines with their kings, so it is the custom of despots to throw in several others for no reason whatever with those who are being executed by them.[30]

This context is, of course, absolutely coherent with the political dimension of resistance to imperial despotism which Dio attributes to his exile, as we have already seen. But let us examine more closely what, according to Dio's own account, happened afterwards (*Or.* 13.2):

> ἐσκόπουν πότερον ὄντως χαλεπόν τι καὶ δυστυχὲς εἴη τὸ τῆς φυγῆς ὡς [add. Cohoon] κατὰ τὴν τῶν πολλῶν δόξαν, ἢ πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα ἕτερόν τι πέπονθεν, ὁποῖον λεγόμενόν ἐστι περὶ τὴν μαντείαν τὴν τῶν γυναικῶν ἐν τοῖς ἱεροῖς.
>
> I began to consider, whether this matter of banishment was really a grievous thing and a misfortune, as it is in the view of the majority, or whether such experiences merely furnish another instance of what we are told happens in connection with the divinations of the women in the sacred places.[31]

Dio is referring to a strange form of popular female divination, of which we know nothing else, but which was based on the fortuitous picking up of clods or stones: each woman associates the degree of difficulty in removing the respective object from the earth with a problem she is facing at that moment. Dio compares this kind of divination with different ways of facing exile and other misfortunes like poverty, old age

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[29] On Dio's Socrates see (from different points of view) Desideri (1991b) 3917, 3929, 3933–4, 3949–50, and Brancacci (2000).

[30] Translation by Cohoon (1932–40). For a recent discussion about the possible identity of this person see Verrengia (2000) 66–77.

[31] Translation by Cohoon (1932–40).

or sickness. According to Dio (*Or.* 13.3) "God lightens the weight…to suit the strength and will-power of the afflicted one" (ἐλαφρύνοντος τοῦ δαιμονίου τὸ βάρος…πρὸς τὴν τοῦ χρωμένου δύναμιν καὶ γνώμην).[32] However, recalling the words and behaviour of great historical figures and of characters in the works of Homer and Euripides, Dio found that all of them seemed to imply that exile was definitely a terrible misfortune (*Or.* 13.4–6).[33] Faced with the same situation Dio recollected one of the oracles given by Apollo to the Lydian king Croesus, namely the one suggesting that Croesus should leave his country and go into exile with no shame for being considered a coward.[34] This precedent encouraged Dio to accept the idea (*Or.* 13.8–9) "that exile is not altogether injurious or unprofitable, nor staying at home a good and praiseworthy thing" (ὅτι οὐ πάντως ἡ φυγὴ βλαβερὸν οὐδὲ ἀσύμφορον οὐδὲ τὸ μένειν ἀγαθὸν καὶ πολλοῦ ἄξιον), and he decided to go to the god's temple himself and "consult him, as a competent adviser, according to the ancient custom of the Greeks" (χρήσασθαι συμβούλῳ ἱκανῷ [Cohoon, ἱκανῶς codd.] κατὰ τὸ παλαιὸν ἔθος τῶν Ἑλλήνων).[35] Apollo's response was (*Or.* 13.9) "to keep on doing with all zeal the very thing wherein I am engaged, as being a most honourable and useful activity, 'until thou comest', he said, 'to the uttermost parts of the earth' " (αὐτὸ τοῦτο πράττειν ἐν ᾧ εἰμι πάσῃ προθυμίᾳ, ὡς καλήν τινα καὶ συμφέρουσαν πρᾶξιν, "ἕως ἄν", ἔφη, "ἐπὶ τὸ ὕστατον ἀπέλθῃς τῆς γῆς").[36] A very strange response indeed, which at any rate Dio decided to take literally as being an order on the part of the god; and this was the beginning of his philosophical career, or rather of his world-wide fame as a philosophic preacher, as he himself says at the end of this section of the speech (*Or.* 13.10–12).

I shall not enter into the multiple problems which are posed by this passage,[37] but shall confine myself to underlining two elements which are important from our present point of view. First of all, it is evident that Dio tends to present his exile—at least in the extreme form it assumes

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[32] Translation by Cohoon (1932–40).

[33] Both references to literary examples of exiled persons (Homer: Odysseus; Euripides: Electra) seem to stress the inadequacy of the poets as possible guides in difficult situations: see Desideri (1991b) 3934 (Euripides is blamed again in a different context at *Or.* 7.82, where, however, Homer is presented in a more positive light); another reference to Odysseus as an exile occurs in *Or.* 45.11; cf. also p. 195 n. 12 above.

[34] This is, of course, a Herodotean echo: cf. Hdt. 1.55.

[35] Translation by Cohoon (1932–40).

[36] Translation by Cohoon (1932–40).

[37] See the bibliography quoted at n. 28.

according to this last passage—not in terms of a compulsion decreed by the government, but of a decision he has taken himself, following Apollo's advice.[38] This is a substantial correction of the reconstruction of the events as proposed at the beginning of this very speech, where he had presented himself as a victim of the emperor's arrogance (see p. 200 above). But it is also a way of (strongly) emphasizing that with the aid of the gods it is possible to resist the men in power and to successfully cope with their brutality. I will return to this element later because it involves further general reflections on the nature of the relations between Roman emperors and the Greek world. The second element is a simple confirmation of what we have already observed above, namely that Dio puts his exile under Apollo's protection; this seems to imply that according to Dio only religion can help men in this type of situation. Literature, on the contrary, only increases their despair: as Dio puts it in an important passage of the *Euboean* speech (*Or.* 7.98) poets cannot help amplifying the common opinions (τὴν τῶν πολλῶν διάνοιαν).

We have already seen that Dio presents his relationship with philosophy as a consequence of exile. However, it is important that Dio does not say—neither here nor in other passages—that he has become a philosopher, but only that little by little his activity as a popular preacher, together with his humble attire (στολὴ ταπεινὴ, cf. *Or.* 13.10), has earned him the title of philosopher with his audiences—a title which he never accepted, even though at a certain moment he ceased to resist the general opinion (*Or.* 13.11–12). On this basis, it would be hard to affirm that Dio's strong reaction to the psychological test of exile was due to philosophical training—as is implied by Philostratus, who connects Dio's exile with the general 'war' waged by the emperor Domitian against philosophy.[39] Synesius' idea that it was exile which provoked Dio's discovery of philosophy (Synesius, *Dio* 1.18, speaks of a conversion, μετάπτωσις, from sophistry to philosophy) would be much more appropriate.[40] Moreover, as we have seen above, Dio emphasizes the role of religion, not philosophy, as the necessary companion in one's struggle against adversities; this idea may be prompted by the consideration that philosophy was not within the reach of the common people who were

[38] A passage like this could well have suggested to Philostratus that Dio's disappearance was based on his own personal decision, cf. n. 3 above.

[39] See the passage quoted in n. 3 above.

[40] This is no surprise, of course, for Synesius explicitly says that his theory is based on Dio's text, cf. n. 28 above.

the likely addressees of this speech: philosophy could not be proposed as a useful model of behaviour to them, and it was much more effective to appeal to religion, which—as Dio himself knew very well[41]—had a much stronger hold on the people.

The long initial passage of *Or.* 13.1–13 ought to be interpreted as an introduction to the real body of the text, i.e. to the two speeches (*Or.* 13.13 ff. and 13.31 ff.) on ethical subjects which are proposed as examples of the themes developed by Dio during—or during and after[42]—his exile. The function of this introduction is to present Dio's personal experience of change of life as a positive model[43] for the general change of life that Dio demands from all his listeners—a warranty of the real possibility of a change, which ought to be so radical as to be considered a sort of exile from each of his listener's previous life.

Dio's self-presentation as a living model of what could be called a bearable, if not a happy, exile, can also be traced in another of his speeches, *On Fondness for Listening* (*Or.* 19), which opens with the recollection of an episode of his life during exile. According to Dio (*Or.* 19.1)

> ἐδέοντο μὲν πάλαι τῶν οἰκείων τῶν ἐμῶν τινες ἐντυγχάνειν μοι· καὶ τῶν πολιτῶν δὲ ἐλέγοντο ἐπιθυμεῖν πολλοὶ θεάσασθαι, νομίζοντες πλέον τι παρὰ τοὺς ἄλλους ἔχειν με διὰ τὴν ἄλην καὶ τὴν μεταβολὴν τοῦ βίου καὶ διὰ τὴν δοκοῦσαν αὐτοῖς τοῦ σώματος ταλαιπωρίαν.
>
> a number of my intimate [sc. Prusaean] friends had long been asking for an opportunity to meet me; and besides, many of my fellow-citizens were said to be eager to see me, considering that I have a certain advantage over most men because of my wanderings and the reversal of my fortunes, and the bodily hardships which I was supposed to have experienced.[44]

At that time Dio happened to be close to the Bithynian border, and it would have been easy for him to arrive even closer to his home town, but he refused to do so because he thought (*Or.* 19.1) "that any such act befitted a man who was utterly crushed by his exile and very eager to be restored" (τὸ τοιοῦτο παντελῶς ἀχθομένου τινὸς εἶναι τῇ φυγῇ καὶ ἐπιθυμοῦντος κατελθεῖν);[45] therefore he stopped at Cyzicus in order to

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[41] See especially the *Olympic* speech (*Or.* 12.46,60,61) and cf. Desideri (1980).

[42] If we must accept that Dio could not give a speech in Rome during his exile: cf. *Or.* 13.31 and n. 9 above.

[43] See Desideri (1991b) 3939 and cf. Nesselrath, p. 101 above, for a similar thought in Favorinus' *De Exilio*.

[44] Translation by Cohoon (1932–40).

[45] Translation by Cohoon (1932–40).

give his friends and countrymen the possibility of visiting him easily, and to avoid any admission of psychological or physical troubles connected with his exile.[46]

The passages discussed so far show clearly that Dio lived his banishment as a far more complete exile from the entire 'civilized' world and that he presented it not only as a decisive personal experience, but also as a fundamental event for mankind at large. Dio not only solicited respect and even admiration from his listeners but also exploited his exile to communicate a more general, political and psychological message concerning the situation of the Greeks in the Roman Empire at this time.[47] This becomes particularly prominent in Dio's four speeches *On Kingship* (Περὶ βασιλείας), which arguably are the foremost result of his struggle against the πονηρὸς δαίμων Domitian. These speeches—one of which (*Or.* 3) seems never to have been brought to a final form—differ sharply among themselves and were composed in different times; as a whole they give the impression of a sort of open laboratory, in which Dio made various attempts to find an appropriate definition of the nature and limits of imperial power (which was *Roman* power, of course). Before Dio no comparable effort had been made by any Greek or Roman author, and it seems to have been the experience of exile that inspired Dio to such an undertaking; from Dio's point of view this undertaking could appear as a firm Greek reply to the Roman exhibition of stupid brutality.[48]

It is not possible to deal with every single aspect of Dio's thought on the subject of political legitimization,[49] but I shall at least point out the three keystones of his construction. First, Dio underlines the necessity for

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[46] What remains of the speech is unfortunately too meagre to allow us to understand the context in which this preamble was inserted.

[47] I must say that I do not see any real advantage in submerging Dio's individual experience in the general category of "persecuted Greek philosophers" (thus Whitmarsh (2001b) 134 ff.). After all, it was only Dio, who was able to extract from this experience a thorough reflection on Roman imperial power and its possible legitimation by the (Greek) intellectual. Moreover, I still believe that one has to pass through Dio's "individuality" and "personality" if one wants to fully understand even "the wider cultural framing of the *Kingships*" (Whitmarsh (2001b) 184).

[48] Whitmarsh (2001b) 181–2 n. 3, offers a synthetic review of pre-Dionean kingship literature—from Xenophon's *Hiero* on. Of course, Dio was indebted to this tradition, but his approach was completely new, because the king he had to face was the Roman emperor, the ruler of the entire οἰκουμένη.

[49] See the more detailed discussions in Desideri (1978) 283–318, Jones (1978) 115–22, Moles (1990), Hidalgo de la Vega (1995).

an intellectual legitimization of each single emperor's power: this point is made absolutely clear by Dio's version of the intense debate between the Cynic Diogenes and Alexander the Great in the *Fourth Speech on Kingship* (*Or.* 4.1 ff.)[50] and by the *Second Speech on Kingship* (*Or.* 2), in which the philosopher assumes, as often in Dio, the mask of Homer.[51] With no less energy—and this is the second point—Dio recommends to his emperor that he should avail himself of friends who are not to be chosen among the closest persons, but among the best from all around the world (*Or.* 3.86 ff.)[52]—and the best, this goes without saying, are in Dio's eyes, of course, the Greeks. Third and last, Dio stresses that the emperor is no god: the emperor has to take Zeus as a model for a government which is on the scale of the entire οἰκουμένη, but he must be conscious of the limits of human nature and must not expect to overcome them; in particular, he must not consider himself superior to the law.[53]

These three keystones are some of the fundamental principles of what Santo Mazzarino has called "l'impero umanistico".[54] According to a long tradition of Greek political thought kingship was at least theoretically considered the best form of government. Dio's reflections provide some indications of how to distinguish a good from a bad king and how to behave towards good and bad rulers: if the philosopher, who is Greek by definition, views a Roman emperor as a good king, he should be prepared to cooperate with this emperor; if, on the contrary, he sees this emperor as a bad demon (as was the case with Dio and Domitian, see above), he should not only refuse all cooperation, but he should even oppose this unlawful rule—unless, of course, he is willing to pass into the despicable category of the flatterers (κόλακες).[55] His own exile is not presented by Dio as the result of his choice to oppose Domitian, but as a key experience which allowed him to understand his political responsibilities; likewise Dio's return to the palaces of power under the later emperors Nerva and Trajan is presented as a sign of conscious—but also cautious and not unconditioned—appreciation of the qualities of

[50] The date of this speech is disputed. *Contra* Moles (1983) I still believe it had a long gestation, beginning probably in Domitian's age, see Desideri (1978) 288–96.

[51] On the second speech Περὶ βασιλείας see now Fornaro (2003).

[52] Cf. Desideri (1978) 301 ff.

[53] Cf. Desideri (1978) 299–301 and notes.

[54] Cf. Mazzarino (1962) 205–17; cf. Desideri (1996), especially pp. 165–8.

[55] In many a passage Dio is very harsh against κολακεία, cf. e.g. *Or.* 1.15,82 and 3.3,12,13,16.

these new leaders, with whom Dio was willing to cooperate for the welfare of the world. Through the *Bithynian* speeches we are informed at length that Dio obtained from Trajan several administrative measures which favoured the city of Prusa, and we learn that Dio (together with the Roman governor of Bithynia) was personally involved in putting these measures into practice.[56] Moreover, Dio cooperated with Trajan in various ways also in other parts of the eastern half of the Roman empire, notably in Cilicia, where Dio delivered two of his most politically involved speeches.[57]

More or less in the same period personal cooperation with a good emperor is seen as acceptable also by Plutarch,[58] and the gradual assumption of political, administrative and military responsibilities in the Roman bureaucracy by members of the Greek elite, which begins at the end of the first century AD, must not be underestimated.[59] It is true, of course, that in one of his speeches (*Or.* 31) Dio furiously attacks the Rhodians for their servile attitude towards the Romans and claims that they fail to understand that through the erasure of old inscriptions and their replacement by new ones they are repudiating their own glorious past.[60] But in this context Dio does not say that the Greeks are not allowed to cooperate with the Romans, nor that the Romans do not deserve their empire. He simply says that the Greek cooperation should not mean disavowal of their own political and cultural identities. Moreover, in several famous passages of the *Second Tarsic Speech* (*Or.* 34.49 ff.) and the *Nicomedian Speech* (*Or.* 38.38) as well as in other less famous speeches Dio warns the Greeks not to continue their ancient habit of internal feuds and hostilities, because this would inevitably

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[56] Cf. Desideri (1978) 376–422, Jones (1978) 83–114, Sheppard (1984). For a more general survey of Dio's (and other) testimonies on the political life of Asian cities see Salmeri (2000).

[57] I.e. *Or.* 33 and 34, which were delivered in Tarsus (cf. also the title of *Or.* 80: *Among those of Cilicia, on Freedom*). I agree with Whitmarsh (2001b) that "the general principle that the *Kingships* seek to establish [sc. is that] *paideia* is the *sine qua non* of good rule, and Greek wisdom must guide Roman rule" (p. 211; cf. pp. 213–16); I would add, however, that this principle is not to be interpreted only in terms of "rhetorical self-representation", but also has a strong ideological, or even political, significance.

[58] Plutarch, however, pretends to deter his countrymen from directly being involved in imperial administration, cf. Plut. *Prae. ger. reip.* 814D; on Plutarch's cooperation with Trajan see Stadter (2002) 11–13 and many other of the contributions in Stadter/van der Stockt (2002); for a reassessment of Plutarch's political activity see Stadter (2004).

[59] See the synthetic treatment by Salmeri (1991) 569–75.

[60] Cf. *Or.* 31 *passim* and see Desideri (1978) 110–16, Jones (1978) 26–35.

strengthen the political influence of Roman governors.[61] The Romans are not loved, but no other political scenery is envisaged than the one which they have built up and which unifies the οἰκουμένη under their hegemony.

In a sense, Dio's reflections, suggestions and warnings were accepted. The period which followed Dio's life was the one during which the glorious Greek past was more actively revived than in any other previous period of Greek history.[62] It was the intellectual phenomenon which was later termed 'Second Sophistic' by Philostratus[63] and which has been the object of exhaustive research particularly in the last four decades.[64] However, it ought not to be forgotten that at the same time—beginning with Plutarch—the history of the Roman people, of their great men, their values, their military achievements and internal struggles, in one word the history of the making of their Empire (and of its functioning as a political entity) was revisited and renewed by Greek (much more than Roman!) writers such as Appian, Arrian, Cassius Dio and others. They were functionaries of the Roman Empire, and eventually they obtained Roman citizenship—like Dio himself, whose Roman name was Cocceianus.[65] One could say that they aimed at appropriating the Roman Empire. Both types of Greek intellectuals—those stressing the Greek heritage, and those appropriating Roman history—were preparing the passage from the Roman to the Greek (Byzantine) Empire, and Dio's experience of exile and his reaction to it can be seen as an important step along this road.

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[61] On the situation in Cilicia (Tarsus) see Desideri (2001a), on the situation in Bithynia (Nicomedia) cf. Desideri (1978) 410–22 and Jones (1978) 84–91.

[62] On the civic use of the great Greek past from Dio's times on see Gascó (1998).

[63] On Philostratus' coining of the term see Desideri (1992) 57–8.

[64] Cf. imprimis Bowersock (1969), Bowie (1970), Swain (1996), Schmitz (1997). Other important studies are Reardon (1984), Anderson (1989), the essays collected in Russell (1990), Anderson (1993), Brunt (1994), Whitmarsh (2001b), and the contributions in Goldhill (2001). See Desideri (2001b) for an attempt to review the Italian scholarship on the subject.

[65] Cf. Plin. *Ep.* 10.81.

CHAPTER ELEVEN

# OVID AND THE MEDIEVAL EXILIC IMAGINARY

Ralph J. Hexter

In a few short years we will celebrate, so to speak, the bimillennium of Augustus' banishment of Ovid from Rome in 8 CE and the poet's relegation to a far-flung outpost of the Roman Empire on the Black Sea. We will certainly not celebrate the act of *relegatio* itself. Whatever the actual circumstances that lay behind it,[1] at this distance and given that virtually the only witness is Ovid, the edict perforce must seem to us the willful act of an autocrat. A view, to be sure, that, considering recent history, we have been inclined to credit. Through the twentieth century we—the 'we' of the 'civilized world'—have often associated the exile or expulsion of artists with totalitarian regimes; likewise we regarded self-exile, voluntary exile in other words, as tarnishing the reputation of the abandoned country rather than that of the courageous artist who fled repression or censorship.[2] By the end of the century, it had seemed as if such instances had grown quite rare and might soon cease altogether, extinct like smallpox, say, or polio. But, just as these viruses have proved more resilient than a confident twentieth century once thought, so we may well be entering upon a new phase of exile and self-exile. If this be speculation, it is the kind of speculation to which the Ovidian imaginary has also, at other times and places and *mutatis mutandis*, given rise.

One may, of course, celebrate the poetry that his removal from Rome, the city (*urbs*) and center of the world as he knew and imagined it, occasioned him to write, in particular the *Tristia* and the *Epistulae ex Ponto*, the two great collections (of five and four books, respectively) that

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[1] Cf. nn. 9 and 10 below. On the relative mildness of *relegatio* in contrast to *exilium stricto sensu*, and Ovid's clever tactic of blurring the distinction so that he might appear the greater victim, see Ehlers (1988) 150, 155–6.

[2] Cf. Ehlers (1988) 151: "Verbannung oder Flucht stigmatisieren das verstoßene Land". One thinks, for example, of Alexander Solzhenitsyn. Claassen (1999a) 256–8 describes the case of the Afrikaans writer Breyten Breytenbach who first entered into voluntary exile after marrying a non-white but ended up returning to South Africa only to be imprisoned.

first describe his journey to Tomis on the Black Sea and then transcribe aspects of his life there, with abundant and plangent appeals for recall or at least a resettlement to a somewhat more pleasant location.[3] One may also celebrate the collective outpouring of sympathetic lamentation that has flowed ever since from the pens of those for whom Ovid became a mythic figure of exile, displacement, and despair. Most are sympathetic in the sense that they see him as the victim of the Roman ruler's exercise of absolute authority; of these, some allege that the emperor was, hypocritically, seeking to cover up his own personal scandal. All, however, are sympathetic in the sense that one string is sympathetic with another, sounding in response. It is this genealogy of the exilic imaginary that I trace here, at least in part, for while I will concentrate on the medieval centuries, the name of Ovid as the exemplary banished poet lived on to be evoked by authors from du Bellay, Goethe, Grillparzer and Pushkin to Marx, Verlaine, Brecht and Brodsky.[4]

[3] The *Ibis* is also a product of this period, as are at least certain sections of the *Fasti* and possibly even portions of the *Metamorphoses* as we have it (see Harrison and Gaertner on pp. 135 and 155 above). On the *Ibis*, see now Williams (1996). I focus here on the two major collections as they constituted the prime canon of exile elegies for the tradition I will be tracing in this essay.—When I write 'describe' and 'transcribe', as here, or any other such verb, I do not mean to imply that these are 'realistic' representations. They are to be understood, rather, as 'reality effects' within a fictive and poetic realm. See Chwalek (1996), who argues cogently for the existence of an "elegiac ego" ("elegisches Ich") that the poet Ovid created in the *Tristia* and *Epistulae ex Ponto* (just as surely as he created an amatory-elegiac ego in the *Amores*) and whose exaggerations and contradictions readers are supposed to appreciate as a product of that persona. The history of the reception of the poems is largely, of course, a history of misreading from Chwalek's perspective, since the majority of readers before the late twentieth century seem to have fallen afoul of the autobiographical fallacy (for some exceptions, see Ehlers (1988)). Given the primary orientation of my study on that reception history, my own summaries usually reflect the less complex understanding of the readers I am studying, though were I writing a study of Ovid's *Tristia* and *Epistulae ex Ponto* directly, I would certainly use language much more in line with Chwalek's formulations. Chwalek's study also offers virtually exhaustive reference to relevant secondary literature up to the mid 1990s.

[4] Bibliography is vast and largely scattered; I offer the briefest of beginnings in Hexter (1986) 83 n. 2. For a sampling of more, on Grillparzer and Pushkin, see von Albrecht (1971) and Smolak (1980) 174–5, on Goethe and Brecht, see Ehlen (2000) 152–3, on Brodsky, see Kennedy (2002). Late-twentieth-century novels by Malouf (1978) and Christoph Ransmayr ((1988) and (1990)) are the best well-known, in the English-speaking world, of fictions that are inspired by Ovid on the Black Sea; among discussions, see Hardie (2002b) 326–37, Kennedy (2002) and Ziolkowski (2005). Other novels include Horia (1960 [discussed by Smolak (1980) 176–84 and, yet more briefly, by Claassen (1999a) 254]) and the last tenth of von Naso [sic!] (1958).—Some portions of this essay cover ground explored more extensively in Hexter (1986) 83–107 (reprinted in abbreviated form as Hexter (1995)) and revisited, from different angles and in more summary

Ovid is never more seductive than when enticing readers into the successive books of *Tristia* and *Epistulae ex Ponto*, precisely when a potential reader might be debating whether he or she should unroll yet another scroll of poetry.[5] Virtually without exception,[6] at book openings Ovid highlights the remoteness, even exoticism of his place of exile; the distance that separates him from Rome; his status as an exile; the book that must traverse the intervening space; or some combination of these elements. At the opening of the entire *Tristia*, for example, he addresses the book of poetry he has just completed (*Tr.* 1.1.1–2):

> *parve (nec invideo) sine me, liber, ibis in urbem:*
> *ei mihi, quod domino non licet ire tuo!*

> Little book (not that I'm jealous), without me you will travel to the city: Alas for me, that it is not permitted your master also to make the journey.[7]

The book can enter the city, while its creator-master cannot. By no means insignificant is the fact that at this initiatory moment Ovid evokes not only distance but dominion and domination, and, especially, dominion's limitations, suggesting that mastery may not always be the master's. Ovid acclaims his own lack of mastery at the opening of subsequent books as well,[8] but it is when one thinks of the power dynamic between banishing *princeps* and banished poet that this topic becomes

fashion, in Hexter (1999) and (2002); other segments of this essay reflect significant expansions and/or updates of what were only brief treatments in Hexter (1986). I refer readers, when still appropriate, to details and bibliography especially in the first of those studies; in the notes here I list only the most important of older studies and, of course, more recent scholarship, though that selectively, since many of the relevant titles appear also in the notes and bibliographies of the other contributions to this volume.

[5] One might well compare the opening couplets of many of the *Heroides*—the single epistles at least are much earlier works of Ovid—for his position is now quite similar to that of the abandoned heroines in his earlier work. There also the seductive opening has a *duplex intentio* (to use a phrase from a medieval commentary on the collection), representing the intent both of the fictive heroine to win back the attention of her absent beloved and of Ovid to draw in his reader.

[6] The opening of the final book, *Ex Ponto* 4—if its organization is indeed to be attributed to Ovid himself—constitutes a definite exception. Already by the opening of *Ex Ponto* 3 Ovid is able to address the land in which he finds himself: he now expresses himself resigned to banishment from Rome, seeking only a less hostile habitation.

[7] Unless otherwise noted, all translations are mine and, quite patently, have no literary pretensions whatsoever.

[8] Particularly insightful on this dimension of the opening of *Tr.* 1.1 is Hinds (1985) 13–14. Ovid's exhibitionism of his own 'weakness' or 'wretchedness', especially prominent at the openings of *Tr.* 2–4, could also be related to this thematic, but a full treatment lies outside the scope of this essay.

most interesting. And as it happens, the enigmatic nature of the fault for which Ovid was banished not only attracted readers but subtly introduced them to a comparable power dynamic.

Subtly, indeed, for most readers, up to and including modern scholars, have focused less (if at all) on Ovid's production of this enigma than on the enigma itself. The "mystery of Ovid's exile", to cite the name of both a book[9] and a familiar scholarly crux, has brought out the Sherlock Holmes in many of our scholarly confrères. Ovid himself, famously, tells us that the causes were two: a poem and a mistake (*carmen et error* (*Tr.* 2.207)). The poem, whether or not a pretext, was the *Ars amatoria*; no mystery there. The mystery inheres in the *error*, which Ovid intentionally veils, ostensibly to prevent further offense. His discretion appears to have served the emperor well,[10] unless, of course, it was Ovid's clever calculation that his ostentatiously discreet, even obsequious silence would itself constitute the gap that generations of readers would fill with the most outrageous fantasies, devising scandals that, for all we know, far exceed the original (if scandal there was). It is precisely this that I mean to describe as the production of enigma.[11]

Certainly, the sum total of retrojected scandal outweighs and surpasses, in variety and inventiveness, whatever act it was that lies concealed beneath the word *error*. A few examples will suffice. Late classical and medieval speculation often followed Ovid's own hints in devising more or less plausible scenarios, but given the identification of Ovid with the world of sexual adventure—he proclaims himself, after all, the erotodidact *par excellence* in the *carmen* that was the first-named cause of his banishment—almost all the speculation involved sexual high jinks of one sort or another. One of the earliest testimonia suggests that beneath the nickname Corinna, whom the singer of the *Amores* pursued, hides a young lady somehow connected to the emperor, but it is not absolutely clear if there is any connection here with the cause of Ovid's exile.[12] Later authors seem to have constructed scenarios around whatever

[9] Thibault (1964).

[10] To my mind, one of the most helpful of overviews of this issue, with reasoning as sound and sober as one could hope for, remains Green (1982). Virtually contemporary with this piece is Goold (1983), slightly earlier Syme (1978), a work of the noted historian of Augustan Rome.

[11] This would make Ovid in certain regards the author of his own reception.

[12] Cf. Sidonius, *Carm.* 23.160–1: *quondam Caesareae nimis puellae / ficto nomine subditum Corinnae*; see Hexter (1986) 89.

they imagined might enrage an emperor. For example, according to one tradition, Ovid cuckolded Augustus by sleeping with the empress, Livia. Since Ovid more than once describes his *crimen* as having involved seeing something he ought not have (*Tr.* 2.103–6 and 3.5.49–50) and since, in the first of the two passages, Ovid, characteristically evoking mythological comparanda, likens himself to Actaeon, punished when he unwittingly caught sight of the goddess Diana in her bath, we read in some medieval biographies of the poet that Ovid was being punished for having seen Livia bathing.[13]

A particular trio of possibilities—linked with the perennial 'or''s of commentary—achieved common currency and even a sort of canonical status among the *accessus* (introductions or headnotes) to the *Tristia* and *Ex Ponto*. The version I cite here embraces both the *carmen et error* of *Tr.* 2.207, offering for the latter both Ovid's adultery with the empress and a perhaps surprising elaboration of the idea that Ovid saw something the emperor did not want him to see:

> *quaeritur autem cur missus sit in exilium. unde tres dicuntur sententiae: prima quod concubuit cum uxore Cesaris Livia nomine, secunda quod sicut familiaris transiens eius porticum vidit eum cum amasio suo coeuntem, unde timens Cesar ne ab eo proderetur misit eum in exilium, tercia quia librum fecerat de Arte Amatoria, in quo iuvenes docuerat matronas decipiendo sibi allicere, et ideo offensis Romanis dicitur missus in exilium.*
>
> It is asked why he was sent into exile. Three causes are given in response: first, because he slept with Caesar's wife, Livia; second, because, as a member of the household, crossing the portico he saw Augustus having sex with his [i.e., Augustus's] boyfriend, and Augustus, fearing that he might be betrayed by him, sent him into exile; and third, because he had written the *Art of Love*, in which he instructed young men to deceive married women and ally them to them, and having so offended the Romans it is said that he was sent into exile.[14]

In this manuscript, the compiler or master expresses no preference for one explanation over either of the others. In contrast, an *accessus* to the *Epistulae ex Ponto* found in at least two manuscripts lists the same three explanations but singles out the boyfriend story as the "best", concluding that "this was the principal cause of his expulsion".[15]

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[13] Cf. Ghisalberti (1946) 33 note, col. 2 (Giovanni del Virgilio [fourteenth century]) and 59 (Cod. Laur. 36.2 [fifteenth century]).

[14] Cited from the *accessus* to the *Tristia* in codex latinus monacensis [henceforth 'clm'] 19475 (twelfth century); cf. Huygens (1970) 35–6.

[15] *vel quod melius est, quia vidit Cesarem cum amasio suo concumbere. . . . hec causa principalis erat*

Another Munich manuscript includes, before it cites the three standard explanations, a fabulous, even fabliaux-like story. In this tale it is none other than Vergil who is Ovid's rival for the affections of Augustus's wife, whom, it is further alleged, he "celebrated in his 'book without a title' under the name of Corinna"—in other words, in the *Amores*.[16] The 'boyfriend' tale knows a somewhat less flamboyant but even more anachronistic variant in a Berkeley manuscript: there the 'boyfriend abusing' emperor is none other than Nero.[17]

As I intimated above, engagement with Ovid as poet not merely banned but banished was based on deeper chords of response than mere titillation or a tantalizingly unsolved mystery. One infers this from the depth and breadth of response in medieval Latin literature, unbroken from the Carolingian poets through the thirteenth century. Particularly arresting is the fact that evidence for the engagement is even earlier. It is never wise to trust the vagaries of transmission, so much have the ravages of the centuries removed from our view, but it is at least worth mentioning the Wolfenbüttel fragment (G) of a likely once complete text of the *Epistulae ex Ponto*, which dates from the later fifth century.[18]

The imaginations of Carolingian poets seem to have been haunted by the image of Ovid as exile, certainly if one judges from their poetic remnants. I have traced some of the shadows of the exiled Ovid before,[19] and recently Thomas Ehlen has offered a detailed account of the exchange between Theodulf of Orléans and Modoin of Autun as

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*sue expulsionis*, clm 14753, fol. 40v; cf. Hexter (1986) 220; for Paris, Bibliothèque nationale, ms. lat. 8207, see Ghisalberti (1946) 33, note (col. 2) and 50 (*hanc autem causam esse principalem innuit ipse* . . .). The most important work of gathering, editing and printing Ovidian biographies since Ghisalberti is Coulson (1987).

[16] Clm 631, fol. 148r; cf. Hexter (1986) 221, (1999) 335–6. The *Amores* circulated widely in the Middle Ages as the *De sine titulo* or *De sine nomine*; on this, cf. Hexter (1986) 65 and Dimmick (2002) 273–4.

[17] Berkeley, UCB 95, here fol. 60ra; cf. Hexter (1999) 342. The manuscript was described, and the headnote first published, in Jeauneau (1988).

[18] On the transmission of Ovid's works, see Richmond (2002), who describes G on p. 446. G and the second-oldest witness for the *Epistulae ex Ponto*, Hamburg codex 52 in scrinio, from the ninth-century, are discussed briefly at Hexter (1986) 86–7, with reference to further bibliography. Gaertner (2004b) reveals further evidence of early direct engagement with the *Epistulae ex Ponto* by identifying interpolations that can only have dated from the fourth or fifth centuries. One would very much like to know what the motivations of such interpolators were. See also Gaertner (pp. 18–19 above and (2005) 39) on the reception of Ovid's exile poetry by Seneca, Statius, Rutilius Namatianus and other ancient authors.

[19] Cf. Hexter (1986) 83–107 and (2002) 416–24.

the first of four 'case studies' of the modes "*exilium* was, in very different ways, either experienced or figuratively deployed".[20] For example, in response to Theodulf's own highly Ovidianized epistle from Le Mans written in 820, Modoin explicitly evokes the spectre of the exiled Ovid in ostentatiously Ovidian language:

*livor edax petit alta fremens, consternere temptans*
*id quod ovans simplex pectore turba colit.*
*pertulit an nescis quod longos Naso labores?*
*insons est factus exul ob invidiam.*

> Voracious greed seeks the heights and, growling, attempts to bring low that which the simple-hearted crowd, applauding, approves. Or do you not know that Ovid endured long years of suffering? Innocent, he was exiled on account of envy.[21]

In the world of the Carolingian poet writing to distant friends, Ovid's Tomis becomes the 'touchstone' for all places of exile or even temporary removal.[22] So Ermoldus Nigellus (d. *c.* 835) praises Strasbourg, admitting that his place of 'exile' is not so harsh as Ovid's. Not long thereafter,

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[20] Cf. Ehlen (2000) 166, prefacing the section (pp. 167–82, plus excursus on pp. 183–4) of which the title is "Vertrieben wie einst Ovid" ("banished as once Ovid was", p. 167). Ehlen provides abundant evidence of Ovid's poetic presence behind these texts.

[21] *Modoinus indignus episcopo Theodulfo suo*, vv. 47–50 (*PLAC* 1.571). *livor edax* obviously echoes Ov. *Am.* 1.15.1 and *Rem.* 389. Further on the Carolingian Naso's Ovidianism amidst the general *renovatio*, see Whitta (2002). *Roma iterum renovata* is Modoin's own language: cf. *prospicit alta novae Romae meus arce Palemon, / cuncta suo imperio consistere regna triumpho, / rursus in antiquos mutataque secula mores / aurea Roma iterum renovata renascitur orbi* (Modoin, *Egloga* 1.24–7, in Korzeniewski (1976) 76–87, here p. 78; in part anthologized and translated in Godman (1985a) 190–7, who highlights just these verses as a motto for the Carolingian renaissance (p. 1)). The degree to which Carolingian letters participated in and contributed to Charlemagne's own calculated attempts to evoke imperial Rome hardly needs rehearsal. In the realm of imperial bibliography, one can cite Einhard, who modeled his *Vita Caroli Magni* (*c.* 833) on Suetonius's *Vitae Caesarum*, but much earlier most of the leading poets took classical nicknames: Alcuin (d. 804) styled himself as Horace ('Flaccus'), Angilbert (d. 814) as 'Homer', and Modoin (d. *c.* 840) as 'Naso', i.e., Ovid. On this literary parlor game, see Garrison (1997).

[22] "Modoin has the *senex* refer to Ovid's exile in the eclogue quoted above, at" vv. 60–6. "Modoin consoles Theodulf with the names of notable predecessors, placing him in a procession beginning with Ovid and continuing (without concern for strict chronology) with Boethius, Vergil, Seneca, St. John on Patmos, Hilarius, Peter and Paul" (Hexter (2002) 419). Ehlen (2000) 168 calls this "probably the first 'catalogue of exiles' in occidental literature since Ovid and Boethius". In his commentary on Revelations, Ambrose Autpertus (d. 784) referred to John's period on Patmos as *exilium*: cf. Ehlen (2000) 162. For reference to a legend of direct contact between John on Patmos and Ovid in Tomis, see Smolak (1980) 167, Ehlen (2000) 180 and Dimmick (2002) 275. The thirteenth-century witness to this legend is published in Bischoff (1951).

Walahfrid Strabo styles his sojourn in Speyer as an exile. Though he sings the praises of the city on the Rhine, Ovid in "frosty Scythia" heads the crowd of exiled poets, philosophers, and prophets he evokes.[23] Exile becomes the poet, he proclaims (*Carmen* 76, vv. 60–5):

*est veluti proprium et cunctis civile poetis*
*extera regna pati tormentaque mentis amarae*
*carmine solari vario: sub frigore Naso*
*congemuit Scythiae, Musarum ubi munere tantum*
*excoluit, quantum Romanae moenibus urbis*
*non faceret, patriae praedulci nomine captus.*

It is as it were the appropriate and civil right of all poets to suffer distant lands and to comfort the torments of a bitter mind with varied song: Ovid lamented while suffering the frosts of Scythia, where by the muses' gift he perfected [sc. his poetry] as much as he had not [sc. done] within the walls of the Roman city, captivated as he was [there] by the sublimely sweet name of his homeland.[24]

If only we could ask medieval writers what contributed to the deep affinity they often expressed and certainly seemed to feel for the exiled Ovid! Lacking their answer, any explanation one can offer is of necessity speculative, which is, I would argue, only right and fitting, since it is, after all, an imaginary realm, the 'medieval exilic imaginary', I seek to explore. We can begin our speculations by noting that the topos of the chain of exiles—at whose head Ovid often stands[25]—suggests, very much as Walahfrid Strabo makes explicit, that there is something almost

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[23] Walahfrid adds Porphyry, Anaxagoras (cf. p. 10 above in this volume), Socrates, and the man not a prophet in his own country (Matthew 13.57) to Modoin's list; see Hexter (1986) 91 and (2002) 420 and Ehlen (2000) 180–1. On Modoin, again Ehlen (2000) and Whitta (2002); on Ermoldus and Walahfrid Strabo, *i.a.*, see Smolak (1980) 161–2 and Godman (1985b).

[24] In the Latin text, I follow the punctuation of Stroh (1969) 15, rather than that of Duemmler at *PLAC* 2.415. The idea that exile is a *proprium* of poets can be compared to the association of exile with historiography and philosophy: see pp. 10–11 above (with further material). A full survey of medieval poets who reflect on exile and Ovid would exceed the permissible scale of this essay, even more so one that took appropriate account of prose authors, who, undeniably, are also witnesses to a 'medieval exilic imaginary'. All works of reception history oriented around a single author run the risk of over-selectivity (cf. Hexter (2006)), and the present study is no exception. For additional contextualization, and a strong sampling of prose authors, I highly recommend three contributions to a recent volume, Ehlen (2000), which I have already had reason to cite, Haye (2000), and Kortüm (2000), each with extensive, relevant, and recent bibliography.

[25] At least figuratively; cf. Froesch (1987).

existential about the condition of exile and poetry. Not, of course, that it is strictly necessary in definitional terms, as his *veluti* concedes (see above). We recognize just such a link between 'poète' and 'maudit', and our knowledge that some poets lead pleasant lives, thank you very much, does not break that link. (Are we not even a bit suspicious of any 'happy poets', tacitly assuming that they would have been much greater had they known more sorrow?)

Exile as a topic is, of course, richer than a mere catalogue of exiles. As many readers will know, there is a long history to philosophical, even theological meditation on exile ranging from a starting point for consolation to an idealized spiritual state.[26] Some of the exemplary exiles in the traditional list, such as Seneca and Boethius—the latter's imprisonment by Theoderic constituted his 'exile'—themselves point to the philosophical and spiritual dimensions of the condition of exile.[27] Boethius was of course heir, like Augustine before him, to a double tradition that looked to both Hellenistic philosophy and scriptural texts, the latter from both Old and New Testaments.[28]

The very terminology of the two testaments, polemical in origin, bespeaks the Christian point of view dominating the Latin Middle Ages.[29] It is worth noting, if only as a point of departure, that in the Jewish scriptural tradition, 'exile' is suffered in the first instance by an entire people rather than by an individual,[30] although a number of individual

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[26] See, for example, the contributions by Branham (pp. 71 ff.), Nesselrath (pp. 87 ff.) and Fantham (pp. 173 ff.) in this volume, with particular reference to Plutarch (see pp. 98–9 above) and the theme of exile, and the remarks by Gaertner (pp. 12–13, 17–18) on Chrysippus, Musonius, Dio Chrysostom and Favorinus.

[27] This is a large topic, itself with a large bibliography. It surfaces at odd intervals in the arbitrarily organized book by Claassen (1999a): 16, 20–6, 49–50, 64–8, 78–82, 161–73. Gaertner (pp. 10–12, 19 n. 105 above) provides helpful bibliography.

[28] Not that the latter, and even some of the later stages of the former, were utterly sundered from contact with contemporary Hellenistic philosophical schools (see also Gaertner and Nesselrath on pp. 12 and 98 above). I never use the terms 'Old' and 'New Testament' without pointing out its ultimately polemical origins and its obnoxious connotations to non-Christians.

[29] Other frames of reference coexisted even in the Middle Ages, but in this account, I have had to limit my focus to the Christian Latin Middle Ages, which thought of course in terms of the traditional and biased terminology. For one recent study of the medieval Hebrew tradition, see Alfonso (2004).

[30] For example, on more than one occasion Assyrian rulers removed the inhabitants of a good many Israelite cities to Assyria (in 734 BCE Tiglath-peleser *transtulit eos in Assyrios*, 4 Reg. 15.29; in 721 Sargon *transtulit Israhel in Assyrios*, 4 Reg. 17.6; a bit more than a century later it was the Babylonian Nebuchadnezar (4 Reg. 24.14–17)). I cite the Latin of the Vulgate since for medieval readers of Ovid scripture was also a Latin

figures, e.g., Abraham, Jacob, Joseph, Moses, experience displacement and the fate of being a foreigner in a strange land.[31] In the Christian tradition, as early as Paul's letters, exile is employed as a figure of estrangement from what should be our true home. "Being at home in the body", he writes, "we are in exile from the Lord" (2 Cor. 5.6).[32] "We" is plural, to be sure, but the emphasis is very much on the 'first person': this engages each one of us on our journey to potential salvation.

According to this figuration, the body represents our exile. The entire visible and corporeal world is a place of exile from the spiritual, in other words, the invisible and incorporeal. So Paul writes in the Epistle to the Hebrews (11.13–16):

> *iuxta fidem defuncti sunt omnes isti, non acceptis repromissionibus, sed a longe eas aspicientes, et salutantes, et confitentes quia peregrini et hospites sunt super terram. qui enim haec dicunt, significant se patriam inquirere. et si quidem illius meminissent de qua exierunt, habebant utique tempus revertendi; nunc autem meliorem appetunt, id est, caelestem. ideo non confunditur Deus vocari Deus eorum: paravit enim illis civitatem.* (Vulgate)

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text. The language is not one of *exilium* (much less *relegatio*) but of 'transport' (*transtulit*) from the perspective of the ruler and 'migration' or 'resettlement' (*transmigratio*) from the perspective of the people moved. For the absence of the word *exilium* in Jerome's translation, see Ehlen (2000) 160. For the repeated use of *transmigratio* (and other forms of the word), cf. Jeremiah 29.1 ff.; here one could well translate the recurrent phrase *omnis transmigratio* as 'the entire people in exile'. Kortüm (2000) 122 also points to the original 'exile' of Adam and Eve from Eden (Gen. 3.23–4). Ehlen (2000) 160–1 cites selected patristic and medieval comments on this tradition. For the 'fall' of man as exile, cf. also Dante, *Paradiso* 26.115–17, and the following note.

31 Cf. Kortüm (2000) 119. The twelfth-century English Benedictine Osbert of Clare, vocal in his disappointment at not being named Abbot of Westminster, as he had expected, was sent to a series of places, and in the complaints that followed he deployed a host of Old Testament models to describe his situation (Moses, Joseph, Samson, the Jewish people in Babylon) in addition to Christ and Boethius: cf. Haye (2000) 149–54. On Babylon, see Ehlen (2000) 161–2; on Jacob and Joseph, Ehlen (2000) 163–4. That Christ's time incarnate on earth is an *exilium* is central to Ehlen's rich revisionary reading of the oft-interpreted lyric *Ut quid iubes*, an *exilium* its extraordinary author, the monk Godescalc or Gottschalk (803–before 870), feels himself sharing ((2000) 193–208).

32 Cf. Murphy-O'Connor (1986). Not all Biblical translations render the ἐκδημέω of 2 Cor. 5.6 as 'exile'—the Jerusalem Bible, for example, does, the King James Version [henceforth 'KJV'] does not—though that is certainly one of the possible senses of the term and arguably the best rendering (cf. Pl. *Leg.* 864E). Jerome writes: *audentes igitur semper, scientes quoniam dum sumus in corpore, peregrinamur a Domino*. The sense of wayfaring or sojourning in foreign parts away from the Lord is a nice one (cf. the sense in which Philo uses ἐκδημέω, *Spec. Leg.* 4.142), hearkening back to the *transmigratio* of Jeremiah but not echoing it, for it is different: this is a willful, not a forced exile. Obviously, Biblical intertextuality and the systematic construction of a network of cross-references, traditional to exegesis, functions differently in Hebrew, in Greek, in Latin, and in every one of the modern languages.

> These all died in faith, not having received the promises, but having seen them afar off, and were persuaded of them, and embraced them, and confessed that they were strangers and pilgrims on the earth. For they that say such things declare plainly that they seek a country. And truly, if they had been mindful of that country from whence they came out, they might have had opportunity to have returned. But now they desire a better country, that is, an heavenly: wherefore God is not ashamed to be called their God: for he hath prepared for them a city. (KJV)

This is, quite recognizably, the figural economy that subtends the entirety of Augustine's *City of God*, in which Augustine contrasts not only the worldly 'city of man' with the 'city of God', Rome with Jerusalem, but also the earthly with the heavenly Jerusalem. No brief summary can do justice to the complex ramifications of this schema, but since the city of God is our true home, any time away from it constitutes exile.[33] As Margaret Ferguson, however, argues, in the *City of God*, exile is not merely a figure or trope: figuration itself *is* exile. Just as human understanding cannot comprehend the divine perspective; just as 'time', which in God's view is but an instant, must for humans be splayed out across a dimension that can only be grasped in spatial terms; so human language is exiled from a state in which it could express divine realities. "Paradoxically", she writes, "in his very insistence that the 'distance' he speaks of is not to be understood literally, Augustine is at the same time defining all language as figurative because it is incapable of grasping the literal truth of God's nature as pure presence".[34]

The Augustinian solution, indeed, one may say, the Nicene and orthodox Catholic solution, was to honor and redeem the visible as well, the corporeal through the spiritual.[35] But this orthodoxy notwithstanding,

[33] The bibliography on Augustine and the *Civitas Dei* is vast beyond citation. For the specific centrality of 'exile' to its economy, see the rich essay of Ferguson (1992), an item that (unfortunately) seems to me not to have made it into the ever more canonical bibliographies on exile, for it constitutes a unique contribution.—Even before Augustine, Ambrose (whom Augustine admired) wrote in his commentary on Psalm 118: *qui enim domesticus Dei est, exul est mundo; qui conversatur in celestibus, peregrinus est terris*; cf. Kortüm (2000) 122, citing *In Psalm. 118 Serm.* 7.28. On Ambrose's interpretation see also Ehlen (2000) 161–2. Kortüm (2000) 123 further instances Jerome in his commentary on Ezekiel.

[34] Ferguson (1992) 79. Cf. as well the remarks of the editors of the volume in which her essay appears, esp. those on pp. xix and 67–8.

[35] It will be worth citing Ferguson ((1992) 85) once more: "It is precisely because Christ is consubstantial with God that His Word provides a redemptive escape from the *regio dissimilitudinis*. It is important to realize, however, that for Augustine, the Incarnation does not redeem language itself; rather, the Incarnation guarantees the *end* of language because it promises the possibility of an ultimate transcendence of time".

it is always the world and the flesh that constitute our temptations, for we are flesh and it is the world that we can see. It is in service of reminding Christians of the invisible and incorporeal that the trope of exile was deployed in the wake of Paul's simple, affective and effective terms rather than Augustine's more complexly and intellectually elaborated ones, and it gained special currency in spiritual communities. The ideal monastic life was an exile from the world and from the joys and pleasures in which laypersons are perforce entangled. The monk's exile was regarded as exemplifying a deeper Christian truth, namely, that the entire earthly life of humans is but a *peregrinatio* or wandering, exile from our true homeland (*patria*) in heaven.[36] As Hugh of St. Victor (d. 1141) wrote, in contrast to the weak-willed man, who loves the country of his birth, and even the brave man, for whom any country could serve as a homeland: *perfectus vero, cui mundus totus exsilium est*—the perfect man is the one for whom the entire world is an exile.[37]

Independent of theology, the trope of exile harnesses one of the most powerful and seemingly constant of human notions—or should I write 'emotions'?—nostalgia, 'home sickness', although the German *Heimweh* sounds somewhat loftier than English's more homey phrase. Simon Goldhill has, in a recent essay (2000), organized reflections on the trope of exile in the writings of select modern philosophers around Nietzsche's evocation of the term:

> For Nietzsche, along with Sartre and other luminaries of twentieth-century exile writing, it is the general condition of alienation, loss of home, which defines man's lot as exilic. As Adorno puts it, "it is part of morality not to be at home in one's home".[38]

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[36] Cf. n. 33, above, on Ambrose and Jerome.

[37] The quotation occurs in the following context: *delicatus ille est adhuc, cui patria dulcis est; fortis autem iam, cui omne solum patria est; perfectus vero, cui mundus totus exsilium est* (*Didascalion* 3.20 (Buttimer (1939) 69), where it follows another commonplace, *omnis mundus philosophantibus exsilium est*, to support which Hugh in fact cites Ov. *Pont.* 1.3.35–6. See Haye (2000) 248 and Ehlen (2000) 164–5. After Hugh, Lothar of Segni (i.e. Pope Innocent III) wrote: *iustus … non habet hic manentem civitatem, sed futuram inquirit. sustinet seculum tanquam exilium*. Cf. Kortüm (2000) 123, citing his *De Miseria humanae conditionis* 1.18 (in the edition of Maccarrone (1955)).—This topic will emerge again, below, in the context of discussion of Petrarch's *De Remediis utriusque fortunae.*

[38] Goldhill (2000) 2. Cf. Adorno (1997) ch. 18 ("Asyl für Obdachlose"): "Es gehört zur Moral, nicht bei sich selber zu Hause zu sein", quoted and translated also by Said (1984) 54. For a similar concept see Cohen, p. 124 above.

Goldhill further cites Julia Kristeva writing very much in the same vein: "How can we avoid sinking into the mire of commonsense if not by becoming a stranger to one's own country, language, sex and identity?", citing in summation Exner's dictum that "Intellectualism in the twentieth century is a form of exile".[39] Estrangement, alienation, exile at least in one's mind, is almost a moral imperative in the contemporary world, and one can feel that such sentiments are as appropriate today as in some of the darkest years of the twentieth century.[40] One can see the points of contact between an Adorno or Kristeva and a Hugh of St. Victor. Boethius certainly seems to deserve to stand in these ranks. Whether Ovid does is quite another question, but I submit that some such power is at work behind the figure of Ovid in exile, whether he deserved it or not.

That such reflections and topics (as well as topoi) circulated in literate medieval circles does not begin to explain why the philosophical and spiritual traditions of exile resonated with them, and to such a degree. What specifically sustained and inspired the kind of intense identification with Ovid the exile to which the citations several paragraphs above attest? What inspired so many authors to cast their experiences in the tradition at the head of which stood Ovid? There is, no doubt, a degree of aggrandizement (but perhaps also play) in the self-fashioning that claimed affinities with classical poets via learned sobriquets. Perhaps playing the exile was in part classical pose,[41] but on the other

[39] Goldhill (2000) 5 quotes the first from Kristeva (1988) 298, the latter from Exner (1976) 292, further referencing Eagleton (1970).

[40] I do not pursue here the contemporary turn in reflections on exile from focus on the individual to one on the displacement of entire peoples, no surprise when we are confronted with the plight of refugees in several parts of the world on a daily basis. This development must be understood within larger historical currents and comprises a pressing issue for students, not to mention proponents of human rights. I have found Balfour/Cadava (2004) helpful in beginning to work in this larger area. Our most recent history adds a new layer of potential referentiality. Ovid's open-ended term on Tomis, and his bootless appeals during first one and then a second imperial 'administration', cannot help but bring to mind those who now find themselves in "indefinite detention", the title of one of the chapters of Butler (2004) 50–100. If his error exposed him to that kind of penalty, his *carmen*, for which he was also allegedly exiled, brings to mind another class of modern 'criminals' who, at least in the United States, are increasingly finding out that the end of their prison sentence may not mean a return to freedom: 'sex offenders'. This is an alarmingly capacious category. Writing about sex has not yet been declared a sexual offense, but it is not inconceivable that it one day will.

[41] Cf. p. 230 on Baudri trying to bridge the temporal distance to antiquity, and pp. 5, 10–11, 17 on exile as a role and a *proprium* of philosophers and historians as well as a motif by which writers of the Second Sophistic sought to place themselves in a literary tradition.

hand, princes of all ages can be provoked and rusticate hitherto favored courtiers.

For Carolingian men of letters, the finding of a classical model, an Augustan correlative, might be thought almost inevitable in the first century of a political entity that modeled its unity and much of its cultural imaginary on ancient Rome. But what was the attraction of exile? One might begin with a 'sociological' explanation of sorts and speculate that the standard career paths of these products of the new Carolingian educational system may have predisposed them to identify with an Ovid who looked back longingly at Rome. The skein of personal relationships among these individuals woven first in schools over the texts of Roman authors and then stretched across Europe as they themselves were sent on diplomatic missions or posted to distant monastic foundations, might very well have inspired a particular sympathy for the plight of an Ovid separated so far from his friends and family in Rome.

The educational system did not just launch these men on career paths. It perfected their Latin, focusing them—as training in Latin always does—on ancient Rome. This both contributed to and reinforced the programmatic identification between their contemporary world and the great Rome of antiquity, at least as they saw it, in almost pointillist fashion, in the texts they studied in which Rome, both city and polity, was reflected and refracted. For this reason, when the great Carolingian scholar Theodulf (d. 821)—among his accomplishments was an edition of Jerome's Vulgate—wrote *De Libris quos legere solebam*, it represents something more than a pedantic exercise, something more than a *Kataloggedicht* long *après* the Alexandrian and Ovidian *lettre*.[42] Rather it should be read as an inventory of the building blocks with which, in the late eighth and early ninth centuries, those who played the game of culture could build both the invisible city of Rome and the invisible city of their own world. For, very much in Calvino's spirit, the cities that really matter for us are *le città invisibili*.

My evocation of Calvino is perhaps not so out of place as at first it might appear, certainly not for a culture one of whose organizing texts was Augustine's *City of God*, and not of just any god, but of *dominus deus, creator omnium, visibilium et invisibilium*. That a sense of the loss and

[42] Though of course 'chatty Ovid' finds his place there, cf. Theodulf, *De Libris quos legere solebam*, vv. 17–18 (*PLAC* 1.543): *et modo Pompeium, modo te, Donate, legebam, / et modo Virgilium, te modo, Naso loquax*.

invisibility of a place was particularly potent in precisely these circles, at these times, owes something, I suggested just now, to their mutual experience of the network to which they belonged as Latin clerics, most in orders. That last fact helps us bring into the mix the spiritual tradition of exile. What I want to emphasize at this point, however, is the special role of the language in which they read, among other things, Ovid's exile poetry.

It is not a little paradoxical that the Latin that they read and wrote was, on the one hand, decreasingly their linguistic 'home', if by that one means their vernacular or 'mother tongue'.[43] On the other hand, their training indoctrinated them in and acculturated them to Latin, so that over the career of each of the literati Latin became more and more their home. One might hypothesize that longing for an artificial and learned home would, only at first blush paradoxically, be even more intense. Certainly, Latinity was what defined them as a network dispersed in cultural centers across the face of Europe; it was what many had experienced in common as students; and it was what they used to bind themselves together, to the extent they could, via epistles in prose and verse, when their postings or other business sundered one from another.

Medieval clerics, certainly those who received assignments that took them from their house of origin and thus figuratively "exiled"[44] them from the friends of their youth and schooldays, would appreciate the pathos of Ovid sundered from his friends at Rome. I imagine them as finding especially pathetic Ovid's separation from his linguistic community, apologizing for his Latin, fearing that he is losing his language by being exiled from his linguistic origins, precisely because for them it is that same Latin, the Latin of Ovid's Rome, Ovid's own Latin, that they seek to make their own. I posit a nostalgia for Latin, the fiercest

[43] Credit for terming Latin "die Muttersprache des Abendlandes" goes to Bieler (1949) 104, though of course, given the status of medieval Latin, it was not, like other mother tongues, learned at one's mother's breast. "Bieler's claim that medieval Latin is the 'mother tongue of the West' is arresting because the 'invention of medieval Latin' depended on the very fact that Latin was no longer the mother tongue of any individual.... [M]edieval Latin could become the 'mother tongue of the West' only after this disjoining, after the infant had been snatched from its mother and sent to the school..." (Hexter (1987) 86). Ziolkowski (1996) 506 takes the next step and terms "Latin in the Middle Ages... a *father tongue*" (original emphasis).—The speculation throughout this section owes a debt to the very different but perennially thought-provoking work of Ong (1959).

[44] Hexter (2002) 421.

nostalgia of all: for this Latin represents in fact a home they never actually inhabited. They were, as a group, born in exile and they continued to sojourn amidst foreigners, far from the longed-for home of Latinity. Like Ovid, they yearned always to return to Rome, but, of course, this yearning was for a Rome they had themselves never inhabited. They are like the children of Israel transported to Babylon: they were born too late to have seen Jerusalem with their own eyes, and they must take their parents' lamentation and make it their own, their keening the sharper to the extent that what they lost was already, for them, a dream. It is the lamentation of every child of a people born in captivity, in a refugee camp, in exile.[45]

Late-comers, epigones. I described above, apropos Augustine, how time, that is, our human sense of time, is a mapping of eternity onto an axis, the spatial metaphorization. Ferguson brilliantly showed how metaphor itself was an 'exile' in language, and the Latin of the Vulgate, especially its use of *transferre* to describe the forced displacement of peoples, would easily suggest figuration, or translation, for that matter. Here I want to argue that this troping of time as space becomes an important element in medieval Latin responsiveness to Ovid's exile.[46]

Such a pattern of thought need not focus on Ovid, but the Latin tradition often gestured in his direction. For example, already in the poetic 'itinerary' (*De Reditu Suo*) of the early fifth-century author Rutilius Namatianus, geographical separation seems to figure temporal and cultural distance as well, not without well-chosen Ovidian echoes.[47] Rutilius had actually traveled to Rome in 416 and was now returning to his home in Gaul, but the physical Rome that attracted him was, clearly, already not the Rome his own classical poetic and linguistic models had inhab-

[45] A particularly moving modern voice is that of Mahmoud Darwish whom I first encountered through one selection of his poetry in English translation (2000).

[46] I am looking at relatively large temporal and spatial displacements, but the trope itself is at the heart of the utterly common, even banal expressions 'to follow after someone' or 'to follow in one's footsteps'. Worth recalling in this context is one of the supreme acknowledgments of an epigone, the lines Statius addressed to his own *Thebaid* as he concluded it: *vive, precor; ne tu divinam Aeneida tempta, / sed longe sequere et vestigia semper adora* (12.816–17). Curtius (1953) 162–6 highlights the key role Statius had in organizing medieval Latin thinking about poetic precedence.

[47] Recent studies have quite aptly highlighted Rutilius' strategic allusions to Ovid, the exile elegies especially, in the *De Reditu Suo*; see Tissol (2002) 435–8 (with reference to other scholars). Though the resulting style is by no means Ovidian (as Tissol grants (p. 437)), my previous formulation "without notable Ovidian overtones" (Hexter (2002) 417) cannot stand.

ited. The sense of distance and thus of longing only increased after the time of Rutilius, and as centers of learning were established in northern Europe as well, real geographical distance was added to a growing temporal one. One could still, of course, travel to a real Rome, but if one did, one would have discovered that it had changed considerably even from Rutilius's time. My argument, then, is that one can understand how Ovid's longing to return, physically, across the seas to the Rome he had left but recently could be invested with a longing to return to it from the 'distance' of a growing number of centuries.[48]

Real visits to Rome were not the issue, for Rome is already a hypostatized entity created in the minds of literati by their reading. But, of course, the value of this Rome was unstable and thus all the more anxiety-provoking. For in the very same *City of God* in which one learned of the spatial metaphorization of time, one also learned all the sins of the Romans. And, in yet another sense, these literati were already residents of some version of this Rome, for it was a veritable invisible city that their own subculture created and inhabited. I have suggested elsewhere that through the "resources and resonances" of the very Latin they used, they brought a simulacrum of the *urbs* itself into being, an *urbs* that resembled the phantom Rome of Ovid's exile poetry: "a city already invisible to him that he treasured in memory and longingly evoked. At a distance", I wrote, "the network of contacts and communications that are the hallmarks of city life can only be recreated in letters. The epistle, prose or verse, becomes then the means par excellence of connecting".[49]

It is from this perspective that I want to take up—briefly, for they have in recent years often been discussed—the most ostentatiously Ovidian poems of Baudri of Bourgueil (1046–1130), in particular the paired letters "Florus to Ovid" and "Ovid to Florus".[50] Baudri's poetry, known

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[48] Cf. the formulation, apropos of a much later poet, "Goethes 'Exil' meint den Abschied aus einem idealisierten Kulturraum, wenn man so will: einer geistigen Heimat..." (Ehlen (2000) 153).

[49] Hexter (1999) 418.

[50] Poems 97 and 98 in the now universally employed numeration of both Hilbert (1979) and Tilliette (1998/2002), though earlier scholarship will employ the numeration of Abrahams (1926). For a specific study of Baudri 97–8, see Schuelper (1979), and the poems are discussed as well in the influential work of Bond (1995). On the thematic of one's course of study in foreign parts as exile (cf. p. 223, above) see Ehlen (2000) 165, with reference above all to Baudri 150 (Hilbert), vv. 1–4. I cite other recent literature immediately below.

from one manuscript in the Vatican, is replete with Ovidian echoes and references.[51] Many are epistles to friends and other correspondents. The impress of the *Heroides*, in these years rapidly gaining the popularity it will hold into the eighteenth century, is quite strong. In poems 7 and 8, for example, Baudri actually rewrites *Heroides* 16 and 17, inventing new letters from Paris to Helen and Helen to Paris and altering the meter from Ovid's elegiacs to hexameters. Significant for my argument are the intentional anachronisms he works into this pair of letters. For example, Baudri's Paris informs Helen of the fine vintages of a city called Orléans under a certain King Henry (7.193–8). Baudri is playing a more complex historical game still when he has this new Helen vaunt Greece's conquest of "the language Greek calls Latin" (8.42).[52]

In poems 97 and 98, relevant in the context of our discussion of the exilic imaginary, Baudri grafted the *Epistulae ex Ponto* onto the *Heroides*, creating a pair of letters—like *Heroides* 16–17, 18–19, or 20–21—that arise from Ovid's own peculiar situation.[53] In poem 97, Florus—a creation of Baudri—writes from Rome to the exiled Ovid ('Ovidius').

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[51] Cf. Hilbert (1979). One, *Ad eum qui Ovidium ab eo extorsit* (poem 111 (Hilbert)), is an amusing poem of abuse against someone who has borrowed his copy of Ovid but has not returned it. The long (if imperfectly transmitted) mythological poem 154 (Hilbert) cannot be read without constant reference to Ovid. Still valuable on Ovid's impact on the style of Baudri as well as other medieval Latin erotic poets is Offermanns (1970). Godman (1990) offers a broader perspective.

[52] Less jarring, though still anachronistic, are the remarks of both Paris and Helen on the sexual proclivities of Greeks (7.111–38,185–6, 8.107–10), which clearly bespeak medieval anxieties about sodomy and may be part of Baudri's own defensive armature.

[53] This is a conceit that the "the genre-bending and -blending Ovid" (as I called him in Hexter (2002) 423; the present discussion expands on pp. 422–4 of that study) would have appreciated. Baudri's application of the idea of paired letters à la *Heroides* 16–21 to Ovid's own situation recalls the response to *Heroides* 1–15 of Ovid's friend Sabinus, who, Ovid tells us (*Am.* 2.18.27–34), penned responses to at least six of these single letters (the Augustan Sabinus's letters are lost; the three that circulate under his name are fifteenth-century confections (cf. Dörrie (1968) 104–6) by a fifteenth-century Sabino or, in Latin, Angelus de Curibus Sabinis). Ovid seemed to take delight in this twist on his own letter game, penning pairs of letters himself.—The authenticity of a good number of the *Heroides* has been impugned (see p. 161 n. 37 for literature); this is fairly irrelevant for students of Ovid's medieval reception, for whom the *Heroides* comprised, by our numeration, *Heroides* 1–14, 16 (less vv. 39–144), and 17–21.14 (until its fifteenth-century rediscovery, *Heroides* 15 could have been read in only one Frankfurt manuscript; we know little about the pre-1470s history of the 'missing' portions of *Heroides* 16 and 21). For the possibility that the paired letters were the work of Ovid's period of exile, see Gaertner p. 155 n. 4 above.—Throughout this section, I use 'Ovidius' to refer to Baudri's fictional Ovid; Florus is, of course, entirely an invention of Baudri's.

Florus touches on the rumor of Ovid's adultery with Livia (97.31–2),[54] but more tellingly, he seeks to share in Ovid's exile. He will come to Pontus. In 98, Ovidius writes back, opening with phraseology that calls the *Heroides* to mind. His somewhat lengthier response bids Florus not to risk the journey. Florus, Ovidius writes, is to stay at Rome and petition for his return.

These are quite remarkable poems, exemplifying the quality of imaginative engagement Baudri invests in his poetic traffic with his classical models. The most recent discussion about them seems to turn, first, on the question of identification—in which of the figures, Florus or Ovidius, does Baudri invest himself?—and, then, on the not entirely unrelated question whether Baudri intends us to imagine a loving relationship between the two individuals, and if so, of exactly what sort. Christine Ratkowitsch argues that Baudri dons the mask of the exiled Ovid to lament his own relegation to the bishopric of Dol (in Brittany) instead of the more central post he felt was his due, figuring a career setback and provincial posting with exile.[55] She also argues that the poems engage in a de-eroticization[56] of the *Heroides*. Jean-Yves Tilliette rejects Ratkowitsch's biographical allegory; indeed, he argues for an utterly autonomous fictive realm.[57] This permits him, also, to steer readers away from what he believes is the utterly anachronistic reading of anyone who would see the expressions of affection between the two male figures as in any way 'homosexual' or 'gay'—and here I employ his own inverted quotation marks.[58]

[54] Cf. Smolak (1980) 166, though I would certainly not use the word "Fälschung" to describe these letters as Smolak does (pp. 165, 167).

[55] Cf. Ratkowitsch (1987) 154: "Wenn die These, mit dem Exil sei Dol gemeint, richtig ist, kann der 'Caesar' der beiden Versbriefe nur mit dem französischen König identifiziert werden, denn ihm hatte Baudri sein Bischofsamt in dem kleinen Ort der Bretagne zu 'verdanken' ". I acknowledge with appreciation the critique of both Ratkowitsch's and Tilliette's positions in a short paper by Paul Springer, a graduate student in Berkeley's Department of Comparative Literature, written for a course taught by my former colleague Dr. James Whitta and which Mr. Springer was kind enough to share with me.

[56] Cf. Ratkowitsch (1987) 165 (*i.a.*): "Enterotisierung". For a similar debate concerning de-eroticization in Ovid's exile poetry see n. 32 on pp. 160–1 above.

[57] Cf. Tilliette (1994) 82: "Est donc ici vigoureusement proclamée l'autonomie de la fiction. Toute lecture fondée sur l'illusion référentielle est d'avance disqualifiée".

[58] The language is quite dismissive, cf. Tilliette (1994) 75: "Mentionnons pour mémoire la thèse curieuse qui fait de nos auteurs des hérauts de l'amour au masculin, les chantres de Ganymède; les vocables modernes d''homosexuel', plus encore 'gay' ne correspondent strictement à aucune réalité sociale, morale ou culturelle au moyen âge". It is ironic to see a strict social-constructionist argument employed in such a program.

But is the only alternative to a biographical allegory a world of complete make-believe? These and others of Baudri's poems—the same could be said of the poems of many of his contemporaries, indeed, of all poets—become richer the more we understand that an author can simultaneously have investments in multiple positionings. It seems to me that Baudri is investing himself in both the positions of Florus and Ovidius. Florus is florid in his affectionate expressions (97.83–6,89–90,97–100):

83 *sim Nasonis ego, Naso sit Cesaris exul,*
*Naso potestatis, exul amoris ego.*
*debeat inscribi nostro res ista sepulchro:*
*"exul Nasonis sponte sua iacet hic"*. . . .
89 *reges edomiti vim Cesaris experiantur,*
*experiar liber foedus amoris ego*. . . .
97 *immo, nos unus capiat quicunque locellus,*
*ambo vivamus, vivere dum liceat.*
*alter si moritur, subito moriatur et alter,*
100 *nos ambos unus suscipiat tumulus.*

Let me be Ovid's exile, Ovid Caesar's; Ovid is the exile of tyranny, I of love. My tomb would then need be engraved thus: "Here lies the man who chose to be Ovid's exile". . . . Let conquered kings experience Caesar's power: Free, let me experience the bond of love. . . . Instead, let one little space, whatever one it be, encompass us both. Let us both live together, while it is permitted to live. If one should die, let the other die at once: Let one tomb embrace us both.

This friendship is at the very least extremely passionate, and the last-cited sentiment is one, as Tilliette himself points out in his notes, that echoes Canace to her brother-lover Macareus, in *Heroides* 11.126[59]—not to mention Achilles and Patroclus.[60]

[59] Cf. Tilliette (1998/2002) 1.208.

[60] In 97.101, Baudri uncannily has Florus echo the express wishes of Patroclus' shade and Achilles (*Il.* 23.83,243–4), but unwittingly, because knowledge of Homer and the *Iliad* was indirect for the Latin Middle Ages. Indeed, in most of the post-Homeric tradition apart from classical Athens, "Achilles is firmly heterosexual" (King (1987) 172). Most but not all. As King ((1987) 287) notes, "sporadic references to the homosexual relationship continue to occur in Latin poetry, e.g., Ovid *A.A.* 1.743, and in the twelfth century CE Benoît of Sainte-Maure resurrects it in the form of an insult delivered to Achilles by Hector (*Roman de Troie* 13183–4)". It was almost certainly from the *Roman de Troie* via its Latin translation (Guido della Colonna's *Historia destructionis Troiae*, written between 1272 and 1287), which he had translated into Italian, that Filippo Ceffi knew to speak about Achilles' love for Patroclus—"amore troppo domestico"—in his headnote to the third of his Italian prose *Heroides* (by 1325).

It is interesting that Ovidius himself seems less consistently warm; his affections for Florus are real, but there are reasons they need to be somewhat deflected, indeed, rerouted. Ovidius needs Florus to focus on something else and above all, do nothing so drastic as to rush to him in Tomis (one can imagine Baudri also having to negotiate this phase of an affectionate relationship in his ecclesiastical world: that one *can* imagine it does not, of course, mean that one must). Whatever passion Florus feels must be directed (by Ovidius) to help him engineer his return to Rome. Towards the conclusion of his response, Ovidius longs passionately for Rome, where he could refresh himself at her breasts (98.154). The (feminine) city of Rome seems to be the object of his most passionate desire. Should he ever see her again, he writes, again redirecting the expression of his affection, he would smother Florus with kisses (158). In a turn that is both somewhat comic but also, characteristically, one that keeps at arm's length any hint of, or at least renewal of a 'special friendship' with Florus, he says he would kiss the senators as well (157). He ends his verse, bidding Florus a "final farewell" (*extremum*...*vale*, 174).

It seems to me that Baudri, too, may be expressing a longing for Rome beneath both guises. Granted, the longing for Rome is simpler and more direct on the part of the Ovidius-persona. Like Ovid, the author of the *Tristia* and *Epistulae ex Ponto*, this figure simply wants back to a contemporary capital city. Florus, in contrast, actually wants to leave Rome, but only in order to rejoin Ovidius (97.77–8):

> *Roma michi locus est, tibi Pontus: vel michi Roma*
> *sit Pontus, Pontus vel tibi Roma foret!*

> Rome is where I find myself, Pontus where you are: let Pontus be my Rome, or Rome be your Pontus.

By the logic of this trope, where Ovid is, there is Rome,[61] a place where Florus and Ovidius may come together. This is one of the moments where it seems to me that Baudri must have significantly greater investment in the perspective and persona of Florus, and not simply as a mere sympathizer with Ovid in exile or representative of the empathetic reader of the exile elegies. I contend that in Florus's longing for Ovidius we see clearly figured Baudri's longing for Ovid and for the classical Rome Ovid represents.

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[61] Cf. the similar thoughts in Cicero (See Cohen, p. 111 above) and Ovidian lines such as *Pont.* 1.5.68: *quem Fortuna dedit, Roma sit ille locus*.

Unlike Ovidius's longing, this is not a longing for a contemporary Rome but a much more complex historical triangle. Perhaps Florus seeking to join Ovidius in exile stands—and here I dabble in quasi-allegory myself—for those literary spirits who, like Baudri, yearn to leap the gap not so much between Rome and Tomis as between the high Middle Ages and antiquity. Behind this unsatisfiable longing lies "an anachronism more fundamental than the obvious intrusions of eleventh-century France into Helen's Sparta" noted above. While no such drastic anachronism breaks the "historical fiction" in the Florus poems, readers who take seriously any degree of investment on Baudri's part in the persona of Florus must understand the longing he expresses for the exiled Ovid precisely in this sense. For Baudri and other high medieval neo-Ovidians, Ovid's Rome constituted their true home and Ovid in exile an apt image for their condition of temporal displacement, even belatedness.[62] What Baudri expresses through Florus is the further idea that by joining Ovid, Baudri could repair both exiles at once, returning Ovid, as it were, to Rome.

The exiled Ovid did not inspire sympathy in every reader's heart. For the unmoved, the very amplitude of Ovid's own poetic lamentations would only provoke *ennui* and harden hearts, and one might further imagine that any such readerly resistance would only be strengthened by the lionization of Ovid on the part of so many of their contemporaries. Perhaps the anonymous poetic tractate *Antiovidianus* is in some respects atypical, but it well represents at least one authentic perspective of the fourteenth century,[63] when, on the one hand, classical material was circulating well beyond learned circles, while, on the other hand (but in fact in part precisely for this reason), there was much greater anxiety about its non-Christian roots and the possibility of what one might call 'contact impiety'. The relentlessly anti-Ovidian author of this tract articulates objections to each of Ovid's genuine works (and

[62] Hexter (2002) 424. One may compare the way in which the Second Sophistic authors Musonius, Dio Chrysostom and Favorinus use the topos of the exiled philosopher for the purpose of their self-fashioning and connecting with the Greek past: cf. Gaertner pp. 5, 17 above and Whitmarsh (2001a). See also pp. 221–2 on exile as an element of self-fashioning and a means of connecting with antiquity for Carolingian men of letters.

[63] It is interesting to speculate on the possible impact of an apparent increase in the frequency of exile as a punishment precisely in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries: cf. Ehlen (2000) 159–60 (with further bibliography).

several of the popular pseudo-Ovidiana as well).[64] When it comes to the exile elegies, in this critic's overtly religious view, Ovid's greater sin lies in his having wasted this God-given opportunity to reflect on his crimes and repent (121–6):

*nam fles exilium, fles excidium, gemis urbe*
*te pulsum. non fles, te quod Avernus habet.*
*sed qualis fueris, patet hic. nam nullus amicus*
*te revocare studet, nec reperire vales*
*in te, quo releveris, ut ille Boecius almus*
*exul agit, summe laudis honore nitens.*

For you bewail your exile, bewail your destruction, moan that you were driven from Rome. You do not weep, that Hell has you in its power. Your true nature is clear from this: for no friend strives to recall you, nor are you able to find within yourself the means by which you could be relieved, as that nourishing exile Boethius does, shining with the glory of highest praise.[65]

From his narrow and explicitly Christian perspective, the exile poetry shows Ovid failing to gain the enlightenment and salvation he should have sought—at least an inkling of which the 'Ovid' of the popular mid-thirteenth-century *De Vetula* is able to attain by the conclusion of the very alternative autobiography he narrates for us.[66]

A more complex and subtle fourteenth-century reader of Ovid was Petrarch.[67] Most critical attention to Petrarch's Ovidianism has focused

[64] Discussed briefly also in Dimmick (2002) 267–9.

[65] Cf. Kienast (1929) 94 and Hexter (1986) 98–9.

[66] In the third of the work's three books, 'Ovid' arrives at a prophecy of Christ's birth based on astrological lore. Since our 'Ovid' is learned in the Hebrew scriptural tradition, his prophecy includes a virgin birth, even if it—as well as other Christian mysteries like the incarnation and the trinity—escape his capacity to understand. He ends his book with hopes for salvation and a prayer to the virgin mother of god (*optima virgo*, 3.805).—*De Vetula* is best consulted in Klopsch (1967); the next year saw the publication of another edition, Robathan (1968). Despite the fact that it was a blatant literary fiction, *De Vetula* was often listed among Ovid's works. Given its contents, not to mention the style of the nearly 2400 hexameters of its three books, no well-schooled reader of Ovid could have been deceived for very long. The actual author remains unknown, although its likely date (first half of the thirteenth century) sorts well with one name that has been suggested: Richard of Fournival. On the question of authorship, see Klopsch (1967) 78–99. In the end, Klopsch thinks the attribution to Richard "unlikely" ("unwahrscheinlich"), but admits that it is not possible to exclude it unconditionally (p. 99). Whoever the author, its composition must fall between 1222 and 1268. I have discussed the *De Vetula* most recently in Hexter (2002) 440–2.

[67] Petrarch, by the way, understood that *De Vetula* was not one of Ovid's authentic works. Cf. Klopsch (1967) 83, with reference to Petrarch's *Epistolae Seniles* 2.4.

on the central place the *Metamorphoses* held in his imagination, most richly revealed in his vernacular masterpiece, the *Rime sparse*.[68] The impress of Ovid's exile poetry is more evident in the Latin Petrarch. When it comes to direct comment on Ovid's exile, Petrarch can display a censorious tone, if not so narrow a view as 'church-lady' 'Anti-Ovidianus'. In *De Vita Solitaria* (1356), Petrarch criticizes Ovid for being weak-willed especially in his love affairs (2.7.2):

> *qui nisi his moribus et hoc animo fuisset, et clarius nomen haberet apud graves viros et Ponticum illud exilium atque Istri solitudines vel non adiisset vel aequanimius tolerasset.*
>
> Had he been otherwise in his habits and spirit, Ovid would have a greater reputation among serious men and either would not have entered on his Pontic exile in the Istrian wilderness or would have borne it with greater equanimity.[69]

One suspects that the impulses behind this critical view are quite different from those that underlay the 'Anti-Ovidianus', for if ever there was a spirit who should have been prepared to appreciate the extraordinary act of poetic self-representation Ovid's *Tristia* and *Epistulae ex Ponto* constitute, it was Petrarch.

Ovid's exile, and his complaints, may have cut too close to the bone for Petrarch, for whom exile was a central, even existential issue.[70] The topic surfaces, for example, in the consolatory letters he writes to Severo Appennincola in exile,[71] and he draws on many of the traditional consolatory topoi as in two chapters of the *De Remediis utriusque fortunae* (2.67 and 2.125), with which I choose to conclude this essay. In the chap-

[68] *Canzona* 23 ("Nel dolce tempo de la prima etade") may simply be the most concentrated distillation within the *Rime sparse*, but metamorphosis is a dominant theme and thus Ovid a dominant literary presence throughout, with echoes, *i.a.*, in poems 5, 45, 51, 78, 129, 206, and 332. References to secondary literature could ramify almost without end, but I limit myself to a relative few in English, each with further bibliography: Greene (1982) 127–46, Vickers (1981), Lyne (2002) 291, and now, especially, Hardie (2002b) 70–81.

[69] Cf. Hexter (1986) 96, following Stroh (1969) 29–30. Petrarch's views in *De Vita Solitaria* are also reviewed in Ehlen (2000) 165–6. Both Ehlen and Ehlers (1988) 152 remind us that the view of Ovid's exile poetry as 'a whiner's whining' was the standard one, especially in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries (both with reference to the canonical history of Latin literature edited by M. Schanz and C. Hosius; on their verdict cf. also p. 156 above in this volume).

[70] See Giamatti (1984) 12–32 on the degree to which exile was an essential part of Petrarch's sense of his self.

[71] *Fam.* 2.3–4, discussed by Giamatti (1984) 14–16.

ters of the *De Remediis*, Petrarch employs a dialogue between allegorical figures. In both these essays taken from the second book, the 'remedies' for adverse fortune,[72] Reason attempts to console, first, one sorrowful on account of unjust exile (2.67: *exilio pellor iniusto*) and then one sorrowful because he is dying away from his homeland (2.125: *morior extra patrios fines*). There is no explicit suggestion that Ovid is the addressee in either essay, but given the course of his life, he seems to stand at least notionally somewhere behind the figure of Sorrow in these sections. Certainly, one can link the consolatory advice, or, rather, the exhortations Reason gives here with the remark, part criticism, part wish, with which Petrarch concluded his judgment on Ovid cited from the *De Vita Solitaria*: if only Ovid had borne his exile with more equanimity —*vel aequanimius tolerasset*—he would have had greater fame (see above).[73] Further, although the structure and tone of these dialogues are fairly consistent throughout the entire *De Remediis,* here, the refrain-like nature of Sorrow's complaints might at least be imagined as a less-than-entirely-sympathetic reader's take on the individual elegies in the *Tristia* and then the *Epistulae ex Ponto* as a series of slight variations on a single, self-pitying theme.

2.67 becomes particularly interesting if one reads it as a dialogue between Petrarch and Ovid—itself a very Petrarchan motif, if one recalls his dialogue with Augustine in the *Secretum* or his letters to classical authors such as Cicero and Vergil in *Familiares* 10. First, Petrarch tells Ovid—permit me to summarize in terms of my fantasy dialogue—that he should take comfort in the fact that his exile is unjust rather than just. Assuming that this is true, it then follows that the ruler who has delivered himself of such a sentence is not just, and, by extension, no true king. All depends upon how one bears one's exile: *multos exilium honestavit, multos acrior aliqua fortune vis atque iniuria notos reddidit et illustres* ("Many have been honoured by their exile—many have become, through the powers of misfortune and outrage, as it were, better known and more

[72] That the wise man must learn how to bear good fortune as well as bad fortune is a philosophical commonplace, widely known from Boethius's *De Consolatione Philosophiae* and of course prominent in the consolatory tradition before Boethius: see e.g. Nesselrath p. 103 above on Favorinus *De Exil.* 5.2. Petrarch's structure and title seems to owe little of significance to Ovid's pair *Ars Amatoria/Remedia Amoris*, though he does refer to the *preceptor amoris*, e.g., in *De Rem.* 2.53.

[73] Petrarch constantly measures himself by these standards (and, implicitly, against Ovid). He proudly asserts that he must bear his exile "with equanimity" (*Ep. Met.* 3.8; Giamatti (1984) 14). Compare this with the words from the *De Vita Solitaria* quoted above (see p. 232).

respected").[74] Petrarch then exhorts Ovid to think about his exile, and his place of exile, in philosophical, even Christian ways:

> *longum* [sc. *exilium*] *vero aliam tibi patriam dabit, unde exulent qui te exulem voluere, dedissetque nunc, si ad naturam rerum, non ad opiniones hominum aspiceres: valde enim angustus est animus, qui sic ad unum terre angulum se applicat, ut, quicquid extra sit, exilium putet. multum abest exilii deplorator ab illa animi magnitudine, cui totus orbis carcer exiguus videtur. interrogatus Socrates cuias esset, "mundanus", inquit, "sum".... Socrati autem patria omnium mundus erat, non hoc solum, quem vulgo mundus dicitis, cum pars ultima mundi sit, sed celum ipsum, quod hac rectius appellatione comprehenditur.*
>
> *illi patrie destinati estis, ad quam si suspirat animus, qualibet in parte terrarum peregrinum atque exulem se noverit. nam quis patriam vocet, ubi non habitet nisi ad breve tempus? illa vere cuiusque patria dicenda est, ubi quisque perpetuo securus ac tranquillus deget. querere hanc in terris, puto, irrita erit inquisitio... "non habemus hic manentem civitatem", dixit Paulus. "omne solum forti patria est", inquit Naso. "omne homini natale solum", ait Statius. his te vocibus armatum velim, quibus ubique unus, et vel numquam vel semper in patria tua sis.*
>
> Exile of long duration provides you with a new homeland from which those are now exiled who wanted you to be exiled. This will be a fact as soon as you accept the nature of things rather than the opinions of people. Only an exceedingly narrow mind is so attached to one corner of the earth that it thinks it is exiled when it is somewhere else! Whoever deplores his exile is far removed from the loftiness of mind to which the whole world seemed a small prison. When Socrates was asked in what country he was born, he answered: "*Mundanus sum*—I am a citizen of the universe".... [F]or Socrates the whole *mundus* was his native land, not only the part that you are used to call *mundus*, that is, your 'world', which is but the lowest part of the whole *mundus*—but the dome of the heavens too, which bears this name with greater justification.
>
> This is the country which is intended for you. If your mind longs for this home, it will feel like a stranger and exile no matter where on earth it may be—for who calls home a place where he dwells just for a short while? Home is the country where one can stay forever safe and peacefully. To seek for this on earth, I think, will be a vain undertaking.... Paul said that we do not have a permanent home on this earth; Ovid said: "Every land is to the brave his country"; Statius said: "All soil is human birthright". I want you to be armed with these words, which let you be a man always or never at home anywhere![75]

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[74] Translation by Rawski (1991) 3.152. The idea has a parallel at Ov. *Pont.* 3.1.49–56 (see p. 18 above). Cf. also Cohen, p. 124, on exile as a sign of *virtus*.

[75] Translation by Rawski (1991) 3.152–3. The references to Paul, Ovid and Statius are to Hebr. 13.14, *Fast.* 1.493: *omne solum forti patria est*, and *Thebaid* 8.320, respectively. Most, if not all of the concepts in the passage have close parallels in the ancient consolations on exile, see Nesselrath, pp. 87 ff. above, and especially Cic. *Tusc.* 5.106–9

Petrarch reminds my imaginary Ovid of his own version of this principle, but in this dialogue—which Petrarch has so carefully engineered—Petrarch's Ovid remains deaf to his own words.

Ovid's *Tristia* and *Epistulae ex Ponto* have recently been accorded new appreciation and respect, not least because critics are freeing themselves from earlier tendencies to read the exile poetry primarily as history and autobiography.[76] As one looks back across the centuries traversed in this survey—with speed more befitting Medea or Phaethon on their various flights—one senses that it was the very readiness of readers to be persuaded by Ovid's poetry of the reality of his exile and to take the pain and sufferings he describes as guarantees of the 'truth' of his experience that led them to respond to it as deeply as they did. Paradoxically, then, it seems as if it was the fiction of Ovid's poetry (and not its fictiveness)[77]—a 'reality effect' that is only too convincing—that led earlier generations to misconceive the poetics of the exile poetry and, possibly as a result, underestimate the poetry itself.

The fact that it *was* poetry may explain in part why Ovid's impact in this arena was stronger than writings on exile by Cicero or Seneca, coupled, no doubt, with the fact that in the *Tristia* and *Epistulae ex Ponto*, readers got a concentrated 'dose' of the exile thematic. But the concurrent circulation of works—one might even say 'presence'—of Cicero, Seneca, Boethius, and other fellow exiles provided a sounding box that amplified and made more resonant Ovid's plaintive notes. The idea and image of exile so richly developed in ancient philosophy was elaborated and amplified in Christian theology and spiritual practice. Medieval readers of Ovid, then, heard all these overtones when they came upon the poetry of the exiled Ovid in their libraries and studied it in their classrooms.

In these classrooms, students learned that virtually all the poetry of the *auctores* belonged in the category of the ethical,[78] and even a Petrarch, at

(with Nesselrath n. 24 on pp. 93–4), from where Petrarch may have taken the famous anecdote about Socrates.

[76] See n. 3, above, again with reference, *inter multos alios*, to Chwalek (1996). This does not mean that recent criticism reads them anachronistically; far from it.

[77] Or 'fictivizing'. Chwalek (1996) uses the term 'Fiktivierung'. For example: "Der Begriff der Fiktivierung, wie er in dieser Arbeit Verwendung findet, zielt aber vorrangig darauf, die Transformation der scheinbar realen Welt des Textes in die elegische Welt zu beschreiben" (p. 33).

[78] *Ethicae supponitur*: cf. Hexter (1986) 16 (where n. 3 offers standard bibliography), 47, 111, 124.

least in his prose, will let Ovid and his exile serve him as historical exemplum. To be sure, Petrarch responds to Ovid's exile quite passionately. Petrarch places himself squarely in that very exemplary world, vaunting the "equanimity" with which *he* bore the displacements he figured as exile over Ovid's incessant lamentations. On the one hand, in contrast to metamorphosis and the *Metamorphoses*, which inspired Petrarch to some of his greatest poetry, Ovid's exile poetry inspired him to prose that, however eloquent, can hardly rank with the *Rime sparse.* On the other hand, it may not be accidental that, at least in the *De Remediis utriusque fortunae*, he cast his argument with Ovid into an encounter of personas. Perhaps, poet and rhetorician himself, he instinctively understood that exile can be a mask that one can put on or off.[79]

Alone among the medieval authors known to me, only Baudri of Bourgueil seems fully to have appreciated, via his own poetic transformations of personas, his and Ovid's into Florus's and Ovidius's, the sophisticated game Ovid was playing in his exile poetry. Perhaps unsurprisingly, not a few recent critics of Baudri have wanted to read this pair of poetic epistles the same way so many generations of readers and critics read the Roman poet's exile elegies, but as I hope to have shown, there are subtler and suppler ways to read Baudri's creations—whether Florus or Ovidius—than as straight-on encodings of Baudri himself.*

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[79] Cf. Gaertner's remarks on pp. 4–5.

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# GENERAL INDEX


Abraham 218
Achilles 8 with n. 37, 25, 228
Actaeon, as comparandum 160, 213
Adam, banished from Eden 218 n. 30
address, forms of address and status 46
Adorno, T. W. 84, 220–1
adultery, punishment 175, 180 n. 22
adulthood, and travel 8 n. 38
Aeetes 146–9
Aeneas 7, 13, 130–4; attraction to Dido 130; as exemplum 16 n. 85, 19, 157, 179
Aenos, settlement 39
Aeolus, as exemplum 95
Aeschylus, voluntary exile 54; as exemplum 96
Ajax, as mythical exemplum 95
Akkade, dynasty 7
Alcaeus of Mytilene 32–42; date 24; life 32–4; exemplary exile 10; discourse on exile 9, 14, 34–42; invective 38; pains of exile 35; shipwreck imagery 158; use of allegory 40–1; compound epithets 38
Alcinous, as exemplum 95
Alcmaeon, as exemplum 95
Alcman, date 24; fared better in his new home 92, 93 n. 20
Alcuin of York 215 n. 21
Alexander Polyhistor, historian detained abroad 53 n. 8, 68
alienation *see* estrangement
allegory, in Alcaeus 40–1
Alpamysh, Usbek epic 8
Amazons, as exemplum 104
Ambrose Autpertus, commentary on Revelations 215 n. 22
Ambrose, St., life on earth as exile 219 n. 33
Amorgos, colonization 23; topography 30
Ampius Balbus, T., recalled through Cicero's influence 120 n. 29
Anacharsis, paradigm in Cynicism 10 n. 47
Anacreon, date 24
Anaxagoras, his trial in Athens 55; discourse on exile 10 nn. 45–6; as exemplum 98, 216 n. 23
Andocides, discourse on exile, influence on Cicero 9 n. 44, 11 n. 51, 14, 57
Androclus, foundation of Ephesus 7
Andromache 27 n. 21, 131
Androtion, exiled Atthidographer 57, 68
anecdotes 10 n. 45, 72, 75–7, 80–1, 83, 89 n. 10, 186 n. 51, 235 n. 75
Angilbert, Carolingian poet 215 n. 21
Anicetus, freedman of Nero 175 n. 11
Antenor, ktistic exile 131; as exemplum 179
Antigonus Gonatas 56–7
Antimenidas, brother of Alcaeus 33–4, 40
*Antiovidianus* 230–1
Antipater of Thessalonica 171 n. 87
Antonius Pallas, M. 186
Apollonius Rhodius, motif of mental travel 158
apostles *see* New Testament, Paul, Peter
Archilochus, date 24; life 29; treatment of his exile 8, 28–30; allegorical winds 41; as exemplum 10, 30
Areus, philosopher 188
Argonauts, myth 25, 146–9; as exemplum 105
Aristides, as exemplum 157 with n. 12, 181 n. 24
Aristippus of Cyrene 93 n. 21
Aristobulus of Cassandreia, criticized by Alexander the Great 56
Ariston of Chios 74, 93
Aristotle, history of Mytilene 33; concept of citizenship 72, 75, 77; on fallacies 80; as exemplum 95
Artemon, editor of Aristotle's correspondence 169
Asia Minor, colonization 22–3; Persian take-over 24
Athens, claim to autochthony 7, 23; civic identity and exile/asylum 9 n. 43, 48; as exemplum 104

Attis, nostalgic monologue 14
Augustine, St., on exile 19 n. 105, 219; dialogue with Petrarch 233
Augustus, attitude to Caesar's dictatorship 183 n. 35; medieval speculation about his reasons for exiling Ovid 213
Aurelius Cotta Maximus Messalinus, M., Ovid's addressee 170
Aurelius, Marcus, emperor, on Dio's exile 194
autobiography, and exile 11 n. 51, 57; of Ovid 171 n. 87; in *De Vetula* 231
autochthones, compared to lowly insects 104

Bacchylides, as exemplum 62, 97
Baiae, founded by Baius 132 n. 10
Bakhtin, M. M. 79
Bartleby the Scrivener 83
Baudier, Dominique 20 n. 108
Baudri of Bourgueil 225–30; 'relegation' to Dol 227; Ovidian echoes 226; use of anachronisms 226; de-eroticization 227; longing for the past 229
begging 82, 83
Bellay, J. du 210
Benoît of Sainte-Maure, *Roman de Troie* 228 n. 60
Berlin, Isaiah, concept of freedom 82
biography, biographical fallacy 62–4, 72; biographical speculation about Latin authors 19
Bion of Borysthenes 90–1; 101 n. 56
boat people 3 n. 13
Boethius 19 n. 102; estrangement 221; consolatory tradition 233 n. 72; influenced by Ovid 155; reception 235; as exemplum 215 n. 22, 217, 218 n. 31, 231
Bona Dea affair 117–18
Brecht, B. 6, 210
Breytenbach, B. 209 n. 2
Broch, H. 20 n. 108
Brodsky, J. 1, 3 n. 13, 5 nn. 22–3, 210
Brutus *see* Iunius
burial customs 90–1, 104
Burman, P. 20 n. 108

Cadmus, myth 7, 9, 13, 135, 150; as exemplum 19, 90, 157 n. 12
Caecilius Metellus Numidicus, Q., as exemplum 16 n. 85, 174 n. 4; an exiled statesman is not an exile 112 n. 9
Caecilius Metellus, L., in Silius' *Punica* 144
Caecina, A., friend of Cicero 120, 181
Caesar, Bona Dea affair 118; civil war, dictatorship 109–12, 114, 138–41; *clementia* 121; treatment of Pompeians after Pharsalus 113, 181, 183; avoids seeing Marcellus in exile 182; identified with the *res publica* 126–7; representation in the principate 183 n. 35
Caligula, emperor 175, 190
Callimachus 95; influence on Ovid 161
Callinus, elegiac poet, date 24
Callisthenes of Olynthus, aversion to *proskynesis* 55; executed by Alexander the Great 55–6
Calpurnius Piso, Cn., the *senatus consultum de Gnaeo Pisone patre* 186 n. 48
Calvino, I. 222
Camillus *see* Furius
Canace 228
Carolingian renaissance 215 n. 21
Cassius Dio, appropriation of Roman history 207; treatment of Cicero's exile 4; on Favorinus 99; influenced by consolatory literature on exile 4 n. 17
Cassius Salanus, addressee of Ovid 175 n. 12, 187 n. 54
Cassius Severus, exile 16 n. 87
catalogues, in Ovid's exile poetry 18, 156 n. 7, 172 n. 89; of exiles 98, 215 n. 22, 216 n. 23, 216–17; of heroic founders 5 n. 18, 16 n. 85, 179; of life's misfortunes 173, *see also* exempla
Cato *see* Porcius
Catullus 14
Ceffi, Filippo 228 n. 60
censorship 55 n. 13
Chalciope, Aeetes' daughter 147
chariot racing, prestige 28 n. 23
Charlemagne, attempts to evoke imperial Rome 215 n. 21
*chreiai* *see* anecdotes
Chremonides, Athenian politician, as historical exemplum 89 n. 7
Christ, as exile 218 n. 31
Christianity *see* New Testament

Chrysippus, philosophical dimension of exile 12 n. 60, 217
Cicero, miserable in exile 173 n. 1; attachment to Rome 110; importance of Clodius and exile for his self-image 110, 119 n. 26; proconsulship in Cilicia as second exile 14 n. 74; definition of the state 111; attitude to Caesar and Pompey 113–14; to the *res publica* under Caesar's dictatorship 124–5; identifies Caesar with the *res publica* 127; loss of forensic kingdom 114, 125; involved in arranging recall of prominent Pompeians 115, 120 ff., 182 n. 29; discourse on exile 14–16, 109–28, 173; influenced by *Theognidea* 9 n. 42; by Andocides 14; by the consolatory tradition 15, 120 n. 28; by Stoic discourse on exile 15; by epistolographic conventions 169; mythologizing self-dramatization 14, 159, 160 n. 32; pleas for support 160; exile as death 159 n. 24; motif of endless weeping 159; theme of suicide 159; medical imagery 13 n. 65; letter as *colloquium* 169 n. 80; autotherapeutic effect of letter writing 170; παρουσία-motif 170; refutation/inversion of consolatory motifs 15, 111 n. 5, 126, 157 n. 12; rationalizations of exile 173 n. 1; later presents his departure as a kind of *devotio* 111; claims that the *res publica* was banished with him 111; exile as a metaphor for disempowerment 15–16; links exile and legitimacy 16, 112; notion of internal exile 15, 125, 128; individual works, *De Temporibus Suis* 14–15 n. 76, 129; *Paradoxa Stoicorum* 114–19, combination of Stoic and Academic arguments 115; legal inaccuracies 117; slippery logic 118; veiled critique of Caesar's dictatorship 119; reception 19, 110–11 with n. 5, 235; influence on Ovid 157 n. 12; Cicero as exemplum 97 n. 37; addressee of Petrarch 233
Circe 149
Claudius Etruscus, exile 18–19
Claudius Marcellus, M. 120 ff.; 138; presented as an exemplary Stoic 121, 182 n. 29; devotion to *bonae artes* in exile 11 n. 53; represents the legitimate republic 121; turns exile into a sign of *virtus* 122, 124, 126; as exemplum 16 n. 85
Claudius, emperor 17, 175, 187; faculty of total recall 188; clemency 190; healer of the empire's distress 191; mitigated Seneca's fate 191; as exemplum 187
clemency 17, 121, 122, 138, 165, 176 with n. 13, 190
Clement of Alexandria 45
Cleombrotus, battle of Leuctra 59 n. 26
Clodius Pulcher, P., involvement in Bona Dea affair 117–18; Cicero's enemy 111–12, 115–17
Coetzee, J. M. 20
colonization 7, 23–5
Colonna, Guido della 228 n. 60
comedy, *exilium amoris* 14
comparanda *see* exempla
consolation, medical treatment of the soul 160 n. 30; consolatory literature 87; consolations on exile 4, 9, 13, 87–108, 176 n. 15; influenced by Greek tragedy 9 n. 43, 158 n. 15; structure 187; conventional arguments and examples 87–108, 181 with n. 24; stereotypical complaints about places of exile 157 with n. 11; well-being a matter of perception 89 n. 10; use of medical imagery 4 n. 17, 13, 160, 178 n. 17; use of exempla 4 n. 17, 10, 88–9, 91, 94–6, 101–2, 104–7, 157; dissemination of such treatises 157 n. 10; blended with the genre of declamation 13; influence on Ovid and Cicero 15, 120 n. 28, 157; refutation/inversion of consolatory motifs 15, 157 n. 12, 171 n. 87
Cornelia, mother of the Gracchi 188
Cornelius Scipio Africanus, P. 142, 144–5
Cornelius Sulla Felix, L., 113–14, 119
Corsica, history/colonization 180; alleged barbarity 179 n. 19; linguistic situation 191
cosmopolitanism 11 n. 55, 12, 74, 82 n. 36, 93–4 n. 24, 116
Cotys, Thracian king 171 n. 87

Crates of Thebes 71, 91
Cremutius Cordus, A., prosecuted historian 55
Croesus, as exemplum 201
Ctesias of Cnidus, historian detained abroad 53 n. 8
Cumae, foundation 23
Cycladic islands, as places of banishment 95
Cymodoce, sea-nymph 144–5
Cynicism 4, 10–12, 71–85, 91; anecdotal tradition and reception 72; appeal to the norms of the universe 11–12; cynic discourse and exile 75, 78; Cynics as paradigm of real and metaphorical exile 85, 101; cosmopolitanism, rejection of citizenship 11–12, 74, 76–7; transformation of Socrates into an example of cosmopolitanism 12 n. 55, 93–4 n. 24; reconception of *autarkeia* 77; emphasis on freedom 84; joking, parody and satire 79; attitude to norms and taboos 11–12, 81, 83; begging 82–3; theft 73 n. 9, 79; ant comparison 94 n. 26; reception by Stoics 12, 85; in the Second Sophistic 17, 93, 199; in Late Antiquity and Middle Ages 19 n. 105; modern reception 71; *see also* Diogenes of Sinope

Daedalus, detained on Crete 136–7, 167–8
Dardanus, left Italy to found Troy 129
Darwish, Mahmoud 224 n. 45
*De Vetula* 231 with n. 66
death, wished for 9, 14; suicide 159; as act of rebellion 121–2 n. 31
Decius, Capuan captive 145
declamation 13, 99–100; declamatory elements in Ovid 163
de-eroticization 160–1 n. 32, 227
Demetrius of Magnesia 61
Demetrius of Phalerum, as exemplum 94
Demetrius Poliorcetes 57
Demetrius, *On Style*, conventions of epistolography 169, 170, 171 n. 87; on Cynic discourse 78
Demochares, exiled historian 57
Democritus of Abdera, extensive travelling 10 n. 47; legendary laughter 78
Demonax of Cyprus, Cynic, trial, attitude towards religion 81
Demosthenes 9 n. 44, 57
detachment 1, 51, *see* estrangement
Deucalion 105
*devotio* 111
dialects *see* Greek dialects
dialogue, genre 169 n. 79, 182 n. 32, 187
diaspora, of Greek settlements 22; Jewish discourse 12 n. 59
Diderot, D., voluntary exile, influenced by Cynicism 71 n. 4; verdict on Seneca's consolation to Polybius 185
Dido, ktistic exile 130, 143; attraction to Aeneas 130
Dio Chrysostom, banishment 193–4, 200; attitude to Roman power 196, 206; relation to Domitian 194, 204; to Trajan 193 n. 4; cooperation with governors and emperors 205–6; reticence about material consequences of his exile 195; personal experience as positive model for others 203; dramatization, fictionalization 194, 196; emphasis on psychological and intellectual consequences of his exile 195–6; exile and self-fashioning 5 n. 19, 11, 17, 230 n. 62; exile and philosophy 11, 201–2; Cynic elements 17, 71, 78; Socratic elements 200; estrangement 199; religious dimension 199, 201–2; political dimension, exile and legitimacy 197–8, 202, 204–5; attitude to flattery 205; advantages of exile 203; use of exempla 201; inadequacy of poetry as guide in difficult situations 201 n. 33; reception 193, n. 1; Dio as exemplary exile 194
Diogenes Laertius, on Xenophon's death 61 n. 32; on Diogenes of Sinope 71–3, 79, 82–4
Diogenes of Sinope, Cynic philosopher 71–85; anecdotal tradition and reception 72, 91; cause and circumstances of exile 72–3; life modeled on Plato's Socrates 72; discourse on exile 10–12, 74–85; exile and rejection of citizenship 76–7, 81; exile and freedom 84; attitude towards religion and social norms 81; compares himself to Heracles 84; Diogenes as exemplum

13 with n. 62, 74, 91 n. 14, 97 nn. 37–8, 101–2, 157 n. 12, 205
Diomedes, self-chosen exile in Italy 131; as exemplum 179
Dionysius I of Syracuse 56
Dionysius II of Syracuse, exile and intellectual pursuits 11 n. 53, 125
displacement *see* exile
Domitian, emperor, persecution of philosophers 55 n. 13, 193 n. 3, 202; presentation by Dio Chrysostom 194–5, 204
Domitius Ahenobarbus, Cn. 120 n. 29
Dorian invasion 22–3
Douglas, Mary 78
Dracontius, influenced by Ovid 155 n. 1
*duplex intentio* 211 n. 5

Eden 218 n. 30
education, paradigms in ancient education 15; *prosopopoeiae* 182 n. 32
Elea, colonization 31
Electra, as exemplum 201 n. 33
elegy, ancient etymologies 160; love elegy blended with rhetoric of exile 16, 160
embassies, under the Empire 95
Empedocles, life 10 n. 46; life on earth as exile 12, 98, 159 n. 24; as exemplum 101 n. 53
Ennius, exile in his tragedies 13; in the *Annales* 129; exile as death 159; his *Medea*, adaptation 159 n. 24
Epeigeus, hero 25 n. 18
Ephesus, foundation 7
Ephorus of Cyme 62 n. 40
epic, theme of travel and exile 8, 13, 24–7, 129–54
Epictetus, Cynic influence 71; discourse on exile 93 n. 24
epistolography, conventions 168–71; typical motifs, autotherapeutic effect of letter writing 170; circumstances as excuse for inadequacy 191; letter as a gift/service of friendship 169; letter as *colloquium* 169; παρουσία-motif 169 n. 75, 170; use of proverbs and popular philosophy 171 n. 87; consolatory letters 170
Ermoldus Nigellus, influenced by Ovid 19 n. 107, 215
Erysicthon, as comparandum 160
estrangement 51, 54, 67–9, 71 n. 4, 84, 199, 218, 221; affects style 51
Eteocles 149–53
ethnic cleansing 27
Etruscus *see* Claudius
Eumenes, Hellenistic dynast 57
Euripides, voluntary exile 54; his *Phoenissae* and the discourse on exile 9, 14, 44, 87, 201, *see* Polynices; influence on the consolatory tradition 75, 90, 97, 158 n. 15, 175 n. 8; motif of desertion 44, 158 n. 15; adaptation of the *Phoenissae* by Seneca 174–5; Euripides as exemplum 96
Europa, her displacement 14, 135
Evander, in exile at Pallanteum 132–3; as exemplum 179
Eve, banished from Eden 218 n. 30
exempla 17–19, 88–9, 94–5, 98, 104–6, 112 n. 9, 180, 183, 187–8, 217; from contemporary history 89; historians as exempla 97; philosophers as exempla 95, 96; poets as exempla 96, 97; exempla no guide in difficult situations 201 n. 33
exile, **terminology and definitions**: 2–3, 21, 51–4; cannot be considered in isolation from other forms of displacement 21; no differentiation between voluntary and involuntary exile in archaic Greek literature 27; exiles compared to immigrants, Gastarbeiters, boat people, refugees 3 n. 13; exile a mere change of place 179; **historical and legal aspects** of exile in antiquity 2 n. 5; omnipresent phenomenon in archaic Greece 22–4; in Hellenistic times 87; consequence of rivalry and political tension 27–8, 30, 32, 40, 53; flight as normal consequence of killing a member of one's community 25 n. 18, 26–7, 33, 136, 152; as a corollary of slavery 48; politicians/generals exiled because of professional failure 59 with n. 26; material consequences 195; different quality of exile under Caesar's dictatorship and under the principate 16, 122, 198–9; punishment in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries 230 n. 63; **discourse on exile**, not a genre or mode 1–6, 2 n. 8, 20;

modern concepts misapplied to classical literature 1–6; discourse determined by canons 19–20; by conditions of performance 22; discourse on exile in the Jewish and Christian tradition 12 with n. 59, 217–20, 235; in Late Antiquity 19 n. 105, 219; in the Middle Ages 19–20, 209–36; in medieval prose authors 216 n. 24; in twentieth-century literature 1, 5–6, 209; in East German poetry 20 n. 108; in post-colonial literature 1 with n. 2; in antiquity, historical development 7–20; exile in foundation narratives 7, 16 n. 85, 22, 27–8, 129; structural function in epic plots 136; anti-ktistic exile in Silver Latin epic 138, 150; fundamental element of tragedy 9, 174; exile and autobiography 11 n. 51; adds emotional weight, arouses pity 8, 48, 133–4, 139, 141, 144–5, 151; as an insult 11 n. 54, 74–5, 143, *see also* shame; **typical complaints of exile** 4, 9, 13; 'Sprachnot', cultural and linguistic isolation 5, 48, 223; exile is a disgrace 11 n. 54, 89–90, 96–7, 103, 105–6, 120 n. 28, 143, 146, 150–1, 179, *see also* shame; loss of political influence 89; desertion 9, 14, 44, 97, 158 with n. 15; stereotypical complaints about the places of exile 157 with n. 11; poverty 105, 179, 195; burial in foreign soil 90; exile deprives of freedom and free speech 9 n. 43, 16 with n. 87, 89, 97, 107, 183–4 with n. 36; exile worse than living in a bad state 9 n. 44; exile compared to death 5, 159, 178; worse than death 9 n. 44; compared to a disease, medical imagery 13, 160, 178 n. 17; exile as shipwreck 9, 14, 19 n. 101, 158; **further conventional motifs:** nostalgia and mental travel 9, 14 with n. 70, 31, 158; mythologizing self-dramatization, heroization 5, 14–15, 159; wish for death 9, 14; **'advantages' of exile** 10–11, 51–2, 58, 61–2, 68, 88, 93, 96–7, 123, 203; gives independence 122–3; opportunity for travel 96; leisure for literary studies 96, 181 n. 24, 184; travel and wisdom 8 n. 38; change of perspective and greater knowledge 10–11, 51–2, 58, 61–2, 68, 96–7; exile influences the historian's style 51–2, 62, 69; exile and cultural achievements 97; good test for firm friendship 105; exile as a sign of *virtus* 124, 126, 233; **exile and identity**, exile is an assault on the very identity of a person 75; exile and construction of identity in foundation myths 22 (cf. 7–8, 27–8, 129); exile and asylum in Athenian civic identity 9 n. 43, 48; exile and self-fashioning 5 n. 19, 10–11, 17–18, 193 n. 2, 221, 230, 236; exile as a *proprium* of poets 216 n. 24; of philosophers 11, 17, 96, 201, 221 n. 41; of historians 4 n. 17, 11, 51–70; as a classical pose in the Middle Ages 221–2; exiles identifying themselves with other exiles 5 n. 18; inventory of typical exiles 13 with n. 62, 17, 19, 157 n. 12, *see also* catalogues, consolation, exempla; **exile as a metaphor** for alienation and dissociation 1, 10, 11–12, 15, 19, 125–8, 218, 220–1; for temporal distance 224–5, 229–30; for disempowerment 15; metaphor as exile 219, 224; **philosophical/spiritual dimension**, life on earth as exile from heaven 12, 19 n. 105, 159 n. 24, 217–20; exile test case for ethical guidelines, consolatory literature 4, 9, 13, 87–108, 176 n. 15, *see* consolation; exile in Cynicism 71–85, *see also* Cynicism, Diogenes of Sinope; in Stoic philosophy 12, *see also* cosmopolitanism, Stoics; **exile and politics**, exile as a challenge to power 128; exile and legitimacy 15, 17, 111–12, 116, 118–19, 120–1, 125–7, 141, 204–5, 233; exile and freedom of speech 9 n. 43, 16 with n. 87, 84–5, 89, 97, 183–4 n. 36; 'innere Emigration' 15, 16 n. 84, 128 n. 39; **other themes and motifs**, exile/travel and transition to adulthood 8 n. 38, 25; exile compared to colonization 179; to the movements of the stars 179; to other predicaments: slavery 45–6; poverty, old age, and sickness 200–1; exile

in conventional enumerations of life's misfortunes 173; exiled statesman is not an exile 112 n. 9; foolish man is an exile 12; the good citizen understands that he is an exile 124; exiles are unreliable friends 44; exile indicator of national catastrophe 153; new home will become familiar in the course of time 105; exile no harm to man's soul or body 88; self-chosen exile and cowardice 145

Fabius Maximus, Paullus, addressee of Ovid 171 n. 87, 175 n. 12, 187 n. 54
Favorinus, life, alleged exile 99; Reifenstein's syndrome 100; relation to Polemo of Laodicea 100–1 n. 50; exile and self-fashioning 5 n. 19, 17, 230; his *De Exilio* 13, 17, 99–108; transmission 100–1; not an autobiographical statement, genre 100; emphasis on cheerfulness 101, 106–7; Stoic and Platonic elements 105, 108; motifs shared with New Testament 102–3 n. 59, 106; originality 107–8; speaker presents himself as exemplum 101; refers to his γραφή, not his λόγος 101 n. 55; criticizes Hesiod 106; exempla 101 n. 53, 107, 157 n. 12; psychomachia 104
fictionalization 172 n. 89, 194, 210 n. 3, 235
flattery 205
Fortune 18; blamed by Seneca 177–9, 188–91
freedom, in Cynicism 77–84; Isaiah Berlin's concept 82; freedom of speech 9 n. 43, 16, 55, 71, 74–5, 82, 84, 89, 97, 176, 183–4 n. 36; under Augustus 183 n. 35
friendship, with exiles 44; exempla of friendship 105; friendship and epistolography 169
Furius Camillus, M., exile and return 4, 145–6; as exemplum 97 n. 37

Gastarbeiter 3 n. 13
Gellius, on Favorinus 99
Germanicus, addressee of Ovid 187 n. 54
Gilgamesh, epic 8
Giovanni del Virgilio 213 n. 13
Glaucon, brother of Chremonides, as exemplum 89 n. 7
Godescalc or Gottschalk, Carolingian monk 218 n. 31
Goethe, J. W. von 19 n. 102, 155 n. 2, 210, 225 n. 48
Golden Fleece 147, 148
Greek dialects, distribution, relation to Dorian invasion 22; in Asia minor 63–4
Grillparzer, F. S. 20 n. 108, 155 n. 2, 210

Haliartus, battle 59 n. 26
Halicarnassus, foundation, dialect 64
Hannibal, exile 143–4; as exemplum 97 n. 38
Hecataeus, extensive travelling 10 n. 47
Helen 226
Helenus, ktistic exile 131
Heliades, as comparandum 160
Helvia, Seneca's mother 17, 177–8; prevented from studying philosophy 184 n. 37
Heracles, all Greece is his home, wandering hero 25, 93; freedom 84; as exemplum 90, 101 n. 53, 102, 197; sons of Heracles and the Dorian invasion 22
Hermogenes of Tarsus, death 55 n. 13
Herodotus, extensive travelling 10 nn. 46–8; exile and historiography 51, 53–4, 69; dialect 63–4; claims to autopsy 66; the *Suda*'s account of his life 63–4, 66; Herodotus as exemplum 96
Hesiod, date 24; criticized by Favorinus 106
Hicesias, father of Diogenes the Cynic 72–3
Hieronymus of Cardia, exiled because of links with Hellenistic dynasts (?) 57, 68
Hilarius of Poitiers, as exemplum 215 n. 22
Hildebert of Lavardin 19 n. 107
Hippomedon, as a historical exemplum 89 n. 7
*Historia Augusta*, on Favorinus 99
historiography, a *proprium* of exiles 4 n. 17, 10–11 with n. 48; closer relationship to government in Rome than in Greece 55 n. 13; public readings of local histories 68

n. 57; Greek historians detained abroad 52–3; prosecuted for political association, not for their writings 55–6; local historians not regularly exiled 68; fabrication of improbable tales of some historians' exiles 11, 62–4; Roman historians mostly senators 64; prosecuted for their works 55
home *see patria*
homebodies 94
Homer, date 24; treatment of displacement 25–7; praise of small islands 95
homicide, and displacement 25 n. 18, 26–7, 33, 136, 152
Horace, theme of displacement 14; colloquial and prosaic elements in *Epistles* 168 n. 73; use of monosyllables 165–6
Horia, Vintila 20, 210 n. 4
Hugh of St. Victor 220–1
Hughes, Ted 20
humour, as a means of perception 78; violation of tacit and explicit rules 78–9; joke and ritual 80–1
Hypsipyle, Lemnian princess 153

Ibycus of Rhegium, date 24; expatriate lifestyle 31–2
identity, damaged by exile 75; threatened by absence of legitimate government 127; new identity in exile 67; local identity and exile narratives 7; social identity and dissociation 11–12; exile/asylum and Athenian πόλις identity 9 n. 43, 48; identity connected with sacred sites 110
Idomeneus, displacement from Crete 26, 132
*Iliad*, oral antecedents, theme of separation 24–6; use of paradigms 15 n. 79
imagery, medical imagery 4 n. 17, 13, 160, 163, 178 n. 17; shipwreck 9, 14, 19, 158
immigrants, in Rome 179
Innocent III 220 n. 37
insult, exile as insult 11 n. 54, 74–5, 143
interpolation 166 n. 66, 185
invective 2, 5 n. 24, 38
Io, persecuted from Greece to Egypt 135; as paradigmatic exile 148
Ionian migration 7, 23
islands, praise of small islands 95, 179
Isocrates, and Greek discourse on exile 9 n. 44
isolation, cultural and linguistic 5, 9, 48
Iulii, descent from Aeneas 7
Iunius Brutus, M., 113–14, 115 n. 18, 119, 122, 183–4; his *De Virtute* 120–1, 180–2
Iunius Silanus, D., supposed adulterer of Julia the Younger 175 n. 11

Jacob, as exemplary exile 218 n. 31
Jason, wandering hero 9, 136, 146–9; travel and transition to adulthood 8 n. 38; exemplum 19, 105, 157 n. 12
Jerome, commentary on Ezekiel 219 n. 33
Jewish tradition, exile and diaspora 12 n. 59, 217–18
Jocasta, myth 44, 149, 151; negative exemplum 105
John, St., on Patmos 215 n. 22
joke *see* humour
Joseph, as exemplum 218 n. 31
Julia, daughter of Augustus 175 n. 11
Julia, grandchild of Augustus 175 n. 11
Juno, goddess, Argive connections 133
Juvenal, his legendary exile 11 n. 50

kingship, best form of government 205; in Greek literature 204 n. 48; in the *Aeneid* 134 n. 13
Kristeva, J. 221

Labienus, T., exiled orator 55 n. 13
Lacius, founder of Phaselis 7 n. 37
Laelius, D., follower of Pompey 113 n. 13
Late Antiquity, discourse on exile 19 n. 105, 217, 219, 224–5
Latin, 'mother tongue of the West' 222–3
law, legal aspects of exile 2 n. 5, 3 n. 11; *exilium* and *relegatio* 209 n. 1; *aquae et ignis interdictio* 112 n. 9; *lex Iulia de adulteriis* 180; dictatorship 113–14; legal expressions in Ovid 163
legitimacy, and exile 15, 17, 111–12, 116, 118–21, 125–7, 141, 204–5, 233
Leonidas of Tarentum 159 n. 24

Lesbos, inhabitants loyal to Pompey 182 n. 31
Ligarius, Q., follower of Pompey 120, 181
Lindian Chronicle 69
liturgies 95
Livilla, sister of Caligula 175
Livy, no 'senatorial historian' 64 n. 49; influenced by Cicero's complaints of exile 4, 19 n. 104
Lothar of Segni 220 n. 37
Lotichius, P. 20 n. 108
love elegy, blended with rhetoric of exile 16, 160; theme of death, vocabulary of love-sickness 160
Lucan, *De Bello Civili* 138–42; use of monosyllables 165–6; Vergilian models 140; exile anti-ktistic 138–9; used to elicit sympathy 139, 141; discourse of legitimacy 141; Pompey likened to Aeneas 139
Lucian, influenced by Cynicism 71, 78; on Dio's exile 194
luxury 31, 180, 181 n. 24
Lycabas, exile 135–6
Lycambes, enemy of Archilochus 29–30
Lycinus, as historical exemplum 89 n. 7
Lycophron, Homeric hero 25 n. 18
Lygdamis, tyrant of Halicarnassus 53–4, 56, 63
Lysander, Spartan general 59 n. 26

Macareus, brother of Canace 228
Maeon, seer 150
Malouf, D. 20, 210 n. 4
Mandelstam, Osip 20 n. 108
Manlius Torquatus, A., follower of Pompey 120 n. 29
Mann, T. 1, 5–6
Manto 7 n. 37
Marcus Aurelius *see* Aurelius
Marius, C., as exemplum 16 n. 85
Marx, K. 210
Medea, serial exile 136, 146–9, 159, 167; compared to Io 148
Medon, Homeric hero 25 n. 18
Melanchrus, tyrant of Mytilene 32
Melville, H. 83
memory, manipulated by cultural paradigms 5 n. 18
Menelaus, as exemplum 105
Menemachus of Sardes, exiled, addressee of Plutarch's *De Exilio* 92
Messalina, wife of Claudius 175, 185; her intrigue with Silius 186 n. 51
Metabus, father of Camilla, exile 133–4
metaphor, figuration as exile 219, 224
metre, elision 163 n. 42; pentameter ending 166 n. 66; monosyllables 165–6
Mezentius, king of Caere 133–6, 151 n. 45
Miltiades, emigration to Chersonesus 28
Milton, J., influenced by Ovid 155 n. 2
Mimnermus, date 24
Modoin of Autun 19 n. 107, 214–15, 215 n. 21, 216 n. 23
monastic life, exile from the world 220
Mopsus, seer 7 n. 37, 149
Moses, narrative 7 n. 30; as exemplum 218 n. 31
mother tongue 5, 48, 172
Mucius Cordus Scaevola, C., as exemplum 101 n. 53
Musonius, treatise on exile 91–2, 157 n. 11, 175 n. 8, 176 n. 15, 181, 183; Cynic elements 17; use of exempla 157 n. 12; exile and self-fashioning 5 n. 19, 13 n. 62, 17, 217, 230 n. 62; as exemplum 101
Myrsilus, tyrant of Mytilene 32–3; exile 32 n. 37

Nabokov, V. V. 1
Naevius, exile in the *Bellum Punicum* 13, 129
narrative pace 150
Naso, E. von 210 n. 4
nature, life in accordance with nature 76
Nausithous, Phaeacian king, as exemplum 95
Naxos, foundation 23
Nero, emperor 186 n. 49, 197 n. 18, 214
Nerva, emperor 197 n. 18, 205
Neuer Stil 156, 163
New Testament, discourse on exile 12, 19, 217–19
Nietzsche, F. W., voluntary exile, alienation from German culture 71 n. 4, 84 n. 46, 220; influenced by Cynicism 71; on Cynic complacency 83; on Cynic humour 78

Nigidius Figulus, P., follower of Pompey 120, 181
Niobe, as comparandum 160
nomadic way of life 105
Norden, E. 156, 163 n. 45
nostalgia 9, 31, 220, 223–4
*Nostoi* 25
novel, ancient, travel and transition to adulthood 8 n. 38; epistolary novels 171 n. 87
numismatics 73

Octavia, daughter of Claudius, accused of adultery 175 n. 11
Odysseus, his expressions for longing 25 n. 17; travel and initiation 8 n. 38; as exemplum 5, 9–10, 18–19, 25 n. 17, 95, 102, 104–5, 157, 195, 201 n. 33
*Odyssey*, oral antecedents 24; exile 25–7; travel and wisdom 8 n. 38; 'Urform' of the novel 8 n. 39
Oedipus 87, 149–50; negative exemplum 105
oral poetry 8, 22, 24–5, 46
oratory, Attic orators and exile 9
Orestes, travel and transition to adulthood 8 n. 38
Orsilochus, Homeric hero 26–7
Osbert of Clare 218 n. 31
Ovid, dirge for Messalla 171 n. 87; relation to Fabius Maximus 171 n. 87; reasons for his banishment 155, 212; doubts about the reality of his banishment 172 n. 89; Ovid blurs distinction between *exilium* and *relegatio* 209 n. 1; receives letters in Tomis 158 n. 15; *Heroides*, composition and authenticity 155 n. 4, 161 n. 37, 226 n. 53; opening couplets 211 n. 5; *Remedia Amoris*, consolatory motifs 157 n. 10; *Fasti* partly reworked in exile (?) 155 n. 4; *Metamorphoses*, Vergilian influence 135; partly rewritten in exile (?) 135, 155 n. 4; *Ibis*, psychologizing interpretations 172 n. 89; *Tristia* and *Epistulae ex Ponto*, transmission 214 (cf. 166 n. 66); rhetorical position, presentation of Augustus 16–17, 176 n. 13; poetological framework 161; fictionalization 172 n. 89, 210 n. 3, 235; relation to *Heroides* 171 n. 88, 211 n. 5; resonances of *Amores, Ars, Rem., Met.*, and *Fasti* 160; palinode/de-eroticization (?) 160–1 n. 32; Callimachean and Horatian echoes 161; influenced by Cicero's treatment of exile 157 n. 12, 160 n. 32; by consolatory treatises on exile 15, 157; by epistolographic conventions 168–71; by Greek epistolary novels (?) 171 n. 87; by Leonidas Tarent. 159 n. 24; by *Theognidea* 9 n. 42, 44 n. 76, 158; addressees 171 n. 87, 175 n. 12, 187 n. 54; book openings 211; motifs, themes: Ovid claims to have lost his poetic genius 156, 161, 169 n. 77; mythologizing self-dramatization 14, 159; Ovid likens his stay in Tomis to Daedalus' detention on Crete 136–7; compares himself to Actaeon 213; to Odysseus, Aeneas, and other exiles 18, 157 with n. 12, 160, 172; separation from linguistic community 223; desertion, fear of being forgotten in Rome 156, 158; of losing his mother tongue 156 n. 7; exile as death 159, 160; suffering and ill-health in exile 160; theme of suicide 159; motif of endless weeping 159; theme of *utilitas* 165 n. 64; his pleas for support 160; communication of suffering is the main objective 161; autotherapeutic effect of letter writing 170; παρουσία-motif 169 n. 75, 170; letter as *colloquium* 169; *officium*, letter as a service of friendship 165 n. 63, 169; personal tone, glimpses of character, autobiography 171 n. 87; description of Tomis 157 with n. 11, 211; medical imagery 13 n. 65, 160; refutation/inversion of consolatory motifs 15, 157 n. 12, 171 n. 87; mental travel 158; imagery of shipwreck 158; popular philosophy 171 n. 87; catalogues 156 n. 7; style, exilic works fundamentally different from his earlier works (?) 155–6, 161–9; use of proverbs 171 n. 87; Neuer Stil, declamatory elements, legal expressions, technical language 163; metre, pentameter ending 166

n. 66; use of monosyllables 165–6; reception 18, 19, 155, 209–36; Ovid author of his own reception 212; his influence on Boethius 155; on Dracontius 155 n. 1; on Goethe 19 n. 102, 155 n. 2, 210 n. 4; Grillparzer 155 n. 2, 210 n. 4; Milton 155 n. 2; Pushkin 155 n. 2, 210 n. 4; Rutilius Namatianus 19, 155 n. 1, 214 n. 18, 224 n. 47; Seneca the Younger 18, 155, 172 n. 91, 179 n. 24, 191; Statius 18–19; medieval reception 155 n. 2, 209–36; impact on style of medieval Latin erotic poetry 226 n. 51; medieval biographies, speculation about the reasons for his banishment 212–14, 214 n. 15; Ovid as exemplum 18–19, 172 n. 91, 210, 215–17; 235–6; criticized as weak-willed 232 with n. 69

Pacuvius 13, 15 n. 80
*paideia*, in the Second Sophistic 18; *sine qua non* of good rule 206 n. 57
Pallas *see* Antonius
panegyric 186
paradigms, in ancient education and rhetoric 15; influence on perception 5
Paris, Homeric hero 226
parody 79–80
parrhesia *see* freedom of speech
Partheniae, founders of Tarentum 27
pastimes, Roman 171 n. 87
Patavium, foundation 179
*patria*, as an abstract concept 11–12, 15, 115, 123; metaphysical *patria* 12, 19 n. 105, 159 n. 24, 217–20; humans do not have a natural home 74, 93 *see also* exile
Patroclus, displacement 8 n. 39, 9, 25–6; friendship with Achilles 228 n. 60; as exemplary exile 157 n. 12
Paul, apostle, exile as metaphor for estrangement 12, 218, 234 with n. 75; use of similes 102–3 n. 59; Paul as exemplum 215 n. 22;
Pausanias, Spartan king, exile 59 n. 26
perception, manipulated by cultural paradigms 5 n. 18
performance, of sympotic literature 21–2, 49; meta-textual allusions 46
personification 103, 188
Peter, apostle, exile as metaphor for estrangement 12; as exemplum 215 n. 22
Petrarch 231–5; exile 232 with n. 70; dialogues with classical authors 233; Ovidian echoes 232; theme of metamorphosis 232 n. 68; criticizes Ovid as weak-willed 232; consolatory topoi 232–3 with n. 72, 234 n. 75
Phaethon, negative exemplum 98
Pharsalus, battle 113; *see also* Caesar, Pompey
Phaselis, foundation 7 n. 37
Philemon, comic playwright 89 n. 10
Philistus of Syracuse, exiled historian 56
Philochorus, life in *Suda* 65; death 55–6
philosophy, responses to exile 74; philosophy as a *proprium* of exiles 10–11, 17, 125, 201, 221 n. 41; philosophers exiled for their works 55; philosophers as exemplum 95, 96; philosophy and humour 78, 171 n. 87; philosophical reasoning parodied by Cynics 79–80; popular philosophy in letters 171 n. 87
Philostratus, on cosmopolitanism 18 n. 99; on Favorinus 99; on Dio Chrysostom's exile 193 n. 3;
Phocaea, foundation 24; Phocaeans as exemplum 104
Phoenix, his displacement 8 n. 39, 25–6; as exemplum 88
Photius, fabricated Theopompus' exile 62–3
Phrixus, in Colchis 147–9
Pindar, exile a most painful thing 47; praise of small places 95 n. 28
Piso *see* Calpurnius
Pittacus, enemy of Alcaeus 32–4; Thracian name 38; ancestry 39
Plancius, Cn., follower of Pompey 120 n. 29
Plato, ideal state 91; on citizenship and community 72, 75; arguments against going into exile 74; attacks against travelling sophists 11 n. 54
Pliny the Younger, on Dio Chrysostom 193; on obsequious language 186
Plutarch, cooperation with Roman authorities 206; habits of quotation 30 n. 27; biography of

Cicero 19 n. 104; his *De Exilio* 13, 18–19, 30, 74–5, 92–9, 101, 104, 108, 175 n. 8, 176 n. 15, 179, 181; date 92; addressee 92; Cynic elements 93; Platonic elements 92, 94, 98; Stoic elements 94; exile grants leisure for intellectual pursuits 17 n. 92, 94–5; historians in exile 4 n. 17, 10 n. 48, 62; use of exempla 13 n. 62, 94, 157 n. 12
poetry, no guide in difficult situations 201 n. 33, 202; exile as a *proprium* of poets 216 n. 24
Polemo of Laodicea, enemy of Favorinus 100–1 n. 50
Poliziano, influenced by Ovid 20 n. 108
Polybius, Claudius' freedman, secretary *a studiis* 17, 175 n. 12, 187; culture and literary enterprises 186; not an intriguer 186 n. 51
Polybius, the historian, detained in Italy 11 n. 48, 52–3, 56, 62 n. 40, 68; criticism of Timaeus 69–70
Polynices, his complaints in Euripides' *Phoenissae* and their reception 44, 87, 75, 90–2, 97, 104, 174–5, *see also* Euripides; in Statius 149–53
Pompeians, status after Pharsalus 113, 181, 183
Pompey, civil war, abandons Rome, departure from Italy 109–10, 112–13, 139–41; loyalty of the inhabitants of Lesbos 182 n. 31; likened to Aeneas by Lucan 139–40
Porcius Cato Uticensis, M., death 114, 121 n. 31; as exemplum 181
Porphyry, as exemplum 216 n. 23
Presocratics, extensive travelling 10 n. 47
principate, exile and freedom of speech 17, 55, 175–6, 183–4, 198–9
Prometheus 105
Propertius, use of monosyllables 166; theme of death 160 n. 26
*prosopopoeiae* 182 n. 32, 187–8
Protagoras, travelling 10 n. 46; condemnation for impiety 55
Proteus, sea-god 144–5
proverbs, proverbial expressions 32, 74; in ancient letters 171 n. 87
Prudentius, concept of *psychomachia* 104
Punic War (Second) 142–6
puns 80 with n. 28, 112 n. 9, 156, 159 n. 24, 160; un-punning of elegiac vocabulary in Ovid (?) 161 n. 32
Pushkin, A. 20 n. 108, 155 n. 2, 210
Pylades, as exemplum 105
Pyrrhus, his war against Rome 8 n. 37
Pythagoras, his extensive travelling 10 n. 47; speech in Ovid's *Metamorphoses* 137

Ransmayr, C. 20, 210 n. 4
reception 5–6, 18–19, 224 n. 46; of Diogenes of Sinope 72; Ovid author of his own reception 212; reception history 216 n. 24; *see also* Boethius, Cicero, Cynicism, Dio Chrysostom, Ovid, Seneca the Younger, Statius
recitation, public readings of local histories 68 n. 57
refugees 3 n. 13, 221 n. 40; *see also* exile
Reifenstein's syndrome 100
religion, no need for a particular place to address the gods 104; more influential than philosophy 203; Xenophon's role as priest in exile 67
rhetoric, use of paradigms 15; *prosopopoeiae* as rhetorical exercise 182 n. 32
Richard of Fournival 231 n. 66
rituals of ephebic separation and re-integration 25
*Roman de Troie* 228 n. 60
Roman history, written by Greek historians 207
Romans, claims to legendary ancestry 7, 132 n. 10; typical pastimes 171 n. 87
Rome, foundation myth 7, 13; foundation as exemplum 179–80; full of immigrants 179; sacred sites integral to Roman identity 110; Rome as exile under Caesar's dictatorship 122–3
Rutilia, sister of Rutilius Rufus, as exemplum 184
Rutilius Namatianus, influenced by Ovid 19, 155 n. 1, 214 n. 18, 224 n. 47
Rutilius Rufus, P., exile and historical works 11; as exemplum 16 n. 85, 157 n. 12, 174, 183

Sabino/Sabinus, Angelus de Curibus Sabinis 226 n. 53
Said, E. W. 3 n. 13, 5 n. 22, 20, 88 n. 6, 220 n. 38
Salanus *see* Cassius
Samos, dialect 63–4

Samson, as exemplum 218 n. 31
Sappho, date 24; banished 9 n. 42
Sargon, Sargon-legend 7
Sartre, J.-P. 220
Saturn, deity, displacement 132
Sauromates, nomadic tribe, as exemplum 105
Scaliger, J. C. 20 n. 108
Scipio *see* Cornelius
Scythia, clichés 157 n. 11; Scythians as exemplum 104–5, 200
Second Sophistic, genre of declamation 99; exile and the construction of identity 17–18, 193 n. 2, 221, 230; revival of glorious Greek past 207; Greek intellectuals cooperate with Roman authorities 95, 206; appropriate the Roman past 207; pave the way towards the Byzantine Empire 207
Seghers, A. 5
self-sufficiency, in Cynicism 75–7, 82; attribute of the *sapiens* 179, 191; of Marcellus 121
Semonides, date 24; movement from Samos to Amorgos 8, 30–1
Senate, in the 40s BC 110–24, 139–41; honorific decree for Pallas 186; membership 'requirement' for being a Roman historian 64
Seneca the Younger, reasons for his banishment 175; silence about his daily life in exile 180; exile and intellectual pursuits 11 n. 53, 184; treatment of exile during and after his banishment 173; rationalization of the sorrows of exile in his tragedies, adaptation of Euripides' *Phoenissae* 174–5; influenced by Ovid's exile poetry 18, 155, 172 n. 91, 179 n. 19, 191; Cynic influence 71; influence of conventions of ancient epistolography, letter as *colloquium* 169 with n. 80; *Dialogi*, title 182 n. 32; dating 173 n. 2; freedom of speech 175–6; double audience of his consolations to Helvia and Polybius 175 with nn. 10 and 12, 192; blending of different types of consolations 176; *Consolatio ad Marciam*, enumeration of the sorrows of the dynasty 176 n. 14; use of *prosopopoeiae* 188; *Consolatio ad Helviam* 176–84; implicit self-representation 184; structure 177; originality 177; conventional consolatory motifs 181; exile compared to death 178; self-sufficiency 179; exile no dishonour 179–80; evils of poverty 179; barbarity of Corsica, praise of small islands 179; diatribe against luxury 180; civil war between Caesar and Pompey 181–2; implicit comparison with Marcellus 182–3; Fortune blamed for blows of fate 177; use of *prosopopoeiae* 182, 188; exempla 179, 180, 181; *Consolatio ad Polybium* 184–92; relation to Claudius' freedman Polybius 175 n. 12, 187; structure 187; reception 185; irony/flattery/panegyric 185–6; imperial clemency 190; central role of Fortune 188–90; use of *prosopopoeiae* 187–8; use of exempla 188; Seneca protagonist of the epigrams attributed to him 19; Seneca as exemplum 215 n. 22, 217
Seven against Thebes 149–53
Severo Appennincola 232
shame, rejected by Cynics 77–81; shame of exile 91, 97, 143, 151, 179–80, 181 n. 24, *see also* insult
Silanus *see* Iunius
Silius Italicus, *Punica* 13, 97 n. 38, 142–6, 150 n. 43, 151; Vergilian influence 142, 144; exile as insult 143; used to elicit sympathy 144–5
similes 26, 91, 139, 158; man as actor on a stage 101–2; man as an athlete 102–4; humans compared to ants or bees 94; literature compared to works of art 115
Simonides, date 24; as exemplum 96
sleep, as medicine 171 n. 87
Socrates, relation to Xenophon 61; influence on Cynicism 72; as an example of cosmopolitanism 12 n. 55, 74, 91 n. 14, 93–4 n. 24, 98, 101, 106 n. 64, 180–1, 216 n. 23, 234–5 with n. 75
Solon, date 24; extensive travelling 10 n. 47, 54 with n. 10; linguistic and cultural isolation of exile 9, 14, 47–8; persona of self-justificatory politician 48
Solzhenitsyn, A. 209 n. 2
Sophists, attacked by Plato 11 n. 54
Sparta, foundation myth 7; concept of citizenship 90
Sprachnot 5, 48, 172, *see* exile

statesman, embodies the state 119, 127
Statius, reception of Ovid's exile poetry 18–19; exile in the *Thebaid* 13, 149–53, 234; Polynices simply the *exul* 150; reversal of the *Aeneid*, exile anti-ktistic 150; exile as a disgrace 150, 151 with n. 45; emotional weight of exile 151; exile and narrative pace 150; reception, influence on medieval thinking about poetic precedence 224 n. 46, 234 with n. 75
Stesichorus, date 24
Stilpon of Megara 88
Stoics, reverse Cynic concept of exile 12; influence on consolatory tradition 91, 93–4, 101, 105, 181; on Cicero 15, 109–27; Marcellus as exemplary Stoic 182
style, reflects estrangement 51; Cynic style 78 with n. 23; *see also* Neuer Stil, Ovid
*Suda*, life of Herodotus 53, 63–4; life of Philochorus 65; life of Favorinus 99
Suillius Rufus, P., addressee of Ovid 175 n. 12, 187 n. 54
Sulpicius Rufus, Servius, follower of Pompey 120–1
syllogism, parodied by Cynics 79–80
Syme, R. 51–70, 155 n. 3, 171 n. 87, 183 n. 35
sympotic poetry 21; transmission and variation 44; meta-textual allusions to performance context 46
Synesius of Cyrene, on Dio Chrysostom's exile 199 n. 28, 202
syntax, infinitive used to qualify nouns 163 n. 42; final infinitive after verbs of movement 163 n. 42; future perfect in place of future 163 n. 42; *ne* + present imperative 163 n. 42; dative of the agent with adjectives in *-bilis* 163 n. 42; adverbial phrases involving *mente* 162 n. 40; transfer of epithet 168; ellipsis 164 n. 47; emphatic constructions 164 n. 47
Syracuse, foundation 23
Syriscus of Chersonesus, local historian 68–9

taboos, questioned by Cynics 81
Tacitus, on obsequious language, snobbery against freedmen 186
Tantalus, negative exemplum 95, 98
Tarentum, foundation 27
technical language, used by Hellenistic and Roman poets 163
Telemachus, travel and transition to adulthood 8 n. 38
Teles, his *De Exilio* 4, 13, 88–92, 97, 103–4; epitomization 88–9 with n. 10; audience 89 n. 8; Cynic convictions 90; use of exempla 94, 157 n. 12
Telesicles, father of Archilochus 29
Teucer 9, 13–15; as exemplum 19, 157 n. 12
Thasos, colonization 23
*Thebaid* 24
Thebes, founded by Cadmus 7, 135, 150; Seven against Thebes 149–53
Themistocles, as exemplum 13, 89, 91 n. 14, 94, 97 n. 37, 157 with n. 12
Themistogenes of Syracuse, Xenophon's *nom de plume* 66
Theoclymenus, Homeric hero 25 n. 18
Theodorus, his epitome of Teles' *De Exilio* 88
Theodulf of Orléans 214–15, 222
Theognis, *Theognidea* 9, 14, 42–6; date 24; criteria for authenticity 42 n. 74; γνῶμαι 45; myth of the end of the Bronze Age 157; motif of desertion 158; influence on Cicero and Ovid 9 n. 42, 158 n. 15
Theopompus of Chios, his alleged exile 56, 62–3
Theras, founder of Thera 28
Theseus 25, 136; as exemplum 105
Thoreau, H. D. 76
Thucydides, historiography and exile 10, 11 n. 51, 51–69; 'Second Preface', description of his banishment, command at Amphipolis 58; use of patronym and ethnic 58 n. 25; already a historian before his exile 68; as exemplum 11 n. 48, 62, 97
Thurii, foundation 53
Thyestes, return from exile 174
Tiberius, emperor 175 n. 11, 186 n. 48; self-fashioning as philosopher in exile 11; as exemplary exile 95
Tibullus, use of monosyllables 166
Timaeus of Tauromenium, exiled by Agathocles 57; 'armchair' historian, criticized by Polybius 69–70; as exemplum 68
time, makes new home familiar 105;

temporal and cultural distance as exile 224–5, 229–30
Tlepolemus, Homeric hero 26
Toranius, C., follower of Pompey 120 n. 29
tragedians, in voluntary exile 54
tragedy, exile and civic identity, freedom of speech 9 n. 43; influence on consolatory tradition 9 n. 43, 93, 157 n. 11; in Roman schooling 15 n. 80; Roman tragedy influenced by Greek rhetoric of exile 13, 15 n. 80
Trajan, emperor 193 n. 4, 196–7, 205–6
transmission, of sympotic poetry 21–2, 44; of Ovid 214
travel, generates wisdom 8 n. 38, 10 n. 47; motif of mental travel 14 n. 70, 158 n. 19
Triptolemus, as comparandum 160, 167
Turnus, Argive connections 133
Tydeus 9, 152–3; as exemplum 157 n. 12
Tyrtaeus, date 24; on destitution and exile 46–7

underworld, distance 90

Valerius Flaccus, *Argonautica* 13, 146–9, 150 n. 43, 153; exile as a reproach 146
Varro, in the civil war 182 n. 29; as authority for the glory of nature 180–1
Vergil, loss of possessions near Mantua 14 n. 71; biographical speculation about him 214; treatment of exile 13–14, 129–34; foundations of Odysseus' companions omitted in *Aeneid* 132 n. 10; exile removes former enemies from Aeneas 132; use of monosyllables 165–6; influence on ancient discourse on exile 16 n. 85; influence on the tradition of Latin panegyric 186; Vergil as exemplum 215 n. 22; as addressee of Petrarch 233
Verlaine, P. M. 210
vocabulary, of love-sickness 160; of elegy 161 n. 32; technical vocabulary in poetry 163; adjectives in *-osus* 162 n. 40
voiceprint 52

Walahfrid Strabo 19 n. 107, 216
winds, as allegory 41

Xenophanes, date 24; expression of nostalgia 8, 31
Xenophon, *nom de plume* 66; date of banishment 60, 61 n. 33; Xenophon reticent about reasons for his exile 61–2; banishment revoked (?) 61; self-effacement 66–7; new identity in exile as priest and 'country gentleman' 67; shrine to Ephesian Artemis 60; second exile in Corinth 61; exile and historiography 11 n. 51, 51–68; historiographic orientation and alienation 67; viewpoint of the *Hellenica* 51 n. 2, 61; Xenophon's *Hiero* and kingship literature 204 n. 48; Xenophon's *Oeconomicus* 67; Xenophon as exemplum 62, 97

Zeus, as a model for government 197, 205

# INDEX OF GREEK


ἀνακαλεῖν 53
ἀπερύκειν 45
ἄτοπος 80
γνώμη 105
διάλογος 187
ἐκγίγνεσθαι 39
ἔκγονος 39
ἐκδημεῖν 218 n. 32
ἐλαύνειν 52
εὐθυμία 101
εὐψυχία 105
θάρσος 105
κακοπατρίδας 38
κατορύττειν 89
κολακεία 205 n. 55
κόσμιος 74, 93
κοσμοπολίτης 74
λόγος 80 n. 28
λυκαιχμίας 37
μετάπτωσις 202
μέτοικος 75, 90
μικρός 75
ξένος 75
ὀξύβαφον 69
πτωχός 75
φαλακρός 75
φεύγειν 2, 21, 52
φυγάς 52, 74
φυγή 2, 52

# INDEX OF LATIN


*acceptum referre* 163–4 n. 47
*agere* (*age* + imperat.) 162 n. 41
*amarus* 160 n. 32
*ambitiosus* 162 n. 40
*animos facere* 162 n. 41
*attonitus* 19 n. 101
*auxilium* 161 n. 32
*bene* (+ adj.) 162 n. 42
*carere* 161 n. 32
*causa* (~ 'res') 163 n. 47
*censere* (+ *de*) 164 n. 47
*clementia* 17, 165
*commilitium* 164 n. 47
*comparare* (+ inf.) 163 n. 47
*condicio* 164
*constanter* 164
*convicium* 190 n. 60
*credere* (*crede mihi*) 164
*credibilis* 164
*crimen* 161 n. 32
*crudelis* 161 n. 32
*culpa* 161 n. 32
*cupido* 161 n. 32
*cura* 160 n. 32
*de* (in place of *ex*) 162 n. 42
*desiderium* 161 n. 32
*deus* 161 n. 32
*dolor* 160 n. 32
*durus* 161 n. 32
*ecquid* 165
*edere* 163 n. 47
*error* 161 n. 32, 155, 212
*exceptus* 164
*exilium* 2–3, 15, 21, 159 n. 24, 218 n. 30
*exul* 21, 143, 150, 151 n. 44
*facere* (+ acc. and inf.) 162 n. 42
*facere* (*fac modo*) 164
*facere* (*cum aliquo*) 163 n. 42
*factum* (*in facto meo*) 163 n. 47
*fastiditus esse* 162 n. 41
*fides* 161 n. 32
*fidus* 167
*fletus* 160 n. 32
*fortasse* 164
*frenare* 168
*fuga* 2–3
*fulmen* 19 n. 101
*gratia* (+ *quod*-clause) 162 n. 41
*habere* (~ 'posse') 163 n. 42
*humus* 168
*iactare* (*i. pennas*) 168
*immo ita* 163 n. 42
*improbus* 161 n. 32
*infelix* 160 n. 32
*inmemor* 161 n. 32
*invidiosus* 162 n. 40
*ira* 16–17
*labor* 160 n. 32
*lacrima* 160 n. 32
*laedere* 161 n. 32
*lenis* 161 n. 32
*levare* 161 n. 32
*libra et aere* 163 n. 43
*liquet* 165
*littera* 162 n. 42, 167
*luctus* 160 n. 32
*maestus* 160 n. 32
*malum* 160 n. 32
*memor* 161 n. 32
*mens* (*aequa mente* vel sim.) 162 n. 40
*metus* 160 n. 32
*ministra* 167
*miser* 160 n. 32
*mitis* 161 n. 32
*mos* (*in morem venire*) 163 n. 42
*natura* 164 n. 54
*nemo* 165
*notitiam ferre* 162 n. 41
*nullus* 165
*numen* 161 n. 32
*obligare* 162 n. 41
*officiosus* 165
*omnibus annis* 162 n. 41
*operosus* 162 n. 40
*pars* (*(in) parte esse/tenere*) 162 n. 41
*particeps esse* 162 n. 41
*participare* 162 n. 41
*patrocinium* 165
*pellere* 130
*penna* 168
*perarare* 167
*Pierides* 167

*poena* 161 n. 32
*posteritas* 164
*preces* 161 n. 32
*probator esse* 163 n. 47
*profugus* 3, 135
*quid mihi cum…?* 163 n. 42
*repente* 167 n. 71
*saevus* 161 n. 32
*sarcina* 162 n. 40
*scelus* 161 n. 32
*sermocinatio* 187
*solacium* 161 n. 32
*sollicitus* 160 n. 32
*spes* 161 n. 32
*subire* 162 n. 42
*subito* 167
*succurrere* 162 n. 42
*summa* (*ad summam*) 163 n. 47
*supplex* 161 n. 32
*sustinere* (+ inf.) 164
*taedium* 161 n. 32
*tempus ad hoc* 164
*testari* 163 n. 43
*transferre* 218 n. 30, 224
*transmigratio* 218 n. 30
*tristis* 160 n. 32
*utilitas* 161 n. 32, 165
*vadere* (*vade!*) 163 n. 42
*venia* (*cum venia*) 163 n. 47
*veniam dare* 163 n. 42
*vera facere* 162 n. 41
*verba dare* 162 n. 42
*votum* 161 n. 32

# INDEX LOCORUM


ACHILLES TATIUS
5.11.4 93 n. 21

AELIANUS
*VH* 10.13 29

AESCHYLUS
*Ag*. 1269–74 9 n. 43

ALCAEUS
fr. 6 (Campbell) 40–1
fr. 34.6 (Campbell) 38 n. 53
fr. 45 (Campbell) 39 n. 66
fr. 67.4 (Campbell) 38 n. 59
fr. 68.3 (Campbell) 38 n. 59
fr. 70.7 (Campbell) 33
fr. 72 (Campbell) 34
fr. 72.11–13 (Campbell) 37, 39
fr. 73 (Campbell) 40–2
fr. 73.3–6 (Campbell) 9 n. 42, 158
fr. 73.8 (Campbell) 158 n. 17
fr. 75.7 ff. (Campbell) 32 n. 35
fr. 75.11 (Campbell) 38 n. 59
fr. 106.3 (Campbell) 38 n. 59
fr. 114 (Campbell) 33 n. 39
fr. 129 (Campbell) 33, 34
fr. 129.11–12 (Campbell) 9, 34, 35
fr. 129.20 (Campbell) 35
fr. 129.23–4 (Campbell) 35
fr. 130B (Campbell) 34
fr. 130B.1 (Campbell) 36
fr. 130B.2 (Campbell) 36
fr. 130B.3–5 (Campbell) 36
fr. 130B.4 (Campbell) 34
fr. 130B.5–8 (Campbell) 36
fr. 130B.7 (Campbell) 38 n. 58
fr. 130B.9–11 (Campbell) 33 n. 42, 36, 36 n. 51
fr. 130B.17–20 (Campbell) 36 n. 51
fr. 130B.18 (Campbell) 38 n. 54
fr. 208 (Campbell) 40–1
fr. 261.5 (Campbell) 38 n. 53
fr. 298.18 (Campbell) 38 n. 59
fr. 305 (Campbell) 32 n. 37
fr. 306 (Campbell) 41–2
fr. 329 (Campbell) 38 n. 55
fr. 332 (Campbell) 33
fr. 345.2 (Campbell) 38 n. 56
fr. 348 (Campbell) 33 n. 41
fr. 348.1 (Campbell) 38 n. 59
fr. 348.2 (Campbell) 38 n. 57
fr. 350 (Campbell) 34 n. 44
fr. 384.1 (Campbell) 38 n. 54
fr. 429 (Campbell) 38 n. 59
test. 9 (c) 4–6 (Campbell) 34 nn. 43 and 46

ALEXANDER AETOLUS
*Anth. Pal.* 7.709 (= Gow-Page, *HE* 150–5) 92

ALEXANDER POLYHISTOR
*FGrHist* 273 T 2 53 n. 8

AMBROSE
*In Psalm*. 118 *Serm*. 7.28 219 n. 33

ANACREON
fr. 348.4 (Page) 46 n. 77

ANDOCIDES
1.5 9 n. 44
2.10 9 n. 44
2.9 9 n. 44

ANON.
*Anth. Pal.* 7.714 (= Gow-Page, *HE* 3880–5) 32 n. 34
*Antiovidianus* 121–6 231
*De Vetula* 3.805 231 n. 66
Inc. *trag*. 92 (Ribbeck) 15 n. 80
*TrGF* Adesp. 281.1 (Kannicht/Snell) 90 n. 12
*TrGF* Adesp. 392 (Kannicht/Snell) 93 n. 23
*TrGF* Adesp. 393 (Kannicht/Snell) 157 n. 11

ANTIOCHUS OF SYRACUSE
*FGrHist* 555 F 13 27

ANTIPATER OF SIDON
*Anth. Pal.* 7.745 (= Gow-Page, *HE* 286–95) 32 n. 34

Antipater of Thessalonica
*Anth. Pal.* 16.75.5–6 171 n. 87

Apollonius Rhodius
*Argon.* 2.541–7 158

Apollodorus
*Bibl.* 2.8.2 7 n. 34
*Bibl.* 3.1.1 7 n. 33

Apuleius
*Apol.* 57 25 n. 17

Archilochus
fr. 5 (West) 30
fr. 19 (West) 30
fr. 21 (West) 10, 29, 30
fr. 22 (West) 29, 30
fr. 102 (West) 29
fr. 116 (West) 29, 30
fr. 188 (West) 41

Aristippus of Cyrene
fr. IV A 4 (Giannantoni (1990), II p. 23) 93 n. 21
fr. IV A 51 (Giannantoni (1990), II p. 29) 93 n. 21

Aristobulus of Cassandreia
*FGrHist* 139 T 4 56 n. 16

Aristophanes
*Plut.* 1151 15 n. 80

Aristotle
*Pol.* 1253ᵃ1–4 11 n. 54
*Pol.* 1261ᵇ11 75
*Pol.* 1285ᵃ35 33 n. 41
*Pro.* 1.23 79 n. 27
*Rh.* 2.20 15 n. 79

Arrian
*Anab.* 4.11.9 55–6 n. 14

Athenaeus
7.51 p. 297F-298A 8 n. 37

Baudri of Bourgueil
7 (Hilbert) 226
7.111–38 (Hilbert) 226 n. 52
7.185–6 (Hilbert) 226 n. 52
7.193–8 (Hilbert) 226
8 (Hilbert) 226
8.42 (Hilbert) 226
8.107–10 (Hilbert) 226 n. 52
97–98 (Hilbert) 225–230
97.31–2 (Hilbert) 227
97.77–8 (Hilbert) 229
97.83–6 (Hilbert) 228
97.89–90 (Hilbert) 228
97.97–100 (Hilbert) 228
97.101 (Hilbert) 228 n. 60
98.154 (Hilbert) 229
98.157 (Hilbert) 229
98.158 (Hilbert) 229
98.174 (Hilbert) 229
111 (Hilbert) 226 n. 51
150.1–4 (Hilbert) 225 n. 50
154 (Hilbert) 226 n. 51

Benoît of Sainte-Maure
*Roman de Troie* 13183–4 228 n. 60

Caesar
*Gal.* 2.17.4 164 n. 57

Callimachus
fr. 1.18 (Pfeiffer) 95 n. 28
fr. 114.14–15 (Pfeiffer) 161 n. 35
fr. 178.11 (Pfeiffer) 39 n. 65

Callinus
fr. 1.1 (West) 46 n. 79

Callisthenes of Olynthus
*FGrHist* 124 T 21 56
*FGrHist* 124 T 7–21 55–6

Cassius Dio
38.18–29 4 n. 16, 111 n. 5, 176 n. 15
38.18.5 4 n. 17
38.19.1–2 4 n. 17
38.24.2 3 n. 12
38.25.2 13 n. 62
38.26.3 4 n. 17
38.27.3 4 n. 17
38.28.1–2 11 n. 48
56.27.1 55 n. 13
60.8.5 175 n. 11
60.29.3 186 n. 51
60.31.2 186 n. 51
61.10.2 185

Catullus
Cat. 63.50–73 14, 158 n. 19
Cat. 68a 191

Celsus
*pr*. 69 171 n. 87

Chrysippus
fr. 677–81 (von Arnim) 12 n. 60

Cicero
*Att*. 3.3 159 n. 20
*Att*. 3.4 164 n. 50
*Att*. 3.7.1 160 n. 27
*Att*. 3.7.2 159 n. 20
*Att*. 3.15 4, 15, 157 n. 12
*Att*. 3.15.2 160 n. 29
*Att*. 4.13.1 170
*Att*. 5.15.1 4 n. 15
*Att*. 7.11.3 110
*Att*. 8.14.1 170
*Att*. 9.4.1 169 n. 76
*Att*. 11.6.2 113 n. 13
*Att*. 11.7.2–4 113 n. 13
*Att*. 11.9.1 113 n. 13
*Brut*. 11–12 181 n. 28
*Brut*. 248–53 182 n. 29
*Brut*. 250 181 n. 28
*Caec*. 100 3 n. 10, 117 n. 23
*De Orat*. 1.18 15 n. 79
*De Orat*. 1.196 157 n. 12
*De Orat*. 1.246 15 n. 80
*Dom*. 72 117 n. 22, 118 n. 25
*Dom*. 137 6 n. 28
*Dom*. 141 6 n. 28
*Fam*. 2.4.1 169 n. 76
*Fam*. 2.9.2 170 n. 83
*Fam*. 2.11.1 4 n. 15
*Fam*. 2.12.2 4 n. 15, 109
*Fam*. 2.13.3 4 n. 15
*Fam*. 4.4.3 120
*Fam*. 4.4.4 124 n. 34
*Fam*. 4.7.2 113 n. 11
*Fam*. 4.7.3 122
*Fam*. 4.7.4 16 n. 87, 122–3
*Fam*. 4.8–12 183 n. 33
*Fam*. 4.8.2 123
*Fam*. 4.13 181 n. 25
*Fam*. 4.13.1 169 n. 76, 170
*Fam*. 4.13.4 170 n. 87
*Fam*. 4.14.1 114 n. 16
*Fam*. 6.6–8 181 n. 25
*Fam*. 6.13–14 181 n. 25
*Fam*. 6.13.1 170 n. 87
*Fam*. 6.22.1 170 n. 87
*Fam*. 7.3.4–5 124
*Fam*. 7.7.3 120 n. 28
*Fam*. 7.28.2 125 n. 36
*Fam*. 9.15.4 114
*Fam*. 9.18.1 11 n. 53, 125
*Fam*. 9.21.1 169 n. 75
*Fam*. 12.30.1 169 n. 80
*Fam*. 14.1–4 173 n. 1
*Fam*. 14.2.1 159 n. 22
*Fam*. 15.16 158 n. 19, 171 n. 87
*Fam*. 15.16.1 170 n. 83
*Fam*. 15.20.2 126
*Fin*. 5.54 171 n. 87
*Leg*. 2.3 157 n. 12
*Marc*. 22 127
*Mil*. 101 15 n. 83
*N.D*. 3.54 167 n. 69
*N.D*. 3.66 159 n. 24
*Parad*. 5 115
*Parad*. 18 115
*Parad*. 27–8 116
*Parad*. 29 116 n. 21, 117, 119 n. 27
*Parad*. 29–30 117
*Parad*. 30 118
*Parad*. 31 117
*Parad*. 32 118
*Q.fr*. 1.3 173 n. 1
*Q.fr*. 1.3.1 159 n. 24
*Q.fr*. 1.3.3 159 n. 22
*Q.fr*. 1.3.5 160 n. 27
*Red. Pop*. 14 6 n. 28, 111
*Red. Pop*. 7 16 n. 85
*Red. Sen*. 25 16 n. 85
*Red. Sen*. 34 6 n. 28
*Red. Sen*. 38 16 n. 85
*Rep*. 1.6 3
*Rep*. 1.39 111–12
*Rep*. 3.43–5 112 n. 8
*Sen*. 57–8 171 n. 87
*Sen*. 84.4 12 n. 59
*Sest*. 141 3
*Sest*. 42–50 173 n. 1
*Tusc*. 3.81 15 n. 81
*Tusc*. 4.44 10 n. 47
*Tusc*. 5.106–9 15 n. 81, 176 n. 15, 234 n. 75
*Tusc*. 5.107 96 n. 35

| | |
|---|---|
| *Tusc.* 5.108 | 11 n. 49, 15 n. 80, 94 n. 24 |
| *Tusc.* 5.114 | 158 n. 19 |
| *Tusc.* 5.115 | 158 n. 19 |
| *Ver.* 1.98 | 164 n. 57 |
| [Cicero] | |
| *Rhet. Her.* 3.9 | 15 n. 79 |
| Cledonius | |
| *G.L.* 5.66.29–30 | 164 n. 51 |
| Clement of Alexandria | |
| *Strom.* 6.8.1 | 45 |
| Columella | |
| 1.8.1–2 | 171 n. 87 |
| Cratinus | |
| fr. 184 (Kassel/Austin) | 93 n. 21 |
| Critias | |
| *VS* 88 B 44 | 29 |
| Dante | |
| *Paradiso* 26.115–17 | 218 n. 30 |
| Demetrius | |
| *Eloc.* 223 | 169 nn. 75 and 79 |
| *Eloc.* 224 | 169 n. 81 |
| *Eloc.* 227 | 171 n. 87 |
| *Eloc.* 231 | 171 n. 87 |
| *Eloc.* 232 | 171 n. 87 |
| *Eloc.* 259 | 78 |
| *Typ. Epist.* 1 | 171 n. 87 |
| *Typ. Epist.* 5 | 170 |
| Democritus | |
| *VS* 68 B 299 | 10 n. 47 |
| Demosthenes | |
| *Or.* 57.70 | 9 n. 44 |
| Dio Chrysostom | |
| *Or.* 1.14 | 16 n. 87, 198 |
| *Or.* 1.15 | 205 n. 55 |
| *Or.* 1.49 | 197 |
| *Or.* 1.50 | 197 |
| *Or.* 1.51–2 | 197 |
| *Or.* 1.55–6 | 197–8 |
| *Or.* 1.82 | 205 n. 55 |
| *Or.* 2 | 205 |
| *Or.* 3 | 204 |
| *Or.* 3.3 | 205 n. 55 |
| *Or.* 3.12 | 205 n. 55 |
| *Or.* 3.13 | 196, 205 n. 55 |
| *Or.* 3.16 | 205 n. 55 |
| *Or.* 3.86 ff. | 205 |
| *Or.* 4.1 ff. | 205 |
| *Or.* 4.25 | 198 n. 24 |
| *Or.* 7 | 194 n. 7 |
| *Or.* 7.82 | 201 n. 33 |
| *Or.* 7.98 | 202 |
| *Or.* 12 | 194 n. 7 |
| *Or.* 12.46 | 203 n. 41 |
| *Or.* 12.60 | 203 n. 41 |
| *Or.* 12.61 | 203 n. 41 |
| *Or.* 13 | 101 n. 55 |
| *Or.* 10.30 | 82 n. 33 |
| *Or.* 13.1 | 200 |
| *Or.* 13.2 | 200 |
| *Or.* 13.3 | 201 |
| *Or.* 13.4 | 25 n. 17 |
| *Or.* 13.4–6 | 201 |
| *Or.* 13.8 | 201 |
| *Or.* 13.9 | 201 |
| *Or.* 13.10 | 202 |
| *Or.* 13.10–12 | 201–2 |
| *Or.* 13.13 ff. | 203 |
| *Or.* 13.14 | 194 n. 9 |
| *Or.* 13.29 | 194 n. 9 |
| *Or.* 13.31 ff. | 203, 203 n. 42 |
| *Or.* 18 | 194 n. 8 |
| *Or.* 19.1 | 203 |
| *Or.* 30 | 194 n. 7 |
| *Or.* 31 | 206 |
| *Or.* 31 | 206 n. 60 |
| *Or.* 32.60 | 197 n. 18 |
| *Or.* 33 | 206 n. 57 |
| *Or.* 34 | 206 n. 57 |
| *Or.* 34.49 ff. | 206 |
| *Or.* 36.1 | 194 n. 7 |
| *Or.* 38.38 | 206 |
| *Or.* 40.2 | 195 |
| *Or.* 44.1 | 25 n. 17 |
| *Or.* 45.1 | 195 n. 1, 196 |
| *Or.* 45.2 | 196, 197 n. 18 |
| *Or.* 45.10 | 195 |
| *Or.* 45.11 | 195 n. 12 |
| *Or.* 45.11 | 201 n. 33 |
| *Or.* 52 | 194 n. 8 |
| [Dio Chrysostom] | |
| *Or.* 64.27 | 100 n. 49 |

Diodorus Siculus
1.96.1–3 10 n. 47
5.13 179 n. 19
15.7.3 56
15.62.3 61
21.17.1 57

Diogenes Laertius
1.74 32 n. 35
1.81 38 n. 59
2.10 10 n. 45
2.51 61 n. 34
2.53 61
2.56 61
2.66 93 n. 21
6.20 71 n. 1, 72
6.21 72–3
6.22 76 n. 17, 77
6.24 80 n. 28
6.29 83 n. 37
6.35 73 n. 9
6.37 71 n. 1, 79, 81
6.38 76 n. 14, 80 n. 28
6.42 81
6.46 83 n. 39
6.47 81
6.49 10 nn. 45 and 47, 72 n. 6, 76 n. 15, 84 nn. 41–2
6.56 83 n. 38
6.59 81 n. 31, 83 n. 40
6.59–62 81
6.60 84 n. 43
6.63 74, 76, 82 n. 36
6.69 77, 79–80, 84 n. 45
6.71 84
6.72 74, 82 n. 36
6.73 81, 82 n. 33
8.1–2 10 n. 47
9.18 24 n. 14, 31
9.35–6 10 n. 47

Diogenes of Sinope
*TrGF* 88 F 4 76 n. 14

Diogenianus of Heraclea
*Paroem.* 2.71 32 n. 33
*Paroem.* 5.12 32 n. 33

Dionysius of Halicarnassus
*Ant. Rom.* 1.47 7 n. 36
*Ant. Rom.* 1.48 7 n. 36
*Ant. Rom.* 1.49 7 n. 36
*Ant. Rom.* 1.52 7 n. 36
*Ant. Rom.* 1.56 7 n. 36
*Ant. Rom.* 1.57 7 n. 36
*Ant. Rom.* 1.73 7 n. 36

Empedocles
fr. 107.13 (Wright) = *VS* 31 B 115.13 12 n. 57, 159 n. 24

Ennius
*Ann.* 14–25 (Skutsch) 13 n. 66
*scen.* 208–45 (Jocelyn) 13 n. 68
*scen.* 229–31 (Jocelyn) 13 n. 68
*scen.* 231 (Jocelyn) 159
*scen.* 265–79 (Jocelyn) 13 n. 68

Ephorus of Cyme
*FGrHist* 70 F 126 7 n. 35

Epictetus
*Diss.* 1.9.1 93 n. 24
*Diss.* 4.2.10 102 n. 56
*Ench.* 17 101–2 n. 56
fr. 11 (p. 464.7–14 Schenkl) 102 n. 56

*Etymologicum Magnum*
p. 326.47 160 n. 25

Euripides
*Med.* 374–5 159 n. 24
*Med.* 643–51 9 n. 43
*Phoen.* 357–406 87 n. 2
*Phoen.* 357–78 9 n. 43
*Phoen.* 388–405 17 n. 90, 174–5
*Phoen.* 388–9 92
*Phoen.* 388–93 9 n. 43, 97
*Phoen.* 396–7 97
*Phoen.* 402–5 97
*Phoen.* 403 44, 158 n. 15
*Phoen.* 638–42 7 n. 33
*Phoen.* 1447–52 90 n. 12
fr. 360.8 (Kannicht) 7 n. 32
fr. 723.1 (Kannicht) 94 n. 27
fr. 1047 (Kannicht) 9 n. 43, 12 n. 55

Favorinus
*De Exil.* 1 100 n. 50
*De Exil.* 2 101
*De Exil.* 2.2 100 n. 50, 101 n. 55
*De Exil.* 3 102
*De Exil.* 3.3 102 n. 57
*De Exil.* 4 102
*De Exil.* 5.1 102 n. 58
*De Exil.* 5.2 103 n. 60, 233 n. 72
*De Exil.* 7–14 104–5
*De Exil.* 7 103 n. 61
*De Exil.* 10.2 10, 100 n. 47
*De Exil.* 15–18 105
*De Exil.* 14.51 ff. 13 n. 62
*De Exil.* 16.3 107 n. 67
*De Exil.* 19–27 105–7
*De Exil.* 26.4 16 n. 85
*De Exil.* 27.2 107 n. 65
*De Exil.* 28–9 107
*De Exil.* 28.1 107 n. 66

Fronto
*ad M. Caes. et invic.* 1.4.3 (p. 7.5–6 v.d.Hout) 25 n. 17
*ad M. Caes. et invic.* 5.20.2 (p. 72.4 v.d.Hout) 25 n. 17

Gellius
*Noctes Atticae* 17.2.7 112 n. 9

Gregory of Nazianzus
*Ep.* 51.5 171 n. 87
*Ep.* 51.7 171 n. 87

Hecataeus of Miletus
*FGrHist* 1 T 12a 10 n. 47
*FGrHist* 1 T 4 10 n. 47

Hellanicus of Lesbos
*FGrHist* 4 F 84 7 n. 36
*FGrHist* 4 F 1a 7 n. 33

Hephaestion
*Ench.* 10.3 34 n. 44

Hergesianax of Alexandria
*FGrHist* 45 F 7–10 7 n. 36

Herodotus
1.29.1 54
1.30.2 10 n. 47
1.55 201 n. 34
1.142.3–4 64
1.144 64
1.147.2 23 n. 7
2.30 94
2.49.3 7 n. 33
3.60.1 64
4.76.1 10 n. 47
4.146–9 28, 30
4.147.3 28
4.147.4 7 n. 33
4.149.1 28
4.151 23 n. 10
5.95 32 n. 36
6.34.6 30
6.35.3 28
6.36.1 28 n. 23
7.28.3 39 n. 64
7.99.1 63

Hesiod
*Op.* 448–51 43
*Op.* 618–32 43

Hesychius
λ 1369 37

Hippocrates
*Aph.* 2.1–3 171 n. 87

Hipponax
fr. 26 (West) 47 n. 83

Homer
*Il.* 2.661–70 26
*Il.* 4.50–4 133
*Il.* 4.520 39 n. 64
*Il.* 5.297–317 132
*Il.* 9.393–400 25 n. 17
*Il.* 9.448–80 8 n. 39
*Il.* 9.478 26
*Il.* 9.479–84 25 n. 18
*Il.* 13.694–7 25 n. 18
*Il.* 15.430–2 25 n. 18
*Il.* 16.571–4 25 n. 18
*Il.* 16.776 181 n. 23
*Il.* 23.83 ff. 8 n. 39
*Il.* 23.83 228 n. 60
*Il.* 23.243–4 228 n. 60
*Il.* 24.86–90 26
*Il.* 24.480–2 26
*Il.* 24.487–92 25 n. 17

*Il.* 24.507–11 25 n. 17
*Il.* 24.725–38 27 n. 21
*Od.* 1.1–3 8 n. 38
*Od.* 1.57–9 25 n. 17
*Od.* 5.82–4 87 n. 1
*Od.* 9.27–8 25 n. 17
*Od.* 9.34 25 n. 17
*Od.* 13.257–86 26, 30
*Od.* 14.379–81 25 n. 18
*Od.* 15.272–8 25 n. 18
*Od.* 15.403–84 25
*Od.* 23.118–20 25 n. 18

Horace
*Carm.* 1.7 14
*Carm.* 2.3.27–8 12 n. 59
*Carm.* 3.27 14
*Ep.* 1.7.8 165 n. 63
*Ep.* 1.11 14
*Ep.* 1.18.82 165 n. 60
*S.* 1.3.98 165 n. 64
*S.* 1.4.105 163 n. 47
*S.* 1.9.52 164 n. 55
*S.* 1.17.13–21 93 n. 21
*S.* 2.5.48 165 n. 63
*S.* 2.7.6 164 n. 53

Hugh of St. Victor
*Didascalion* 3.20 220

Ibycus
fr. 289 (Page/Davies) 32
fr. S220 (Page/Davies) 32 n. 32

Inscriptions
*CE* 1383.4 165 n. 62
*CEG* 302 (Hansen) 28 n. 23
Chaniotis E 7 68–9
*IOSPE* I 184 68–9
*IOSPE* $I^2$ 344 68–9
*SEG* 15.517 29
*SEG* 15.518 29
*SGDI* 3086 68–9
$SIG^3$ 45 63

Isocrates
*Paneg.* 51 9 n. 43
*Paneg.* 54 9 n. 43
*Or.* 14.46–50 9 n. 44
*Or.* 19.23–7 9 n. 44

[Isocrates]
*Or.* 1.2 169 n. 81

Ister
*FGrHist* 334 F 32 61

Julius Victor
*Ars Rhet.* 27 171 n. 87

Justin
*Epit.* 28.1.6 8 n. 37

Juvenal
10.47–50 78 n. 22

Leonidas of Tarentum
*Anth. Pal.* 7.715 (= Gow-Page, *HE* 2535–40) 159 n. 24

[Libanius]
*Charact. Epist.* 25 170

Livy
5.51–4 4
5.54.2–3 158 n. 19
5.54.3–4 4, 14 n. 70, 19 n. 104
26.41.19 164 n. 57
42.21.7 163 n. 42
43.2.1 117 n. 23
45.31.9 52 n. 5

[Longinus]
35.2 103 n. 59

Lothar of Segni (Innocent III)
*De Miseria humanae conditionis* 1.18 220 n. 37

Lucan
1.277–9 138
1.488–92 139
1.503–4 139
2.601–9 139
2.728–30 140
2.730 142
3.4–7 140
5.1–64 140
5.9–10 140
5.22 165 n. 58
5.29–34 141
5.230 164 n. 52
5.723–4 182 n. 31
6.433 165 n. 58
6.572 167

7.379 141
7.703–6 141
8.109–46 182 n. 31
8.208–9 142
8.837 140
9.1–14 140

LUCIAN
*Hermot.* 5 94 n. 26
*Hist. conscr.*12 56 n. 16
*Icarom.* 19 94 n. 26
*Patr. Encom.* 1 25 n. 17
*Patr. Encom.* 11 25 n. 17
*Peregr.* 18 194
*Vit. Auct.* 13 78 n. 22
*Nec.* 16 102 n. 56

LUCRETIUS
2.301 164 n. 54
3.491 164 n. 53

MANUSCRIPTS
Berkeley, UCB 95, fol. 60ra 214 n. 17
Florence, Cod. Laur. 36.2 213 n. 13
Hamburg, Codex 52 in scrinio 214 n. 18
Munich, Clm 631, fol. 148r 214 n. 16
Munich, Clm 14753, fol. 40v 214 n. 15
Munich, Clm 19475 213 n. 14
Paris, Bibliothèque Nationale, ms. lat. 8207 214 n. 15
Wolfenbüttel, Aug.4° 13.11 214 n. 18

MARCUS AURELIUS
*Med.* 1.14 194
*Med.* 6.2.1 93 n. 21

MARTIAL
4.32.4 164 n. 55

MAXIMUS OF TYRE
1.1 102 n. 56
1.4.A–E 104 n. 62
1.6.B–E 104 n. 62
8.7.B 104 n. 62
12.9.D–F 104 n. 62
34.9.E–G 104 n. 62

MENANDER
*Epitrepontes* fr. 9 (Arnott) 74
*Samia* 616 ff. 14 n. 69
*Mon.* 783 171 n. 87

MENANDER RHETOR
p. 433 (Spengel) 25 n. 17

MODOIN OF AUTUN
*Egloga* 1.24–7 215 n. 21
*Egloga* 1.60–6 215 n. 22
*Modoinus indignus episcopo Theodulfo suo* (*PLAC* 1.571) vv. 47–50 215

MUSONIUS
p. 41.6 (Hense) 157 n. 11
p. 42.1–2 (Hense) 94 n. 24
p. 48.6 (Hense) 175 n. 8
p. 48.15 ff. (Hense) 183 n. 36

NAEVIUS
frr. 5–29 (Blänsdorf) 13 n. 66

NEPOS
*Di.* 3.2 57 n. 18

NEW TESTAMENT
Matth. 5.29–30 106 n. 63
Matth. 13.57 216 n. 23
Matth. 18.8–9 106 n. 63
Mc. 9.43 106 n. 63
Mc. 9.45 106 n. 63
Mc. 9.47 106 n. 63
Petr. 1 Ep. 1.17 12 n. 58
Paul. 2 Cor. 5.6 12 n. 58, 218
Paul. Eph. 6.12–13 102 n. 59
Paul. Eph. 6.14–17 102 n. 59
Paul. Hebr. 11.13–16 12 n. 58, 218
Paul. Hebr. 13.14 12 n. 58, 234 n. 75

OLD TESTAMENT
Gen. 3.23–4 218 n. 30
4 Reg. 15.29 217 n. 30
4 Reg. 17.6 217 n. 30
4 Reg. 24.14–17 217 n. 30
Jer. 29.1 ff. 218 n. 30

OVID
*Am.* 1.4.30 162 n. 42
*Am.* 1.7.27 163 n. 42
*Am.* 1.7.63 162 n. 42
*Am.* 1.11.27 167
*Am.* 1.12.2 162 n. 42
*Am.* 1.15.1 215 n. 21
*Am.* 2.3.9 162 n. 42
*Am.* 2.11.37 163 n. 42
*Am.* 2.18.27–34 226 n. 53
*Am.* 2.18.33 162 n. 42
*Am.* 2.19.50 162 n. 42

| | |
|---|---|
| *Am*. 3.6.16 | 168 n. 72 |
| *Am*. 3.6.87 | 163 n. 42 |
| *Am*. 3.8.49 | 163 n. 42 |
| *Ars* 1.467–8 | 168–9 |
| *Ars* 1.483 | 162 n. 42 |
| *Ars* 1.743 | 228 n. 60 |
| *Ars* 2.38 | 163 n. 42 |
| *Ars* 2.61 | 168 |
| *Ars* 2.198 | 164 n. 50 |
| *Ars* 2.263 | 162 n. 42 |
| *Ars* 3.762 | 163 n. 42 |
| *Ep*. 1–14 | 161 n. 37 |
| *Ep*. 4.156 | 163 n. 42 |
| *Ep*. 7.105 | 163 n. 42 |
| *Ep*. 11.126 | 228 |
| *Ep*. 12.209 | 164 n. 51 |
| *Ep*. 15 | 161 n. 37 |
| *Ep*. 16–21 | 161 n. 37 |
| *Ep*. 16 | 226 |
| *Ep*. 16.154 | 164 n. 53 |
| *Ep*. 16.290 | 166 n. 66 |
| *Ep*. 17 | 226 |
| *Ep*. 17.16 | 166 n. 66 |
| *Ep*. 17.259 | 164 n. 51 |
| *Ep*. 18.30 | 170 n. 84 |
| *Ep*. 19.202 | 166 n. 66 |
| *Ep*. 20.83 | 164 n. 51 |
| *Ep*. 20.180 | 164 n. 50 |
| *Ep*. 21.17–8 | 169 n. 78 |
| *Fast*. 1.493 | 12 n. 55, 234 n. 75 |
| *Fast*. 2.235 ff. | 160 |
| *Fast*. 4.3 | 163 n. 42 |
| *Fast*. 4.63–80 | 179 |
| *Fast*. 4.755 | 163 n. 42 |
| *Fast*. 5.283 | 163 n. 42 |
| *Fast*. 5.333 | 162 n. 42 |
| *Fast*. 5.582 | 166 n. 66 |
| *Fast*. 6.660 | 166 n. 66 |
| *Ib*. 1 | 164 n. 57 |
| *Ib*. 508 | 166 n. 66 |
| *Met*. 1.583–746 | 135 |
| *Met*. 1.727 | 135 |
| *Met*. 2.60 | 164 n. 52 |
| *Met*. 2.340 ff. | 160 |
| *Met*. 2.755 | 162 n. 42 |
| *Met*. 2.835 | 168 |
| *Met*. 2.837 | 167 |
| *Met*.3.1–137 | 7 n. 33, 135 |
| *Met*. 3.4–5 | 135 |
| *Met*. 3.7 | 135 |
| *Met*. 3.131–2 | 135 |
| *Met*. 3.138 ff. | 160 |
| *Met*. 3.623–5 | 135 |
| *Met*. 4.469 | 163 n. 42 |
| *Met*. 4.789 | 168 |
| *Met*. 5.137 | 162 n. 42 |
| *Met*. 5.646–7 | 160, 168 n. 72 |
| *Met*. 6.103–28 | 136 |
| *Met*. 6.148 ff. | 160 |
| *Met*. 6.430 | 162 n. 42 |
| *Met*. 7.155–8 | 136 |
| *Met*. 7.351 | 136 |
| *Met*. 7.397 | 136 |
| *Met*. 7.402 | 136 |
| *Met*. 7.424 | 136 |
| *Met*. 7.512 | 163 n. 42 |
| *Met*. 7.690–1 | 162 n. 42 |
| *Met*. 8.57 | 165 n. 61 |
| *Met*. 8.183–5 | 136 |
| *Met*. 8.260 | 137 |
| *Met*. 8.830–1 | 160 |
| *Met*. 8.868 | 164 n. 52 |
| *Met*. 9.658 | 163 n. 42 |
| *Met*. 10.356–7 | 162 n. 42 |
| *Met*. 11.132 | 163 n. 42 |
| *Met*. 11.137 | 163 n. 42 |
| *Met*. 11.221–65 | 136 |
| *Met*. 11.718 | 165 n. 58 |
| *Met*. 15.60–2 | 137 |
| *Met*. 15.75–478 | 137 |
| *Met*. 15.479 | 137 |
| *Met*. 15.840 | 162 n. 42 |
| *Met*. 15.871–9 | 135 n. 15 |
| *Pont*. 1.1.4 | 164 n. 47 |
| *Pont*. 1.1.19–20 | 169 n. 82 |
| *Pont*. 1.1.[66] | 166 n. 66 |
| *Pont*. 1.1.69 | 163 n. 47 |
| *Pont*. 1.2.3–4 | 160 |
| *Pont*. 1.2.6 | 169 n. 78 |
| *Pont*. 1.2.27 | 159 nn. 21 and 23 |
| *Pont*. 1.2.29–30 | 160 |
| *Pont*. 1.2.31–2 | 160 |
| *Pont*. 1.2.41 ff. | 171 n. 87 |
| *Pont*. 1.2.47–50 | 158 |
| *Pont*. 1.2.59–60 | 19 n. 101 |
| *Pont*. 1.2.59 | 165 n. 61 |
| *Pont*. 1.2.60 | 158 |
| *Pont*. 1.2.68 | 165 n. 62, 166 n. 66 |
| *Pont*. 1.2.72 | 164 n. 54 |
| *Pont*. 1.2.97 | 137 n. 19 |
| *Pont*. 1.2.121 | 161 n. 35 |
| *Pont*. 1.2.129–36 | 171 n. 87 |
| *Pont*. 1.2.131–2 | 171 n. 87 |
| *Pont*. 1.2.136 | 171 n. 87 |

*Pont.* 1.2.145–50 171 n. 87
*Pont.* 1.3 13 nn. 64–5, 15, 157, 157 n. 12, 171 n. 87
*Pont.* 1.3.3–8 158 n. 15
*Pont.* 1.3.5–8 160 n. 30
*Pont.* 1.3.15 163
*Pont.* 1.3.35–6 220 n. 37
*Pont.* 1.3.45–6 36 n. 51
*Pont.* 1.3.48 157 n. 11
*Pont.* 1.3.49 44 n. 76, 158 n. 14
*Pont.* 1.3.63–80 157 n. 12
*Pont.* 1.3.63–6 16 n. 85
*Pont.* 1.4.47–58 167 n. 68
*Pont.* 1.5.3–8 156 n. 5, 161 n. 33
*Pont.* 1.5.15–18 167 n. 68
*Pont.* 1.5.18 164 n. 49
*Pont.* 1.5.27 164 n. 57
*Pont.* 1.5.39–42 158
*Pont.* 1.5.41 164 n. 53
*Pont.* 1.5.45–50 171 n. 87
*Pont.* 1.5.53–6 161 n. 34
*Pont.* 1.5.55–6 170 n. 85
*Pont.* 1.5.68 229 n. 61
*Pont.* 1.6.12 19 n. 101
*Pont.* 1.6.15–20 170 n. 86
*Pont.* 1.6.29–30 157 n. 13
*Pont.* 1.6.41–4 159 n. 20
*Pont.* 1.7.29–30 171 n. 87
*Pont.* 1.8.11–16 167 n. 68
*Pont.* 1.8.[20] 166 n. 66
*Pont.* 1.8.31 ff. 158
*Pont.* 1.8.[40] 166 n. 66
*Pont.* 1.8.41–8 171 n. 87
*Pont.* 1.8.50 3 n. 11
*Pont.* 1.9.1 158 n. 15
*Pont.* 1.9.15–16 45 n. 76, 158 n. 14
*Pont.* 1.9.21–2 159 n. 20
*Pont.* 1.10.9 160
*Pont.* 2.1.17 163 n. 44
*Pont.* 2.2.6 166 n. 66
*Pont.* 2.2.43 163 n. 43
*Pont.* 2.2.54 163 n. 43
*Pont.* 2.2.59 163 n. 44
*Pont.* 2.2.70 166 n. 66
*Pont.* 2.2.76 166 n. 66
*Pont.* 2.2.102 162 n. 41
*Pont.* 2.2.104 163 n. 47
*Pont.* 2.2.119 165 n. 61
*Pont.* 2.3.18 166 n. 66
*Pont.* 2.3.23–4 171 n. 87
*Pont.* 2.3.67 170 n. 86
*Pont.* 2.4.1 169 n. 78
*Pont.* 2.4.7–8 170 n. 84
*Pont.* 2.5 187 n. 54
*Pont.* 2.5.16 164 n. 54
*Pont.* 2.5.26 166 n. 66
*Pont.* 2.5.72 164 n. 47
*Pont.* 2.5.73 164 n. 47
*Pont.* 2.6.7 162 n. 41
*Pont.* 2.6.35 164 n. 50
*Pont.* 2.7.1 167 n. 71
*Pont.* 2.7.39 163 n. 42
*Pont.* 2.7.76 162 n. 42
*Pont.* 2.8.1–2 158 n. 15
*Pont.* 2.8.21 163 n. 44
*Pont.* 2.9.20 166 n. 66
*Pont.* 2.9.42 166 n. 66
*Pont.* 2.9.47–8 171 n. 87
*Pont.* 2.10.43 162 n. 41
*Pont.* 2.11.11–12 170 n. 86
*Pont.* 3.1 160 n. 31
*Pont.* 3.1.5 ff. 36 n. 51
*Pont.* 3.1.49–56 18, 234 n. 74
*Pont.* 3.1.75 164 n. 47
*Pont.* 3.1.82 163 n. 42
*Pont.* 3.2.15–16 45 n. 76, 158 n. 14
*Pont.* 3.3 160 n. 31
*Pont.* 3.3.7 171 n. 87
*Pont.* 3.4.11 156 n. 5, 161 n. 33
*Pont.* 3.4.69–70 170 n. 84
*Pont.* 3.5.29–30 170
*Pont.* 3.5.40 166 n. 66
*Pont.* 3.5.48 162 n. 41
*Pont.* 3.6.7 165 n. 61
*Pont.* 3.6.11–14 170 n. 86
*Pont.* 3.6.46 166 n. 66
*Pont.* 3.6.47 162 n. 41
*Pont.* 3.6.53–8 169 n. 82
*Pont.* 4.1.15 163 n. 47
*Pont.* 4.1.25 165 n. 61
*Pont.* 4.2.13 171 n. 87
*Pont.* 4.2.15 156 n. 5, 161 n. 33
*Pont.* 4.3.12 166 n. 66
*Pont.* 4.3.21 162 n. 41
*Pont.* 4.3.54 166 n. 66
*Pont.* 4.4.45 170 n. 84
*Pont.* 4.5.24 166 n. 66
*Pont.* 4.6.6 166 n. 66
*Pont.* 4.6.14 166 n. 66
*Pont.* 4.8 187 n. 54

*Pont.* 4.8.62 166 n. 66
*Pont.* 4.8.65–6 156 n. 5, 161 n. 33
*Pont.* 4.9.[26] 166 n. 66
*Pont.* 4.9.48 166 n. 66
*Pont.* 4.9.80 166 n. 66
*Pont.* 4.12.1–6 169 n. 82
*Pont.* 4.13.28 166 n. 66
*Pont.* 4.13.44 166 n. 66
*Pont.* 4.13.46 166 n. 66
*Pont.* 4.14.4 166 n. 66
*Pont.* 4.14.18 166 n. 66
*Pont.* 4.14.56 166 n. 66
*Pont.* 4.14.60 164 n. 57
*Pont.* 4.15.11 163 n. 43
*Pont.* 4.15.26 166 n. 66
*Pont.* 4.15.42 163 n. 43
*Rem.* 95 162 n. 42
*Rem.* 152 163 n. 42
*Rem.* 389 215 n. 21
*Rem.* 390 171 n. 87
*Rem.* 555 ff. 160 n. 31
*Tr.* 1.1 211 n. 8
*Tr.* 1.1.1–2 211
*Tr.* 1.1.26 165 n. 62
*Tr.* 1.1.45–8 156 n. 5, 161 n. 33
*Tr.* 1.1.46 163 n. 47
*Tr.* 1.1.90 137
*Tr.* 1.2.17 163 n. 47
*Tr.* 1.2.41 163 n. 44
*Tr.* 1.2.51 164 n. 47
*Tr.* 1.2.82 164 n. 47
*Tr.* 1.2.83 162 n. 41, 163 n. 44
*Tr.* 1.2.99 163 n. 42
*Tr.* 1.2.107 163 n. 44
*Tr.* 1.3 16 n. 85
*Tr.* 1.3.6 166 n. 66
*Tr.* 1.3.101–2 170 n. 86
*Tr.* 1.4 16 n. 85
*Tr.* 1.4.20 166 n. 66
*Tr.* 1.5.3 19 n. 101
*Tr.* 1.5.5 159 n. 20
*Tr.* 1.5.17 158
*Tr.* 1.5.27–8 171 n. 87
*Tr.* 1.5.64 44 n. 76, 158 n. 14
*Tr.* 1.5.79 163 n. 44
*Tr.* 1.7.15 162 n. 42
*Tr.* 1.7.16 162 n. 41
*Tr.* 1.7.20 162 n. 41
*Tr.* 1.7.32 162 n. 41
*Tr.* 1.7.33–40 155 n. 4
*Tr.* 1.7.38 162 n. 42
*Tr.* 1.9.5–6 171 n. 87
*Tr.* 1.9.37–8 159 n. 21
*Tr.* 1.9.43–4 171 n. 87
*Tr.* 1.9.52 162 n. 41
*Tr.* 1.9.65 44 n. 76, 158 n. 14
*Tr.* 1.9.66 171 n. 87
*Tr.* 1.10.34 166 n. 66
*Tr.* 2.10 164 n. 47
*Tr.* 2.103–6 213
*Tr.* 2.105–6 160
*Tr.* 2.125 165 n. 61
*Tr.* 2.207 155 n. 3, 212
*Tr.* 2.212 166 n. 66
*Tr.* 2.232 166 n. 66
*Tr.* 2.267–8 163 n. 47
*Tr.* 2.294 166 n. 66
*Tr.* 2.514 166 n. 66
*Tr.* 3.2.27 164 n. 53
*Tr.* 3.3.16 162 n. 41
*Tr.* 3.4.21 137
*Tr.* 3.4.55 ff. 158
*Tr.* 3.4.55–6 170 n. 84
*Tr.* 3.5.39 165 n. 61
*Tr.* 3.5.40 166 n. 66
*Tr.* 3.5.49–50 213
*Tr.* 3.5.54 164 n. 54
*Tr.* 3.7.1–6 166–7
*Tr.* 3.8.1 ff. 158
*Tr.* 3.8.1–2 160
*Tr.* 3.8.1–6 167, 168
*Tr.* 3.8.7–8 137
*Tr.* 3.9.2 157 n. 11, 166 n. 66
*Tr.* 3.10.4 166 n. 66
*Tr.* 3.11.66 163
*Tr.* 3.14.7 163 n. 42
*Tr.* 3.14.9 3 n. 11
*Tr.* 3.14.32 164 n. 49
*Tr.* 3.14.33–6 18 n. 100, 191 n. 61
*Tr.* 3.14.33 156 n. 5, 161 n. 33
*Tr.* 4.1.24 163 n. 47
*Tr.* 4.1.54 163 n. 42
*Tr.* 4.1.87–8 164 n. 49
*Tr.* 4.1.95 159 n. 21
*Tr.* 4.1.104 163 n. 47
*Tr.* 4.2.57 170 n. 84
*Tr.* 4.4.11 169 n. 82
*Tr.* 4.4.14 164 n. 49
*Tr.* 4.4.23 169 n. 78
*Tr.* 4.4.53 165 n. 61

*Tr.* 4.5.5–6 19 n. 101
*Tr.* 4.5.23 164 n. 53
*Tr.* 4.5.24 166 n. 66
*Tr.* 4.8.39 165 n. 61
*Tr.* 4.9.4 164 n. 50
*Tr.* 4.9.5 164 n. 50
*Tr.* 4.10 171 n. 87
*Tr.* 4.10.2 166 n. 66
*Tr.* 4.10.74 164 n. 49
*Tr.* 4.10.115–30 159 n. 24
*Tr.* 4.10.115–22 157 n. 12
*Tr.* 4.10.117–18 161 n. 34
*Tr.* 5.1.79–80 170
*Tr.* 5.4.10 171 n. 87
*Tr.* 5.4.19 165 n. 61
*Tr.* 5.4.49 164 nn. 50 and 53
*Tr.* 5.6.30 166 n. 66
*Tr.* 5.6.46 44 n. 76, 158 n. 14
*Tr.* 5.7.41 44 n. 76, 158 n. 14
*Tr.* 5.7.45 157 n. 11
*Tr.* 5.7.67–8 161 n. 34
*Tr.* 5.7.67 170 n. 85
*Tr.* 5.8.3 162 n. 41
*Tr.* 5.8.27 163 n. 42
*Tr.* 5.11.23 163 n. 44
*Tr.* 5.12.16 164 n. 49
Tr. 5.12.21–2 156 n. 5, 161 n. 33
*Tr.* 5.13.11 170 n. 86
*Tr.* 5.14.9 162 n. 41

Pacuvius
*trag.* 313–46 (Ribbeck) 13 n. 68

Papyri
*P Berol.* 9569 33 n. 39
*P Oxy.* 1234 42
*P Oxy.* 2165 37
*P Oxy.* 2306 32 n. 37
*P Oxy.* 2307 41
*P Oxy.* 2506 34 nn. 43 and 46
*P Oxy.* 2637 32 n. 32
*P Oxy.* 3711 36 n. 52, 37
*Pap. Gr. Vat.* 11 101–7

Paulus
*Sent.* 2.26.4 180 n. 22

Paulus Diaconus
*Epit.* p. 479.3–5 (Lindsay) 3 n. 10

Pausanias
1.12.1 8 n. 37
3.22.11 7 n. 36
7.2.6 7 n. 35
7.10.11 52 n. 5
8.5.6 7 n. 34
9.12.1 7 n. 33

Petrarch
*De Rem.* 2.53 233 n. 72
*De Rem.* 2.67 232–4
*De Rem.* 2.125 232
*De Vita Solitaria* 2.7.2 232
*Ep. Met.* 3.8 233 n. 73
*Fam.* 2.3–4 232 n. 71
*Fam.* 10 233
*Rime sparse* 5 232 n. 68
*Rime sparse* 23 232 n. 68
*Rime sparse* 45 232 n. 68
*Rime sparse* 51 232 n. 68
*Rime sparse* 78 232 n. 68
*Rime sparse* 129 232 n. 68
*Rime sparse* 206 232 n. 68
*Rime sparse* 332 232 n. 68

Petronius
9.5 172 n. 90
17.7 171 n. 87

Pherecydes of Athens
*FGrHist* 3 F 155 7 n. 35

Philistus of Syracuse
*FGrHist* 556 T 5b 56
*FGrHist* 556 T 5c 56
*FGrHist* 556 T 5d 57 n. 18

Philo Judaeus
*Spec. Leg.* 4.142 218 n. 32

Philochorus
*FGrHist* 328 T 1 56, 65

Philostephanus
*FHG* 3.29.1 (= Ath. 7.51 pp. 297F–298A) 8 n. 37

Philostratus
*VA* 1.35 (1.34) p. 44 18 n. 99
*VS* 1.7 p. 488 193 n. 3
*VS* 1.8 p. 489 100 n. 48

Pindar
*Pyth.* 4.288 47 n. 85
*Pae.* 4.50–3 95 n. 28

Plato
*Leg.* 716A 94 n. 25
*Leg.* 864E 218 n. 32
*Ti.* 19E 11 n. 54

Plautus
*Capt.* 519 159 n. 24
*Cist.* 284 ff. 14 n. 69
*Mer.* 644 ff. 14 n. 69
*Mer.* 652 3
*Mer.* 830 ff. 14 n. 69
*Poen.* 580 164 n. 50

Pliny the Elder
*Nat.* 16.197 179 n. 19
*Nat.* 26.118 171 n. 87

Pliny the Younger
*Ep.* 8.6.3 186
*Ep.* 8.6.13 186
*Ep.* 10.81 207 n. 65
*Ep.* 10.81–2 193 n. 4
*Pan.* 82 171 n. 87

Plotinus
*Enn.* 1.6.8 19 n. 105

Plutarch
*De Exil.* 599A–C 92
*De Exil.* 599D 92 n. 19
*De Exil.* 599D–F 92
*De Exil.* 600A 92 n. 17, 93
*De Exil.* 600B 93
*De Exil.* 600D 93 n. 22
*De Exil.* 600E 74, 92, 93, 181 n. 24
*De Exil.* 600E–F 93
*De Exil.* 600F–601B 98
*De Exil.* 601A–B 94 n. 25
*De Exil.* 601B 94
*De Exil.* 601C 94
*De Exil.* 601D–602A 94
*De Exil.* 602A–603B 179
*De Exil.* 602A 13 n. 62
*De Exil.* 602B 94 n. 27
*De Exil.* 602C–604C 181 n. 24
*De Exil.* 602C 36 n. 51, 95, 157 n. 11
*De Exil.* 602D–E 95
*De Exil.* 602F–603A 95 n. 28
*De Exil.* 603B 95 n. 29
*De Exil.* 603C–D 95 n. 30
*De Exil.* 603D 95
*De Exil.* 603E 95 n. 31
*De Exil.* 603F 96
*De Exil.* 604B 92 n. 17, 96 n. 32
*De Exil.* 604C 10, 30, 96 nn. 33–4
*De Exil.* 604D–605B 11 n. 49, 96, 181 n. 24
*De Exil.* 604F 62
*De Exil.* 605B–C 96 n. 36, 97 n. 38
*De Exil.* 605C–D 4 n. 17, 10 n. 48, 51 n. 2, 62, 97
*De Exil.* 605D–F 97 n. 37
*De Exil.* 605F–607A 97, 175 n. 8
*De Exil.* 606C 74
*De Exil.* 607A 74–5
*De Exil.* 607B–C 98
*De Exil.* 607C 159 n. 24
*De Exil.* 607C–D 12 n. 57, 19 n. 105
*De Fac.* 943C 98 n. 40
*Dio* 11.4–7 56
*Dio* 11.5 57 n. 18
*Mor.* 138C 62
*Mor.* 345E 66 n. 51
*Prae. ger. reip.* 814D 206 n. 58
*Vit. Cat. Min.* 66.2 122 n. 31

Pollux
*Onom.* 9.157–8 2 n. 9

Polybius
12.23.7 69
12.25 d 1 57 n. 19
30.13 52 n. 5
30.32.10 53
31.23.5 53
32.1–12 52 n. 5
32.6.4 53
33.1.7 53
33.1.14 53

Propertius
1.9.15–16 171 n. 87
1.11.1 165 n. 60
1.15.2 164 n. 52
2.1.59 160 n. 30
2.1.64 160 n. 30
2.28.47 165 n. 61

Publilius
*Sent.* e.9 159 n. 24
*Sent.* u.33 6 n. 28, 15 n. 83

Quintilian
*Decl.* 366.2 3 n. 10
*Inst.* 9.2.31 187 n. 56
*Inst.* 9.4.19 169 n. 75

*Inst.* 12.10.2 164 n. 54
*Inst.* 12.11.18 171 n. 87
*Inst.* 12.11.22 15 n. 78

Rutilius Namatianus
*De Red. Suo* 1.195–6 25 n. 17

Sallust
*Cat.* 6 7 n. 36

[Sallust]
*Cic.* 7 15 n. 76

Scholia in Ap. Rhod.
3.1177–87 7 n. 33

Seneca the Elder
*Con. praef.* 10.5–7 55 n. 13

Seneca the Younger
*Ben.* 2.20 181 n. 27
*Ben.* 6.37 15 n. 83, 16 n. 85
*Dial.* 1.3.7 16 n. 85
*Dial.* 3.4 174
*Ep.* 24.4 174 n. 4
*Ep.* 67.7 174 n. 4
*Ep.* 75.1 169 nn. 75 and 80
*Ep.* 79.14 16 n. 85, 174 n. 4
*Ep.* 82.11 174 n. 4
*Ep.* 90.14 76 n. 16
*Ep.* 95.45 181 n. 27
*Ep.* 98.12 174 n. 4
*Helv.* 1–4 178, 177, 178
*Helv.* 1.1 177, 178 n. 17, 189
*Helv.* 1.2–3 177 n. 16
*Helv.* 2.2 177, 178, 178 n. 17
*Helv.* 2.4 177, 178, 178 n. 17
*Helv.* 2.5 178 n. 17
*Helv.* 3.1 178 n. 17
*Helv.* 4.1 177
*Helv.* 5–13 177
*Helv.* 5–6 177
*Helv.* 5 189
*Helv.* 5.1 179
*Helv.* 5.2 179
*Helv.* 5.5 179
*Helv.* 5.6 179
*Helv.* 6.1 179
*Helv.* 6.2 188
*Helv.* 6.2–3 3, 179
*Helv.* 6.4 179
*Helv.* 6.5 179 n. 19
*Helv.* 6.8 177
*Helv.* 7 5 n. 18
*Helv.* 7.1 179
*Helv.* 7.2 179
*Helv.* 7.5 179
*Helv.* 7.6–7 16 n. 85
*Helv.* 7.7 180
*Helv.* 7.8–10 180
*Helv.* 8.1–10.1 180
*Helv.* 8 179 n. 19
*Helv.* 8.1 179, 184
*Helv.* 8.3 189
*Helv.* 8.5 184 n. 38
*Helv.* 9 179 n. 19
*Helv.* 9.1 36 n. 51, 157 n. 11, 179 n. 19, 188
*Helv.* 9.3 188
*Helv.* 9.4–7 181
*Helv.* 9.4 11 n. 53, 121, 183
*Helv.* 9.6 121, 182, 183
*Helv.* 9.7–8 182 n. 32
*Helv.* 9.8 182–3
*Helv.* 10–12 179
*Helv.* 10.1 179
*Helv.* 10.2–11.4 180
*Helv.* 10.6–8 188
*Helv.* 11 180
*Helv.* 11.1 188
*Helv.* 13 180
*Helv.* 13.1 179, 188
*Helv.* 13.3 184 n. 40
*Helv.* 13.4 181
*Helv.* 13.6 179
*Helv.* 13.6–7 181
*Helv.* 13.8 179, 181
*Helv.* 14–19 177
*Helv.* 14 177
*Helv.* 15.1 188
*Helv.* 15.3 184 n. 37
*Helv.* 16.3 184
*Helv.* 16.5 184
*Helv.* 16.6 184
*Helv.* 16.7 184
*Helv.* 17.1 184 n. 37
*Helv.* 17.3 184
*Helv.* 18–19 178
*Helv.* 18 184
*Helv.* 19.4–5 184
*Helv.* 19.7 184
*Helv.* 20 17 n. 91, 177
*Helv.* 20.1 184
*Helv.* 20.2 184
*Her.F.* 446 165 n. 58

*Marc*. 1.2–2.5 178
*Marc*. 2–4 176 n. 14
*Marc*. 2.1 187
*Marc*. 4.3–5.6 188
*Marc*. 7.1 188
*Marc*. 9.1 188
*Marc*. 12.3 188
*Marc*. 15 176 n. 14
*Marc*. 16 178
*Marc*. 16.1 188
*Marc*. 16.3 188
*Marc*. 16.8 188
*Marc*. 17.2–5 188
*Marc*. 18.1 188
*Marc*. 18.2–8 188
*Marc*. 20.2 173
*Marc*. 22.3 173
*Marc*. 23.6 188
*Marc*. 24–6 178
*Med*. 207 ff. 158 n. 19
*Med*. 1023–4 149
*Nat*. 6.1.11 164 n. 54
*Phaed*. 440 163 n. 47
*Phoen*. 502–13 17 n. 90, 174–5
*Polyb*. 1.2 189
*Polyb*. 1.4 189
*Polyb*. 2–12 187
*Polyb*. 2.1 17 n. 90, 184–5, 190
*Polyb*. 2.2 189
*Polyb*. 2.2–7 188
*Polyb*. 3.3 189
*Polyb*. 3.4 189
*Polyb*. 3.4–5 188
*Polyb*. 4.1 189
*Polyb*. 6.4 189
*Polyb*. 6.5–8.2 187
*Polyb*. 7.4 187
*Polyb*. 8.2 186 n. 50
*Polyb*. 9.1–3 188
*Polyb*. 9.4 189
*Polyb*. 9.7 189
*Polyb*. 11.4 189
*Polyb*. 11.5 186 n. 50
*Polyb*. 12.3 187
*Polyb*. 12.5 190
*Polyb*. 13.1 188, 189, 190
*Polyb*. 13.2 190
*Polyb*. 13.3 190
*Polyb*. 13.4 188
*Polyb*. 14–17 187
*Polyb*. 14.1 187
*Polyb*. 14.2–16.3 187, 189–90
*Polyb*. 16.2 189
*Polyb*. 16.3 189
*Polyb*. 16.5 190
*Polyb*. 16.6 190
*Polyb*. 17.1 190
*Polyb*. 18.1–9 187
*Polyb*. 18.1 186 n. 50
*Polyb*. 18.3 190
*Polyb*. 18.9 17 n. 90, 18 n. 100, 179 n. 19, 191

*Thy*. 380–404 174 n. 6
*Thy*. 446–70 174
*Thy*. 754 164 n. 55

[Seneca the Younger]
*Oct*. 377–80 189 n. 59
*Oct*. 381–90 174

Servius
*A*. 3.441 132 n. 10
*A*. 6.107 132 n. 10
*A*. 8.51 132
*A*. 8.168 167 n. 71

Sidonius Apollinaris
*Carm*. 23.160–1 212 n. 12

Silius Italicus
1.42–4 142–3
1.444–6 143
2.701–3 143
3.567–9 144
3.570–629 144
7.433–4 144–5
7.487–93 145
7.557–9 145–6
10.418–21 144
10.426–48 144
11.155–258 145
13.279–81 145
13.883–5 143
15.820 164 n. 53

Solon
fr. 4.23–5 (West) 47–8
fr. 4a.3 (West) 46 n. 79
fr. 28 (West) 54 n. 10
fr. 36 (West) 9
fr. 36.8–12 (West) 48
fr. 36.13–15 (West) 48

Sophocles
*OC* 562–6 9 n. 43

*OT* 813–20 9 n. 43
fr. 350 (Radt) 93 n. 21

Statius
*Silv.* 1.2.254–5 18
*Silv.* 3.3.154–64 19, 155 n. 1
*Theb.* 1.5–6 7 n. 33
*Theb.* 1.153–4 150
*Theb.* 1.178–85 150
*Theb.* 1.184–5 150
*Theb.* 1.312 150, 151 n. 46
*Theb.* 1.401–4 152
*Theb.* 2.190 152
*Theb.* 2.392 152
*Theb.* 2.400–5 152
*Theb.* 3.71–4 150
*Theb.* 3.406 150 n. 42
*Theb.* 3.696–8 151
*Theb.* 4.77 150
*Theb.* 5.28–498 153
*Theb.* 5.499–500 153
*Theb.* 7.500–1 151
*Theb.* 8.320 234 n. 75
*Theb.* 9.49–53 152–3
*Theb.* 11.377–9 151
*Theb.* 11.503 150
*Theb.* 11.516 150
*Theb.* 11.540 150
*Theb.* 11.665–756 149
*Theb.* 11.730 149
*Theb.* 12.816–17 224 n. 46

Stobaeus
4.32A.11 p. 782 (Hense) 76 n. 18
4.44.76 p. 977 (Hense) 101 n. 52

Strabo
5.2.7 179 n. 19
6.3.2 27
13.1.38 39 n. 64
13.2.3 32, 34 n. 44
14.1.40 46 n. 78

*Suda*
π 1659 32, 39 n. 62
η 536 53
φ 4 99 n. 42

Suetonius
*Tib.* 13 11 n. 52
*Cl.* 5 171 n. 87
*Cl.* 28 186 n. 51
*Cl.* 29.1 175 n. 11
*Dom.* 10.1 55 n. 13

Synesius of Cyrene
*Aegypt.* 1.13.106A 102 n. 56
*Dio* 1.18 202

Syriscus of Chersonesus
*FGrHist* 807 68–9

Tacitus
*Ag.* 2.1 55
*Ann.* 4.21 16 n. 87
*Ann.* 4.34–6 55
*Ann.* 12.53 186
*Ann.* 12.60.6 186 n. 51
*Ann.* 14.62 175 n. 11
*Ann.* 14.63.2 175 n. 11

Teles
p. 5.2–6.1 (Hense) 101 n. 56
p. 16.4–7 (Hense) 101 n. 56
p. 21.2–23.4 (Hense) 88–9
p. 22.14 (Hense) 13 n. 62
p. 23.15–24.10 (Hense) 89
p. 23.4–15 (Hense) 89
p. 24.10–25.7 (Hense) 89
p. 25.8–13 (Hense) 89
p. 25.13–26.8 (Hense) 90
p. 26.8–15 (Hense) 90
p. 26.15–27.10 (Hense) 90
p. 27.10–29.1 (Hense) 90
p. 28.4 (Hense) 13 n. 62
p. 29.1–32.2 (Hense) 91 n. 13
p. 29.2–30.1 (Hense) 90
p. 30.1 (Hense) 90 n. 11
p. 52.2–4 (Hense) 101 n. 56

Terence
*Hau.* 85–7 14 n. 69

Tertullian
*Nat.* 2.14.4 11 n. 49

Theodulf of Orléans
*De Libris quos legere solebam* (*PLAC* 1.543), vv. 17–18 222 n. 42

Theognis
19–254 44
183 42 n. 74
188–9 42 n. 74
191 42 n. 74

209–10 9 n. 42, 44, 158
263–6 46 n. 80
332a–b 44, 158
333–4 43–4
819–20 9 n. 42
922 47 n. 83
926 47 n. 84
1135–6 157 n. 13
1197–202 42–3
1207–8 45
1209–10 45
1211–16 45
1217–20 45

THEOPOMPUS
*FGrHist* 115 T 2 56

THUCYDIDES
1.1.1 58 n. 25, 68
1.12.3 22 nn. 2–3
2.48.3 58, 59
4.104.4–5 58–9
4.106.4 59
4.107.3 38 n. 60
5.26.5 10, 51, 52, 58

TIMAEUS OF TAUROMENIUM
*FGrHist* 566 T 4a 57

TYRTAEUS
fr. 2.12–15 (West) 22 n. 2
fr. 5.7 (West) 47
fr. 6 (West) 47
fr. 7 (West) 47
fr. 10 (West) 47
fr. 10.15 (West) 47
fr. 10.1–8 (West) 46–7

VALERIUS FLACCUS
1.41–50 147
1.225–6 149
2.82–427 153
4.348–421 148
4.349–51 148
4.407–21 148
5.224–5 147
5.233–5 147
5.233–40 147
5.442–51 149
7.26–152 148
7.43–5 146
7.111–15 148
7.119–20 149

VERGIL
*A.* 1.2 129
*A.* 1.3 135
*A.* 1.242–9 131
*A.* 1.385 130
*A.* 1.437 130
*A.* 1.628–30 130
*A.* 2.602 165 n. 61
*A.* 2.637–8 130
*A.* 2.780 130
*A.* 2.798 130
*A.* 3.4–5 130, 140
*A.* 3.11–12 130, 140
*A.* 3.12 7 n. 36
*A.* 3.121–2 132
*A.* 3.167–8 129
*A.* 3.294–471 131
*A.* 3.342 165 n. 60
*A.* 3.462 163 n. 42
*A.* 3.480 163 n. 42
*A.* 4.223 163 n. 42
*A.* 4.325–6 130
*A.* 4.545–6 130
*A.* 4.669–71 131
*A.* 5.548 163 n. 42
*A.* 6.14–19 137
*A.* 6.96–7 133
*A.* 6.177 167 n. 70
*A.* 7.371–2 133
*A.* 7.650 164 n. 52
*A.* 7.789–92 133 n. 11
*A.* 7.794 133 n. 11
*A.* 8.9 131
*A.* 8.134–7 129
*A.* 8.319–25 132
*A.* 8.333–5 132
*A.* 8.483 136
*A.* 8.489–93 133
*A.* 10.51–62 144
*A.* 10.849–50 133
*A.* 10.851–2 134, 151 n. 45
*A.* 11.246–7 131
*A.* 11.252–93 131
*A.* 11.282–7 131
*A.* 11.539–43 133–4
*A.* 11.547–72 134
*A.* 12.826–37 131
*A.* 12.880 164 n. 54
*Ecl.* 1.1–5 14 n. 71

*Ecl.* 1.59–66 14 n. 71
*G.* 2.503–12 14 n. 71
*G.* 3.68 165 n. 61

[Vergil]
*Cat.* 3.7–10 14 n. 71

Walahfrid Strabo
*Carm.* 76.60–5 (*PLAC* 2.415) 216

Xenophon
*An.* 3.1.5 61 n. 36
*An.* 5.3.7 ff. 67
*An.* 5.3.7 52, 60
*An.* 5.6.15–16 67
*An.* 6.4.3–8 67
*An.* 7.7.57 60–1
*Hell.* 3.1.2 66
*Hell.* 3.2.7 67 n. 52
*Hell.* 3.5.25 59 n. 26
*Hell.* 6.4.5 59 n. 26
*Hell.* 6.5.19 61
*Hell.* 7.5.17 67 n. 52
*Mem.* 3.1 67 n. 52

Xenophanes of Colophon
fr. 3 (West) 8, 31
fr. 8 (West) 31

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